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Abstract
Successful tourism planning depends on there being effective relationships 
between central and local government, non-governmental organisations, the private 
sector and other affected parties. Inter-organisational analysis can be used to examine 
these relations. While this type of analysis is quite common in other disciplinary 
fields, its application is less usual in the field of tourism planning. Moreover, most 
such analysis in tourism has concentrated on a single spatial scale rather than on 
several scales, and the specific relationships between central and local government 
have been the subject of little sustained research. This research gap is surprising when 
the application of tourism plans often depends quite crucially on supportive central- 
local government relations.
This study examines the nature of inter-organisational relations around the 
development and implementation of a tourism development plan for Belek, a coastal 
area in Turkey's Antalya region. This case study is of an area experiencing substantial 
tourism development in a rapidly developing country with a centralised system of 
governance. The study develops a conceptual framework and seven key conceptual 
themes that are applied to tourism planning in Belek. The conceptual themes and the 
related assessment focus on inter-organisational relations, and in particular on 
relations between central and local government, in a multi-scale network that links the 
private and public sectors, non-govemmental organisations and local communities. 
There is consideration of inter-organisational communication, stakeholder 
involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter- 
organisational co-ordination, the relative roles of central and local government, and 
the potential for devolving tourism planning powers to the local area.
Various participants in Belek's tourism planning process were interviewed in 
the study order to evaluate their views about inter-organisational relations, notably 
about relations between central and local government. The strengths and weaknesses 
of the tourism administrative system were considered, together with the potential to 
change its character. It was found that the inequalities in power and resources between 
stakeholders, and their differences in interests, ideologies and values, meant that it 
was difficult for them to reach mutual agreements about tourism policies. Resource 
scarcity had actually increased conflict rather than cooperation between organisations. 
There was much distrust and other negative mutual perceptions between the relevant 
parties. The study identified numerous barriers to cooperation and coordination.
There were differing perceptions of the potential for more decentralised forms of 
administration, with various types of decentralisation also being considered, such as 
devolution, deconcentration and delegation. Many obstacles to effective 
decentralisation were noted.
The study, including the conceptual framework and conceptual themes, is 
intended to assist other tourism researchers examining inter-organisational relations, 
administrative structures, and the relative merits of centralised and decentralised 
forms of governance in other developing countries.
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Chapter 1. Research Context and Aims
1.1 Introduction
National level and local public/private organisations operating in the tourism 
environment should no longer be seen in an isolated way, since their success tends 
increasingly to be linked to their interaction with the surrounding environment. This 
includes their ability to cope with the pressures, uncertainties, and turbulences that 
frequently occur. While difficult to define and measure, the surrounding environment 
relates to other organisations and those conditions external to an organisation, which 
directly or indirectly, influence its activities, efficiency, effectiveness and behaviour. 
To Tjosvold (1986: 517), the organisational environment is crucial to the success of 
an organisation, because “interdependence pervades organisations and is fundamental 
to understanding them. Individuals within a group, work groups within departments, 
and departments within organisations all depend upon each other. Even persons who 
work independently at their own job typically require others to provide information 
and supplies to complete their work”. Organisations similarly need to obtain resources 
to accomplish their specific objectives. Typically, acquiring resources to fulfil their 
organisational objectives means that the organisation must interact with other 
organisations operating in the environment.
Planning is an interactive process undertaken in a social context, rather than a 
purely technical process of design, analysis and management (Healey 1997, cited in 
Hall 2000: 55). Thus, successful interorganisational relationships are critical to the 
implementation of development plans. The processes of formulating and 
implementing a development plan are conducted in an ever-changing environment, of 
economic, political, cultural, technological and geographical realities and events (Liu 
1994), and of a varied set of national level (central) and local organisations, each of 
which controls a variety of resources to a differing extent, including capital, 
technology, personnel and knowledge. Organisations are likely to search for an 
adequate supply of resources (authority, information, labour and money) from the 
political and economic system in order to fulfil their programme requirements, 
maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and reliable flow of resources, 
and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). While one can have the best
1
planning model in the world, the development plan will have little chance of success 
unless it is carefully tuned with existing policies and institutional arrangements for 
tourism, which may change over time. It is also necessary to understand the structural 
dimensions of the environment and the complex web of interrelations among various 
parties involved in the plan, as well as to manage the interdependencies between 
various sectors and their policies and plans (Ackoff 1974), and to envisage the 
dynamics involved in the implementation process (Hall 2000). In other words, to 
bring success in any planning initiative, the programmes and activities must be in 
keeping with the wider values, missions, principles, goals and objectives of the 
managing organisation. In addition, any development programme must be monitored 
and evaluated in terms relevant to the wider values, vision, mission, goals and 
objectives; and all relevant variables must be considered in its design (Hall and 
McArthur 1998). Successful implementation is thus closely tied to whether different 
central and local organisations involved in the development initiative interact and co­
ordinate their fragmented activities effectively so that all decisions and activities are 
consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes (Hall 1994). Building, maintaining 
and managing harmonious interorganisational relations, between central/local public 
and private organisations will depend heavily on the degree of equilibrium present 
among these organisations.
Despite relations between tourism organisations at the central and local levels 
being a key element, to date the nature and the extent to which this balance in 
relations can affect the formulation of local level tourism development plans and their 
implementation has not been examined. More specifically, the nature and extent of the 
relationships between different management tiers, their effects on tourism 
administration, and their implications for local tourism development and planning 
have attracted scant attention from researchers. Central-local relations and their 
consequences for public policy have been given much more attention in political 
science, public administration, regional and urban planning, and geography. The 
neglect of these issues for tourism in general, and tourism planning more specifically, 
is curious. Little is known in relation to tourism planning about: the costs and benefits 
of intergovernmental relationships, the reasons behind the development of 
intergovernmental relationships, or the conditions that either facilitate or inhibit 
interorganisational relationships around tourism development projects. Much more
2
empirical and qualitative work on intergovernmental co-ordination and co-operation 
is warranted.
1.2 Research context
Planning is necessary to co-ordinate and synchronise the development of the 
different sectors, to balance competing and sometimes conflicting claims on the same 
limited resource base, to maximise the positive impacts of tourism development and 
to minimise its adverse effects (Pearce 1981). While planning is taken as a requisite to 
minimise the negative effects of tourism, its formulation and implementation are 
complex processes that are fraught with difficulties. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes 
“no matter how thorough the initial preparation and how comprehensive the scope of 
the plan, it is unlikely that planners will envisage all eventualities in implementation 
of changing exogenous conditions, which may necessitate modifications to the 
original goals and strategies”. This is especially likely to be the case with newly 
emerging tourist destinations, particularly in the developing world where the capacity 
for implementation may be largely untested (Pearce 2000). In less developed 
countries the resources may be scarcer (Morah 1996), the planning process may lack 
pluralism, democracy and the involvement of key local community institutions (Bums 
1999), public participation maybe viewed as unnecessary, unwieldy, time consuming 
and an idealistic dream (Haywood 1988), the tourism development planning may not 
be backed by appropriate tourism-related legislation and regulations (WTO 1993), the 
implementing bodies may be weak or yet to acquire years of experience (Morah
1996), and there may be limited authority because the implementing officials often 
have different goals to those of the initiators (Morah 1996). In addition, in the context 
of less developed nations the uncertainties existing in the political and socio­
economic environment may be high (Morah 1996; Tosun 2000), powerful 
bureaucracies may dominate the legislative and operational processes (Tosun 2000), 
high staff turnover, due to political interference, may undermine organisational 
morale, and the central administrative tutelage may curb the capabilities and 
willingness of local government (Tosun 2000). Further, there may be hostility among 
the population toward tourism development because of such potential problems as: 
increasing crime, segregation of locals from tourists, overcrowding and overloading 
(Brohman 1996), the success of tourism development may be measured only in terms 
of increasing tourist numbers and revenues and not host satisfaction (Brohman 1996),
3
organised and powerful business interests may become power centres that serve their 
own self interests at the expense of indigenous people, and a strong local planning 
authority may be absent (Tosun 2000).
The outcome of plan formulation and implementation processes may be 
affected adversely by the existence or absence of a number of other factors. They 
include: (1) a lack of incentives to co-operate and the existence of various blocks to 
collective action, (2) a vagueness about the proposed goals, (3) a lack of crucial 
information about goals, means and actors, (4) an absence of important actors, but the 
inclusion of other actors that may discourage participation by the necessary actors, 
and (5) an absence of commitment from some actors. In addition, tourism planning 
may be negatively impacted because of the (6) main characteristics of a centralised 
approach to tourism management, which might include coercive decision-making, 
ambiguous balances between responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy, 
limited participation in decision-making, and uneven power relations (Syrett 1997).
Plan implementation may also suffer from a misuse of resources, a lack of 
accountability, non-transparency in decision-making, excessive rules and regulations, 
priorities set which are inconsistent with appropriate development, a high degree of 
concentration of political power, and incompetent administration. All stakeholders 
may not be on an equal footing at the planning table, and not all participants may 
work co-operatively to achieve common goals. Finally, some stakeholders might be 
unwilling to share their entrenched power (Williams et al 1998). An alternative form 
of management, that of decentralisation, has been suggested in order to overcome the 
potential problems of centralised tourism planning. The concept of decentralisation 
basically implies the transference of power from central government to local 
government. It has received growing support from researchers as a means for 
achieving improved implementation outcomes. However, the application of this type 
of administrative system, particularly in developing countries seems to be problematic 
too, which raises questions about the suitability of this approach. While tourism 
authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of tourism 
administration, there is no information readily available to guide them in this 
transition. The question remains unexplored as to whether decentralised 
administration can be applied to developing countries due to their different
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institutional and constitutional contexts. There is also limited understanding of 
whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) perspectives on planning 
and management are likely to be more or less effective in handling the complex 
interactions between various parties with differing perceptions, preferences and 
strategies. The decentralisation concept supports the retreat of central government 
from the public domain, but at the same time central government is urged to give 
more attention to the problems of local organisations, to provide them with more 
resources, and to co-ordinate the system as a whole. Thus, one could dispute the 
extent to which decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to the centralist 
model. It seems that whatever approach is adopted, there is a need for greater 
understanding of relations between the multiple actors involved in plan formulation 
and implementation, as well as of their interdependencies, and also of the way in 
which these interdependencies influence management processes (Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997).
According to Costa (1996), the success of tourism programmes may depend 
on the improvement of four elements. First, there is a need to improve the way in 
which the planning and development process is carried out (the procedural 
component). Second, there is the need to pay more attention to the organisational 
framework in which planning is undertaken (the administrative component), since this 
strongly effects the effectiveness of planning activity. In this context the 
organisational structure of tourism administration and the legislation and regulations 
for tourism development are important considerations. Third, there is a need for 
governments to pay more attention to local level administration, since the success of 
the planning activity and the profitability of the tourism industry increasingly depend 
on the effectiveness of planning and on the co-ordination delivered locally (the local 
component). Fourth, account needs to be taken of the potential role of developing 
networks to improve tourism planning and the co-ordination of the tourism sector (the 
network component).
Co-ordination and co-operation between tourism organisations at different 
spatial scales is imperative in order to formulate and implement effective local 
tourism development plans. The multiplicity of agencies involved in the tourism 
planning process is well known. It is thus necessary to understand the dynamics of the
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interactions (co-ordination, co-operation and conflict) between institutions and 
stakeholders in order to promote a successful outcome (Jamal and Getz 1995). 
Because society is more complex, and the economy more interdependent, 
organisations nowadays find it difficult to act unilaterally to achieve their objectives 
(Selin 2000). Rapid innovations in technology, global interdependence, and the 
blurring of boundaries between government, industry and the voluntary sector have 
given rise to a diverse array of collective responses to gain access to new technologies 
or spread the cost of marketing innovation over several parties (Selin 1993). Because 
no one business or government agency can operate in isolation (Gunn 1988), it is 
obvious that co-operation and co-ordination between government agencies are 
essential if tourism is to operate smoothly (Timothy 2000). Private-public sector 
initiatives are considered vital as the public sector depends on private investors to 
provide services and to finance the construction of tourist facilities. By the same 
token, private tourism projects require government approval, support and 
infrastructure development (Timothy 2000). Co-ordinated effort between agencies at 
different governmental tiers (central and local) may decrease misunderstandings and 
conflicts related to overlapping goals and missions. They may help eliminate 
redundancy resulting from parallel or duplicate research and development projects by 
different agencies (Timothy 2000). Co-ordination both within and between the 
different levels of government tends to improve efficiency in time and money 
(Timothy 1998) by eliminating overlapping services and duplication of resources 
(Hall 1994).
Organisations taking part in the formulation or implementation of tourism 
plans should be taken as more or less interdependent stakeholders, involved in 
medium to long-term relationships. Each organisation is likely to interact with others 
in order to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement, since no 
organisation can possess or generate independently all the necessary resources (Klinj
1997). The inevitability of needing to secure inputs, to disperse outputs and of 
attempts to regulate, inextricably links the members of any focal organisation with the 
members of its environment (Dawson 1986). The nature of these interorganisational 
interactions is likely to be influenced by the structural dimensions of the environment, 
including the degree of concentration or dispersal of resources, power and of 
autonomy or dependence (Pearce 1992). The power to formulate and implement
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policies between the national and local levels of public sector tourist organisations is 
likely to influence the balance in relations, which in turn will affect the practice of 
local level tourism planning. The external regulations will shape the nature of 
relationships, which may take the form of either formally established laws, rules, and 
procedures, or the attitudes and values of the organisation (Dawson 1986). The 
political culture of the country, its general economic condition, and broader 
government policies will also determine plan outcomes by laying the foundation for 
the nature of the relations between different levels of governmental agencies, 
including their interdependencies, strategic perspectives, and problem solving 
capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992). The relationships between central and local 
organisations and the context within which they develop and operate can be 
conceptualised as a multi-scale network which links national, provincial and local 
scales of operation and which is set within a broader socio-economic and political 
system. Thus, it is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism environment, 
the patterns of relations among interdependent parties involved in plan formulation 
and implementation, and the factors determining these relationship patterns.
Given the limited level of attention that this subject has attracted from tourism 
scholars, this research assesses inter-organisational relationships, and notably central- 
local government relations, in tourism planning in a multi-scale tourism development 
network. It does this in the specific context of tourism development in Belek, a 
rapidly expanding tourist resort in Antalya, Turkey. An assessment is made of central- 
local relations in the multi-scale network that links the public, private and voluntary 
sectors and the national, provincial and local spatial scales, relevant to tourism 
development in Belek. The approach taken to this study of central-local relations in 
Belek stresses the structural dimensions of the environment, including the 
constitutional, institutional, and operational arrangements, the power relations and 
patterns of resource dependency, as well as the processes of communication, resource 
exchange, and of co-ordination. Particular attention is paid to the rules and procedures 
that apply across the range of state institutions that influence tourism planning in 
Turkey’s municipalities. Assessment is made of the boundaries to the actions of 
public officials and to the discretion they exercise. The balance of power between 
central and local institutions is considered in relation to their statutory and 
discretionary authority, financial resources, expertise, and their human resources.
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Attention is paid to the degree of co-ordination or fragmentation between central and 
local tiers and between actors and agencies at the same level in the hierarchy. 
Fragmentation can be a considerable obstacle to effective tourism planning. For 
example, overlapping responsibilities, bureaucracy and fragmentation among 
government departments and public authorities have been identified as major 
shortcomings in tourism planning in Pamukkale, Turkey (Yuksel, Bramwell and 
Yuksel, 1999). Finally, decentralisation processes are examined in relation to the 
balance of power between the upper and lower tiers of government.
1.3 Research aims and objectives
Tourism researchers have paid limited attention to administrative systems and 
their impact on plan formulation and implementation processes. The main thrust of 
this present research is to explore the nature and the extent of influence of centralised 
and localised administration on the development and implementation of a tourism 
development plan. Focusing on the Belek Development Initiative in Turkey, this 
study focuses primarily on (1) the elements of the present organisational environment 
in which planning is undertaken, (2) the ways in which the planning and 
implementation process is carried out, (3) the areas of interdependency and exchange 
of resources among agencies involved in the decision-making process concerning 
tourism development, and (4) the elements that either facilitate or inhibit the building 
and management of interorganisational relationships formed among the public and 
private sector organisations. Further, this study sets out to provide insights into (5) 
whether the use of alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, could 
help to enhance the management of tourism at the local level.
Hence, this research has four overall objectives.
1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational 
relations in tourism planning, including between central and local 
government. This includes consideration of tourism planning issues in 
Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and 
consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter­
organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, 
and the delegation of power. The framework will draw on an extensive 
critical review of relevant literature.
2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case 
study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country 
with a centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a 
major tourism development initiative.
3. To evaluate the patterns and processes, and strengths and weaknesses of 
inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the 
identified conceptual themes.
4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in 
relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on 
the potential to change its character.
1.4 A synopsis of the conceptual framework and methodology
A conceptual framework was developed to ascertain inter-organisational 
relations, and notably central-local relations, within the tourism planning context, 
with specific reference to the Belek Management Plan but also with wider potential 
applicability. This framework draws on and integrates existing research literature on 
public administration, tourism planning and decentralisation, and also on systems, 
inter-organisational relations and network theories. Within the literature, four main 
types of influence can be identified which affect central-local relations in tourism 
management, including the formulation and implementation of local tourism 
development plans. These are the environmental context, the administrative 
structures, the geographical scales of the administrative structures, and the nature of 
the interorganisational interaction. Each of these influences can then be broken down 
into related elements which can affect central-local relations in tourism management 
and planning. The framework is based on the premise that central-local relationships 
should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. The linkages are multiple, 
and arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources 
and powers. These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, 
financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). 
The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and tourism 
plan development and implementation depend on interactions between organisations 
at national, provincial and local levels. It also helps to evaluate how these 
organisations relate to their surrounding environment. More specifically, the
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framework can help to examine the character of a centralist approach, where a few 
central actors bring about policy proposals on their own, and of a localist approach, 
where local capacities and suggestions are prominent. The framework recognises that 
the collective action by actors at all geographical scales can play a central part in 
tourism policy-making and implementation. Seven conceptual themes used in the 
study were developed from the study's conceptual framework. These themes were 
planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder 
involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter­
organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the 
delegation of power.
The Belek case study was conducted using interviews with representatives 
who had participated in the formulation and implementation of the Belek 
Management Plan, with the research consisting of four interrelated phases. These are: >
desk research, preliminary site visits, a pilot study, and a main field visit phase. First, I
an extensive desk consultation was undertaken of secondary data about Belek and of 
published information about tourism administration, planning and implementation in 
the area. This built up background information about the case study area. The desk 
research was consolidated through preliminary site visits prior to the main field visit. j
The preliminary visits were helpful to identify and make initial contact with potential i
informants. From the early informants the researcher acquired information about other 
informants who were interviewed in the main field visit phase. The site visits assisted 
in several other ways. For example, they helped to familiarise the researcher with the 
case study area (which facilitated a more effective use of the field research time), to 
build a rapport with some key informants (who continued to provide indispensable 
information about the case study during the preliminary site visits and the main field 
work), and to gain insights into how the research should be conducted in practical 
terms. These two preparatory phases, as well as consultations with the research 
supervisors and fellow researchers provided background for the pilot phase. This 
phase assessed the adequacy of the methods to be used in the research, notably of the 
semi-structured interviews and of the questions they contain. Revisions were made to 
the interview questions based on the responses and reactions of respondents. After 
the careful translation of the interview questions (from English to Turkish and from 
Turkish to English by bilinguals), the interviews were conducted with selected
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participants in two phases. The resulting qualitative information was transcribed, 
coded and analysed. In order to reduce “ researcher bias” and to achieve a form of 
triangulation, the elicitation of themes and categories from the data was undertaken by 
the researcher and one other independent researcher. The data was then analysed 
using a computer software programme designed for the qualitative analysis of 
interview transcripts (NUD.IST). Finally, the findings were evaluated in the light of 
previous research studies.
1.5 Study area and background information
The relationships between central and local government tiers and their 
implications for tourism development and tourism plan implementation are 
examined in the Belek region, a rapidly growing tourist destination in Antalya, 
Turkey (Figure 1.1). This region was chosen as the study area for several reasons. 
These include: a growing national concern to reverse environmental degradation in 
the area; the complex interorganisational relations between multiple actors involved 
in the area’s tourism planning; the delegation of some national powers to a private 
organisation in the area; and concerns about the potentially negative impact of 
present institutional arrangements on the implementation of the area’s tourism 
plans.
Figure 1.1 Belek’s location
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Belek is a coastal area with important habitats for varied endemic plants and 
animals. It is located 30 km east of Antalya. It forms a coastal strip of 23 km 
surrounded by umbrella pine forests (Temimhan, 1999). The region lies between the 
Aksu and the Acisu rivers (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2 Map of Belek
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There are four settlements: Belek, Kadriye, Karadayi, and Kumkoy. Until 
1993, these were villages in Serik municipality, but since then Kadriye, Belek and 
Karadayi were reorganised as municipalities (Adaman, 1995). Only Kumkoy is still a 
village, being located within Serik municipality. Fishing, agriculture, transportation 
and trading are important local sources of employment. The inclination to work in 
tourism enterprises is quite low in Belek and Kadriye, and hardly exists at all in 
Kumkoy. There are very few workers with high educational qualifications in these 
towns (DHKD 1998). Additionally, as the residents of Belek and Kadriye make a 
fairly good living from agriculture, they are not enthusiastic to abandon farming 
unless tourism offers a clearly better source of income. Because of these
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circumstances, most well-qualified tourism staff originate from areas other than Belek 
and Kadriye (DHKD 1998).
In the late 1980s the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) designated Belek as a 
Tourism Investment Area (TIA). Based on the Tourism Encouragement Law of 1982, 
and to promote tourism development, central government leased land in the area to 
tourism investors for forty-nine years. The region boasts many tourist attractions and 
activities, including river rafting, mountain trekking, historical sites and marine turtle 
breeding grounds. It has plenty of spring water, a broad sand dune system with 
attractive forests, and parts of the area produce high quality agricultural products. 
Scientists refer to Belek as one of the last major nesting grounds of the marine turtle. 
In 1995, Belek was designated as a Specially Protected Area (SPA), owing to its 
unique environmental and wildlife features.
Intensive tourism investment aimed at immediate financial returns has led to 
an increase in the area’s bed capacity. At present, there are 26 first class holiday 
villages, 15 five star hotels and 4 golf clubs in Belek’s Tourism Centre. The Centre is 
geared to accommodate up to 28, 000 tourist beds (Temimhan 1999). A parallel 
increase in environmental degradation has been observed. Growth in the number of 
hotels particularly threatens the area’s most fragile and unstable zones, such as the 
beaches, sand dunes, and watercourses. A new road running between the low inland 
flatlands and the coastal dunes acts as a dam that prevents natural drainage and 
produces heavy winter floods. Water pollution from untreated sewage from tourist 
accommodation has a detrimental impact on the aquatic life, and the use of speedboats 
threatens the marine turtles. Intensive development has taken place, and it is 
suggested that the local inhabitants feel somewhat alienated and discontented in 
relation to the tourism development as they have been insufficiently integrated into 
the development process (DHKD, 1995).
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Figure 1.3 Overall view of Belek
In order to reduce Belek’s environmental problems, the Belek Management 
Plan (BMP) was designed in 1995 by specialists in planning, geomorphology, civil 
engineering, marine and land-based ecology, sociology, economics, tourism, public 
awareness and education, local community organisations, institutional participation 
and legislation. The BMP was also developed based on research involving a 
document and bibliographical search and interviews carried out in the Belek and Serik 
region. The BMP aims at "making human uses compatible with the environment, 
reducing the unnecessary impact of tourist and other human activities, while 
enhancing the beauties and values of Belek and improving socio-economic conditions 
in the region" (DHKD, 1995: 15).
The plan was designed to address several issues, including land use planning, 
tourist activities, the use of the beaches and forests, water quality, urban development, 
nature conservation, the protection of sea turtles, landscape maintenance, the 
diversification of economic activities, community participation in development, 
training, and also building consensus about policy aims, institutional arrangements 
and legal enforcement. The BMP provides guidelines for decision-makers at the 
national and local levels in relation to the sustainable use of the coastal ecosystem, 
and, unlike many other tourism plans, it recommends an institutional framework for 
implementation.
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The plan’s implementation relies on co-ordinated effort by various actors, 
including central government ministries, local authorities, tourism investors and local 
residents. However, at present the co-operation between central and local government 
organisations in relation to the plan is very limited and there is some local resentment 
toward central government as it is felt that decision-making has not sufficiently taken 
into consideration the views of Belek residents (DHKD, 1995). There is evidence of 
serious tensions between central and local government in the region, as well as 
between organisations in the public and private sectors. These tensions appear to 
result from legislative confusion, the coercion from centrally imposed decisions, 
ambiguities over responsibilities and autonomy, and the delegation of some central 
powers to a private sector organisation (Betuyab) formed by tourism investors in the 
area.
The Investors Organisation (Betuyab) was established through the support of 
the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and it attained shareholder status in 1990. Its prime 
goal is to assist the MoT to supervise and fund investment in tourism infrastructure, 
but it has become a focus for local residents’ resentment. Although Betuyab plays an 
intermediary role between central government and the region, it is perceived by locals 
to be a counterpart of central government. Betuyab has taken over the enforcement of 
tourism development rules and standards and it aims to create a “model international 
resort ” to be emulated by other Mediterranean countries. Betuyab is portrayed as an 
environmentally friendly association by such central government organisations as the 
MoT and the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and some international organisations 
concerned with environmental protection (Betuyab 1999). The production of 
awareness-raising studies and publication of books publicising Belek’s unique natural 
environment illustrate Betuyab’s aspirations to be perceived as one of Turkey’s most 
environmentally sensitive organisations. The organisation of bird watching, ecology 
and culture tours, together with the efforts to protect and present the marine turtles, 
also promote Betuyab’s desired image.
Betuyab was “highly endorsed” as an environmental agency in 1999 in an 
international tourism and environment competition sponsored by British Airways, the 
“Tourism for Tomorrow Awards”. Environmental projects at the Belek Tourism
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Centre were also awarded a prize in a United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs competition. Finally, Belek’s beaches have been awarded Blue Flags. 
Betuyab appears to have realised that by presenting aspects of eco-tourism and 
environmental preservation, this might give them a national and international 
competitive advantage (Betuyab 1999).
Locals criticise Betuyab for being run by investors who are mainly from 
Istanbul and Ankara and who largely prioritise short-term profitability, and also for its 
limited commercial linkages and business transactions with local population (DHKD 
1995). Despite the existence of local government, Betuyab exercises many of the 
powers of local government in the Belek coastal region. This organisation derives its 
power from its financial strength, which is the main reason for its recognition, and it 
provides diverse public services and infrastructure in the area. At present, there is a 
lack of co-ordination of activities and of co-operation between Betuyab and local 
government. Although important decisions may be taken in relation to the region’s 
future, the local authorities do not attend the meetings organised by Betuyab where 
these decisions are made (DHKD 1995). This non-participation exemplifies the 
tensions between the local authorities and Betuyab. However, the local authorities had 
previously provided unspoken support for the delegation of power and authority in the 
Belek region to Betuyab. Subsequently, they have stressed that Betuyab should limit 
its activities to its real function, that is the protection of the interests of the tourist 
investors in the association (Soybay 1995). For the local government authorities the 
tourist investors exert economic, political and other forms of power that they feel 
powerless to counteract (Soybay 1995). The provision of security and infra-structural 
services such as roads and sewage systems by Betuyab instead of the municipalities, 
also illustrates the financial weakness of the region’s local government.
There are also conflicts of authority among the local government authorities 
and between local government and central government. Until 1990, Belek was part of 
the Serik Municipality, which included Kadriye village. When the population of 
Kadriye exceeded 2000 it gained Municipality status, but it has experienced urban 
disorganisation due to the inexperience of the officials involved in urban development 
and due to clientelism (Adaman 1995). Belek also suffers from legislative confusion, 
with at least ten laws significantly related to environmental issues in Belek, and which
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consequently influence tourism. These are: the National Parks Law, the Law for 
Protection of Cultural and Natural Wealth, the Law for the Protection of Coastal 
Zones, the Construction Law, the Municipalities Law, the Law for the Protection of 
General Health, the Law for the Encouragement of Tourism, the Law of Forestry, the 
Law of Aquatic Products, and the Decree Concerning the Usage of Agricultural 
Lands. In addition, although the Turkish Constitution of 1982 and subsequent 
legislation provides mainly legal guidelines for land-use planning and environmental 
protection, notably in coastal areas, they are not applied consistently.
The range of institutions involved in tourism related issues in Belek add to the 
difficulties of plan implementation. At the ministerial level, these include the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Village Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement, 
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Tourism, 
the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the 
Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Forestry. The Ministry of Public Works and 
Resettlement (PWR) is responsible for planning urban development and infrastructure 
in relation to tourism, such as the construction of roads. The (PWR) fulfils its 
functions by means of the delegation of powers from other ministries. The Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), formed in 1991, aims to protect and improve the environment in 
general, to use natural resources in rural and urban areas in an efficient way, and to 
prevent pollution. Based on the Tourism Incentive Law of 1982, coastal zone 
planning and management are largely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Tourism ( MOT). It is claimed that this Ministry has full ownership of several coastal 
areas under its authority, either through the transfer of government lands via the 
Treasury or through expropriation. This ministerial arrangement removes the 
authority and responsibility of municipalities in coastal areas to determine the 
planning, development and management of their urban areas. As well as the potential 
conflicts between relevant central government ministries and between local and 
central government, the fact that the Belek coastal zone remains within the borders of 
the Serik and Kadriye Municipalities also results in conflicts between these two 
authorities.
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1.6 The organisation of the thesis
The thesis has been organised into nine chapters. Extensive literature reviews 
are provided in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five. Chapter Two, the first literature 
review chapter focuses on the notion of tourism planning. Following an historical 
review of the evolution of planning, a detailed consideration is given to four major 
factors prompting failure at the implementation phase of development initiatives. 
Chapter Three considers why organisations need to interact, and it explains the 
notions of systems, interorganisational theory and network theory. Two approaches 
used to evaluate interorganisational relations are presented, along with their 
limitations. Four major variables affecting the nature and the extent of 
interorganisational relations are discussed. Chapter Four deals with the concepts of 
co-ordination, co-operation and partnership. These forms of relationships can assist 
central and local organisations to decrease their mutual misunderstandings and 
conflicts. A number of influences that facilitate or obstruct interorganisational co­
ordination, co-operation and partnership are discussed. Chapter Five examines the 
benefits of decentralisation, and whether decentralisation can be a successful 
alternative approach to plan implementation.
Chapter Six introduces Turkey’s public administration system and its 
implications for tourism development. More specifically, this chapter examines how 
Turkey’s tourism administration has changed over the past five decades, as well as the 
structural problems faced by this administrative system. The conceptual framework 
and the research methodology are presented in Chapter Seven. This chapter explains, 
first, the reasons why a case study approach was employed. The next section focuses 
on two potential methods to use in interorganisational relations research, those being 
the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. Their strengths and limitations are 
touched on, and the preference in this study for a semi-structured and two-phased 
interview technique is justified, including support found in other studies. The phases 
followed in the development and implementation of the main research are presented 
next. The analytical framework employed is explained, together with a justification of 
the involvement of another independent researcher in the analysis. Finally, the 
practical difficulties encountered in the course of the research, and the limitations 
regarding the research findings are discussed.
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Due to the broad scope of the findings, the chapter presenting and discussing the 
results (Chapter Eight) is organised into seven interrelated sections: Planning issues in 
Belek, Inter-organisational communication, Stakeholder involvement and Consensus 
Building, Resource Sufficiency and Exchange, Inter-organisational Co-ordination, 
Roles and Activities of Organisations, and Delegation of Power. In each section, the 
findings are discussed in the light of results in previous studies. The first section 
identifies factors that respondents considered affect tourism development in the 
region. Many comments corroborated the propositions in the literature that the 
political, legislative, institutional and economic environment, together with local 
conditions, have important implications for tourism planning. The next section 
presents a number of structural and situational factors identified in the study that 
facilitated or obstructed effective communication between central and local 
organisations in Belek. The next section attempts to explain what the stakeholders 
involved in the BMP thought about the decision-making process, notably whether 
they felt able to raise their concerns and whether they considered their concerns were 
incorporated satisfactorily in the decisions. The fourth section compares respondents’ 
views about the adequacy of the organisational resources held by different parties 
involved in the. BMP, including their financial, legal, informational and political 
power. The subsequent section examines the extent of co-ordination and co-operation 
between parties involved in the BMP, and considers the influences on, and barriers to 
co-ordination and co-operation. The next section presents the perceptions of 
respondents about the responsibilities, competence, and performance of their own and 
of other organisations. The last section (Section Seven) examines the forms of 
decentralisation that stakeholders from different public, private and non-governmental 
organisations might consider suitable, if any.
Finally, Chapter Nine, the conclusion chapter, provides a summary of the major 
research findings, their implications for Belek and for other academic researchers, and 
it proposes new avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2. Tourism Planning
2.1 Introduction
A review of appropriate literature is undertaken in the next five chapters in order 
to identify useful concepts and gaps in research, to appropriately conceptualise the 
research within the existing knowledge, and subsequently to construct the study's 
conceptual framework. Understanding what has been learned in previous studies and the 
research gaps is needed so that the present Belek case study can fill selected research 
gaps and can draw on the concepts and conceptual frameworks identified. In the paucity 
of prior attempts to integrate the interorganisational relations, and notably central-local 
relations, literature into tourism planning, the intent of this review is to provide an 
insightful view of several factors germane to the development and management of 
interorganisational relations in the context of local tourism planning. More specifically, 
based on their relevance, (1) tourism planning and conditions under which tourism plans 
are likely to fail; (2) power and network relations within varied environment sets and 
organisational strategies employed; (3) different interorganisational relationship forms, 
such as co-ordination, co-operation and partnership, and their causes and consequences;
(4) strengths and limitations of the decentralisation concept; and (5) evolution of the 
tourism industry and administrative structure of Turkey are evaluated to provide 
sufficient background information to the research.
The review of theoretical literature is divided into four inter-connected sections 
due to the scope of the pertinent issues. This first section looks at issues in tourism 
planning. Compared to the extent of attention given to the formulation phase of tourism 
development plans, the implementation phase has received scant attention. Numerous 
planning paradigms, with slightly different considerations, have been proposed to guide 
stakeholders involved in tourism plan formulation. But, despite the clear guidelines and 
goodwill that stakeholders have at the formulation phase, the majority of tourism plans 
either fall short of the ideal or are never initiated. Following an historical review of 
planning approaches, this chapter critically reviews factors that can inhibit successful 
plan implementation. More specifically, there is discussion of the effects of top down
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management, as well as consideration of organisational interdependence, the distribution 
of power, and the extent of co-ordination and co-operation. Awareness of these factors 
should not be taken as potentially overcoming all of the problems that may arise. Rather, 
it should constitute a framework for the pre-planning of a participatory strategy or for its 
alteration during implementation.
2.2 Tourism planning
Planning is a vital approach to guide future tourism development rather than just 
letting things happen (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Murphy 1985). It is “the direction and 
co-ordination of relations in the expansion of the social production capacity”(Ceslajas 
1989: 34) and the linkage between knowledge and organised action. It has been 
described as “a process of formulating goals and agreeing the manner in which these are 
to be met. It is a process by which agreement is reached on the ways in which problems 
are to be debated and resolved” (Cullingsworth 1997: 25). Tourism planning is 
concerned with anticipating and regulating change in a system to promote orderly 
development so as to increase the social, economic, and environmental benefits of 
tourism development (Murphy 1985). It is a decision-making process aiming to guide 
future tourism development actions and solve future problems (Harssel 1994).
Proper planning “brings the advantages of tourism to the society and reduces its 
disadvantages. Appropriate and comprehensive planning of physical, legal, promotional, 
financial, economic, market, management, social, and environmental issues will help 
deliver the benefits of tourism development” (McIntosh et al 1995: 335). Similarly, 
Pearce (1981) suggests that planning is necessary to co-ordinate and synchronise the 
development of the different sectors, to balance competing and sometimes conflicting 
claims on the same limited resource base, as well as to maximise the positive impacts of 
tourism and to minimise its adverse effects. Three conditions need to be met for 
successful planning initiatives (Hall and McArthur 1998). These are: the programmes 
and activities must be in keeping with the wider values, missions, and objectives of the 
managing organisation; they must be monitored and evaluated in terms relevant to the 
wider values, vision, and objectives; and all relevant variables must be considered in 
their design. Hall (2000) notes that even the best planning model is of little practical
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value unless there is the capacity to operate it, which may involve arguing the case to 
politicians and those to whom they are responsible.
2.2.1 Tourism planning approaches
Many tourism planning scholars contend that tourism has developed as an 
unplanned activity during the last four or five decades in most areas of the world 
(Inskeep 1991). Tosun and Jenkins (1996) argue that until the 1960s tourism 
development planning was not prepared at all systematically. According to Murphy
(1985), tourism planning has developed from a site-oriented and physical emphasis to a 
more regional and systems approach. In the course of its evolution, tourism planning has 
changed somewhat (Gravel 1979; Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Murphy 1985; Pearce
1981). The early considerations in tourism planning were the economic or physical 
aspects associated with particular projects. In the early years of the concept, tourism 
planning was an isolated and site-specific venture, with no or little concern about 
possible spin-off effects on adjacent areas or environments. Early tourism plans tended 
to focus on a specific site, with little effort to assess the wider implications (a non­
integrated approach) (Gravel 1979). This period was followed by a more “integrated 
approach” whereby tourism planning began to recognise the wider regional and 
environmental context.
Tosun and Jenkins (1996) note six different tourism planning approaches. These
are a sustainable development approach, a systems approach, a community approach, an
integrated planning approach, a comprehensive planning approach, and a continuous and
flexible approach. The WTO (1998) divides approaches to tourism planning into six
quite similar categories: a continuous and flexible approach, a comprehensive approach,
an integrated approach, an environmental and sustainable approach, a community-based
approach, and a strategic approach. Hudson (1979) provides five categories, namely
rational comprehensive planning or synoptic planning, incremental planning, transactive
planning, advocacy planning, and radical planning (SITAR). According to Getz (1987),
approaches to tourism planning can be broken down into four categories. These are:
boosterism; an economic industry-orientated approach; a physical/spatial approach; and
a community-orientated approach. A review of these and other typologies demonstrates
that the tourism planning approaches have taken many forms, and while they are
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labelled differently, the differences between the typologies are quite subtle. Each of the 
planning traditions that scholars have proposed can be considered to be relatively 
internally consistent, with self-reinforcing networks of methods, professional skills and 
working styles. They are now considered in more detail, within six categories.
2.2.1.1 Comprehensive planning. Rational comprehensive planning 
serves as the centrepiece in the classification scheme proposed by Hudson (1979). This 
approach is the point of departure for most other planning approaches and it has four 
elements: goal setting, identification of policy alternatives, evaluation of means against 
ends, and implementation of decisions. This approach looks at problems from a systems 
viewpoint. Comprehensive planning can be reflected in the form of master plans.
2.2.1.2 Incremental planning. Many previous master plans failed due to 
their rigidity in the face of rapidly changing socio-cultural factors and other conditions, 
and this taught planners the lesson that planning is an ongoing process (Baud-Bovy 
1982) and that it should be flexible in order to cope with changing conditions. 
O’Donovan (1998) terms this a process approach. Gravel (1979) labels this form of 
planning as systems planning, where the process is a continual one aimed at partial 
development, constant monitoring and revision. This means that “the scope of the plan 
can evolve over time and such flexibility will enable it to adjust to changing 
circumstances, producing long term results which are more complete and of superior 
quality than a series of master plans” (Murphy 1985: 160). In this approach, planning is 
incremental with continuous monitoring and feedback based on the effects of previous 
development and the evaluation of new trends, both of which may influence decision­
making in the next development stage (Inskeep 1991).
2.2.1.3 Interactive planning. Gunn (1994) argues that tourism planning
has become more interactive. While conventional planning of the past included some
interactions and a little consultation, this was usually very limited (Gunn 1994). By
contrast, interactive planning incorporates information collected through consultation,
negotiation and feedback. Interactive planning also involves interactions that occur early
on and throughout the planning process, and with the full range of stakeholders. With
conventional planning the affected parties are not involved until late in the process, if  at
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all. Interactive planning assumes that open participation leads to better decisions, 
whereas conventional planning assumes that better information leads to better decisions. 
The fundamental distinction between conventional and interactive planning is that 
interactive planning is based on “what we agree to do”, while conventional planning is 
based on “ what we should do”.
Interactive planning suggests that better results can be achieved by means of a 
participatory process, even though it is likely to be more difficult (Inskeep 1991). This 
shift in emphasis does not necessarily mean that the expertise of professional planners is 
abandoned. Rather it signifies that many other constituencies other than planners have 
experiences, opinions and constructive recommendations. Hence, if all stakeholders are 
involved, then the decisions have a better chance of being implemented (Gunn 1994). 
Lang (1988: 90) depicts this as a “learning adaptive model of planning”, and he 
comments that it is capable of fulfilling two important needs: to create a sense of 
community which may then motivate actors to seek new forms of collaborative action, 
and to build capability in order to respond effectively to changes and to generate change 
when that becomes necessary.
2.2.1.4 Integrated planning. This approach recognises that planning of a
specific project calls for inputs from different sectors, agencies or disciplines (Tosun and
Jenkins 1996). With integrated planning, the tourism sector is integrated into the overall
development policies and plans of the area, and local plans are integrated into the
national and regional tourism plans. It is an interactive or collaborative approach, which
requires participation and interaction between the various levels of an organisation or
unit of governance and between the responsible organisation and the stakeholders in the
planning process (Hall and McArthurl998). Integrated planning recognises that tourism
involves people as well as places, and planning a facility in harmony with its
environment is only part of the success story (Murphy 1985). Inskeep (1991: 27)
suggests that "in order to achieve effective development patterns and not to generate
serious environmental or social problems, all aspects of the area or development sector
being planned must be understood and carefully integrated, and the environmental and
social implications of development taken into account". Pearce (1981: 64) states that
“problems arise and costs are increased when the different sectors of the tourism
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industry do not develop harmoniously or when the motives and capabilities of different 
development agents conflict”.
2.2.1.5 Sustainable planning. The sustainable development approach
seeks to ensure that developments take place in such a manner that future generations 
are not left worse off (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). Tourism is planned in an 
environmentally sensitive manner so that its natural and cultural resources are 
conserved, it does not generate serious adverse environmental or socio-cultural impacts, 
the benefits of tourism are widely spread in society, and tourist satisfaction levels are 
sustained (WTO 1998). Pearce (1981) suggests that sustainable tourism development 
facilitates culture exchange rather than culture shock. It ensures forms of tourism which 
do not destroy the host environment and last for a long time with proportionately greater 
economic benefits. This approach involves a long-term goal of sustaining the three 
elements of the host areas, the holidaymakers, and the tourism operators (Davidson 
1991; Eber 1992). An important feature of sustainable tourism development is that the < 
pace of tourism development is gradual as this gives local people time to adjust to new 
environmental, social and economic conditions, and helps prevent the adverse results of 
rapid uncontrolled ventures (Eber 1992). Vails and Porta (1997) point out that no tourist 
destination, product or business can be truly competitive if  it is incapable of benefiting 
not only the business community but also of protecting and enhancing the natural, socio­
cultural and environmental assets of the entire area.
2.2.1.6 Community-based planning. This approach entails the 
maximum involvement of local communities in the planning and development of 
tourism, with increased benefits gained by local communities, including minority and 
disadvantaged groups. Community planning implies a high degree of public 
participation in the planning process (Haywood 1988). Public participation may mean 
that the local community will have a degree of control over the planning and decision­
making process (Amstein 1969). Indeed, it is contended that socially responsible and 
environmentally viable tourism cannot be fostered without community involvement 
(Brandon 1993). As tourism planning is intended to benefit the residents of an area, they 
should be given the opportunity to participate in it and to express their views on the type
of future community they want to live in (Inskeep 1991). Through this involvement,
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“tourism development will reflect a consensus of what the people want” (WTO 1994: 3). 
It is suggested that only through their involvement can residents grasp the idea of what 
benefits tourism can bring, and therefore can fully support it. Dowling (1993: 53) asserts 
that, “since local people have much to lose or gain from policy decisions, tourism 
planning should always be carried out in close collaboration with the local inhabitants 
who are most likely to be affected”. Public participation in the shaping of tourism 
planning provides a more balanced approach than traditional development planning, and 
can help to recognise the needs and views of both tourists and residents.
Failure to involve relevant stakeholders in decision making processes can lead to 
formidable obstacles to realising the goal of sustainable development (Inskeep 1991; 
Ioannides 1992). Community involvement in decision making for a tourism plan can 
play a significant role in the plan’s successful implementation, for example by 
increasing the local community’s sense of ownership of the project (Brandon 1993).
This involvement can make the local community more supportive, confident and 
productive (Eber 1992). Local participation may provide a way to make sure that greater 
benefits remain in the community.
Tosun and Jenkins (1997: 526) argue that “experts from outside the local 
community, or non elected government officers and the central authorities, may not 
know which policy combination can increase the socio-economic welfare of the 
residents and what will be the appropriate combination of factors to stimulate economic 
growth. The local community may be the only body which can decide the type and scale 
of development which will be appropriate for themselves. Experts outside the local 
community may decide on a type of tourism development but this may not be 
compatible with socio-cultural norms and therefore it may not be an appropriate or 
sustainable development”.
Different goals and forms of public participation have been suggested in the
literature. Painter (1992) distinguishes between pseudo, partial and full participation.
Amstein (1971) depicts a ladder of participation with seven rungs which ascend from
manipulation through therapy, information, consultation, placation, partnership and
delegated power, to full citizen control. In an extensive review of these forms, Tosun
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(2000) proposes alternative typologies of public participation in tourism planning. In 
essence, these different forms of participation mean that participation may range from a 
feeling of participation without its substance to the genuine exercise of power to 
determine outcomes (Painter 1992). Based on Syme (1992), Pearce et al (1996) provide 
a list of issues that may determine the outcomes of public participation in tourism 
development. These are the type of argument, the level of energy among participants, 
the preparedness to negotiate from the most powerful party, the ongoing environment of 
relationships around negotiation, and the effect of environmental context. The perceived 
need for public involvement will vary within the community. Some community 
members may not be interested in participation, while others may actively oppose 
participation. There may be some community members wishing to be kept informed at 
certain stages, and others looking for consultation at all stages.
The success of each planning approach discussed above depends on the existence 
of many desirable conditions (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). To move from a list of desirable 
conditions to a realistic agenda for action is a major problem (Lea 1988). Having 
explained the specific character and strengths of each approach, it should be bom in 
mind that each has its own environmental settings (such as a state of crisis or rapidly 
changing situations versus a stable and predictable environment). Planning is itself 
already a complex process, a situation made worse by an unstable environment. 
Regardless of the approach selected, the relationship elements of ownership and 
commitment and of willingness to collaborate, co-operate and share information are 
prerequisites for the successful implementation of a plan. Tourism development plans 
will not be implemented unless these relationship elements are taken into account by all 
actors. In some cases relationship elements on their own may not be sufficient for a 
successful plan implementation. Resource scarcities may also create obstacles in the way 
of implementation. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes, “no matter how thorough the initial 
preparation and how comprehensive the scope of the plan, it is unlikely that planners 
will envisage all eventualities in implementation or in changing exogenous conditions, 
which may necessitate modifications to the original goals and strategies”. In conclusion, 
envisioning of all possibilities in the environment settings is not practically possible.
This is particularly the case for newly emerging destinations in developing countries.
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2.3 Obstacles in tourism planning
The most elaborately formulated projects will come to naught if the 
implementation of their components is overlooked or is carried out in a diffuse manner 
(UN 1980). According to the World Tourism Organisation, planners are not very 
successful in this respect - only half of the tourism development plans out of 1619 
examined were implemented (WTO 1980 in Choy 1991). Since that estimate was made, 
the situation probably has not changed radically. Thus attention needs to be directed to 
the realistic means to achieve implementation, as preparing a plan alone will not 
guarantee that the recommendations will be implemented (Inskeep 1991).
The outcome of plan formulation and implementation processes may be affected 
adversely by several factors. These include: (1) lack of incentives to co-operate and the 
existence of blocks to collective action, (2) vagueness of proposed goals, (3) lack of 
crucial information about goals, means and actors, (4) absence of important actors, or 
the inclusion of other actors that may discourage participation by the necessary actors,
(5) the absence of commitment from some actors, (6) a centralised approach to tourism 
management which may also potentially hamper the process of formal planning. This 
list is certainly not exhaustive. According to Costa (1996), the success of tourism plans 
may depend on the provision and improvement of a number of elements. First, there is a 
need to improve the way in which the planning and development process is carried out 
(the procedural component); and, second, there is a need to pay more attention to the 
organisational framework in which planning is undertaken (the administrative 
component), since this strongly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of planning 
activity. The organisational structure of tourism administration and the legislation and 
regulations for tourism development may both impact on tourism development. There is 
also a need for governments to pay more attention to local level administration, since the 
success of planning activity and profitability of the tourism industry depend on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the planning and the co-ordination delivered locally (the 
local component). Account also needs to be taken of the potential role which may be 
developed by networks in the improvement of tourism planning and in the co-ordination 
of the tourism sector (the network component).
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Another important point to stress is that many of the planning approaches 
discussed so far generally reflect Western perspectives. It is probable that one may 
encounter formidable challenges in putting the principles behind these approaches into 
practice in developing countries, which arguably have dissimilar administrative 
procedures and cultures. In most developing countries the large majority of 
implementing bodies are either relatively weak or have yet to acquire many years of 
experience in checks and balances. Administrative control is argued to present a 
particular problem to successful implementation in developing countries (Morah 1996). 
“Rampant bureaucratic and political corruption is frequently among the weaknesses 
presented by this lack of administrative control culture. In these countries affluent 
opponents of a specific policy who lose in the policy formulation stage often find 
bribery in the execution stage an especially easy way to neutralise undesirable policy 
intents” (Bierstekker 1978, in Morah 1996: 82). “Remedying the problem of 
implementation becomes primarily a question of controlling discretion and maximising 
routine and compliance in the bureaucracy, through incentives and sanctions, with the 
limits to control tending to depend on the statutory power and amount of resources an 
organisation possesses vis-a-vis those it is seeking to influence” (Morah 1996: 82).
The issue of control in a bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent
explanation for the implementation problem (Morah 1996). According to Downs (1967)
the traditionally recalcitrant behaviour of lower-level bureaucrats not carrying out the
instructions of higher level officials, originates from the leakage of authority inside a
bureaucracy, a leakage that often occurs because implementing officials have different
goals, and each uses their discretion in translating orders from above into commands
going to those lower in the hierarchy (in Morah 1996: 82). In the implementation
environment found in many developing countries, flexibility in policy implementation is
viewed as part of a deliberate technique for policy-wide accommodation and conflict
resolution (Morah 1996). This is often related to the fact that ethnic ties and factions,
nepotism and an extended family network system, and personal coalitions and patron-
client relations, form the basis of political activities in these countries, and are well
suited to individualised interventions at the execution stage. From the point of view of
government officials, community control may be seen as a loss of their power together
with their control over the planning process. Thus the level of public involvement in
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tourism planning may be limited to a form of tokenism where decisions have already 
been made by government (Hall 1998).
Plan implementation may also suffer from the misuse of resources, a lack of 
accountability, non-transparency in decision-making, excessive rules and regulations, 
priorities which are inconsistent with appropriate development, a high degree of 
concentration of political power, or from an incompetent administration. All 
stakeholders may not be on an equal footing at the planning table and not all participants 
may work co-operatively to achieve common goals. Some stakeholders might be 
unwilling to share their entrenched power (Williams et al 1998). Williams et al (1998) 
observe that major challenges associated with implementing the Cariboo-Chilcoting 
CORE project in Canada included a lack of commitment to shared decision-making by 
some participants, weak government support for tourism stakeholders, and a lack of 
resources to conduct the required negotiations. There are many stakeholders involved in 
tourism plans, each pursuing interests that might not be easy to reconcile (UN 1980). 
These and other potential issues which can affect plan implementation are discussed 
next under four broad headings.
2.3.1 Top-down or centralist management. Tourism programmes may be 
formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom who do not achieve the 
outcomes they desire. One reason for this is that the policies of central government are 
out of touch with the needs of local people and are not based on detailed knowledge of 
the local environment. It can be difficult to implement policies if they are unrealistic: 
“like some tourism development plans which can express more the ideals of professional 
planners than actual possibilities” (Elliott 1997: 100). Tourism programmes developed 
by a centralised administration, may tend to overlook the knowledge, skills and goals of 
local tourism organisations, in their design phase, and subsequently there may be 
resistance from the implementing bodies, such as from local government. The success of 
the planning activity and profitability of the tourism industry is likely to depend on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the planning and co-ordinating activities of local 
government. The absence of this important actor in the plan formulation phase, or the 
lack of commitment from this actor to common purposes at the implementation stage, is
likely to be a key reason for tourism plan failure.
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Programme implementation and administration are often problems with 
development plans in developing nations where there is a centralist administration 
(Morah 1996). Quick (1980: 40) observes, “public policies do not get implemented at 
all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation 
often look very different from what their framers originally intended”. It has been 
suggested that the comparatively low level of implementation in developing countries is 
mainly due to many policies only become involved in the political system at the 
implementation stage, rather than before their adoption, as is generally the case in the 
West (Morah 1996). Consequently the resolution of conflicts and the adaptation of 
policies occur at the output stage, thus altering both the original content and intended 
impact of policy. Moreover the implementation process in developing countries can 
involve unusually intense competition and rivalry, simply because their needs are far 
more pronounced and resources are scarcer than in developed nations (Benson 1982).
There is growing agreement that long-term success can only be achieved when
planners have a thorough knowledge of the views of the host population. Community
involvement in the decision-making process is recognised as an important aspect of
sustainable tourism planning (Harssel 1994). According to McIntosh and Goeldner
(1986), it may provide a framework for raising the living standard of local people
through the economic benefits of tourism, it can help develop an infrastructure and
provide recreation facilities for both residents and visitors, it can help ensure that the
types of visitor centres and resorts are appropriate, it can help establish a development
programme that is consistent with the social and economic philosophy of the
government and host population; and it may help to optimise visitor and host
satisfaction. Since satisfaction of locals also ensures that visitors are satisfied, such
arguments may exemplify a win-win position, which is desirable for tourist destinations
(Hall 2000). Public participation has the potential to provide new bargaining arenas that
can turn conflicting views into a more integrated awareness of the wider implications of
the issues (Haywood 1988). By directing tourism planning toward the probable, the
desirable and the achievable, this can improve the quality of community life, and
tourism can be properly integrated into the community (Haywood 1988). Williams,
Penrose and Hawkins (1998) note that direct and meaningful participation in tourism
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plan decision-making may generate a sense of ownership over the resulting decisions: 
“With this sense of ownership comes support for its implementation and ultimately, the 
achievements of an efficient decision” (Williams et al 1998: 865).
Resident involvement can significantly increase the time and effort required by 
professionals to complete a project (Murphy 1985). However, the cost of involving the 
public in decision-making can help to avoid the more significant costs of continued 
conflict and the need to change decisions that prove to be inadequately informed (British 
Columbia 1995 in Williams et al 1998: 865). Where the public and private sectors are 
granted the chance to take part in the early stages of planning process it is possible that 
there will be enough consensus of opinions to reach shared planning objectives (Murphy 
1985). Williams et al (1998) argue that plan objectives resulting from shared decision­
making processes have more potential of being implemented than those taken through 
conventional planning models. Shared decision making is based on consensus-building, 
which refers to,a situation in which all parties seek to agree on decisions. Williams et al 
note that a consensus process is qualitatively different from processes using a vote or 
through administrative or judicial proceedings. They state that “adjudication and voting 
defines winners and losers, thereby, lessening the support for implementation of 
agreements. Consensus building aims to produce win-win solutions. They can help to 
reduce, or eliminate, power imbalances between parties because each effectively has a 
veto over decisions and is thus free from the tyranny of the majority” (1998: 864).
Williams et al enumerate a number of conditions that influence the success of 
consensus-based approaches. These include the willingness of all parties to reach 
decisions through a consensus, the perception of all parties that conventional decision­
making is less acceptable, and the political will on the part of the government to see the 
process through to the end. Amy (1987 in Williams et al 1998: 877) notes that, while a 
consensus-based process should be inclusive, the number of parties should also be 
manageable. The number of representatives involved should be appropriate to minimise 
cost, sustain a productive dialogue and increase the likelihood of building trust and 
consensus. The status, capacity, power and experiences of the representatives are 
important considerations. For example, in their research Williams et al (1998) found
that it was difficult to discuss issues and engage in problem solving because the tourism
32
representatives were volunteers, and most of them had little experience in public 
speaking or negotiation.
2.3.2 Lack of recognition of mutual interdependency. The neglect of other 
factors can contribute to plan failure. One relates to a limited understanding of the wider 
tourism environment and of the relations among the interdependent parties involved in 
plan formulation and implementation. The tourism environment is made up of a varied 
set of organisations. Each of these organisations controls resources, such as capital, 
personnel and knowledge, and each organisation has to interact with others in order to 
acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement since no organisation can generate 
independently all the necessary resources (Klijn 1997). The interorganisational network 
is thus linked to a larger environment consisting of several organisations, authorities, 
legislative bodies, bureaux, and publics. These participants (organisations and officials) 
are linked in interaction patterns focused on the governance of a given network. 
Implementation involves the joint efforts of various parties, often located at different 
tiers of government. It requires careful consideration of interdependencies and of the 
relations between parties in the tourism environment. Thus, there should be an 
understanding of the way these organisations interact, and of the means used to co­
ordinate these interactions. Hence, attention needs to be paid to the nature of, and extent 
of, the relations between central and local government tourism organisations and other 
agencies.
Institutions are increasingly interrelated and, as the process of government
becomes more intertwined, more dependent on each other. This organisational
interdependence gives rise to a major problem of implementation. One organisation
finds that its aims are not achieved and blames others for impeding the realisation of its
objectives, by failing to follow its guidance and direction or by erecting restraints and
obstacles. As government intervenes more in society, discretion is increasingly
conferred on low-level officials or on other organisations, which thus have more scope
to act in ways that may frustrate the goals of the initiators. They tend to respond by
devising mechanisms of control to curb discretion and thus cramp implementation. Thus
there merges a paradox of both growing discretion and increasing controls. Increasing
governmental interdependence and a more complex organisational environment makes
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the formulation and implementation of public policy more hazardous, since it becomes 
more difficult to trace clearly the connections between goals, policy proposals, measures 
to achieve them, and outputs and outcomes (Jones 1982).
2.3.3 Institutional arrangements. The tourism policy process takes place 
within a certain institutionalised context and tourism programmes have little chance of 
success unless this context is considered and arranged carefully. The institutional 
arrangements may either facilitate or inhibit the plan implementation process. Tourism 
programmes involve interactions between government agencies and quasi-government 
and private organisations, and information, goals and resources are exchanged in these 
interactions. An institutional process forms as a result of frequently recurring 
interactions among the participants and as a consequence of the development and 
formulation of interaction rules (Kickert et al 1997). An understanding of the 
institutional context and of related changes are imperative for the successful 
management of the complex interactions between various actors involved in the process 
(Klijn 1997).
Tosun and Jenkins (1997) suggest that highly centralised tourism policies are an 
alienating factor for local participation in tourism developments. They (p. 527) claim 
that “the Ministries of Tourism (in Turkiye) and the bodies responsible for authorisation 
of tourism investment and incentives are accessible to the rich and educated elite and not 
to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense there is a big 
communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short, centralisation 
has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a 
barrier for poor people who may not be able to afford to travel to the capital city”. 
Acknowledging the obstacles emanating from bureaucratic organisations, Haywood 
(1988: 107) states that: “Extensive bureaucratic organisations across diverse tiers and 
levels exist in connection with tourism. In many countries or regions, tourism planning 
suffers from fragmentation and overlapping interests, which in turn dilutes the integrity 
of the network of national, regional, and local governments unit, and precludes co­
operation and collaboration. Many areas are content pursuing an unmanaged adaptation 
policy toward tourism or may believe that the individual and collective planning
activities of local hotels, attractions and visitor and convention bureaux are adequate.
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Public participation may be viewed as unnecessary, time consuming, and an idealistic 
dream. These burdens include the possible dilution of power, the lack of time to interact 
with citizens, the patience to educate others, the forbearance to be educated by outsiders, 
the determination to improve negotiating skills, the courage to risk some loss of control 
over matters previously internal to the industry, and ultimately the danger of failure and 
the pain of bad publicity”. In addition, “the biggest obstacle is the fact that public 
participation usually begins without a legacy of collegial interaction. Many of the 
participants who come together do so as strangers. In an undertaking calling for 
openness and agreement, a lack of prior dialogue is a considerable liability” (Haywood 
1988: 108)
2.3.4 Uneven distribution of power and responsibilities and conflictual 
relations. The ability to impose one’s will or advance one’s own interests (Reed 1997) 
involves "power" and this is a central concept in resource dependency and network 
management. The extent to which power is distributed equally or is concentrated in a 
relatively small group who dominate the decision processes, can be an important 
influence on plan success or failure. During the implementation process the definition of 
power relationships is likely to become a major contentious issue among the various 
groups (Alterman 1982). Reed (1997) and Jamal and Getz (1995) assert and empirically 
verify that power relations may alter the outcome of collaborative efforts or even 
preclude collaborative action. Where some decision-making authority is assigned to 
representatives of the public, then inter-group conflict may arise around the degree to 
which the representatives are perceived to be truly authorised to voice the opinions of 
the various groups (Alterman 1982).
There has been growth in decentralised tourism administration in order to 
empower local government to deal with local tourism development issues. To some, 
decentralisation needs to be adopted in order to provide an equitable distribution of the 
benefits of tourism development. The concept of decentralisation basically implies the 
transference of power from central government to regional and local government, and it 
involves the rearrangement of internal capabilities, responsibilities, and resources, 
notably the devolution of power from upper to lower tiers of government. It is a long­
term process, which aims to reduce central supervision and control, and to enable local
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government to have increased autonomy and power. However, it is important to consider 
why central government becomes willing to distribute or share its power with others 
(Reed 1997). It is often assumed that the governance institutions are neutral arbiters in 
the development process. But these institutions have their own agendas in the 
formulation and implementation of policy. Conflicts are likely to emerge between those 
who seek to maintain the status quo and those who seek to change the nature of local 
economic activities (Reed 1997). In a study of Squeamish, Canada, Reed found that the 
conventional elites, that is the municipality and the proponents of ski-hill development, 
were successful in using the planning process for their own ends. She also identified that 
the traditional elite was unwilling to relinquish its hold on the organisation and co­
ordination of tourism in the municipality. Thus power relations must be addressed at all 
stages of planning initiatives, and in this context collective action can help to settle 
conflicts with minimum damage (Reed 1997).
Conflicts of interest and hidden agendas are likely to exist in all initiatives 
bringing together diverse individuals and institutions with varying ideologies, 
perspectives, and power. Reed (1997) argues that the introduction of tourism in 
communities introduces conflicts over the substance of economic development, the 
allocation of public funds between residents and tourists, and over the processes by 
which decisions are made. Conflict is therefore an inseparable part of any development 
initiative. Conflict over tourism issues may persist despite the best of intentions, and 
despite a clear outcome from the consultation process (Pearce et al 1996). This requires 
an understanding of the dynamics in conflict situations as well as the application of new 
types of resolution techniques depending on the type of conflict.
In their search for an alternative explanation to the implementation problem, 
Barret and Fudge (1981) come back to policy as the key issue. Depending on the kind 
of policy that is pursued, different types of pressures and conflicts are brought to bear on 
the policy-making process. Lowi (1964) postulates three types of policy: distributive, 
redistributive and regulatory, and the last induces the highest levels of conflict, as it 
involves the participation of numerous groups of clear winners and losers. Hence certain 
policies, by virtue of their nature, are candidates for certain types of implementation 
problem.
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2.3.5 Other influential factors. Overlooking the requirements of 
implementation can be very costly. “Insufficient consideration of implementation of 
outputs within the planning process, may result in settlements that create devastating 
precedents that may result in reluctance to negotiate in the future; damage interpersonal 
relationships; and financial, time or resource loss” (Moore 1986, cited in Hall 2000: 89). 
In order to avoid such consequences one should give consideration to the development 
of suitable implementing mechanisms. Such mechanisms include the logical staging of 
development, an effective organisation of the public and private sectors in tourism, 
maintaining close co-ordination between the public and private sectors and with NGOs, 
and the adaptation and application of appropriate legislation and regulations for tourism 
development (WTO 1998). The results of recent studies indicate that key pre-conditions 
for the successful implementation of a tourism development plan may include 
participative decision-making, the delineation of clear balances between responsibility 
and authority, and co-operative relations between stakeholders. Undoubtedly, coercive 
decision making, ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, a distant 
bureaucracy, and uneven power relations between public and private agencies are among 
the factors which can undermine the legitimacy of planning decisions and their 
implementation. Factors that are likely to influence tourism plan outcomes in developing 
countries are summarised in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Reasons for tourism planning failure in the developing world
■ The capacity for implementation may be largely untested (Pearce 2000).
■ Resources may be scarce (Morah 1996).
■ The planning process may lack pluralism, democracy and the involvement o f key local 
community institutions (Bums 1999).
■ Public participation may be viewed as unnecessary, unwieldy, time consuming and an idealistic 
dream (Haywood 1988).
■ Planned tourism development is not backed by appropriate tourism-related legislation and 
regulations (WTO 1993).
■ Implementing bodies may be weak or have yet to acquire years o f experience (Morah 1996).
■ Leakage o f authority may occur because implementing officials have different goals to those of  
the initiators (Morah 1996).
■ Uncertainties may be high in the political and socio-economic environment (Morah 1996; Tosun 
2000).
■ A powerful bureaucracy may dominate legislative and operational processes (Tosun 2000).
■ A high and disruptive staff turnover rate may undermine morale. Central administrative controls 
may curb local government’s capabilities and willingness to take the lead (Tosun 2000);
■ There may be hostility among the population toward tourism development because of potential 
problems such as increasing crime, the segregation o f locals from tourists, and overcrowding and 
overloading (Brohman 1996).
■ The success o f tourism development may be measured only in terms of increasing tourist 
numbers and revenues and not in relation to host satisfaction (Brohman 1996).
■ Organised and powerful business interests may become power centres serving their own interests
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at the expense o f other local people. A strong local planning authority may be absent (Tosun
2000).
According to Baud-Bovy (1982: 308), “Obstacles to implementation can be 
overcome in the planning stage itself by taking account of a range of factors e.g. the 
socio-economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental context of tourism 
developments and the spread of activities and actors involved in the tourism sector”. 
However, taking account of these factors may still not ensure successful 
implementation. All too frequently, plans or programmes are based on a great deal of 
goodwill and good intentions, but few resources (Alterman 1982). Little can be achieved 
in practice where the resources of personnel, finance and management skills are not 
available and where there is no commitment from political and administrative leaders 
(Elliott 1997). Even where resources are allocated at the outset, they may be insufficient 
for an ongoing programme or may not be renewed as necessary. Moreover, where some 
attention is devoted to the resources needed, it may be focused only on the resources of 
the agency in question, and may neglect the resources of the participants (Alterman 
1982). This oversight is a stumbling block frequently encountered by participatory 
planning programmes.
Time is an important resource in tourism planning (Alterman 1982). A 
participatory programme might be successful in drawing a relatively large number of 
residents for one or two meetings, but may fail if the strategy calls for the repeated 
investment of time by the public (Alterman 1982). If an ongoing participatory 
programme is sought, it is important that the planner takes into account the problems of 
securing budgetary allocations from year to year (Alterman 1982). Political support to 
see policy initiatives through is another resource with great importance (Morah 1996). It 
often takes the form of a fixer or a legislator or other person in authority who is 
personally interested in a policy and who will guide it through the playing out of the 
various implementation games until the goals are realised (Morah 1996). It would be 
futile to proceed with planning and assigning resources to a process without first 
securing the support of participants and government (Williams et al 1998). Another 
resource is the space required for meetings or other participatory activities (Alterman 
1982). “This is often not merely a budgetary question, but may also entail a symbolic
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element associated with the location of the meeting place. Often as minor as this 
question might seem, it may become a major hurdle if no adequate large spaces (or small 
spaces) are to be found in the neighbourhood” (Alterman 1982: 309-310). There is also 
the question of the human resources of experience, skills and knowledge, which both the 
planners and participants are expected to bring to participatory programmes (Alterman
1982). But, at times no matter how prepared in advance, “no amount of resources 
applied to projects will produce good results. It is the use of right means to achieve 
wrong ends” (Morah 1996: 83).
Planning is an interactive process, undertaken in a social context rather than a 
purely technical process of design, analysis and management (Healey 1997, cited in Hall 
2000: 55) and thus successful interorganisational relationships are critical to the 
implementation of all development plans. The implementation process is conducted in 
an ever-changing environment, a mixture of economic, political, cultural, technological 
and geographical realities and events (Liu 1994) and of a varied set of organisations, 
each of which controls various resources to a differing extent, including capital, 
technology, personnel and knowledge. These organisations will search for an adequate 
supply of resources (authority and money) from the political and economic system in 
order to fulfil their programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain 
an orderly and reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things 
(Pearce 1992). The implementation success is thus closely tied to whether these 
organisations interact and co-ordinate fragmented activities effectively so that all 
decisions, policies and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes 
(Hall 1991). Building, maintaining and managing harmonious interorganisational 
relations will depend heavily on the degree of equilibrium present among these 
organisations.
2.4 Summary
This discussion has reviewed tourism planning, its definition, benefits, and
approaches, as well as the major obstacles likely to inhibit the implementation of
tourism plans. Needless to say, planning is a fundamental activity. It helps to organise
the future, rather than letting things happen chaotically. During the course of its
development, the focus of tourism planning has shifted from physical planning to
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consideration of socio-cultural and environmental issues. Researchers have proposed 
different approaches to tourism planning. These approaches differ, but they are also 
considered to form an internally consistent, self-reinforcing network of methods and 
working styles. Community participation, which entails the involvement of individuals 
in a tourism-oriented community in the decision-making and implementation processes 
(Pearce et al 1996), has become a widely espoused contemporary approach to tourism 
planning. However, it is not free of limitations and there are arguments for and against 
its use. For instance, Minnery (1985 in Pearce et al 1996) reports that, while general 
public involvement seems to be important in the early stages of plan development, it is 
evident that strong opinions are often held about different alternatives, and that 
compromise can be difficult. Seeking comments on alternative plans can escalate 
community conflict and confusion, and it may lessen the commitment to proceed with 
the final plan.
Whatever approach is adopted, an awareness of the possible dynamics during the 
implementation process is indispensable. However, this phase has not received as much 
attention as has the formulation phase of tourism plans. Hence, detailed consideration 
has been given to four main obstacles causing implementation failure. These are the 
problems of top-down management where decisions are taken centrally, neglect of the 
interdependencies between multiple organisations involved in tourism management, 
obstacles related to the network of institutional arrangements, and problems related to 
the uneven distribution of power and responsibilities. The notion of equilibrium and 
other concepts, including organisational environment, interorganisational 
interdependence, relations, and networks, are addressed in the next chapter.
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3. Interorganisational Relations
3.1 Introduction
Organisations tend to form joint arrangements to cope with growing complexity 
of their environments, notably the complex problems that are beyond the capabilities 
of any one organisation to solve single-handedly (Jamal and Getz 1995). The success 
of an organisation is often determined by its ability to form and manage relations with 
other organisations operating in its business environment. There are often 
interdependencies between organisations because they do not possess or control 
important resources which influence their future, such as human, political, structural 
or symbolic resources. It is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism 
environment and of the relations among interdependent parties involved in plan 
formulation and implementation in the specific political and institutional context of a 
country. This chapter reviews relevant literature on systems theory, 
interorganisational theory, and network theory. This literature is evaluated in order to 
provide a framework for the examination of relationships between organisations and 
of the administrative deficiencies in tourism plan implementation, with these being 
examined subsequently for Belek in Turkey.
3.2 Systems theory
The concept of a system is a very valuable, powerful and influential analytical 
tool, which has been conceptualised in different ways (Hall 2000). At its simplest, a 
system can be viewed as an integrated whole, whose essential properties arise from 
the relationships between its constituent parts (Hall 2000). It comprises a set of 
elements, the set of relationships between these elements, and the set of relationships 
between those elements and the environment (Hall 2000). As Mill and Morrison 
(1985: xix) note, “the system is like a spider’s web, touch one part of it and 
reverberations will be felt throughout”. Systems are embedded within systems, and 
each system has strictly defined boundaries and operates within an external 
environment. According to general systems theory, a system’s environment 
encompasses all factors both inside and outside the system that can influence progress 
toward the attainment of its objectives. The environment is a result of the interplay of 
many complex and continually changing forces (Liu 1994).
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Early rational organisation theory generally depicts organisations as entities 
without relations with their environment, whereas the systems approach views the 
organisation as part of an open system, having connections with its environment, 
which in turn suggests that an organisation is dependent on its environment for its 
survival (Klinj 1997). Hence, the organisation is no longer a unity, but consists of 
sub-systems which need to be co-ordinated. Researchers adopting an open systems 
approach recognise that the interorganisational network may be affected by 
environmental conditions, which provide a social context within which network 
relationships take place (Pearce 1992). The environment consists of “anything 
external to the organisation” (Ahmed and Youngl974) or “ those events, 
circumstances and factors which occur outside the boundaries of the organisation and 
which may happen within it” (Bryson and Crosby 1992: 54).
Systems theory recognises that the behaviour of a system is constrained by the 
needs and conditions of its setting (micro and macro environment). Changes in one 
component of the system and the ways in which its internal subsystems and processes 
are linked, affect the entire system. A vast range of policies influence tourism, and 
changes in economic, social and environmental policies can have direct and indirect 
effects on the way the tourism industry behaves (Robinson 1996). Such elements in a 
country as its legislation, competition and politics, and its policies for environmental 
and cultural preservation may affect the nature of tourism management and 
development (Taylor 1994). Political stability is a hygiene factor in that it will not 
necessarily promote tourism development but its absence will certainly damage or 
even destroy it (Liu 1994). Numerous studies demonstrate that tourism business can 
be curtailed by political upheaval, war or terrorist activity in different parts of the 
world.
Political ideologies are significant influences on the way tourism develops. 
Liberals may be more likely to support tourism development, while conservatives 
may attempt to retain the existing economy (Liu 1994). “The ways in which tourism 
is organised, and its impacts, can be expected to a differ considerably in countries 
with a different political structure” (de Kadt 1979: 32). Government ideologies will 
also impinge directly on tourism management policies (IUOTO 1974). The goals of
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tourist organisations may be influenced by the extent to which government supports 
interventionist or free market policies. This may also influence the ways in which they 
pursue their activities. The interventionist approach aims to control the market, the 
tourism sector and its development, whereas the laissez- faire approach aims to allow 
the market to create competition in a free market environment (Airey 1983; Akehurst 
et al. 1994; Hayward 1989; Mansera 1998; Taylor 1994). Countries with a more 
centralist system may tend to demonstrate an interventionist attitude (for example, 
Ireland and Greece) toward tourism management policies, whereas countries with 
decentralised systems may tend to have a laissez- faire attitude (for example,
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany). By the same token, the economic 
environment of a country impacts, to a great extent, on the nature of tourism 
administration and the relations between organisations at different scales. The level of 
economic development will largely determine the availability and adequacy of 
infrastructure, superstructure, capital and technology in a country (Liu 1994). Poor 
access and inadequate infrastructure have been cited as major obstacles to tourism 
development in developing nations (Tosun 2000).
3.3 Interorganisational relationship theory
The interorganisational approach has evolved out of the systems concept. 
Interorganisational relations involve connectedness, dialogue, co-operative efforts and 
other types of interaction between interconnected agencies (Easton 1996). 
Interorganisational theory focuses on the relations and communication networks 
among organisations, including between the different levels of governmental 
agencies. It also examines their interdependencies, their strategic perspectives, and 
their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997). This theory, as district from rational 
organisation theory, recognises (1) the effects of environmental factors on 
organisational structure and behaviour, and (2) the notion that other organisations are 
a critical part of the environment of any organisation (Hall et al 1978).
Hewitt (2000) provides a list of several practical reasons for setting up 
interorganisational relationships. These include gains in scale and scope (such as in 
research, services, products), information sharing, the building of complementary 
skills and resource synergies, the strengthening of competitive position, and improved 
access to new technologies and new markets. Oliver (1990 in Hewitt 2000: 53)
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provides a different set of reasons why interorganisational relationships may emerge. 
It is suggested that such relationships may result from necessity (when mandated 
through regulation or law), reciprocity (in the pursuit of common or mutually 
beneficial goals), efficiency (where co-operation produces higher input/output ratios 
or economies of scale), stability (to overcome uncertainty through risk sharing) and 
legitimacy (by enhancing the prestige and reputation of those co-operating). There are 
different forms of interorganisational relationship (such as conflict, co-operation, 
competition, co-ordination, partnership and mergers), and the necessary conditions for 
each of these forms of relationship are somewhat different.
A key issue emerging from the above discussion is that tourism organisations 
are part of an open system and can no longer be seen in an isolated way. Their success 
tends to become increasingly linked to elements of the surrounding environment. 
While it is difficult to define and measure, the surrounding environment refers to 
other organisations and those conditions external to an organisation which directly or 
indirectly influence its activities, efficiency, effectiveness, and behaviour. The 
environment (and the organisation’s connections with it) is crucial to the survival and 
success of an organisation because “interdependence pervades organisations and is 
fundamental to understanding them” (Tjosvold 1986: 517 in Costa 1996). The 
“structure of the environment” has important implications for interorganisational 
relations. This structure involves patterned relations between the participants, on the 
one hand, and the network, on the other hand (Emery and Trist 1965; Terrebery
1968). There are three key dimensions to this structure. First, concentrated 
environments, where resources are channelled through one or a few outlets. Second, 
dispersed environments, where resources flow through multiple channels. While 
some networks may be composed of organisations that all depend on a single funding 
source or domain-validating channel, other networks may be supplied by multiple 
channels. (Benson 1975). The third structural dimension relates to power, and 
specifically to power concentration and power dispersion. This relates to the extent to 
which some participants in the environment dominate others. While some 
environments are characterised by clear-cut patterns of dominance in which some 
participants control others, in other environments power is dispersed among many or 
all participants. These three structural dimensions of the environment, have a
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considerable bearing on the supply of money and resources (Benson 1975) and on the 
distribution of power within the network (Pearce 1992).
3.3.1 Approaches to interorganisational relations
Two alternative approaches to the study of interorganisational relations have 
received considerable attention in the literature. A number of researchers view 
interorganisational relationships from an exchange perspective, in which 
organisations are assumed to interact voluntarily to achieve mutual organisational 
goals (Levine and White 1961). However, other researchers adopt a power- 
dependency approach when studying interorganisational relations. In this approach, 
organisations are thought to be induced to interact by a more powerful organisation 
(Aldrich 1976). Various organisational players seek to achieve their goals and to 
avoid becoming “dependent” on the other players. These two approaches are 
generally regarded as dissimilar, with research attention devoted to different elements, 
components, and levels. However, while each approach has a district formulation, 
they are also closely associated (Selin and Beason 1991). Among the common 
elements recognised by both approaches are the concepts of domain consensus and of 
interdependence, and a recognition of the importance of shared resources for 
organisational survival.
3.3.1.1 Resource exchange theory
Levine and White’s (1961) resource exchange theory bases itself on systems 
theory in that organisations are regarded as a system with individual organisations 
varying in the kinds and frequency of relationships with one another. Other key 
premises of the resource exchange model are the concept of resource scarcity and of 
relations being formed with other organisations in order to acquire necessary 
resources. Each organisation has objectives (such as, to make profit, to expand its 
market, to survive, and to increase customer or employee satisfaction), and it needs to 
possess certain resources in order to realise its specific objectives. The resources 
necessary to meet these objectives can include equipment, specialised knowledge, or 
funding. However, few, if any, organisations have enough resources in the above 
forms, or enough access to these elements, to enable them to accomplish their 
objectives completely. There are two options for organisations facing resource
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scarcity. The organisation could narrow the number and range of its functions in 
order to use scarce resources more effectively for fewer functions. Alternatively, the 
organisation could turn to other organisations, usually those controlling the necessary 
resources, to form voluntary relations with them in order to carrying out the functions. 
The basic assumption of the model is that interorganisational exchanges are necessary 
for goal attainment. Exchange involves a voluntary agreement involving the offer of 
some form of present, continuing, or future utility in exchange for other utilities 
offered in return (Weber 1948).
According to Levine and White (1961), there are three preconditions for 
organisational exchange: (1) the accessibility of each organisation to necessary 
resources from the system; (2) awareness of organisational functions; and (3) the 
existence of some domain consensus among the various organisations. Obviously 
there would be no exchange of elements between two organisations that do not know 
one another and their functions. There would also be no exchange without some level 
of agreement or understanding, even if it is only implicit. Thus, exchange agreements 
are contingent upon the organisation’s domain as well as the specific goals that an 
organisation wishes to pursue and the functions it undertakes in order to achieve its 
goals. In operational terms, the organisational domain refers to the claims that the 
organisation stakes out for itself in terms of its functions, the population it serves and 
the services rendered. In other words, the organisational domain embraces what the 
organisation seeks to do, for whom, and how it does it. For instance, a Tourism 
Ministry may strive to achieve balanced development for the satisfaction of residents, 
tourists and entrepreneurs, and may do this by issuing and enforcing development- 
related legislation and regulations. The delineation of the organisational domain 
within the wider system is highly desirable, because without at least minimal domain 
consensus there will be no exchange among organisations.
In essence, resource exchange theory assumes that organisations form relations 
when they perceive mutual benefits or gains from interacting. The management of 
each organisation is motivated to form relationships because they perceive that the 
organisation will be better able to attain its goals by interacting than by remaining 
autonomous (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). This type of relation is more likely to 
emerge in periods of resource scarcity or of declining resources. The exchange
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approach also implies that the nature of the interactions between the participants is 
characterised by a high degree of co-operation and problem solving as opposed to 
high levels of conflict and bargaining. This is largely because the parties are 
motivated to co-ordinate their efforts to maximise their benefits (Schmidt and Kochan
1977). Four dimensions are considered to be influential in determining the nature of 
exchange relations. These are the parties that are involved, the kinds and quantities of 
exchange relations, the agreement underlying the exchange (it could be informal or 
formalised), and the direction of the exchange. The direction of the exchange could be 
unilateral, where elements flow from one organisation to another and no elements are 
given in return, it could be reciprocal, where elements flow from one organisation to 
another in return for other elements, and it could be "joint", where elements flow 
between two organisations acting in unison to ward off a third party.
3.3.1.2 The power and resource dependency model j
The resource exchange model has received growing criticism, and this gave rise \
to the development of an alternative approach to the study of interorganisational 
relations. Proponents of this approach argue that the interactions between 
organisations are motivated less from anticipated mutual benefits than from a desire to 
obtain resources, frequently at the expense of other organisations (Rhodes 1981; j
Gamm 1981). Similarly, others have challenged the basic assumption that i
organisations engage in exchange relations because they need resource elements to 
fulfil their specific functions (Cook 1977). By contrast, the power and resource 
dependency model states that organisations operate in an environment of scarce 
resources (Yutchman and Seashore 1967) and they enter into exchange relations in 
order to achieve negotiated and relatively predictable environments (Thompson
1969). By pursuing scarce resources, organisations develop differing power and 
resource dependence levels relative to one another (Gamm 1981). In other words, one 
of the organisations is being instigated to interact by a more powerful organisation.
This theory implies that the motivation to interact is asymmetrical (Schmidt and 
Kochan 1977). That is, interorganisational relationships only emerge when the 
motivated party is powerful enough to force or induce the other to interact. Two of the 
basic assumptions of the resource dependency model are (1) that environmental 
resources are in short supply because of interorganisational competition, and (2)
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organisations survive and prosper to the extent that they are able to out-manoeuvre 
other organisations in the acquisition of scarce resources.
According to Thompson (1967: 29-30), an organisation is dependent upon a 
specific element of its task environment (1) in proportion to the organisation’s need 
for resources or performances which that element can provide, and (2) in inverse 
proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or 
performance. Thompson argues that organisations seek to maintain alternative sources 
because when the capacity that is needed is dispersed through the task environment 
this minimises the power of any single task environment element. The availability of 
alternative sources increases an organisation’s power and autonomy by decreasing its 
dependence upon other organisations. Levine and White (1961) also viewed the 
availability of alternative sources as a primary influence on the character of 
interorganisational exchange. They argue that an organisation is less dependent upon ,
exchange relations with other organisations in its local environment to the extent that j
it has access to the elements it needs from outside sources, although it must still 
negotiate some form of exchange with these sources.
Resource dependency occurs frequently in the tourism field (Selin and Beason i
1991). For example, “regional tourism planning often breaks down when a powerful j
destination refuses to participate and co-operate” (Smith et al 1986, in Selin and 
Beason 1991: 642). From the perspective of likely relations between central and 
peripheral organisations, one can argue that peripheral organisations are economically 
dependent on central organisations. While this is true, the state is also dependent on 
local institutions and people for knowledge, political support, and policy commitment 
and ownership. In fact a similar type of dependency relationship may exist between 
the public and private sectors in tourist destinations (Timothy 1998). This is that the 
public sector is normally dependent on the private sector to provide services and to 
finance, at least in part, the construction of tourist facilities. And without co-operative 
relations then tourism development programmes may stall because private investors 
require government approval of, and support for, most kinds of projects (Timothy 
1998).
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3.3.2 Organisational interdependence and power relations
A key assumption in interorganisational relations is that relations among 
organisations grow out of the interdependencies among them. The recognition of an 
organisation’s domain by other organisations leads to interdependencies. The task 
environment of organisations (that is the organisations, groups and persons with 
which an organisation interacts directly) is pluralistic. This means that each 
organisation must relate to a number of different groups, each of which is itself 
involved in networks of interdependencies. Another reason for interdependency is the 
uncertainty caused by the task environment. Depending on the amount of resources 
belonging to an organisation, it may choose to use competitive or co-operative 
strategies to help reduce uncertainty. With sufficient power, organisations may choose 
to follow competitive strategies, but if the acquisition of power is difficult then 
organisations are more likely to choose co-operative strategies, including contracting 
for services, and co-opting and coalescing ( which refers to a combination or joint 
venture with other organisations). Organisations faced with external resource 
constraints are likely to make interorganisational arrangements if  they can not obtain 
help from the government or support from social or political elites (Aldrich 1979).
Organisations or individuals often have power because of their position and 
leadership ability, and they can use this to help implement policy (Elliott 1997). Some 
see power as distinct from exchange (Blau 1964 a,b), while others view power as a 
kind of exchange (Homans 1974). Broadly defined, power refers to “all kinds of 
influence between persons or groups, including those exercised in exchange 
transactions, where one induces others to accede to his wishes by rewarding them for 
doing so" (Blau 1964 a: 115). Power in Max Weber’s classic definition (1948: 152) is 
“the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests”. Power is the capacity to overcome resistance, the capacity to change the 
behaviour of others and to stop them getting what they want (Elliott 1983). It 
determines who gets what, when, and how (Elliott 1983). While exchange relations 
can be considered a subset of power relations, power dependency differs from 
resource exchange in that exchange, it is argued, is voluntary, while power involves A 
getting B to act against his (B’s) will (Homans 1974). Thus, power relations are
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characterised more by conflicts than co-operation, which is the general characteristic 
of exchange relations.
Power derives to some extent from structures in society and from resource 
dependencies (Cook 1977). To the extent that alternative sources are available to an 
organisation in an exchange relationship, dependence is less and the organisation has 
more bargaining power in terms of influencing the exchange ratio. The more power an 
organisation has, the more influence it has to determine the nature of the 
interorganisational exchange; that is its ability to determine the form of the interaction 
and the ratio of exchange. Hence some parties are in dominant positions that permit 
the imposition and enforcement of their own conceptions of reality. Others are in 
positions of relative weaknesses and must act in conformity with the definitions of 
others (Benson 1977). Organisations with power will inevitably use that power. 
Organisations with a power advantage in an exchange relation will usually exploit the 
situation to alter the exchange ratio to make it more favourable.
Authority pertains to the legitimisation of activities, and the right and the 
responsibility to execute programmes. (Benson 1975). Administrators seek authority 
to implement specific types of activities and this authority is often derived from 
legislative mandates. When such authority is granted, the domain of the organisation 
is validated. In addition, the domain accounts for the organisation's requests for state 
funding. The ownership of a domain permits the organisation to operate in a certain 
sphere, to claim support for its activities, and to define proper practices within its 
environment (Benson 1975). Furthermore, authority is important in a restrictive way, 
such as by determining the types of activities which can not be undertaken by the 
agency. Administrators seek and defend authority due to the crucial role of authority 
in legitimating the work of agencies (Benson et al 1973). In some cases, 
administrators abuse their authority to gain funding for personal benefit rather than for 
public needs.
3.4 Network theory
The initial power and resource dependency model (Rhodes 1981) views 
relationships between organisations (such as between central and local government) 
as a game in which participants from both organisations manoeuvre for advantage.
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They deploy the resources at their disposal - constitutional, legal, organisation, 
political and information - to maximise their influence. The game takes place in the 
arena of policy networks, each with different structures of dependency (Stoker 1995).
A close look at these resources suggests that, with the exception of political resources, 
the primary resources are legal. That is, the framework of legal powers and duties 
shapes the allocation of financial resources, determines duties to provide access to 
information, and is the key determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships 
(Laughlin 1996). However, this early model's emphasis on the rules of the game 
perhaps gives insufficient emphasis to the less formal but no less important rules 
which largely define the institutions of society. Moreover, the model’s emphasis on 
organisations possibly downplays the diverse interests of individuals within 
organisations (Stoker 1995).
The foregoing discussion suggests that the survival of organisations depends 
largely on their ability to cope with environmental contingencies, negotiating 
exchanges to ensure the continuation of needed resources. Morgan (1988: 94) claims 
that, “gone is the old-fashioned notion of hierarchy in which one member (for 
example, the focal organisation) directs the activities of other members. In comes the 
notion of a network which must be managed as a system of interdependent j
stakeholders”. The term network refers to two or more organisations or actors j
involved in long-term relationships (Thorelli 1986, in Costa 1996). Johnston and 
Lawrence (1991: 193-195) define network as a “set of independent companies that 
work closely together to manage the flow of goods and services along the entire 
value-added chain in which each player has a stake in others success”. A network, 
according to Aldrich and Whetten (1981), is the totality of all the units connected by a 
certain type of relationship, whereas Scharpf (1978) defines networks as the ensemble 
of direct and indirect linkages defined by mutual relationships of dependency. Benson 
(1982: 148) views networks as “a complex of organisations connected to each other 
by resource dependencies and distinguished from each other by breaks in the structure 
of resource dependencies”. To Hall (2000) network means a wide range of co­
operative behaviour between otherwise competing organisations and between 
organisations through social and economic relationships and transactions. Based on 
these definitions, three important characteristics of networks can be observed: (1) 
networks exist because of interdependencies between actors, (2) networks consist of a
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variety of actors each with their own goals, and (3) networks consist of relations of a 
more or less lasting nature between actors (Klinj 1997).
Networks involve organisations of all sizes in various combinations. They can 
be locally, regionally or internationally based, can occur at all stages of the value 
chain, and they range from highly informal relationships through to contractual 
obligations (Hall 2000). Among the advantages of network relationships are that they 
can help to pool resources in order to increase competitiveness, to draw up strategic 
management and marketing plans, to reduce operating costs, and to increase know­
how (Buhalis and Cooper 1998: 338).
The idea that actors are dependent on each other because they need each other’s 
resources to achieve their goals lies at the core of network theory. Networks develop 
because of the interdependency between actors. The division of work in a network 
means that firms are dependent on each other. Therefore, “their activities need to be 
co-ordinated. Co-ordination is not achieved through a central plan or an organisational 
hierarchy, nor does it take place through price mechanisms, as in the traditional 
market model. Instead, co-ordination takes place through interaction among firms in 
the network, in which price is just one of several influencing conditions” (Harris 
2000). Powell (1990: 272) observes that “A basic assumption of network relations is 
that one party is dependent upon resources controlled by another, and that there are 
gains to be had by the pooling of resources. In essence, the parties to a network agree 
to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others” (Powell 
1990: 272). Similarly, Mondragon (1998) notes that there exists a situation of ‘ 
interdependence between different government levels and institutions, and it is this 
situation of interdependence which will give rise to intergovernmental relations. 
Importantly, successful network relations rely on the existence of trust.
Network theory suggests that a policy is a result of interaction between a 
number of actors, and there is no single actor who has enough power to determine the 
strategic actions of the others. The theory also stresses the fact that more or less 
stable, lasting relational patterns develop between actors, which influence the 
interaction patterns taking place within networks. The position of actors can be 
calculated through the assessment of the regularity of communication and interactions
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(frequency, directness and centrality) (Klinj, 1997). Several classifications of 
network relationships have been developed and one classification is now presented 
which is of particular value for this study (Harper 1993; Whetten 1981; Hall 2000).
3.4.1 Network relations
(1) A dyadic linkage is the simplest form of interaction (Benson 1975). A 
dyadic linkage is formed when two organisations find it mutually beneficial to 
collaborate in accomplishing a common goal. A less formal type of dyadic interaction 
entails simple co-ordination of various aspects of two organisations’ production 
activities. These dyadic linkages differ from joint ventures since a unique 
organisational entity or project is not created. Instead organisations simply agree to 
co-ordinate their respective activities to increase efficacy. Because the commitment of 
organisational resources is modest, the dyadic relationship is typically less formal and 
consequently more difficult to maintain. It is generally dependent on the informal 
agreements between the initiators and, as a result, it is vulnerable to turnover in 
organisational personnel. Dyadic co-ordination is the most fundamental form of 
interorganisational relations and a great deal of research has examined the antecedents 
and consequences of these relations.
(2) Organisation sets refer to interorganisational linkages that are clusters of 
dyadic relations maintained by a focal organisation. They refer to the sum total of 
interorganisational linkages established by the focal organisation. Hence it is not a 
true network because, although all the dyadic linkages between the focal and 
interacting organisations are examined, the other relations between the interacting 
organisations are ignored.
(3) The third form is called an action set, which is essentially a purposive 
network. That is, it is a coalition of organisations working together to accomplish a 
specific purpose. The concept of action set refers to an interacting group of 
organisations, whereas the concept of organisation set is explicitly centred on a single 
focal organisation. Philips (1960) identifies four conditions that affect the degree to 
which an inter-firm action set will be able to achieve co-ordinated behaviour. First, 
the number of organisations in the action set; second, the extent to which a single 
powerful organisation assumes a leadership role; third, the degree of similarity in
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values and attitudes among the members; and, finally, the impact of behaviour in 
other action sets.
(4) The final form is the network. Network relations involve a group of 
organisations that share common organisational ties and among which can be 
recognised a bounded interorganisational system. Network relations can be seen as a 
form of steering aimed at promoting joint problem solving or policy development 
(Kickert et al 1997). According to this concept, a central organisation is no longer 
seen as occupying a superior position to other parties, but as being on an equal footing 
with them (Kickert et al 1997). Thus, the formulation and implementation of policies 
within networks is about co-operation between interdependent parties with different 
and often conflicting rationality, interests and strategies. Implementation processes 
are not seen as ex ante formulated goals, but as an interaction process in which actors 
exchange information about problems, preferences and means, and also trade-off their 
goals and resources. The pattern of interaction represented in this form becomes most 
instructive to an investigator when s/he understands the dynamic processes that have 
generated the configuration (Whetten 1981). This requires an in-depth understanding 
both of the contextual factors impinging on the entire network and the evolutionary 
processes occurring within the dyadic and action set components of the network. Hall 
(2000) notes that in order to improve the potential contribution of network 
development it becomes essential that network relationships move from dyadic 
relations and organisation sets to action sets and formal networks. He further notes 
that the success of networks depends on their structure in that they should be 
internally driven rather than maintained by government. According to Hall, like any 
other organisational structure, networks are goal driven and they will go through an 
organisational lifecycle. It is also impossible to assume that every network will 
succeed. However, the creation of co-operative arrangements between multiple 
organisations will undoubtedly achieve more than when they are focused on a single 
organisation (Hall 2000).
3.4.2 Strategies in network management
Various strategies are utilised in network management. Four will be considered 
here as they are particularly relevant to this study.
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(1) The most frequently used strategies are co-operative strategies (Benson 
1975). In co-operative strategies, change is sought through agreements and joint 
planning in which each affected party participates and exercises options. Network 
alterations coming out of such a process are typically compromises agreed upon by 
the affected organisations. Such compromises usually involve a process of negotiation 
and exchange through which each party has voluntarily given up some valued 
condition in exchange for similar concessions on the part of others. Despite the 
frequency of co-operative strategies, the conditions for their success are restrictive. 
Such strategies are limited to situations in which each party has some minimal degree 
of power vis-a-vis other parties. Each party must hold something of value for the 
other party and be capable of resisting the others’ demand. Only then can co-operative 
strategies be effective.
If a party cannot withhold something of value from another, there is no basis for 
the latter to make concessions. Agreements reached where the minimal conditions for 
co-operative exchange are absent simply express and formalise the clear-cut 
dominance of one party over the other. This does not mean that equality is a 
precondition for co-operative strategies. On the contrary, exchange between unequal 
parties is common. Each party must be capable at a minimum of sustaining itself as an 
operating concern despite opposition or harassment by other parties. Agreements may 
cover a wide variety of products or behavioural patterns by the organisations. 
Exchanges of funds, personnel, facilities, and clients are among the more obvious. Of 
equal importance are agreements to cease disruptive or harassing activities. Thus, 
agencies often enter into agreements to stop interfering with each other. Such an 
agreement may permit each party to fulfil its programme requirements more 
effectively and assure itself of a continuing or increasing flow of resources. Many 
programmes intended to produce enhanced co-operation between agencies fail 
because co-operation is sought without attending to underlying power relations 
(Aldrich 1976).
(2) The second major strategy is a disruptive strategy. This involves purposive 
conduct which threatens the resource generating capacities of a target agency. Such 
activities are undertaken in order to force change on the target agency, including 
altered relations with other participants in the network or environment. Such tactics
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must effectively attack vital resource-maintaining functions in order to be successful. 
This can be accomplished in a number of ways, including (1) domain violations - the 
invasion of the target agency's domain by the conduct of programmes falling clearly 
within its domain, (b) fund diversion - the acquisition of funds which might otherwise 
have gone to the target agency, and (c) programme circumvention - activities which 
interfere with the programme effectiveness of the target and thereby diminish its 
capacity to compete for funds and authority (Benson 1975).
Disruptive tactics are varied but each involves a tendency to undermine the 
position of the target agency in its political economy and to use this as means of 
producing change (Benson 1975: 242). Two conditions of the political economy 
appear to favour disruptive tactics: (1) a substantial power imbalance between 
agencies, such that the more powerful agency can largely disregard non-disruptive 
requests and demands from the weaker one, and (2) substantial fragmentation in 
resource channels, such that one agency may sustain disruptive actions despite the 
objections and resistance of another even though the other is more powerful. In the 
first instance, disruptive strategies are chosen where normatively prescribed 
communications and pressures are not effective. In the second, breaks in the resource 
channels and a certain disconnectedness are necessary if disruptive tactics are not to 
be quickly stifled by the countermoves of a powerful target agency (Aldrich, and 
Jeffry 1976).
(3) Manipulative strategies involve the purposeful alteration of the 
environmental constraints affecting the flow of resources. Such action is undertaken 
as a means to produce change in interorganisational networks, in the programme 
priorities, and in the technological commitments of agencies. This type of strategy is 
analogous to governmental regulation of the economy thorough the manipulation of 
interest rates, tax rates, and supply. Manipulative strategies of particular importance in 
inter-agency relations include the alteration of the total volume of resources flowing 
into a network. Resource flows may be increased or decreased as a means of changing 
the probabilities of network events. Another manipulative strategy is the alteration of 
resource channels. Resource flow may be diverted from existing channels and into 
new ones as a means of changing the priorities operative within a network. Such a 
strategy involves changing the fundamental connections between a network of
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agencies and the supportive sectors in its environment. Manipulative strategies 
require a certain minimal degree of network autonomy or decentralisation.
Understanding must include the bases of power and influence among relevant 
organisations, publics, and offices in the network (Benson 1975).
(4) Authoritative strategies involve the authoritative alignment or realignment of 
network relations. In this case, an authoritative participant, such as an executive 
office or legislative body, precisely specifies the relations between agencies. It 
establishes negative and positive boundaries of the inter-agency relations, specifying 
what must and must not be done. Authoritative strategies may stem from a wide 
variety of participant bodies. Government bureaux, legislators, executive offices, and 
judicial bodies and publics may utilise authoritative strategies (Benson 1975: 244).
Such strategies would be utilised provided that the participants have a dominant 
position in the flow of resources in terms of money or authority to identify the nature »
of programmes and linkages at subordinate levels. These strategies are authoritative in j
the sense that the directing agent uses its power to mandate precise activities and not 
merely to encourage or reward those activities. The option of choosing an 
authoritative strategy lies only with a particularly powerful participant, while other 
strategies may be selected by a variety of actors (Litwak and Hylton 1962). Another i
example relates to the formalisation of relations. Power may be used to tighten up J
relations between agencies by precisely specifying linkages, which have been 
previously left informal or variable. Mutual obligations and boundaries may be 
precisely set in such a process. Such a formalisation process appears often to be a 
response at high levels to problems generated by coercively formed relations at lower 
levels (Whetten and Leung 1979). A third example is the comprehensive 
reorganisation of relations. Power may be used to rearrange inter-agency boundaries 
and linkages in an entire system.
3.5 Factors affecting interorganisational relations
An inter-organisational network is in equilibrium to the extent that participant 
organisations are engaged in highly co-ordinated, co-operative inter-actions based on 
normative consensus and mutual respect. In research by Benson, Kunce and 
Thompson (1973) four dimensions of inter-organisational equilibrium have been 
identified. These are: (1) domain consensus, (2) ideological consensus, (3)
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interorganisational evaluation, and (4) work co-ordination. Equilibrium is defined as 
“a condition that occurs when the relationship between two or more organisations 
consists of harmonious, non-conflicting, collaborative interactions” (Benson et al
1973). Work co-ordination is defined as patterns of collaboration and co-operation 
between organisations. Work is co-ordinated to the extent that programmes and 
activities in two or more organisations are geared into each other with a maximum 
effectiveness and efficiency. Domain consensus refers to the agreement between 
participants regarding the appropriate role and scope of an agency. Ideological 
consensus refers to agreement among participants regarding the nature of the tasks 
confronted by organisations and the appropriate approaches to those tasks. 
Interorganisational evaluation refers to the judgement by participants or workers in 
one organisation of the value and quality of the work conducted by another 
organisation.
These four variables are used to define and measure the degree of equilibrium 
present among the agencies. When the relationship between a pair of organisations is 
characterised by the presence of each of these phenomena, a condition of 
interorganisational equilibrium is said to be present. To the extent that these 
characteristics are absent, the relationship lacks equilibrium. These four components 
are thought to comprise an interorganisational system in the sense that a stable 
interrelationship between these factors tends to be maintained. When one component 
is present, the others also tend to occur (Benson et al 1973). These variables should be 
balanced. If one component of an inter-agency relationship is inadequate, then the 
other components are also expected to be inadequate. A network or a group of 
agencies are regarded as in equilibrium if these four variables were at relatively high 
levels. External forces to an inter-agency network may however lead to unbalanced 
conditions, such as when there is a high level of work co-ordination in the presence of 
low domain consensus (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). The distribution of funds and 
authority may influence the domain and ideological components of agencies. Hence, 
the degree to which agencies have a co-ordinated relationship rests upon the 
frequency with which they communicate, the division of their labour in a well 
articulated fashion, and the flexibility or adaptability of their relationships (Ackoff
1974).
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The equilibrium components tend toward balance in the sense that an increase 
(or decrease) in one component is likely to produce a corresponding increase (or 
decrease) in other components (Benson et al 1973). Domain consensus directly 
influences the co-ordination of work (i.e., the greater the agreement between 
organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater the co­
ordination of work between them). Domain consensus directly influences ideological 
consensus (i.e., the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the 
appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their agreement regarding the nature of 
and appropriate modes of activities). Domain consensus directly influences 
interorganisational evaluations (i.e., the greater the agreement between organisations 
regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their tendency to evaluate 
each other positively). It should be noted that the tendency for disagreements about 
agency role and scope aggravates ideological differences. In other words, the 
tendency for domain dissensus intensifies ideological dissensus (Benson et al 1973).
Ideological consensus directly influences the co-ordination of work. That is, the 
greater the agreement on the nature and appropriate modes of attack upon common 
tasks, the greater the degree of co-ordination of work. Ideological differences between 
organisations have many sources. For instance, ideological differences are rooted in 
the legislative mandates of agencies, and therefore a certain formulation of the 
agency’s approach to its task may be important for legitimating its activities (Litwak 
and Hylton 1953). Ideological consensus directly influences interorganisational 
evaluation, i.e., the greater the agreement on the nature and appropriate modes of 
attack upon common tasks, the higher the level of interorganisational evaluations. 
Interorganisational evaluation directly influences co-ordination of work, the higher 
two or more organisations evaluate each other, the greater the likelihood of co­
ordinated activity between them (Whetten and Leung 1979).
Interorganisational evaluation is affected by domain consensus and by 
ideological consensus. First, in defending domains, established or proposed 
participants often disparage the performance of an opposing agency. That is, the 
participant is more likely to perceive and to report a negative evaluation of an agency, 
with which his own organisation is in conflict or competition. Conversely, the 
participant is likely to evaluate more highly the services of agencies with which a
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normalised and mutually agreeable set of domains have been negotiated. Partly, this 
results from rationalisation or distortion associated with the defence of vested 
interests. However, it is likely that agencies with incompatible definitions of domains 
will become involved in interactions, which participants will regard as evidence of 
poor quality service by the other organisation. That is, because of incompatible 
definitions of roles, the participants in two organisations will experience problems in 
dealing with each other and will, therefore, develop negative judgements of each other 
(Benson 1977). To summarise, positive interorganisational evaluation of other 
organisations operating in compatible domains is important as this increases the 
likelihood of co-ordinated activity between organisations (Benson et al 1973).
Based on these arguments, Aldrich (1979) remarks that an organisation 
attempting to establish a domain would establish an ideology concerning how it will 
approach the task or a justification for its claims. Notably, where other organisations 
are already operating in or near the proposed domain, the participants in the domain- 
proposing organisation tend to sharpen and emphasise ideological differences with 
established organisations (Benson 1982). Consequently, organisations already 
operating in the environment with established domains are not very comfortable with 
the entry of other organisations in the same field. Therefore, they tend to be critical of 
the ideological differences of the newly entered organisation in the subject by 
claiming that its approach to the task is inappropriate. Inevitably, conflict in the 
domain expansion gives rise to domain defence and eventually leading to some degree 
of ideological dissensus (Benson et al 1973).
3.6 Summary
This section has examined why organisations interact with one another. The 
notions of systems theory, interorganisational theory and network theories were 
explained. The types and structures of task environments were reviewed, and two 
approaches used to explicate interorganisational relations were presented. Factors 
affecting the nature and the extent of interorganisational relations were also discussed.
From this review, it is obvious that organisations need to interact with other 
organisations in their task environment in order to acquire the resources needed to 
realise their specific objectives. The environment of an organisation is made up of
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other organisations and each of these controls resources, such as capital, personnel 
and knowledge. Each organisation has to interact with others in order to acquire 
resources necessary for goal achievement, as no organisation alone can possess all the 
necessary resources. These interdependencies create networks of organisations 
(Benson 1975; Pearce 1992). Organisations will search for an adequate supply of 
authority and money from the political and economic system in order to fulfil their 
programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and 
reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). 
When resources are scarce and there is substantial disparity between organisational 
goals, preferences and strategies, conflict between organisations are likely to occur. 
The existence of conflict and its extent is more than likely to inhibit effective 
interactions between organisations.
The survival of organisations depends largely on their ability to cope with 
environmental contingencies, negotiating exchanges to ensure the continuation of 
needed resources. When a number of organisations engage in recurrent, extensive 
interaction with each other, as in the case of central and local tourism organisations, 
they may be considered to form a network (Aldrich 1976,Aldrich and Jeffry 
1976,Benson 1975, Litwak and Hylton 1962). The interactions that occur in such a 
network may consist of exchange of funds, sharing of information, and collaboration 
and sharing of personnel. The interactions may also include expressions of criticism 
or opposition, competition for funds, and even purposeful disregard between agencies. 
Such interaction may at one extreme include extensive, reciprocal exchanges of 
resources or intense hostility and conflict at the other. The organisations in a network 
may be linked directly or indirectly. Some networks may consist of a series of 
organisations linked by multiple, direct ties to each other. Others may be characterised 
by clustering or centring of linkages around one of a few mediating or controlling 
organisations. Networks may be quite varied in scope and in degree of interaction. In 
other words, the networks may be composed of varying degrees and types of positive 
and negative interactions.
The tourism organisation network is composed of a spectrum of public and 
private sector tourist organisations (national, regional, and local) that seek a variety of 
goals and undertake a range of functions. In most cases, these organisations have
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different values, ideologies, goals and interests and this will give rise to different 
interpretations of the problem at hand and therefore of solutions. Pearce (1992: 20) 
observes that “as tourism is a relatively recent and in many places a far from 
dominant sector of the economy, it is likely that the tourist organisation network will 
heavily reflect established political and administrative frameworks, boundaries and 
division of power”. It is also evident that thp political culture of the country, its 
general economic conditions, as well as the broader government policies may 
influence the structure, goals, and the functions of the tourist organisations and the 
network. Pearce, for instance, states that the extent to which the government supports 
interventionist or free-market policies will influence the goals of the tourist 
organisations, as well as the ways in which they pursue their activities. The state of 
the economy will impinge on the resources available to them. This implies that 
tourist organisations will act like other organisations and will interact with the broader 
environment in order to acquire resources while also being regulated by the law.
Organisations form relationships with other organisations in order to secure 
possible gains from increased scale and scope (in research, services, products), from 
information sharing, from building complementary skills and resource synergy, from 
strengthening their competitive position, and from access to new technologies and or 
new markets. Two main approaches have been examined that help to understand 
interactions between organisations - the exchange and the power-dependency 
approaches. The first is based on exchange theory (Levine and White 1961), which 
assumes that organisational exchange is a voluntary activity between two 
organisations, which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realisation of 
their respective goals or objectives. According to this approach, organisations view 
the chances of realising their goals in some domains to be greater by performing 
jointly rather than by acting independently (Pearce 1992). The emphasis is on 
voluntary, goal-oriented behaviour, not just on the transfer of material goods (Pearce
1992). The power-dependency approach views the interorganisational network as a 
political economy, emphasising the importance of resource acquisition in the analysis 
of interorganisational interactions, specifically the acquisition and defence of money 
and authority (Pearce 1992).
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While some researchers argue that these two theories are dissimilar, they are 
nevertheless closely related. Each of these theories shares the view that the 
recognition of an organisation’s domain by other organisations (domain consensus) 
leads to interdependencies. Organisations conduct their work according to a set of 
norms about which agencies can appropriately carry out certain activities, which 
agencies can appropriately receive certain kinds of resources, which agencies have a 
certain right to existence, and so on. These norms form an interrelated set of domains. 
Stated differently, each organisation learns about the set of boundaries and linkages 
between agencies.
Regardless of the approach adopted, a review of literature suggests that building, 
maintaining and managing interorganisational relations depend heavily on the degree 
of equilibrium present among organisations. The degree of equilibrium is determined 
by the level of agreement between organisations regarding: (1) the appropriate role 
and scope of an agency (domain consensus); (2) the nature of the tasks confronted by 
the organisations and appropriate approaches to those tasks (ideological consensus,): 
(3) the judgement by workers in one organisation of the value of the work of another 
organisation (positive evaluation); and (4) patterns of collaboration and co-operation 
(work co-ordination) (Benson 1975, Whetten and Leung 1979, Pfeffer and Salancik
1978).
It is also important to note that organisations search for an adequate supply of 
authority and money from the political and economic system in order to fulfil their 
programme requirements, maintain their domain authority, maintain an orderly and 
reliable flow of resources, and to defend their way of doing things (Pearce 1992). The 
extent to which organisations can carry this out depends on two power bases: the 
characteristics of the internal network structure, and the external linkages of the 
network organisations. The chapter that follows reviews different forms of 
interorganisational relations (co-ordination, co-operation, and partnership), and also 
seeks common factors either facilitating or inhibiting the effective formation and 
maintenance of these forms of relationships among organisations.
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4. Inter-organisational Co-ordination
4.1 Introduction
The concept of co-ordination, which includes co-operation, partnership and 
collaboration, has been a topic of interest to scholars and practitioners for several 
decades in different academic fields (e.g., in sociology, organisational behaviour and 
community studies). A long list of arguments could be drawn up from studies in these 
fields illustrating why it is beneficial for organisations to co-ordinate their activities. 
However, only a limited amount of empirical research has been conducted on 
interorganisational co-operation, partnership and collaboration specifically in tourism. 
Little is known about the costs and benefits of these interorganisational relationship 
forms in the tourism sector. This chapter therefore aims to critically review co­
ordination, including co-operation, partnership and collaboration, as forms of 
interorganisational relations. These specific concepts and related interpretations are 
used subsequently in the evaluation of processes and patterns of co-ordination of the 
tourism planning process, and their impact on the relationships and outcomes of 
tourism planning in the Belek case study.
4.2 The benefits of co-ordination
Co-ordination is a central issue for organisations. Employees within the same 
department must co-ordinate to avoid duplication, to complement each other’s efforts 
and to help each other solve problems to complete departmental tasks (Tjosvold 
1988). Similarly, people from different work groups and departments must share their 
experiences and expertise to capture synergy and create new services and products 
(Tjosvold 1988). Co-ordination is a way to bring together disparate agencies to make 
their efforts more compatible (in the interest of equity, effectiveness and efficiency). 
Without co-ordination, the danger of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency is great 
(Robinson et al 2000). There are several other reasons for co-ordination, and the 
approach taken to co-ordination depends upon what one is trying to achieve, and what 
the diversity of interests is (Robinson et al 2000). These include a need to manage the 
range of interests, capacity, and activity, which have their own implications for the 
form of interorganisational co-ordination. Oliver (1990 cited in Hewitt 2000: 53) 
summarises the reasons for co-ordination as follows. The potential reasons could be
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for reciprocity (in the pursuit of common or mutually beneficial goals), efficiency 
(where co-ordination produces higher input-output ratios or economies of scale), 
stability (to overcome uncertainty through risk sharing), and legitimacy (by enhancing 
the prestige and reputation of those co-ordinating).
Another important incentive for interorganisational co-ordination is shared 
learning, which is of particular relevance in developing countries where knowledge 
resources are scarce. Benefits of shared learning fostered by co-ordination between 
organisations may include the potential for challenge and structural critical reflection 
from different perspectives, which can bring in concepts that are new to the learner; 
shared experimentation can reduce the risks and maximise the opportunities for trying 
out new things; and the shared experiences can be supportive (Bessant and Francis 
1999, in Hewitt 2000: 63). Shared experience also helps to explicate the system’s 
principles and to see the patterns, thus “separating the wood from the trees”. Shared 
learning provides an environment for revealing assumptions and exploring mental 
models outside of the normal experience of individual organisations (Bessant and 
Francis 1999, in Hewitt 2000: 63).
Co-ordination between the private and public sectors is vital in tourism (Jamal 
and Getz 1995; Timothy 1998). For example, the public sector depends largely on the 
private sector to provide services and to finance, at least in part, the construction of 
tourist facilities (Timothy 1998). Tourism development projects may be stalled 
without co-ordination, since private investors require government approval of, and 
support for most projects (Timothy 1998). In most developing countries government 
agencies compete among themselves for scarce operating funds. In some cases the 
competition between private and public sector tourism initiatives may result in the 
deterioration of relations between these sectors (Timothy 1998). Efficiency could be 
improved if various agencies would co-operate by co-ordinating their efforts in 
tourism development projects (Timothy 1998). Less money would have to be spent 
and more funds could be allocated to other purposes.
In a participatory tourism development project several actors usually are 
involved in the tourism development process and interact with other agencies. Any 
lack of co-ordination is likely to frustrate the potential opportunities for the
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community to involve itself in tourism development (Tosun 2000). This would be a 
missed opportunity. Tourism projects involving collective arrangements are likely to 
have more leverage if they arise out of the local knowledge of the participants (Healey 
1997). However, despite the benefits that co-ordination can offer, some individuals or 
organisations may prefer not to be involved in co-ordination because of the inherent 
difficulties and costs involved. Indeed, extensive co-ordination between members of a 
service delivery system may reinforce the status quo by hindering the entrance of new 
organisations, technologies and ideologies. These issues will be dealt with later in this 
chapter.
4.3 Describing co-ordination
The academic literature provides no universally accepted definition of the 
concept of co-ordination, and the meaning of co-ordination is likely to differ from 
individual to individual. The concept is also often used interchangeably in the 
literature with such concepts as co-operation, partnership and collaboration. The 
similarities and differences between these concepts will be dealt with subsequently.
Rogers and Whetten (1982: 12) provide a general definition of the concept of 
co-ordination as “the process whereby two or more organisations create and/or use 
existing decision-rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared 
task environment”. Schermerhom (1975) defines co-ordination as deliberate relations 
between otherwise autonomous organisations for the joint accomplishment of 
individual operating goals. Mott (1968) proposes that co-ordination leads to 
adjustments among the organisations in their respective outlooks, objectives and 
methods of operation. According to Hall et al (1978), co-ordination is the extent to 
which organisations attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of 
other organisations. Others, such as Aiken et al (1975), define co-ordination as the 
articulation of elements in a service delivery system so that the comprehensiveness, 
compatibility, and co-operation among the elements are maximised. Similarly,
Warren et al (1974) describe co-ordination as a process of concerted decision-making 
or actions where the decisions or actions of two or more organisations are made 
simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each 
other. Spann (1979: 411, cited in Hall 2000) notes that “co-ordination usually refers to
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the problem of relating units or decisions so that they fit in with one another, are not 
at cross-purposes, and operate in ways that are reasonably consistent and coherent”.
Co-ordination can be seen as a structure or a process (Rogers and Whetten 
1982). From a structural perspective, the relationships of co-ordination between the 
participants can be described in relation to the relative power of each, the formal rules 
guiding their efforts, and the degree to which participants lose autonomy. However, 
when co-ordination is viewed as a process, the emphasis is often placed on joint 
decision-making (Rogers and Whetten 1982). In this process, the behaviour of 
participant organisations is adjusted because of the influence of other organisations 
and the wider environment (Warren et al 1974 in Rogers and Whetten 1982: 17).
One school of thought equates co-ordination with control, either in the form of 
an imposing authority or in the form of a stifling bureaucracy. However, for others co­
ordination represents empowerment -it is a liberating ideal where mutual exchange 
and reinforcement encourage further co-operation (Bennet 2000). However, co­
ordination can be depicted as being about power, including power to determine the 
allocation of resources and to exert influence over conflicting parties. In this view, co­
ordination is generally agreed to be desirable, though many organisations are not in 
favour of it. In relation to the nature of co-ordination, Bennet (2000) further suggests 
that most relationships of co-ordination are short-term, ad hoc, and based on self 
interest. And, more importantly, he suggests that most parties do not think hard 
enough about the reasons for co-ordination. In fact in most cases organisations still 
want their autonomy and freedom to act as they choose. A further important point is 
that co-ordination in different sectors may be extremely different. Moreover, 
appreciation of the value of co-ordination between the public and private sectors or 
between different levels of the public sector tends to vary greatly from country to 
country (Rogers and Whetten 1982).
4.4 Co-operation and co-ordination
The concepts of co-ordination and co-operation are often mixed up not only in 
the literature but also in reality (Hall 2000). In fact, there are some quite distinct 
differences between these concepts. (Hall 2000). There are dissimilarities in terms of 
the decision rules, degree of formalisation, kinds of goals emphasised, amount of 
resources involved, primary actors, and the implications for vertical and horizontal
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ties (Aiken et al 1975; Warren et al 1974). In general terms, co-ordination often refers 
to “formal institutionalised relationships among existing networks of organisations, 
interests and or individuals”, while co-operation is characterised by “informal 
tradeoffs and by attempts to establish reciprocity in the absence of rules” (Mulford 
and Rogers 1982: 13).
Two distinguishing characteristics of co-operation are that it is usually 
charecterised by voluntary actions and purposes (Schermerhoml975). Six other major 
distinguishing characteristics can be derived from the literature. (1) As mentioned 
earlier, co-ordination is usually more formal than co-operation and it may require 
contractual agreements (Davidson 1976; Morris 1963). (2) The goals when 
organisations co-operate are likely to be vague and the tasks less clearly delimited. - 
Further, “co-ordination occurs where there is agreement on a set of allocative criteria 
with respect to the resources controlled jointly by the organisations. In contrast, co­
operation is more likely to be characterised by informal trade-offs and by attempts to 
establish some reciprocity in the absence of rules” (White 1974 in Rogers et al 1982).
(3) Co-ordination includes interdependent decisions (Lindblom 1965; Mott 1968; 
Thompson 1967) and the outcomes from co-operation and co-ordination are different. 
With co-operation, one organisation works with another to achieve their different 
individual goals, whereas with co-ordination joint decisions or actions give rise to 
joint outcomes that may be quite different from their initial preferred outcomes 
(Rogers and Whetten 1982). (4) Linkages among organisations that stem from co­
operation are temporary and not formalised and they are less likely to have a 
permanent effect on the horizontal and vertical structure of a community (White
1974). By contrast, co-ordination, motivated by desires at the local level to avoid 
duplication or redundancy, can affect these horizontal dimensions. Moreover, co­
ordination mandated by higher levels to bring local, state, and federal programmes 
into close arrangement may have even more permanent effects. (5) Since the 
relationships in co-operation are more temporary and informal, and involve relatively 
few resources, co-operation is less likely to alter the relationships between 
organisations at the local level or relationships with the state levels (Rogers and 
Whettenl982). The relatively temporary and loose efforts are less likely to require 
substantive resources from organisations. By contrast, co-ordination is more constant 
and more difficult to end. Hence, co-ordination requires a larger commitment of
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various kinds of organisational resources, including personnel and money (Rogers and 
Whetten 1982). (6) There may also be a divergence in terms of the status of personnel 
involved in co-operation and co-operation. Higher-ranking persons are more likely to 
be involved in co-ordination, as decisions that modify organisations are under 
consideration. More importantly, when joint decisions are made that influence 
resources or programmes or goals, higher-ranking persons are especially likely to 
interact with their counterparts in other organisations (Rogers and Whetten 1982). Co­
operation is more likely to involve persons from lower ranks.
While conceptually they are different concepts, they are both about the 
collective action of organisations. The factors contributing to the success and failure 
of co-ordination do not appear to be substantially different from those of co-operation. 
These factors will be examined following a discussion of the various forms of co­
ordination.
4.5 Forms of co-ordination
While various definitions of co-ordination have been presented, this section 
deals with the different forms of co-ordination identified in the literature. The 
phenomena included within the concept of co-ordination are extremely broad 
(Whetten 1981). Most of the literature on co-ordination actually focuses on a limited 
part of this spectrum, namely two or more organisations coming together periodically 
to plan future activities or to work on joint projects. The more ad hoc side of this 
continuum is often conceptualised as interorganisational co-operation, and it happens 
in a loose fashion that does not require formal arrangements.
In general, co-ordination can be separated into two major types: managed and 
unmanaged co-ordination (Mott 1968). Managed co-ordination is different from 
unmanaged, with the latter happening in a random or self-regulating fashion. 
Unmanaged co-ordination embraces the unanticipated consequences of working 
together as the organisations adjust and adapt to each other’s policies in an unplanned 
way. In unmanaged co-ordination, a shared recognition of, or identification with a 
common issue or problem is less apparent.
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Whetten (1981) also classifies co-ordination into mutual adjustment, alliance 
and corporate (Van de Ven and Walker 1984, Zeitz 1980, Mott 1968). These forms of 
co-ordination vary in terms of the intensity, form of operational social power, 
formalisation and scope of the co-ordination activity. Mutual adjustment is the 
weakest but the most general form of co-ordination, while the corporate form is the 
strongest. On the other hand, alliance is relatively stronger than mutual adjustment as 
the participating agencies have more than a few shared goals. The mutual adjustment 
form typifies the type of co-ordination that occurs in a competitive market. 
Consequently, the focus in mutual adjustment situations is on the participating 
agencies, and there are few if any shared goals toward which they work. When 
common goals do emerge these are apt to be only temporary. Co-ordination tends to 
focus on specific cases rather than on the development of a comprehensive delivery 
system. The agency representatives in such situations are generally professionals or 
staff at the supervisory rather than the top administrator level. Individuals who are 
involved in the day-to-day activities of any agency often attend meetings or make 
phone contact with their counterparts in other agencies as the need arises. Since there 
are few if  any resources being committed through the joint activity, it is unnecessary 
for those with higher authority to get involved. The rules used in this form of co­
ordination are developed ad hoc in the process of interaction. They are likely to grow 
out of interpersonal as well as organisational concerns. Consequently, the violation of 
rules and norms is not regarded as severely as in other co-ordinating strategies, nor 
are the types of punishment or sanctions for violation nearly as severe. Further there is 
no central unit to monitor or detect violations. In this context differences of opinions 
regarding goals and programme administration can only be resolved through 
negotiation and bargaining between participants (Van de Van and Walker 1984, 
Davidson 1976, Klonglan et al 1975, Lehman 1975).
Whetten (1981) further distinguishes between voluntary and mandated co­
ordination, and argues that their antecedents differ. According to Whetten, there are 
actually five basic conditions that must be met in order for voluntary co-ordination to 
occur. However, when the law mandates that co-ordination should occur, only three 
conditions must be met. In the case of voluntary co-ordination, it is necessary (1) first 
of all for administrators to have a positive attitude towards interorganisational co­
ordination. Otherwise they will define their organisational problem in such a way that
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co-ordination does not appear to be a useful solution. (2) Next, they must recognise an 
organisational need for co-ordination that is salient enough to justify absorbing the 
costs inherent in co-ordination. The recognition of partial interdependence is a 
necessary prerequisite of interorganisational co-ordination. When organisations share 
the same client pool, the same resource base or provide the same type of services, the 
need for co-ordination becomes apparent. If organisations share too little in common 
then they have little incentive to collaborate. On the other hand, if they share too 
much, then they may perceive one another as strong competitors, and they might 
refuse to work together.
(3) Once this positive attitude has been articulated then the search for potential 
co-ordination patterns is initiated. However, co-ordination is not going to occur 
unless two organisations become aware of their complementary needs. (4) After the 
pool of candidates has been assembled the members are evaluated in terms of their 
desirability and compatibility. Organisations are sought that have roughly equal 
status, have common definitions of the problems to be addressed, have an 
encompassing professional ideology, do not present a threat to respective domain 
claims, and have compatible organisational structures and procedures. (5) Finally, 
after deciding to co-ordinate, the participating organisation must assess their capacity 
to adequately manage the ongoing co-ordination process. This is particularly 
important because successful co-ordinating programmes often break down because 
one or both of the partners are incapable of maintaining the relationship. This could 
result from a resource cutback, a small staff overloaded with internal administrative 
responsibilities, staff inefficiency or ineptitude, inadequate internal or 
interorganisational communication channels, or a lack of flexibility in organisational 
policies for dealing with exceptions (Van de Van and Walker 1984, Zeitz 1980, 
Davidson 1976, Lehman 1975).
4.6 Facilitators and inhibitors to collective action and the influences on 
success or failure
Next, it is instructive to examine the factors influencing an organisation’s 
decision to enter into or avoid such collective arrangements as co-ordination, co­
operation and partnerships (Whetten 1981). The decision can be analysed within the 
framework of a general cost and benefit analysis, for inherent in every
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interorganisational agreement are both assets and liabilities. The principal asset is 
access to the resources controlled by other organisations. However, in return for an 
enlarged resource base, organisations give up some of their autonomy since resource 
exchange agreements with other organisations also represent obligations that restrict 
their degree of freedom. The more agreements that are in force, the more 
commitments and obligations must be considered in making subsequent decisions. 
“With this in mind administrators must be convinced that the benefits of entering into 
a new co-ordination agreement outweigh the inherent costs” (Whetten 1981: 14).
From an organisation’s point of view, to become involved in co-ordination 
implies that (1) it will lose some of its freedom to act independently when it prefers to 
maintain control over its domain and affairs. (2) It must invest in scarce resources and 
energy to develop and maintain a relationship with another organisation when the 
potential returns on this investment are often unclear or intangible. Thus, the parties 
may prefer not to become involved in an interorganisational relation (such as co­
ordination) unless they are compelled to do so, either because of scarcity, or because 
of specialisation, which requires the organisations to fulfil their obligations. Benefits 
may be outweighed by a greater cost if either organisation is perceived as a 
competitor (Jamison 1971).
Organisations may calculate the difference between benefits and costs, and if 
the latter outweighs the former it is unlikely that co-ordination will occur (Davidson 
1976). It has been revealed that the costs of co-ordination increase as organisations 
increase in differences. Differences that involve greater costs are: (1) different tasks 
and or resource asymmetry (Hooyman 1976); (2) different modes of operation and 
priorities (Black and Kase 1963; Alexander 1969); (3) different goals (Reid 1964; 
Charters and Pellegrin 1972); and (4) lack of functional interdependence of services 
(Wright 1979). Also co-ordination is unlikely when the other organisation is viewed 
as lacking exchange items (Lewis 1969; Wright 1979), or having inadequate resources 
such as money or personnel to exchange (Baker and O’Brien 1971; Grass and 
Umansky 1971). In short, parties will deem co-ordination too costly if their own 
organisations are weak in resources.
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Several factors appear to be critical for successful collective endeavours (Table 
4.1). These include an enabling environment, domain similarity, shared goals and 
complementary resources, geographical closeness, information sharing, frequency and 
quality of contact, high trust, and appropriateness of partners. The most important of 
these will now be explained in turn. The definition of partnerships suggests that 
participants must work within an agreed-upon set of norms and rules to develop 
mutual orientation. The study does not focus on collaboration as other studies in 
tourism field investigate the issue in depth.
Table 4.1 Factors contributing to the success or failure of different forms of 
collective arrangements______________________________________________
Forms of Relation Success Factors Failure Factors
Co-ordination Continuity and appropriateness of partners
Domain similarity
An enabling environment
Geographical closeness
High trust
Information sharing
Quality and frequency o f contact
Shared goals and complementary resources
A Communication gap 
Fragmentation
Historical relations o f conflict 
Weak institutional culture 
Negative image and stereotyping 
Physical distance 
Political instability 
Power disparity 
Power struggles 
Resource inadequacy
Co-operation Benefits outweigh costs 
Common and complementary goals 
Communication 
An enabling environment 
Existence of mutual need/purpose 
Geographical closeness 
High trust
Recognition o f benefits o f co-operation 
Recognition o f interdependence 
Resource exchange 
Resource scarcity
A centralised approach 
Competitive goals 
Hidden agendas 
Historical relations o f conflict 
-Interest conflicts 
Low communication 
Low trust
Power concentration 
Probable costs
Sensitivity o f organisational domains 
Traditional bureaucracy
Partnership A convenor with enough status and authority 
Accessible and acceptable decentralised 
management
Active dialogue and communication 
A common vision and understanding 
Compatible interests and goals 
Confidence in implementability 
An enabling environment 
Establishment o f legitimacy and trust 
Maintenance o f interest 
Management commitment 
No hidden agendas 
Perceived benefits 
Recognition o f interdependence 
Recognition o f mutual benefits 
Right level o f representatives 
System/staff continuity
Bureaucratic procedures
Discontinuity (withdrawal o f key partners)
Divergent goals
Hidden agendas
Lack o f awareness
Lack o f initial understanding and agreement 
Low degree o f interdependence 
Low trust
Negative evaluations 
Power struggles 
Resource limitations 
Stereotyping 
Turf protection
73
4.6.1 An enabling external environment
Collective action is fostered when enabling laws and management systems 
empower the formation and continuance of partnership agreements (Selin 1998). An 
enabling environment involves the necessary legal, economic and political conditions 
for co-ordination (Robinson 2000). With sufficient power, organisations may choose 
to follow competitive strategies; but if the acquisition of power is hard, organisations 
are more likely to choose co-operative strategies, including contracting for services, 
and co-opting (Rogers and Whettenl982). According to Aldrich (1979), organisations 
faced with external resource constraints are likely to make interorganisational 
arrangements when they can not get help from the government or support from a 
social or political elite.
4.6.2 Domain similarity
Another issue important for understanding what kinds of organisations are 
likely to engage in co-ordination is domain similarity, defined as the degree to which 
the organisations have the same services, clients, and personnel skills (Van de Ven 
and Walker 1984). Three factors are crucial (Hall et al 1977). First, the parties need to 
be sure that their organisations are equal in status. Second, they have to perceive that 
they are equal in social status. Finally, they have to reach a consensus on the 
exclusive right of each organisation to its specific domain.
However, the evidence is conflicting on whether domain similarity helps or 
hinders the establishment of interorganisational co-ordination (Van de Ven and 
Walker 1984). At the low extreme of domain similarity, organisations have little in 
common and are not likely to initiate communication with one another. When 
organisations have moderately similar domains, they are likely to have 
complementary resources, which tends to motivate them to communicate more 
frequently in order to negotiate arrangements that are mutually beneficial. 
Furthermore, organisations with moderately similar professional skills, clients and 
services represent a common culture of shared meanings, which facilitates 
communication. But, as the domain similarity increases, the potential for territorial 
disputes and competition increases (Van de Ven and Walker 1984). If organisations 
have highly similar domains, they are also likely to need the same kinds of resources, 
which reduces the potential benefits of making exchanges. Thus, having highly
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similar domains may hinder the potential for effective co-ordination to emerge 
between organisations.
4.6.3 Shared goals and complementary resources
Three conditions must be present before co-ordination of any substance can 
occur (Reid 1964). Agencies must have shared goals, complementary resources, and 
also efficient mechanisms for controlling whatever exchanges are involved. When 
agencies are seeking similar or identical goals, a major force for co-ordination is 
brought into play. Each agency has a stake in the goal attainment of the other, and 
both therefore may become willing to enter into exchanges to further mutual 
objectives. Moreover, sharing of goals leads to logical divisions of responsibility and 
labour, which can reduce the burden of each. With co-operative goals, people realise 
that they can be more successful together and it is in their own self-interest to assist 
each other (Tjosvold 1986). As' one person moves towards accomplishing their goals 
others move towards reaching theirs. Consequently they will help each other and 
manage conflicts.
However, people with competitive goals develop very different dynamics. They 
believe that their goals are negatively related, so that as they move toward goal 
attainment then the others will find it more difficult to achieve their goals. They are in 
a win-lose situation in which their success is incompatible. They fail to assist each 
other and either avoid or escalate their conflicts. People with independent goals 
believe that they can attain their objectives whether others do or do not achieve their 
goals: their success is unrelated. As a result, they minimise their interaction (Tjosvold
1988). In a study of public health organisations in Western Canada, Tjosvold (1988) 
found that goal interdependence affected co-operation both within and between 
groups. Employees who stated that their goals were co-operative had trusting 
expectations, exchanged information and resources, worked efficiently and 
productively, and developed confidence for further collaboration. However, 
interactions with competitive goals were characterised by suspicion, little exchange, 
and low productivity and morale. Tjosvold identifies that productive co-operation was 
prevented by failure to give assistance, avoiding discussing problems, and solving 
problems from just one perspective. By contrast, co-operation was encouraged by 
exchanging resources, giving assistance, and discussing problems and conflicts
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constructively. However, while the sharing of goals may be a necessary condition for 
interagency exchanges, it is not in itself a sufficient condition. In addition, for 
exchange to occur, each agency must be able to provide the other with the resources it 
needs to achieve its goals. In other words there must be complementary resources.
4.6.4 Geographical closeness
Effective co-ordination requires direct relations between organisations and 
individuals operating in close proximity, usually ones involving face-to-face contact 
(Robinson 2000). This is largely because this proximity enables informal interactions 
between key decision-makers and communication between staff of the organisations. 
Such interaction facilitates recognition of: (1) similarities in orientation, (2) 
similarities in staff training, (3) possible matches between goals and resources, and (4) 
a dependence on each other for scarce resources.
4.6.5 Information sharing
Information sharing is another important issue in co-ordination. Without the 
sharing of information, there will continue to be ambiguity in the aspects of the 
organisational agendas and approaches that can be used as the starting point for co­
ordination. In the context of tourism development, for instance, tourism agencies 
responsible for authorising tourism investment and incentives are not generally 
accessible to the majority of people in local tourist destinations due to their physical 
remoteness (Tosun and Jenkins 1996). This lack of communication not only increases 
the knowledge gap between local communities and decision-makers but also 
accelerates the isolation of the local community from the tourism development 
process. Consequently, knowledge gaps between centralised authorities and local 
communities make it difficult for host communities to participate in joint 
arrangements in relations to the tourism development process (Tosun and Jenkins
1996).
Information sharing is critical because, although some groups may have more 
access to information than others, shared agreements are unlikely to emerge unless 
there is provision for sharing information and for agreeing on its value (Gray 1989). 
“The inequality of information is particularly relevant to disputes involving complex 
or scientific facts disputes are often characterised by one side controlling the
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technical data.... data can only be obtained at great expense and scientifically 
analysed at even greater expense. The party with control of data has the power to 
unilaterally influence the dispute. This party is often reluctant to share such data with 
an adversary because it will create the equalisation of power and would decrease the 
ability to unilaterally affect the dispute” (Riesel 1985: 109-110 in Gray 1989). Parties 
in environmental negotiations often find themselves in dispute over the accuracy of 
various technical reports and expert witnesses (Gray 1989).
The exchange of intangible resources, such as communication and information, 
can improve organisational performance (Njoh 1993). There are several cases around 
the world which show that the lack of interagency communication in the development 
policy field can lead to undue costs and frustrations. In Jamaica, for instance, the lack 
of communication between two major development organisations (Department of 
Housing and Ministry of Agriculture) resulted in the former scheduling the 
construction of a housing project on a parcel of land which the latter had designated 
for irrigation purposes (Njoh 1993). In Thailand, a similar lack of communication 
amongst the country’s six semi-autonomous electric power agencies resulted not only 
in high costs to clients, but imperfect co-ordination and lack of uniformity with 
respect to standards, equipment and technical practices in the country. The list of 
such cases is infinite. Njoh (1993) suggests that interagency interaction can be 
encouraged by (1) locating complementary agencies within close proximity of each 
other; (2) ensuring that the representatives involved from the agencies are of equal 
professional ranking; and (3) ensuring that agencies operating in common policy 
fields are familiar with each other’s activities and programmes.
4.6.6 Frequency and quality of contact
The performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered 
when the agencies know nothing about one another (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may 
lead to the unnecessary duplication of functions as well as compound the problem of 
organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to expect that agencies that 
interact are in a better position to know one another, and hence to respond better to 
the needs of their clients and adapt to the larger environment within which they 
operate (Njoh 1993). This holds true even when such contacts mean that agencies are 
doing no more than simply talking to one another. This is because by talking to one
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another, agencies are likely to exchange vital information about their activities, 
thereby ensuring that these activities are tailored to avoid conflicts and/or unnecessary 
duplication of effort.
4.6.7 High trust
Another important component is the establishment of legitimacy and trust 
(Syrett 1997). Trust is essential for co-operative behaviour within emerging networks 
of governance (Rhodes 1999). “Rebuilding trust between central and local 
government is seen as vital in establishing a new and productive working relationship, 
replacing the suspicion -even downright hostility, which characterise the transactions 
between central and local governments" (Logsdon 1991: 116). Trust, it is argued, 
constitutes the key organisational glue within networked organisations. Trust 
lubricates economic exchange and organisational transactions of all sorts; it reduces 
the costs of communication and relationship building, and facilitates risk taking and 
innovation. The business case for fostering relationships of trust bolsters the moral 
argument.
As Hirschman (1958) points out, trust is a unique and peculiar source: it is 
increased rather than depleted by use. Trust refers both to the specific expectation that 
another’s action will be beneficial rather than detrimental to one’s own interest; and 
the generalised ability to take for granted, or to take on trust, a vast array of features 
of the social order. Trust in relation to central-local relations might thus refer to 
expectations that central and local government have regarding the effects (and 
motivations) of each other’s actions, and to the degree of acceptance by both parties 
of the underlying rules of the game. The greater the level of trust, the less the need 
for negotiation over matters or detail (and a reduction in friction or transaction costs) 
and the greater the opportunity for long-term planning, risk-taking and innovation.
The downside of trust is what makes individuals or organisations vulnerable, it 
involves constantly having to think about whether or not the other parties will do 
something beneficial or detrimental (Logsdon 1991). Individuals or organisations are 
open to exploitation, to being taken advantage of. Decisions about whether to trust 
other parties involves trade-offs between autonomy, certainty and control on the one 
hand, and potential gains of efficiency and innovation on the other. In central-local
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relations it is not too strong to say that the two parties are often used to expecting the 
worst of each other in terms of both motivations and tactics. And for the "cat and 
mouse" to learn to trust each other is a huge challenge. To keep on trusting each other 
may be even harder (as circumstances and priorities change), and yet a long-term 
perspective is vital to building trust (Logsdon 1991).
4.6.8 Representation
Consideration must be given to the level from which partner representatives are 
drawn. One key to successful collective arrangements is having individuals present in 
the forum that can make on-the-spot decisions. This is critical since the lack of a 
structured hierarchy makes it imperative that participants are able to commit their 
organisations to action without the delays of having to seek permission (Waddock 
1989). Gaining management commitment is important to the coalition-building 
process, if the activities of the partnership are to go beyond a single organisation’s 
domain. During coalition building, the partners must bring together organisations 
whose domains overlap around the problem, as well as the right level of 
representatives from those organisations, and this helps them to ensure organisational 
commitment to the partnership. It also helps them to act on the spot, and also to 
educate the representatives about the issues at hand and the norms, values, and 
behaviours of the other partner organisations (Waddock 1989).
4.7 Conditions inhibiting co-ordination
A number of pitfalls may exist to the building of co-ordinating relationships 
(Feyerherms 1994). These include: (a) a lack of clear hierarchy and limited 
organisational structures; (b) organisations being brought together which have 
different backgrounds and may have complex previous relationships which have 
involved conflict or lack of understanding; and (c) relationships starting without an 
initial common goal. In this respect, co-operating leaders can play a role both in 
elucidating the interests and positions of all the parties, and in helping to create new 
meanings. According to Thompson and McEwen (1969), any role or programme 
ambiguity needs to be alleviated prior to co-ordination. Additionally, lines of 
authority need to be clear between organisations, as well as within them. Finally, a 
mutual need or purpose, and common or complementary goals, tend to reinforce co­
ordination between organisations (Schermerhom 1975). Other forms of obstacles may
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include political instability, negative evaluations and stereotyping, past adversaries 
and conflicts, power disparities, power struggles, authority fragmentation, gaps in 
communication, and physical distance and red tape. These issues are detailed next.
4.7.1 Political instability
Political instability may constitute a formidable obstacle to forming and 
sustaining joint arrangements between public and private sector businesses or among 
government agencies at different levels. For instance, since the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923, 56 governments have been in power (Tosun 2000). The 
average span of duty of each government is 1.3 years. Similarly, from its foundation 
in 1963, 30 ministers served in the Ministry of Tourism until 1996, with an average 
span of duty of 1.1 years (Tosun 2001). This is too short to achieve anything at 
national level in general and at local level in particular. Moreover, ministers and even 
chief civil servants have the custom of replacing the personnel in their department 
when they are appointed to a new post. As expected, high personnel turnover rates 
decrease efficiency and continuity, and thus the effectiveness of joint arrangements 
for tourism development. Brotherton et al (1994 in Tosun 2000) observe that changes 
in government often gave rise to a political hiatus and re-ordering of priorities and 
changes in personnel. These unstable policies cause uncertainty, which can lead to 
the emergence of a laissez-faire approach to tourism development. Bramwell and 
Sharmann (1999) also view discontinuity as one impediment constraining the 
outcomes of collective initiatives.
4.7.2 Negative images
As organisations interact over a period of time, particular images of each other 
take form and are institutionalised. These images become difficult to change. For 
instance, if one organisation interprets the other as a threat, whether it be well founded 
or unfounded, future attempts at co-ordination will generally fail (White 1968; Caroff 
1977; Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Finlay argues that when decision-making by 
parties to a conflict adheres to rigid images of each other, then there is little likelihood 
that even genuine attempts to resolve the issue will have the desired effect.
Strongly held stereotypes may exist that inhibit productive interactions in 
collective arrangements. For example, private sector members may perceive public
80
sector members to be lazy and unproductive, whereas public sector participants may 
perceive their private sector counterparts to be greedy and irresponsible (Waddock 
1989). An effort aimed at breaking down stereotypes or lack of trust among 
participants is often needed.
Organisation leaders may perceive that co-ordination threatens a loss or 
fragmentation of their authority, and also that it may even lead to a total loss of 
identity or of programme identity (Levine et al. 1963). Similarly, organisational 
leaders may fear that co-ordination could give rise to a loss of organisational prestige 
or a loss of strategic position (Schermerhom 1975). This is notably true when they 
perceive the other agency to be: (1) lower in status and legitimacy, or (2) incompetent 
in dealing with clientele (Levine et al 1963).
4.7.3 Historical relations of conflict
According to McAvoy, Schatz, and Lime (1991), bitter historical relations are 
one key factor working against improved co-operation between public and private 
sector business groups. These groups might take opposite sides in conflicts over the 
management of resources. While some conditions engendering conflict may change, 
historical conflicts may still limit the potential for co-operation between groups. One 
possible explanation for the persistence of conflict between managers and private 
businesses is offered in the literature on community conflict. Coleman (1957) 
describes "a dynamic of controversy", which suggests that a single initial dispute can 
dismpt the equilibrium of community relations. Eventually such disputes can become 
generalised and independent of the initial issue. Coleman further suggests that a 
generalisation of conflict can impede communication between groups, which, in turn 
exacerbates and perpetuates conflict. The continuation of historical conflict is an 
impediment to communication, which in turn perpetuates the conflict. To promote 
co-operation among a group it is necessary to overcome, or at least circumvent, such 
persistent conflict. Several authors suggest that the first step in conflict resolution lies 
in opening channels of communication between groups ( McAvoy, Schatzt and Lime 
1991, Francis 1987, and Coleman 1957).
4.7.4 Power struggles
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Collective actions between organisations are fragile. The fragility is a direct 
result of the interorganisational context out of which the collective arrangement 
develops, the lack of hierarchical controls on actions by members, and the implicit 
power struggles that exist among organisations varying to have their own needs met. 
Power struggles may become more apparent if a key group is left out of the decision­
making process. Should the linkages binding the partners break down or a power 
struggle emerge, the very existence of partnership is in peril. Depending on the nature 
of the partnership, the withdrawal of a partner, the resolution of a problem, or the 
diminishing of an environmental issue may mean an end to the collective 
arrangements.
4.7.5 Power disparity
Rogers et al (1982: 55) note that “agencies are particularly vulnerable to those 
organisations having more power in a hierarchical system such as government. 
Consequently, they are caught in a Catch-22 when commanded to co-ordinate. If they 
co-ordinate, it is very possible they may lose their autonomy and at the same time 
witness the creation of internal havoc to the structure and process of their 
organisation. If they don’t, they will not survive because of their dependence upon 
society for legitimacy. Agencies have been found to deal with this problem by 
interpreting the command to co-ordinate in such a manner that the parameters of the 
constraints are as broad as possible, enabling them to maintain a certain level of 
organisational autonomy with a minimum amount of internal disorganisation”.
Collective action is likely to be hindered when significant power differences 
exist among parties or when certain parties are not perceived as having a legitimate 
claim to participate in the consensus building (Selin and Chavez 1995). Power 
relations are likely to determine which people join collective arrangements and who 
has the most influence on decisions (Bramwell and Lane 2000). Fox (1982: 402 in 
Gray 1989) notes “the weaker party may view collaboration as an attractive 
alternative to the current situation, but the stronger one will see no value in 
negotiating away any of his or her strength. Thus powerful stakeholders who perceive 
little or no interdependence with other stakeholders will resist collaborative efforts 
that seek to balance the power differences among the stakeholders, unless they can be 
persuaded that their own interests will be jeopardised by not participating”. For
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example, large tour operators may feel threatened by a potential loss of control over 
decision-making, while small environmental groups and residents may feel that 
collaboration will not empower them to be able to influence decision-making over the 
tourism domain’s future (Jamal and Getz 1995).
Concerns about preserving an institutional power base pose a formidable 
obstacle to collective arrangements. Parties will be understandably reluctant to co­
ordinate or co-operate if they are at a disadvantage in representing their interests or if 
they believe their interests will be deemed secondary to more powerful ones (Gray
1989).“Those who represent minority or less powerful interests may see little value in 
a negotiated solution to a dispute because they believe that the only possible outcome 
will be an appeasement that could blunt attempts to raise more fundamental issues, 
more pervasive problems, or new principles. For some parties in some instances, the 
public awareness created by continued conflict may have greater value than the 
benefits to be gained by resolving a particular dispute. Thus resolving that specific 
dispute without achieving more sweeping change in precedent policy may be viewed 
not as a success but as a failure” (Bingham 1986 in Gray 1989: 250). Nevertheless, 
“interactions during problem setting have the potential to shake up entrenched power 
dynamics and to restructure existing power relationships with respect to the domain in 
question” (Gray 1989: 126).
4.7.6 Fragmentation o f authority
The word turf protection is generally referred to in the literature as a catchall 
phrase to capture the barriers to interorganisational co-operation or co-ordination.
The fragmentation of the environment in terms of the relationship between 
governmental structures on the federal, state, and local levels is viewed as another 
barrier in the way of co-ordination (Glass 1976). Not only does fragmentation exist 
between levels, but it also exists within levels. Separate missions, competing legal 
mandates, distinct constituencies, and competition for resources are obstacles to 
effective co-ordination of the activities of diverse organisations. Overlapping political 
and geographic domain designations exist between and within governmental levels. 
Duplication of administration, services, and funding sources, and an inequitable 
distribution of funding generate further problems (Gardner and Snipe 1970; Schmidt 
and Madoff 1977). The potential difficulties for mandated agencies can be further
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exacerbated by ambiguity in the roles of federal and state government agencies in 
relation to their mission and accountability (Colt 1970; Widner 1973). Mandated 
agencies can be confronted with inadequate information, diffuse and contradictory 
missions and roles, a lack of clear programme legitimacy and, quite frequently, 
programme uncertainty (Glass 1976; Tropman and Dluhy 1976).
4.7.7 Communication gaps
If organisations have communicated very little, it is likely that there will be few 
grounds on which to build any type of co-ordination (Torrens 1969; Gardner and 
Snipe 1970; Hooyman 1976). Therefore, qualitative and quantitative levels of 
communication are salient factors in co-ordination. Increased bureaucratisation also 
works against communication. It results in increased communication costs with other 
organisations, and the fragmentation and possible breakdown of communication 
(Shermorhom 1975).
4.7.8 Physical distan ce
In addition to communication problems, physical distance may be another 
significant factor in hindering co-ordination. Decision-makers in highly centralised 
organisations generally are located far from the area to be co-ordinated (White and 
Vlasak 1971; Akinbode and Clark 1976). Consequently, any attempt at collaboration 
may involve poor local administrative support and large quantities of red tape (Levy 
1969), role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974), 
fragmentation of authority (Vladeck 1977), and authority ambiguity and conflict 
(Levine et al. 1963; Alexander 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970).
4.8 Collective arrangement practices in tourism
Cross-sectoral co-operation, co-operation between administrative levels, and co­
operation between autonomous polities are strongly advocated in the tourism planning 
literature. However, in practice such co-operation occurs only occasionally (Timothy 
1998: 64). Several tourism case studies reveal that the tourism project did not benefit 
from full co-ordination or co-operation between local and tourism planners, 
sometimes because of a traditional powerful bureaucracy, and dominating legislative 
and operational processes (Tosun 2000). Any approach, particularly in developing
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countries, which conflicts with a traditional bureaucracy is perhaps unlikely to be 
acceptable. There is also often bureaucratic jealousy among official authorities. And, 
further, “Third world politicians can... be very opportunist, offering sops where 
political pressure is the greatest. Such serving incrementally can be very damaging to 
co-ordinated policy making” (Jones 1980: 204).
In a study of tourism policies in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Timothy (1998) 
identified several issues that worked against co-operation. The traditional and 
political hierarchy in the country was found to be a major factor producing sectoral 
and political boundary-restricted planning practices. Political and social power in the 
country rested in the hands of central government or a few key socio-political figures. 
According to tradition in the country: “ power generates its own authority in that those 
who attain positions of dominance are assumed to have deserved it because of their 
skill and moral virtue. Therefore it is believed that the centre of power, whether at the 
national, provincial or village level, will make decisions that are for the good of 
everyone, including lower levels of government. Local tourism planning authorities 
were found to be simply unaware of the need for and do not understand the possible 
benefits of co-operative tourism planning" (Timothy 1998). Local leaders were also 
sometimes unaware of their jurisdictional rights, such as that they are permitted to 
establish cross-border ties with other jurisdictions (Timothy 1998).
Tourism development can bring powerful and organised business interests into 
relatively powerless, unorganised indigenous communities (Tosun 2000). In time, 
business people can become dominant power holders and who often serve their self- 
interest at the expense of less well-off indigenous people. In a study of collaborative 
tourism planning in the Hope Valley, Bramwell and Sharmann (1999) argue that 
unequal power relations remained among the stakeholders, with the distribution of 
power weighed towards the authorities rather than the residents. Reed (1997: 589) 
suggests that stakeholders in tourism planning “who traditionally hold power may 
resist its redistribution thereby hindering attempts for collaboration”.
Reid notes obstacles that tend to reduce the effectiveness of tourism 
partnerships, including turf protection, lack of awareness, bureaucratic procedures, 
and limitations of staff and funds (Reid 1988). Selin and Beason (1991) in a study of
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collaboration between the Forest Service and local tourism service providers in the 
USA found that domain consensus, a sense of interdependence, goal similarity, and 
goal knowledge were significant predictors of the level of co-operation. Selin and 
Chavez (1994) categorise the characteristics of successful partnerships into four 
groups: personal factors, interpersonal factors, organisational factors and operational 
factors. Based on their empirical study they suggest that to foster successful 
partnerships there should be flexible personnel and financial accounting systems, staff 
continuity over the life of a partnership, and partnership incentive programmes for the 
partners. The participants in their study frequently attributed the success of a 
partnership to the unique mix of personalities represented in the group. The 
combination of having the right people involved in the project and strong leadership 
were among the most frequently raised qualities for successful partnership 
programmes. Other qualities identified by the respondents for successful partnership 
included a strong community spirit, active listening, honesty and directness, a shared 
vision, and the ability within the group to adjust to each other and to reach consensus 
on difficult decisions. Another frequently mentioned encouragement to success was 
having support from senior level management. Interestingly, meeting environments 
were also identified as an influential factor for the success of partnership programmes 
(Selin and Chavez 1994).
Selin and Myers (1991; 1995; 1998) and Jamal and Getz (1995) identify 
improved communication, strong leadership, trust, and personal investment as 
positive contributions to partnerships. Constraining factors identified in the literature 
include turf protection, restrictive accounting procedures, lack of formal agreements, 
and a loss of momentum when tasks are delegated to people not on the steering 
committee (Selin and Myers 1995). In a study of one regional alliance, Selin and 
Myers (1991) report that individual and organisational leadership, personal benefits, 
administrative support and level of trust were strong correlates of partnership 
effectiveness. Their findings corroborated findings from several other studies. Selin 
and Myers (1998), however, state that effective collaborative planning efforts require 
more than strong leaders and administrative support. Success depends on a number of 
other interpersonal factors such as adequate representation of interests, a shared 
vision, goal accomplishment, and good working relationships and open 
communication. The participants considered organisational characteristics such as
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hidden agendas and special interests and divergent goals as constraints. Selin and 
Myers (1998) suggest that managers should recognise that effective coalition building 
(Waddock 1989) requires a great deal of attention and effort on the part of all 
members. Coalition leaders must pay close attention to how other members perceive 
the coalition and its purpose and also work to create an atmosphere for open 
communication. All members need to feel that their inputs are important and to be 
provided with opportunities to utilise their influence and talents (Selin and Myers 
1998).
4.9 Summary
The discussion has shown that there are different definitions of co-ordination, 
each having something to offer but none being entirely satisfactory on their own. 
Examining the elements emphasised in these definitions, it is appropriate to state that 
in co-ordination (1) decision rules can be established by a third party or they can be 
created by the participants. Other features frequently emphasised in definitions are (2) 
the composition of the shared task environment and its importance, (3) the role of the 
collectivity and the attainment of its distinctive goals; and (4) the deliberate degree of 
adjustment within the joint decisions. Another important principle is that co­
ordination cannot occur without some level of internal adjustment to the structure of 
the organisation. Thus, co-ordination can be viewed as the process whereby two or 
more organisations create and/or use existing decision-rules that have been 
established to deal collectively with their shared task environment.
Co-ordination between two or more individuals or organisations may take 
different forms, ranging from voluntary co-ordination to mandated co-ordination. 
Different forms of co-ordination require differing structural arrangements and have 
differing conditions enhancing co-ordination. For instance, in voluntary settings there 
is increased potential for co-ordination when there are positive assessments of the 
competence and performance of the other parties, compatible operating philosophies, 
higher frequencies of contact, and when there are negotiations affecting power (Gray 
1985). Regardless of the form, it must be recognised that co-ordination is a dynamic 
process in that participants may have common interests at the beginning of co­
ordination arrangements, but these interests may change or be redefined as the co­
ordination progresses (Wood and Gray 1991).
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Co-ordination offers several advantages to individuals and organisations. The 
reasons why individuals or organisations engage in co-ordination include: to survive 
in turbulent business environments; to avoid duplication; to complement one’s efforts 
with others to develop synergy; to increase one’s knowledge and expertise through 
shared and collective learning; to penetrate into and or maintain new/existing 
customer bases; to cope with new demands of changing realities; and to avoid the 
danger of lapsing into chaos. However, despite the potential benefits, the practices of 
co-ordination are rare, particularly between public and private organisations and 
amongst government agencies at different administrative levels. Although 
administrative and policy reformers often urge co-ordination as the key to more 
effective delivery of public services, there is little beyond anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that most approaches to co-ordination actually improve public services in 
multi-organisational delivery systems (Jennings and Ewalt 1998). Accounts of 
bureaucratic behaviour suggest that it is quite difficult to get organisations to co­
ordinate or co-operate with each other, much less to do so effectively. While joint 
arrangements between the public and private sectors may offer advantages to 
participating bodies, their development in tourism may give rise to formidable 
challenges. For example, the resource allocations, policy ideas, and institutional 
practices embedded within a society may often restrict the influence of particular 
partners on joint arrangements. The power of participants are often unequal, and it is 
suggested that power governs the interaction of individuals, organisations and 
agencies influencing, or trying to influence, the formulation of tourism policy and the 
manner in which it is implemented (Hall 1994: 52).
The notions of co-steering, co-production, co-ordination, collaboration, co­
operative management, and public-private partnerships on national, regional and local 
levels have been embraced by many. However, such joint arrangements have 
produced mixed results in different countries due to several either facilitating or 
inhibiting conditions (Goymen 2000). The development and implementation of joint 
arrangements in developing countries are likely to meet several obstacles, such as 
those of traditional bureaucratic paternalism and of political instability (Tosun 2000; 
2001). Any approach that conflicts with the traditional bureaucracy prevailing in
developing countries is unlikely to be acceptable to powerful bureaucrats (Tosun 
2001). Joint arrangements are likely to confront several other difficulties in 
developing countries, often because democracy has not been fully institutionalised 
and a supportive democratic political culture is only in a formative stage (Goymen 
2000). The relative absence of a pluralist and participative culture might constitute a 
formidable obstacle (Yiiksel, Bramwell and Yiiksel 1999). The political will to 
implement decisions is often lacking in developing countries because of the 
implications for the distribution of power and resources (Desai 1996). The common 
difficulties include a lack of clear hierarchy and limited organisational structures; 
organisations with different backgrounds and ideologies; an absence of common 
initial goals; negative images and stereotyping; unmanageable disparities in status; 
different priorities and goals; a lack of knowledge; low empowerment; lack of legal 
mandates, competition for resources; political instability; staff discontinuity; low trust 
and confidence; turf protection; communication gaps; lack of exchange; and resource 
asymmetry.
Despite the plethora of factors working against co-ordination, the literature 
reviewed here has suggested that co-ordination is not impossible. Effective voluntary 
co-ordination can be achieved through the creation of a more enabling environment; 
the assignment of clear roles and responsibilities commensurate with capabilities; a 
recognition of interdependencies and the identification of organisational contexts; the 
identification of common ground for discussion; and the promotion of person-to- 
person interaction. In addition, co-ordination is encouraged when there are shared 
goals, complementary resources, compatible backgrounds, equality in status, 
geographical closeness, information sharing, a common language, professionalism, 
strong leadership, and so on.
The dominant model of a centralised, rational and comprehensive planning 
process can be criticised as it tends to impede collective initiatives which involves 
joint working with several local and regional interest groups (Selin and Chavez 1995). 
Highly centralised public administration systems in many developing countries appear 
to hinder the emergence of more participatory, approaches inductive to tourism 
development (Tosun 2000; Syrett 1997). The next chapter turns to the notion of
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decentralisation and it critically examines whether decentralisation might be a way 
forward for more effective and equitable tourism planning.
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5. Decentralisation
5.1 Introduction
The concept of decentralised management has gained growing support from 
researchers, as it is thought to offset problems emanating from centralised tourism 
management. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised 
forms of tourism administration, no research has attempted to ascertain whether this 
form of administration is viable and applicable given the prevailing constitutional and 
institutional contexts of centralist countries. At present, there is inadequate 
understanding of whether top-down (centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) 
administrative forms are likely to be more or less effective in handling complex 
interactions between various organisations and parties, with different perceptions, 
preferences and strategies. Building on the administration literature, this chapter 
discusses the potential limitations of centralist tourism administration and it questions 
whether decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to the centralist model. The 
first part of the discussion reviews the concept of governance, a term interchangeably 
used with administration or management, and explicates the dimensions of effective 
governance. An analysis of centralist tourism administration and of its potential 
limitations follows this. The concept of decentralisation and its various forms are 
evaluated, and its potential benefits are presented. Obstacles in the way of decentralised 
tourism management are highlighted, and there is discussion of whether or not it can be 
put into practice. The evaluation of decentralisation concept will guide the investigation 
into the strengths and weaknesses of the prevailing tourism administrative forms 
affecting the Belek region, and into reactions of local and central level organisations to 
different administrative systems.
t
5.2 Administration
Previous tourism research has generally focused on tourism planning and 
development issues and on tourism impact assessments. Despite its central effect on the 
success of tourism planning activity and the profitability of the industry, limited 
attention has been paid to tourism administration systems, their efficiency and 
effectiveness, and their potential limitations and implications for tourism plan
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formulation and implementation. Two administrative frameworks, the centralised and 
decentralised administrative structures, are often used in tourism management. In 
general, the centralised form supports the notion of a central steering agency having all 
the information, resources and solutions at its disposal, whereas the decentralised form 
involves the transference of power from central agencies to local government, and it 
takes the interests of local actors as the point of departure.
The success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the administrative framework. A framework which promotes participative decision­
making, delineates clear balances between responsibility and authority, promotes co­
operative relations and effectively co-ordinates the fragmented activities carried out by 
different public and private sector organisations undoubtedly enhances the chances of 
success. By contrast, a framework endorsing coercive decision-making, resulting in 
ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, and inducing a distant 
bureaucracy and uneven power relations between public and private agencies can 
undermine the legitimacy of policy decisions and their implementation. Thus, successful 
tourism administration requires democratic and transparent participation in decision­
making, and it promotes a greater accountability of institutions to the people they are 
instituted to serve, it increases the availability of information, and it optimises the use of 
resources by clarifying responsibilities, authority and standards.
5.3 Centralised forms of tourism administration (CTA)
Centralisation means that the authority, responsibility and ability to perform the
basic functions of the state are concentrated in central governing organisations (Ocampo
1991: 193). These elements can be concentrated in the central government of a country
so that it can command and control the behaviour of more localised organisations, and
notably local government. It can do this by setting limits on or dictating their goals, by
directing or otherwise guiding their decisions and actions, by substituting their
judgement with their own through prior or post-hoc approval or by their own direct
action, by monitoring and evaluating their performance, by instituting corrective
measures, and by imposing sanctions for local deviations from central guidelines
(Ocampo 1991). Centralisation may be justified as necessary to define a comprehensive
and coherent framework of goals and norms for the government and nation as a whole
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and to ensure there is consistency and compatibility of local activities within that 
framework. It may be needed not only to co-ordinate local decisions and actions, but 
also to aggregate and distribute resources and capacities and to focus them according to 
national standards and priorities that transcend those of local units. Foreign relations, 
environmental standards, human rights and social justice are often considered beyond 
the competence of local units to undertake without central guidance and assistance 
(Ocampo 1991: 194).
The centralised tourism administrative model (CTA) assumes that a central 
steering agency has at its disposal the necessary information about existing public 
problems and preferences and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al
1997). The CTA is generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system 
to allow decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected and in such 
countries tourism is usually considered to be an industry of national concern which 
should be centrally planned and controlled (Wahab 1997).
However, this form of tourism management has certain limitations. When goals,
targets and priorities are promulgated by the central government in a top-down fashion,
there is usually little opportunity for local contributions to their formulation. Central
government tends to put a premium on a strict instead of a liberal interpretation of local
powers, to require prior clearance of local decisions, to closely supervise local
performance, and to penalise departures from norms. In order to ensure goal-
achievement, central government may even pre-empt implementation, such as by
directly taking on policy making and planning roles and by allocating the resources
necessary to perform them. There is very limited local autonomy under a centralist
regime. Central control tends to stifle any initiative, discretion, or self-reliance that local
units may want to exercise. Local units may not be self-aware to begin with, their
identity having been suppressed by the primacy of central government. Most of the
powers and resources as well as responsibilities may be concentrated at the centre and
top. While there may be local government and local representatives of national
agencies, they may be under-endowed in many respects and look to central government
for resources and support. However, these conditions are argued to work against the
whole system. For example, it is argued that centralism is likely to overload central
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government with unessential tasks, hierarchical overgrowth, and unnecessary resources. 
Staff and line units are likely to proliferate near the top. The ability of central authorities 
to make sound decisions and to command and control local actions will be impaired 
because of the sheer volume and complexity of functions that they have to perform or 
direct. The information that local units get might be fragmented and distorted by 
crowded and convoluted communication channels, their decisions delayed or derailed by 
confused lines of command, and implementing actions may lag far behind and become 
incongruent with changing environmental conditions.
There are numerous cases where tourism plans formulated at the top and 
implemented by people at the bottom have not achieved the desired outcomes. One 
reason for this consequence is that the formulation and application of plans by central 
government might be out of touch with the needs of local people and is not based on 
detailed knowledge of the local environment (Baud Bovy 1982). CTA results in local 
tourism development decisions being taken by central rather than by local authorities, 
and decisions are inevitably made at a distance from the location of local administrative 
units. The existence of this physical distance can impact on the willingness of local 
stakeholders to participate in decision-making process. Barry (1965: 56 cited in Stoker 
1996) points out that "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people 
affected by decisions then people become alienated". When individuals do not have 
access to decision-making, this brings about a substantive breakdown in the flow of 
communication. This alienation from participation, whether as a result of distance or 
bureaucracy, may impair the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and 
Powell 1966; Barry 1965). Building on a study conducted in Turkey, Tosun and Jenkins 
(1996) point out that “the Ministry of Tourism and bodies responsible for the 
authorisation of tourism investment and incentives are accessible to a rich and educated 
elite and not to the majority of indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense, there 
is a big communication gap between communities and decision-makers. In short 
centralisation has intensified formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from 
Ankara is a barrier for people who may not be able to afford to go to the capital city” (p. 
527).
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CTA seems likely to reduce the legitimacy of decisions. It can also hinder plan or 
policy implementation in local areas distant from the centre. Tourism plans developed 
by a mono-actor form of centralised administration generally overlook the knowledge, 
skills and goals of local public and private sector tourism organisations, in their design 
phase. Subsequently, there may be resistance from the implementing bodies, such as 
from local government. The centralist model appears to neglect the values and interests 
of implementing bodies, fails to utilise the resources and capacities of local actors, and 
promotes the bureaucratisation of the public sector, which therefore diminishes 
management effectiveness and efficiency (Kickert et al 1997). The main characteristics 
of the CTA, such as coercive decision-making, ambiguous balances between 
responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy, limited local participation, and 
uneven power relations can clearly thwart the effectiveness of tourism administration.
5.4 Decentralised tourism administration (DTA)
An alternative form of administration, decentralisation, has been suggested in 
order to overcome the potential problems that may ensue from CTA. Decentralised 
tourism administration (DTA) involves a transfer of authority to perform some public 
service from an individual or an agency in central government to some other individual 
or agency which is closer to the public to be served (Turner and Hulme 1997). Smith 
(1985: 1) describes this concept as “the delegation of power to lower levels in territorial 
hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a 
large-scale organisation. Thus decentralisation refers to territorially-based delegation not 
to purely functionally based delegation”(in Turner and Hulme, 1997).
Alderfer (1967: 53) defines decentralisation as “the transfer of powers to locally
elected authorities where policies are both made and carried out on the local level”.
Somewhat differently, Rondinelli (1981: 133) views decentralisation as “the transfer of
planning, decision making or management functions from the central government and its
agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous
public corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialised
functional authorities or non government organisations. Decentralisation contributes to
such norms by taking local opinions as well as information into better account, giving
more authority and freedom as well as “voice” to local institutions and communities, and
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extending to their members the opportunities to participate in or “exit” from governance, 
development, and their benefits" (Hirschman 1958).
Although slightly different definitions of the concept exist in the literature, these 
definitions share a similar key notion that decentralisation involves power transference 
from upper governmental levels to lower levels or functionally designed bodies. It is 
important to note that decentralisation does not imply that all authority should be 
delegated. The central government may retain a core of functions over essential national 
matters and ultimately has the authority to redesign the system of government and to 
discipline or suspend decentralisation units that are not performing effectively.
However, “how extensive this core of central government functions remains a major 
ideological and intellectual debate of the late twentieth century” (Turner and Hulme 
1997: 154).
According to some, DTA needs to be adopted in order to “emphasise an equitable 
distribution of the benefits of development which have required programmes that need 
the support and involvement of local level administrators and the citizens. It has been 
necessary to develop the administrative capacity of local organisations to provide 
services in the remote areas as well as to improve the effectiveness of central 
government” (Rondinelli 1978: 45 in Huque 1986). The reasons for decentralised 
administration are varied. The process may be resorted to in order to overcome 
difficulties and constraints that are faced in centralised planning. Administrators may 
prefer decentralisation to emphasise an equitable distribution of benefits of development 
which have required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level 
administrators and citizens. Decentralisation may help to accelerate the pace and spread 
the benefits of growth, integrate diverse regions in internally heterogeneous countries, 
and use scarce resources more efficiently to promote development in economically 
lagging or relatively poor areas (Rondinelli 1981).
5.4.1 Potential benefits of DTA
Decentralisation affects the way state and society interacts, and it has potential to
enhance the legitimacy, perceived fairness and accountability of local government in the
eyes of the public (Crook and Manor 1994). According to Turner and Hulme (1997),
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decentralisation, “when implemented properly”, could offer greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in a number of different areas. Through decentralisation, plans can be 
tailor-made for local areas using detailed and up-to-date information that is only 
available locally, and interorganisational co-ordination can be achieved at the local level. 
Experimentation and innovation can be fostered by decentralisation, and this can 
increase the chances of generating more effective development strategies. 
Decentralisation may also help enhance the motivation of field level personnel, as they 
have greater responsibility for the programmes they manage. Workload reduction of 
agencies at the centre of government will relieve them from routine decision-making and 
give them more time to consider strategic issues so that the quality of policy should 
improve.
Rondinelli (1979; 1981), Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), Rondinelli et al (1989) 
identify a number of potential advantages arising from transferring more responsibilities 
for development planning and management from central government to lower 
administrative levels. Some of the potential benefits of decentralisation are presented in 
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Potential benefits of decentralisation
■ Decentralisation is a means of overcoming the severe limitations o f centrally controlled planning 
by delegating greater authority for development planning and management to officials who are 
working in the field, closer to the problems.
■ Decentralisation to local levels allows officials to tailor development plans and programmes to 
the needs o f different areas and people within a country.
■ Decentralisation is useful in cutting through red tape and highly structured procedures, common 
characteristics of central planning in developing nations, and which can result from an over­
concentration of power, authority and resources at the centre.
■ Central officials can be reassigned to local levels, thus increasing their knowledge o f and 
sensitivity to local level problems and needs.
■ Decentralisation offers closer contact between government officials and the local population, thus 
allowing them to obtain better information with which to formulate more realistic and effective 
plans for government programmes.
■ Decentralisation can pave the way for greater political and administrative penetration o f national 
government polices into areas remote from the national capital, where central government plans 
are often unknown or ignored by the populace or hampered by local elites.
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■ Decentralisation might allow greater representation for various political and other groups in 
development decision-making, and this could lead to greater equity in the allocation o f  
government resources and investments.
■ It might lead to an enhanced administrative capability o f local government and private sector 
institutions in the regions or provinces. It may help to expand their capacities to take over 
functions that are not usually performed well by central ministries, such as the maintenance of 
roads and infrastructure investments in areas remote from the national capital.
■ The efficiency o f central government could be increased by decentralisation. The time released 
from routine administration can free political and administrative leaders to plan more carefully 
and supervise more effectively the implementation o f development polices.
■ Decentralisation may provide a structure through which the activities o f various central 
government agencies involved in development can be co-ordinated more effectively both with 
each other and with local leaders and non-governmental organisations.
■ A decentralised government structure can facilitate the exchange o f information about local 
needs and channel political demands from the local community to national ministries.
■ By proving alternative means of decision-making, decentralisation can offset the influence or 
control over development activities by entrenched local elites who are often unsympathetic to 
national development polices and insensitive to the needs of the poorer groups in rural 
communities.
■ Decentralisation can lead to more flexible, innovative and creative administration. Local
government can have greater potential to experiment with new policies in selected areas. If
experiments fail, their impacts will only be on small jurisdictions.
■ Decentralisation can allow local leaders to deliver services more effectively within communities,
to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economies, and to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation o f development projects more effectively than central government.
■ Decentralisation can increase political stability and national unity by giving groups in different 
parts o f the country the ability to participate more directly in development decision-making, 
thereby increasing their stake in maintaining the political system.
It is important to note that the assertions underlying the potential advantages 
shown in Table 5.1 have not all been empirically verified. Rondinelli (1981) admits that 
in reality, the results of decentralisation policies in many developing countries are often 
disappointing. Huque (1986: 91-92), for instance, insists strongly that “judging from the 
existing conditions, it might be wise to abandon efforts directed at complete 
decentralisation in Bangladesh and concentrate on limited decentralisation”. However, 
there are also cases where some of the potential benefits of decentralisation listed in 
Table 5 have been observed. Crook and Manor (1994) argue that some countries, such as
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India, have benefited from the practice of decentralisation. They suggest that in India 
decentralisation has resulted in a clear division of responsibilities between central and 
local government. Through India’s decentralisation policies, community needs have 
been taken into account better and benefits have sometimes been channelled more 
effectively to vulnerable groups. Other achievements have included an improved 
effectiveness in project delivery, a better mobilisation of local resources, and improved 
horizontal co-ordination. In addition, political awareness has been created among local 
residents, and better information gathering networks have been established in local 
constituencies. Similarly, they argue that through decentralisation, the completion rate of 
local projects has increased and the distribution of resources in localities has sometimes 
become fairer. Decentralisation has also prompted improvements in the institutional 
response to the problems identified.
5.4.2 Forms of decentralisation
Decentralisation can take a number of forms. It must be noted that each form of 
decentralisation has different implications for institutional arrangements, the degree of 
transfer of authority and power, local participation, preconditions for successful 
implementation, and advantages for the political system (Rondinelli 1981). Depending 
on how authority is transferred, the forms of decentralisation could be classified into two 
types, these being territorial and functional decentralisation (Turner and Hulme 1997). 
Territorial decentralisation means that authority is placed at a lower level in a territorial 
hierarchy, and hence it is geographically closer to service providers and clients. It aims 
to transfer responsibility for public functions to organisations within well-defined sub­
national spatial or political boundaries, such as a province, district, or municipality 
(Rondinelli 1981). The transfer is usually to an institution that may legally perform those 
functions only within a specified geographical or political boundary (Rondinelli 1981). 
Functional decentralisation implies that authority is transferred to an agency that is 
functionally specialised. It focuses on the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks 
or activities to specialised organisations that operate nationally or at least across local 
jurisdictions (Rondinelli 1981). Functional decentralisation is further divided into three 
different forms. First, functional decentralisation may involve delegation within formal 
political structures, such as when central government delegates additional authority to
local government. Second, functional decentralisation can take the form of power
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transfer within public administrative or parastatal structures, such as from the 
headquarters of a ministry to its district offices. Finally, functional decentralisation may 
occur when the transfer of power is from an institution of the state to a non-state agency, 
such as when a parastatal national airline is sold to private shareholders.
Based on its degree, the decentralisation concept can be divided into three other 
forms: deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli and 
Nellis 1986,; Rondinelli et al 1989; Crook and Manor 1994). The least extensive form of 
decentralisation is deconcentration (Rondinelli 1981). Deconcentration is the transfer of 
functions within the central government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from 
central ministries to field officers, the creation of field agencies, or the shifting of 
responsibility to local administrative units of central government. Deconcentration tends 
to extend the scope or reach of central government and to strengthen its authority by 
moving executive agencies controlled by the centre down to lower territorial levels in 
the political system. This type of decentralisation includes delegating responsibilities for 
functions within specific territories to field level civil servants. “Deconcentration can 
pursue the objective of technical efficiency leading to greater effectiveness but not 
popular participation” (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 161-162). Deconcentration may merely 
involve the shifting of workload from central government ministry headquarters to staff 
located in offices outside of the national capital. The staff may not be given the 
authority to decide how those functions are to be performed (Rondinelli 1981). This 
form of decentralisation may not be regarded as real decentralisation, as it only removes 
workload out of the national capital; nonetheless for developing nations with an 
entrenched centralist system, it may constitute a first and crucial step toward 
decentralisation. It is therefore the most frequently used form of decentralisation in 
developing countries (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). It is interesting to note that the recent 
work of Destan (1998) and Kocdemir (1998) exemplify such form of decentralisation in 
Turkish context. They argue that the administrative structure of Turkey is characterised 
by a strong central government whose territorial administration is governed by the 
system of provinces which functions according to the principle of deconcentration.
Delegation represents a more extensive form of decentralisation than
administrative deconcentration. Delegation of decision-making and management
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authority for specific functions to organisations that are only under indirect control of 
central government ministries is another form of decentralisation (Rondinelli 1981). 
Delegation implies the transfer of powers to, or creation of a separate authority to plan 
and implement decisions concerning specific activities. The organisations to which 
public functions are delegated have semi-independent authority to perform their 
responsibilities, and they may not even be located within a regular government structure 
(Rondinelli 1981). Delegation includes the transfer of functions to regional or functional 
development authorities, parastatal organisations, or special project implementation 
units.
Devolution is the most extreme form of decentralisation and it involves transfer of
functions or decision-making authority to legally incorporated local government. It is the
creation of, or the strengthening of (financially and legally) sub-national units of
government, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of central
government (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). The devolution type of decentralisation
involves “transferring powers to special bodies endowed with their own legal
personalities, and separate from the state, its central ministries, and local authorities”
(Alderfer 1967: 53). Devolution has the opposite effect of deconcentration since it cedes
legal control of agencies and resources to political actors and institutions at a lower level >
(Crook and Manor, 1994). With devolution, power is relocated by central government to
sub-national government units, and it embodies enhanced local democracy and local
technical capability. Local and provincial government and state government are typical
sub-national units. In terms of their responsibilities, they may have a number of
significant functions or just a few minor functions. Certain characteristics of devolution
include: local government is given autonomy and independence; it is perceived as a
separate level over which the central authorities exercise little or no direct control; it
must have clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries over which it exercises
authority and within which it performs public functions; it must be given corporate
status and the power to raise sufficient funds and resources to perform specific
functions; it must be perceived by local citizens as providing services that satisfy their
needs and as a level of government over which they have some influence; and there
must be mutual benefits and co-ordination between central and local government
(Rondinelli 1981). Riggs (1964: 342) views devolution as an “alternative mode of
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decentralisation in which full responsibility for policy determination in regard to 
specified subjects is transferred to the recipient of authority” (in Huque, 1986). Many 
newly independent countries adopted this classical model of devolved local government 
in the 1950s and 1960s (Maddick, 1963).
Another form of decentralisation is a transfer to non-government institutions, 
which involves shifting responsibilities for activities from the public sector to private or 
quasi-public organisations that are not part of the government structure. It is important to 
note that, while the devolution form of decentralisation is highly desirable in developing 
countries, a review of examples reveals that devolution practices do not generally meet 
all the identified requirements. For instance, while local government is given 
responsibility for certain functions, in most cases central government retains some, and 
often large-scale, supervisory powers and plays a strong financial role.
It is important to note that the specific structures of the administrative system in a 
country are likely to impact on the form of decentralisation that may be applied.
5.4.3 Obstacles to decentralisation
The transition from a centralised to a decentralised management system is likely to
encounter a number of problems. Research indicates that the successful implementation
of decentralisation policies depends heavily on political, organisational, and behavioural
factors, as well as financial and human resources (Rondinelli et al 1989). Many of the
problems stem from long-established operating practices embedded in a centralised
system. For example, some politicians may be reluctant to share their power and
authority, and this can be a severe obstacle to the success of decentralisation. Crook and
Manor (1994), for instance, argue that the implementation of decentralisation policies
can be hampered by the historical legacy of centralist attitudes and interests from both
politicians and bureaucrats. Turner and Hulme (1997: 172) note that with a transition
toward decentralisation it may be the case that “national politicians are reluctant to cede
power; central bureaucracies resist the delegation of responsibilities; when
responsibilities are transferred there is rarely a corresponding transfer of financial
resources; and those resources that are available at the local level are often poorly
deployed by inexperienced, ill-trained and underpaid field staff’. Rondinelli (1981)
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identifies a continuing resistance by central government bureaucrats as a strong obstacle 
to the implementation of decentralisation policies in East African countries. He notes 
that political commitment to decentralisation has been relatively shallow in Tanzania, 
Kenya and Sudan, despite the strong advocacy of this government reform. The 
unwillingness of government officials to transfer power in practice and their desire to 
retain control over local administration has also been observed by Huque (1986) in a 
study of Bangladesh.
Opposition to decentralisation may also come from the deep mistrust that central 
officials may have of local administrators and leaders. It may also come from traditional 
elites and some local leaders (Rondinelli 1981). Turner and Hulme (1997) also state that 
“authentic decentralisation policies (particularly devolution) are likely to be manipulated 
by local elites that may use decentralised power to strengthen their position at the 
expense of lower income groups” (p. 172). Griffin (1981: 225) further observes that “it 
is conceivable, even likely in many countries, that power at the local level is more 
concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the 
centre... greater decentralisation does not necessarily imply greater democracy let alone 
“power to the people”- it all depends on the circumstances under which decentralisation 
occurs”. Rondinelli (1981) notes that in Kenya local leaders and landowners formed 
alliances with ministry officials and members of parliament to protect current patterns of 
decision-making or to resist changes proposed by district development committees that 
are adverse to their interests.
Decentralisation may be difficult to implement because of the centrist attitudes of 
many government officials, which leads them to be scornful of participation by local 
residents in development activities. Huque (1986) suggests that such scornful attitudes 
have led to a situation in which local people could not demonstrate their interest in, or 
capacities to run local administration on their own. That local government in developing 
countries tends to suffer from serious shortages of trained manpower and financial 
resources to carry out decentralised responsibilities constitutes another barrier to 
successful implementation. It is also often the case that central government in 
developing countries transfers functions and responsibilities to local government without
a commensurate transfer of resources or adequate legal power to raise resources.
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However, this situation is not unique to developing countries. For example, Hentic and 
Bernier (1999) cite different cases. For example, in Hungary local political autonomy 
preceded the establishment of a local budgetary system. Due to an inadequate revenue 
base, local government was unable effectively to fulfil its new responsibilities. While 
these problems are almost universal in developing countries, they often combine with 
other problems, such as the inadequate state of the physical infrastructure, transportation 
and communication facilities, which make co-ordination among decentralised units even 
more difficult (Rodninelli 1981). Weaknesses in supporting institutions might also 
induce disappointing results. Jones (1999) identifies twelve types of shortcoming in the 
attempts by Liverpool council to decentralise its activities. These included fragmentation 
of the organisational structure, the creation of winners and losers, the development of 
tunnel vision, and a duplication of resources.
One important point is that decentralisation policies may often yield very limited 
or negative outcomes at a high cost (Turner and Hulme 1997). Experience of 
decentralisation in less developed countries has almost everywhere fallen short of 
expectations and the declared objectives of policy-makers (Smith 1985). The 
pronounced preference that governments have shown for deconcentration and converting 
locally elected bodies into mixed authorities has meant that the participative quality of 
decentralised institutions has been especially prone to erosion (Smith 1985). There has 
also been a mistaken copying of administrative models of decentralisation that were 
developed predominantly from Western perspectives, without them being tailored to the 
specific conditions of developing countries.
5.4.4 Preconditions for successful DTA
There are certain conditions which are essential for the success of decentralisation.
Local government must be autonomous and independent and clearly distinguished as a
separate level over which the centre can exercise little or no direct control. There must
be clearly defined geographical boundaries. Power to raise adequate resources for their
functions must be given. Local government must be developed in such a way as to be
perceived by its citizens as providing services that satisfy their needs and over which
they have some influence. There must be reciprocal and mutually beneficial
relationships between the centre and local government. For successful decentralisation,
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it is necessary that government decides at the beginning what are to be the objectives 
and methods for transferring power to local authorities (Huque 1986). While it is almost 
impossible to obtain all the preconditions specified by Rondinelli, care must be taken to 
secure at least some of the requirements. According to Mowforth (1998) devolution 
should involve five major components. First, it should be a local body that is 
constitutionally separate from central government and responsible for a range of 
significant local services. Second, it should have its own treasury, budget and accounts, 
along with substantial authority to raise its own revenue. Third, it should employ its own 
competent staff who can hire, fire and promote. Fourth, a majority-elected council, 
operating on party lines, should decide policy and determine internal procedures. And, 
finally, central government administrators should serve purely as external advisors and 
inspectors and have no role within the local authority.
Rondinelli et al (1989) lay down four conditions for decentralisation to be
successful in developing countries. They argue that the ability of governments to
implement decentralised polices depends on the existence of, or ability to create a
variety of political, administrative, organisational and behavioural conditions, and to
provide sufficient resources at the local level to carry out decentralised functions. (1)
Strong political commitment and support must come from national leaders to transfer
planning, decision making and managerial authority to field agencies and lower levels of
administration. These leaders must show acceptance of participation in planning and
management by other organisations that are outside the direct control of central
government. (2) Organisational factors that foster successful decentralisation include
the appropriate allocation of planning and administrative functions among the levels of
government and local organisations, with each set of allocated functions related to the
decision-making capability of each organisation. For decentralisation to succeed,
appropriate laws, regulations and directives are needed which clearly specify the
relationships among different levels of government and administration. Consideration
must be given to the allocation of functions, the roles and duties of officials, and the
limitations and constraints. A clear constitutional framework may provide a strong
foundation for decentralised administration to be carried out in localities. There is some
extra protection when decentralisation is embedded in a nation’s constitution rather than
merely in legislation, as the law then gives people sufficient power to encourage them to
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be assertive in representing their interests (Crooks and Manor 1994). However, even this 
may not have effect in countries where the constitution is taken less seriously. The 
features of normal bureaucracy, which include the centralisation of authority (especially 
of financial control and the standardisation of rules, recommendations and actions), may 
not facilitate the empowerment of decentralised local administration. (3) The attitudes 
and behaviour of central and local level officials towards decentralisation must be 
appropriate and there must be a willingness on their part to share authority with citizens 
and to accept their participation in public decision-making. (4) The success of 
decentralisation hinges on financial and human resources. It has also been suggested that 
success with decentralisation policies requires that changes in policies should be 
incremental (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). This is largely because the complexity of 
changes, notably in terms of changes in financial and human resources, necessitates 
incremental steps. However, in addition to incrementalism, some argue that fundamental 
social change is essential prior to the use of decentralised policies to achieve 
developmental goals. For instance, Hyden (1983) argues that enhancements in 
government performance generally depend on the transformation of society.
5.4.5 Decentralisation: is it really a realistic alternative to CTA?
While decentralisation has received growing support from researchers, the 
application of this type of administrative system appears to be problematic. This raises 
the question of whether adopting decentralisation is a productive strategy at all. In spite 
of the lip service paid to the concept of decentralisation, no research has attempted to 
ascertain whether this concept can be applied to a given country’s current institutional 
and constitutional context. Although tourism authorities are advised to switch to 
relatively decentralised forms of tourism administration, there is no information readily 
available for authorities that can help to guide this transition. While the decentralisation 
concept supports the notion of central government retreating from the public domain, 
central government is also being urged to give more attention to the problems of local 
organisations, to provide them with more resources, and to improve co-ordination. Thus, 
the extent to which decentralisation represents a realistic alternative to a centralist 
model, may be disputed.
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While the concept has been taken as a theoretical panacea to solve administrative 
problems, in practice this is not necessarily the case. The poor outcomes obtained from 
decentralisation practices suggest it would be naive to believe that decentralised 
management will resolve all the problems stemming from centralised management 
(Bienen et al 1990; Chitere and Monya, 1989; Hyden, 1983; Oberst, 1986). It should be 
conceded that centralised management, despite its shortcomings, might be more 
effective and economical than decentralised administration in many or some cases, and 
that it might be more suitable particularly in poor countries (Alavi, 1971; Bienen et al, 
1990; Ray and Kumptala, 1987). In such countries skilled manpower as well as material 
and financial resources are scarce, and governments have a particular responsibility to 
utilise optimally the resources available to them (Huque 1986). Such governments are 
often unwilling to decentralise because the amount of resources at their disposal does 
not permit this luxury. Additionally, there may be political reasons behind this 
unwillingness to share power. For political convenience, governments find it essential to 
retain effective control over the localities through local councils and their leaders (ibid.).
Some argue that it may be more suitable to incorporate a combination of principles 
adapted from both centralised and decentralised management approaches (Turner and 
Hulme 1997). However, while it might appear easy to achieve this in theory, 
implementing a combination of central control and local autonomy that responds to 
administrative needs and popular participation is still a puzzle for governments. The 
excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within central government 
continues to represent an obstacle to the effective performance of public administration 
in most developing countries (ibid.).
A decentralised governance structure may also become difficult to operate when
political parties which are not in power at the central level run the local administrations.
The production and delivery of certain goods and services may still be controlled by the
central state administration. Conflicts are likely to occur in such cases when the centre
wants to impose its decisions on local tourism administrations. The features of normal
bureaucracy, which include the centralisation of authority (especially of financial
control) and the standardisation of rules, recommendations, and actions, may not
facilitate the empowerment of local administrations, and thus it is possible that the
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benefits of decentralisation cannot be harvested. One must recognise that centralisation 
and decentralisation are not mutually exclusive or dichotomous arrangements for 
governance (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). Both administrative models have merits, and 
in some cases one would be more effective and economic than the other. Thus the 
challenge for most governments is “to find a balance between centralised and 
decentralised arrangements and to link them in ways that promote development most 
effectively” (Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 11). What is the optimal mix is a challenging 
question.
5.5 Summary
A major characteristic of centralised management which can cause management 
inefficiency, is that public sector institutions are often geographically and socially 
remote from local people. It is often the case that the decisions taken in centralised 
management do not reflect or address local needs and problems. This is largely because 
of a lack of consultation with local people or with their representatives. Centralised 
management is often found to be ineffective and slow as a result of lengthy bureaucratic 
procedures, prompted by laws regulating interactions between government agencies at 
different levels and by conflicting responsibilities and authorities. In order to overcome 
the difficulties and constraints of centralised management a more decentralised 
management approach has been adopted by a number of governments around the world.
Decentralisation conventionally has taken three forms: (1) deconcentration, which 
refers to transferring resources and decision-making from headquarters to other branches 
of central government; (2) devolution, which refers to the devolution of resources and 
power to autonomous units of governments, such as municipalities and local 
government; (3) and delegation, meaning the delegation of resources and power to 
organisations outside the regular bureaucratic structures, such as public corporations and 
development agencies. When carried out properly, the forms of devolution and 
delegation can make development programmes more effective. However, 
decentralisation in developing countries has generally taken the form of deconcentration, 
which implies that the potential benefits are likely to be enjoyed by the dominant power 
groups of the ruling political party, and not by the local people.
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At least in theory, decentralisation is a relatively straightforward process of the 
transfer of powers originally held by the centre to various units of local government. In 
addition, although it may have theoretical appeal, the policies produced by a bottom-up 
model of tourism administration often seem to take the interests of local actors only as 
the point of departure, and therefore they are likely to be one-sided and they may also be 
inconsistent with national policies. In contrast, the top-down or centralist model may 
well disregard the values, interests and strategies of local actors by labelling them as 
“uninformed”, and it may also fail to capitalise on the resources and capacities of local 
government. Thus, both centralist and decentralist models may suffer from significant 
limitations. Both administrative forms fail to consider tourism management from a 
network perspective, which recognises that the multiple actors involved in plan 
formulation and implementation are essentially interdependent stakeholders. In other 
words, actors are dependent on each other because they need each other’s resources (of 
capital, technology, labour, expertise, and information) for goal achievement, as no 
organisation can generate independently all the necessary resources. Thus consideration 
needs to be given to a framework which endorses co-operation and co-ordination 
between interdependent parties with different and often conflicting rationality, interests 
and strategies. This may help to ensure that all decisions, policies, and activities are 
consistent and coherent and not at cross-purposes.
The next chapter briefly introduces the evolution of tourism administration and 
planning in Turkey. This is necessary background to understand the context to tourism 
administration and planning in the case study of Belek. The subsequent evaluation of the 
Belek example uses many of the concepts and frameworks which have been identified 
and evaluated in the large-scale literature review in chapters two to five.
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6. Tourism and Public Administration in Turkey
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the character and evolution of tourism administration in 
Turkey, with particular attention paid to the patterns of central-local relations in 
public sector management. An explanation of Turkey's tourism administrative system 
is necessary in order to understand the administrative context to the Belek case study. 
The historical evolution of the administrative system is an important context to the 
Belek case as it helps to explain difficulties rooted in Turkey's highly centralised, 
fragmented and bureaucratic public administration. It also helps to explain the more 
recent trend to greater decentralisation in public policy and decision-making. It is 
placed here early in the study as the discussion draws very largely on published 
secondary literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, there is a 
discussion of key features of public administration and its main organisational units in 
Turkey. Second, there is an assessment of the main developments in Turkey’s tourism 
administration that have taken place over the past five decades. Changes in the 
organisation and activities of tourism administration are discussed chronologically. 
The 1960s marked a period of transition in the country's approach to tourism 
development with the formation of five-year development plans formulated by the 
State Planning Organisation, an organisation which was itself established in this 
period (Aksoy 1996; Karakaya 1995; Toledo 1985). The most significant 
developments in Turkey's tourism administration during the 1980s included its 
increasing liberalisation, reflected in the introduction of the Tourism Encouragement 
Law (TEL), and also the establishment of a Tourism Ministry (Goymen 2000; Toledo 
1985). The structural problems faced by tourism administration at the local level in 
Turkey are also outlined.
6.2 Public administration in Turkey
Turkey is a unitary republic with a centralised structure and there has been a 
tendency towards deconcentration (delegation of power from central administrations 
to their provincial units) and decentralisation (increasing powers for local
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administrations) over the past two decades (OECD 1993). The country's territorial 
administration is governed by the system of provinces, which are in turn divided into 
districts. The creation of new territorial divisions (more than 15 new provinces and 
more than 300 districts since 1986) is continuing at present. Overall, legislative 
powers in Turkey are vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), which 
is composed of six hundred deputies, who are elected nationally by universal suffrage. 
In accordance with the Constitution the executive functions are entrusted to the 
President and the Council of Ministers. In 1982 the Ministries in Turkey were re­
organised and the principles behind the organisation and functions of the Ministries 
were restructured (Korzay 1994; Toledo 1985). The Ministry of Tourism and 
Information (MTI), which was established in 1963, was linked with the Ministry of 
Culture in the early 1980s to become the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), 
which in 1989 was divided into two independent ministries: the Ministry of Tourism 
(MoT) and the Ministry of Culture (MoC).
In general the administrative structure of Turkey is characterised by a strong 
central government whose territorial administration is governed by the system of 
provinces which functions according to the principle of deconcentration (Kocdemir 
1998; Destan 1998) (see chapter five for further details on deconcentration). 
Municipalities, Special Provincial Administrations (SPA), and Village 
Administrations are the three main public administrative entities established to meet 
the local needs of inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts, and villages. The Law 
relating to local administration (the Municipal Law 1580) regulates the formation, 
duties and powers of these entities. At the provincial level, the governor is the 
representative of the State, of the government and of each of the ministries separately; 
he is also their executive agent (OECD 1993). The tasks entrusted to SPAs come 
under the following headings: public works, training and education, health and social 
assistance. The tasks entrusted by law for municipalities may be grouped under the 
following headings: urban infrastructure work, organisation and control of 
commercial activities, preventive and curative health measures, social security and 
assistance, control, by a municipal police force, of the services provided by 
companies and individuals, and organisation of cultural and sports services (OECD 
1993).
I l l
In the provinces, there are currently more than 80 governors representing the 
central administration, and these are appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. In all 
settlements with more than 2,000 people the inhabitants elect a municipal governor 
(mayor) every five years. For both the provinces and municipalities there are councils 
with members elected every five years. The functional framework for the 
municipalities was established under the Municipalities Act of 1930 and, along with 
many other Acts, they assign to them a wide range of responsibilities. These include 
urban planning and implementation, surveys and mapping, the regulation of 
construction and construction permits, land development and the opening of new 
settlement areas, the construction and maintenance of parks, and urban roads, the 
provision of water, sewage and gas services, the collection and disposal of garbage, 
and the cleaning of public spaces (Unal 1992; Yeter 1993).
6.2.1 Administration problems in central-local relations
According to article 127 of the 1982 Constitution, the central administration 
has the power of administrative control over local government in the framework of 
principles and procedures enshrined in the law. The administrative control over local 
authorities is exercised over their activities, decisions, actions, and personnel 
(Donmez 1999). This supervision can take the form of the approval, postponement 
and even cancellation of some decisions. This is usually done through judicial control 
of the administrative acts of local authorities (Yalcindag 1997). Administrative, 
prerogatives and their limits are prescribed by the Constitution and by law. 
Administrative control over the local authorities is generally applied by the Ministry 
of the Interior, and in the regions by the provincial and district governors (Kocdemir 
1998; Toledo 1985; Unal 1992). In 1994 the Minister of the Interior delegated some 
of its supervisory powers to provincial governors in order to reduce the excessive 
concentration of power at the centre.
There are a number of other causes that prevent local authorities from working 
more efficiently and more effectively, which also undermine the workings of the 
overall administrative structure (Yalcindag 1997). Lack of proper distribution of 
functions between the central and local authorities is one of the major causes leading 
to administrative inefficiency (TID 1995 cited in Donmez 1999). Although the 
Constitution prescribes that local duties are, in principle, to be carried out by local
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authorities, this has not been realised (Tortop 1988). A great deal of local duties are 
still being performed by provisional and regional units of the centre. That central 
government is carrying out local services prompts inefficiency in service delivery, as 
the needs of the public are unlikely to be catered for appropriately due to the fact that 
their needs are not identified accurately (TID 1995). The local authorities’ share of 
public expenditure in Turkey is around 13 %, which is far behind than that of 
developed countries (Yalcindag 1997).
Insufficient financial resources also add to the problems. Local authorities 
have not been in possession of sufficient incomes in proportion to their duties and 
responsibilities, despite the Constitution prescribing otherwise (Tortop 1988). 
Moreover, their capability of creating new incomes is restricted; they can charge 
taxation and other financial obligations only within the limits set by legislation (TID 
1995). Insufficient organisation and personnel are among the other significant 
reasons. Local authorities generally lack the full capability of creating organisations 
and employing personnel, required by their functions (Yalcindag 1997). They can 
only set up organisations, employ personnel, and fix their payments within the limits 
of regulations made by the central administration and of legislation. There is also a 
great deal of unnecessary administrative tutelage by the central administration over 
local authorities, which results in inefficient functioning. Another contributor to the 
administrative inefficiency is the lack of a transparent administrative system and of 
public participation in local decision-making processes (TID 1995). The role of civil 
organisations, as well as local communities in the public management decision­
making process is rather limited. The administrative system is described as being non­
transparent and control-laden. Local authorities are unable to levy taxes or other 
financial obligations on organisations in their localities (TID 1995). Hence, local 
authorities seem to have been over-dependent on the centre owing to financial 
dependence and too much administrative tutelage. The centralist and bureaucratic 
tradition of Turkish administration causes many other problems, including an increase 
in formalism in administration, an unnecessary increase in the number of personnel, 
delays in the realisation of local projects and plans, difficulties of co-ordination, and 
so on. Additionally, the lack of an active, sensitive, and responding citizenship in 
relation to local affairs and authorities constitutes another serious problem for the 
Turkish local government system (Yalcindag 1997).
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6.3 Administrative changes affecting tourism
In general it is helpful to distinguish between three stages in the development 
of tourism in Turkey: the period pre-1960, the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1980s and 
onward. The changes in tourism administration occurring in each period are 
discussed.
6.3.1 The period pre-1960
Official attempts to include tourism in public administration started in the 
early 1930s with the publication of law no. 2450 in 1934 relating to the organisation 
and duties of the Ministry of the Economy. Before then and for more than a decade, 
the Touring and Automobile Club of Turkey was responsible for tourism affairs 
(Aksoy 1996). Changing the name of the General Directorate of Press and 
Publications into the Ministry of Press, Publications and Tourism in 1957 was a major 
step forward, as for the first time tourism affairs were to be dealt with at ministerial 
level. In this period, the government took several actions to stimulate tourism, such as 
laying down legislation for credits and making arrangements for tourist tariffs and 
also custom taxes (Aksoy 1996). The Act for Encouragement of the Tourism Industry 
(1953) prepared the way to boost investment in tourism and also to spread the idea 
that tourism development was desirable for the country. The Act for Co-operation in 
Tourism (1955) promoted the idea that for the national interest, all public and private 
interests should co-operate in the development of tourism. The importance of planned 
development had been realised by the government, and in this period there were a few 
attempts to draw up tourism-related plans (Toledo 1985; Sezer and Harrison 1994).
6.3.2 The 1960s-1970s
An important turning point in relation to tourism in the public sector was the 
establishment of the Ministry of Tourism and Information (MTI) in 1963, followed in 
1964 by the establishment of local tourism units and overseas offices of the MTI, and 
by the assignment of tourism-related responsibilities to various government and 
voluntary bodies (TYD 1992). Tourism-related issues were to be co-ordinated only by 
the MTI. The National Co-ordination Committee, which was established in 1969 
within the State Planning Organisation (SPO), was transferred to MTI, marking
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another turning point in the growing powers of MTI in Turkey’s government in 
relation to planning for tourism (DPT 1997).
In the provinces, tourism management was linked to general public 
administration through a provincial tourism committee and a district (administrative 
section of a province) tourism committee (chaired by the respective governor) in each 
province. In this way, the organisation of bodies responsible for tourism management 
within the country was divided into two separate branches: the Regional Directorate 
of the MTI and the provincial government under the Ministry of the Interior. An 
important feature of tourism administration in Turkey was the lack of power resting 
with local tourism bodies, with most power focused on the central MTI office in 
Ankara (Toledo 1985). One of the main characteristics of the distribution of functions 
and roles within central and local administrations was that the central government 
institutions, such as the State Planning Organisation and the central MTI in Ankara, 
were given the powers for policy-making and planning and also the co-ordinating role! 
for the tourism affairs of the Government. As in government more generally, the MTI 
and the Provincial Governor were the bodies ultimately responsible for tourism 
affairs; in Ankara the central body of the MTI runs tourism affairs and in the 
provinces the Provincial Governor has the final word (not the Regional Director of 
Tourism) (Tourism Ministry 1993).
The country entered a period of strongly planned development after the 
formation of the State Planning Organisation in 1960, which was reorganised in 1994 
by the Council of Ministers (DPT 1997). The State Planning Organisation had the 
authority to request all the necessary information related to its tasks directly from 
public institutions. The State Planning Organisation comprises the High Planning 
Council, the Money Credit and Co-ordination Committee and the Under-Secretariat of 
the State Planning Organisation (Ates 1999). The State Planning Organisation advises 
the Government in determining economic, social, and cultural policies and targets for 
the country, which take into account all types of natural, human and economic 
resources. It prepares long-term development plans and annual programmes in 
connection with the targets determined by the government (DPT 1997).
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Since 1963, all sectors of the economy, including the tourism sector, have 
followed a systematic planning policy laid down in five-year development plans 
(FYDPs). The development plans were intended to channel human and financial 
resources to different economic sectors. A new constitutional law passed after the 
military coup in 1961 further intensified state intervention in the economy by tying 
economic development matters into these five-year development plans (Karakaya 
1995). The State Planning Organisation formulated these plans, which were 
mandatory for the public sector but stimulative for the private sector. The First Five 
Year Development Plan (FYDP) ran from 1963 until 1967, the Second from 1968 
until 1972, the Third from 1973 until 1977, with 1978 being a year of “transition” 
because of political strains in the later 1970s. The main objective of these five-year 
development plans had been to earn significant amounts of foreign currency in order 
to finance Turkey’s imports (Ors 1991,1998; Taner 1978).
Turkey also adopted this “planned development” approach in the tourism 
sector (Goymen 2000; Korzay 1994; Toledo 1985). This approach was based on the 
mixed economy principle. The first FYDP defined the basic principles of this 
approach for tourism policy, and it encouraged investments in tourism mainly because 
of its impact on the balance of payments. It proposed that the state should shoulder 
the responsibility for building infrastructure, while the private sector should develop 
the superstructure. The state also interfered directly with the development of facilities 
through the Tourism Bank (Tourism Bank Chain) and the State Pension Fund (Emek 
Chain). In addition, the state provided other services in order to guide the industry's 
development, such as marketing and promotion and financial incentives for the 
private sector (Toledo 1985). The First FYDP also emphasised the need for 
legislation to facilitate investment and to create a tourism ministry. The Second FYDP 
endorsed the objectives of its predecessor and in addition it introduced the notion of 
physical planning, the concept of an internationally competitive pricing policy, and 
the principles of mass tourism (Sezer and Harrison 1994). The Third FYDP proposed 
the intensification of skill-based training programmes in tourism, the extension of 
physical planning activities in order to prevent haphazard development, and renewed 
efforts to develop a superstructure required for mass tourism.
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Despite all these policy decisions and the clear encouragement given to 
tourism, the expected improvements in bed capacity and in the number of tourists did 
not materialise, and by and large the plan targets were not achieved during the 1960s 
and 1970s (Sezer and Harrison 1994). The public bureaucracy and frequent changes 
of Government during these years were two of the factors negatively affecting the 
development of Turkey's tourism. There was very little consistent tourism policy in 
these years, with continuing changes in policy as each government came to power 
(Ilkin and Dincer 1991).
6.3.3 The 1980s and onward
The involvement in tourism development issues of the new government 
formed after the coup of 1980, far surpassed the efforts of previous governments. 
Important changes included the establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
(MCT), the new Tourism Encouragement Law, and the formation of an inner cabinet 
for tourism chaired by the Prime Minister (the High Co-Ordination Council for 
Tourism Affairs). Another striking development taking place in this period was the 
inclusion of tourism among the country's high priority development sectors and also 
the introduction of further financial incentives (TYD1992).
The establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the new 
Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL) in 1982 brought about a series of changes in 
tourism administration in Turkey. Up until this period the power of the Ministry 
responsible for tourism had not been significant in comparison to other Ministries 
(Toledo, 1985). In 1980 it was claimed that “Tourism in Turkey has until recently 
played a second fiddle to the country’s industrial ambitions and agricultural heritage. 
Despite upgraded ministerial representation since the 1960s, tourism still plays the 
poor neighbour to the demands of more heavyweight Ministries. It has received no 
more than 0.5 percent of the Government budget in any of the last 18 years (until 
1980), and less than 1 percent of all capital expenditures. Just as importantly it has 
lacked full autonomy, and has been dependent on administrative decisions and 
financial allocations in other sectors” (International Institute of Tourism Studies 1991: 
18 in Toledo 1985). For instance, the MTI had to obtain approval from other 
Ministries for the construction of tourism-related infrastructure, such as from the 
Ministry of Transportation for the construction of roads and from the Council of
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Ministers for tourism investments. These procedures usually took a long time, which 
negatively influenced the development of tourism. Subsequently, limited 
improvements were made in these procedures and in the power of the MCT (formerly 
the MTI). However, the organisation of the MCT remained largely the same, other 
than an increase in the number of its departments. The role of guiding and co­
ordinating public sector involvement in tourism was to be executed by the MCT, 
which also supervises and encourages business activities in the sector.
6.3.3.1 The Tourism Encouragement Law
The effectiveness of tourism management was improved somewhat by the new 
Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL) (law number 2634, 1982). This law introduced a 
new more liberal era by trying to overcome some of the previous hindrances, such as 
the weak co-ordination among tourism-related organisations (Tarhan 1996 in Goymen
2000). “The purpose of the present law is to ensure that necessary arrangements are 
made and necessary measures are taken in order to regulate, develop and provide for a 
dynamic structure and operation of the tourism sector. The present law comprises 
provisions governing the tourism sector, including definitions of tourist regions, areas 
and centres, establishment and development of such regions, and encouragement, 
regulation and inspection of touristic investments and facilities”(Ministry of Tourism 
and Culture in Var 2001: 101). According to this law, tourism investments are to be 
channelled to priority zones so that maximum benefits would be gained from Turkey's 
scarce resources being concentrated geographically. The formal legal requirements 
for the allocation of state-owned land were simplified through reducing the number of 
relevant bodies. Other important elements of this law were that the MCT was given 
powers over other Ministries in the tourism priority zones, such as over the Ministry 
of Finance (which holds land that belongs to the State); and also the introduction of a 
Tourism Development Fund, operated by the Tourism Bank.
63 .3.2 Establishment of the Ministry of Tourism (MoT)
An important development for tourism was the establishment of the High Co­
ordination Council for Tourism Affairs, which is intended to facilitate improved co­
ordination within the tourism sector. It comprises the Ministries involved in the 
development of tourism, and it is chaired by the Prime Minister. The Tourism 
Implementation Council, consisting of the Under-Secretaries (mustesar) of the various
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Ministries, was then concerned with the implementation of the decisions of this 
council (SPD 1997). Another turning point in this period was the establishment of a 
separate Ministry of Tourism. In January 1989 the Council of Ministers resolved to 
establish the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) on the basis of the authority granted by Laws 
number 3268, 3347 and 3479. Article one of Decree-law 355 sets out the principles 
for the establishment of the Ministry. The Ministry was formed to ensure that the use 
of the country's resources suitable for tourism made an optimal contribution to the 
national economy and met the recreational needs of the Turkish people. It is intended 
to take measures for the development and marketing of tourism, to steer government 
agencies concerned with tourism, and to co-operate with these agencies.
6.3.3.2.1 The structure of the MoT
The organisational structure of the MoT and the functions and roles of its 
various units have changed over the years. At present the structure of the MoT 
consists of a central organisation, provincial and overseas organisations, and affiliated 
and related agencies. The central organisation of the MoT consists of three main 
service units: the advisory, inspection and the auxiliary units. The Minister is head of 
the MoT and has the duty of conducting the Ministry’s activities in accordance with 
government policies, including legislation and national security policies. The 
Ministry’s development plans and annual programmes promote co-ordination and co­
operation with other ministries that fall within its area of activity. The main services 
of the MoT are outlined in the amended Decree-law number 411. These relate to the 
five MoT directorate generals: for investment, tourism establishments, promotion, 
tourism training and external relations (Kalkan 1995).
The main responsibilities of the directorate generals for investment (DGI) are 
to evaluate the country’s resources that might be used for tourism, to determine 
priorities for their use, to evaluate and protect natural resources affected by tourism 
and to work on these matters with other governmental agencies and private sector 
organisations (Kalkan 1995). The DGI also carries out research in order to formulate 
tourism policies and to steer investment in accordance with changes in the demand for 
different types of tourism. The DGI is also responsible for steering investment in 
tourism infrastructure and superstructure by the public and private sectors, and for the 
preparation of annual investment plans (Ors, 1991; Karakaya, 1995).
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There are several advisory and inspection units within the central organisation 
of the Ministry: the Board of Inspection, the Research, Planning and Co-ordination 
Board (RPCB), the office of Legal Counsel, Advisors to the Minister, and the Office 
of the Press and Public Relations advisor. The Board of Inspection was set up to 
investigate the activities of the Ministry and of organisations associated with the 
Ministry. Among the duties of this Board are the preparation of proposals to the 
Minister with a view to ensuring that the Ministry fulfils its objectives more 
effectively and operates in accordance with the legislation and relevant plans and 
programmes (article 14). The Research, Planning and Co-ordination Board undertakes 
research and develops the activities and measures deemed necessary to be included in 
the Ministry’s long-term development plans and annual programmes, with those 
proposals being sent to the State Planning Organisation, after the approval of the 
Tourism Minister has been obtained (article 15). Another important duty of this 
Board is to determine measures at ministerial or inter-ministerial level that are needed 
to solve problems or bottlenecks during the implementation of the Ministry's 
development plans.
An Intra-Ministerial Commission (IMC) was established within the Ministry 
of Tourism in order to define the locations and boundaries of Turkey’s tourism zones, 
taking into account their natural assets and tourism potential. The IMC contains the 
representatives of the Tourism General Directorate under the co-ordination of the 
Head of the Tourism Planning and Investment Department of the Ministry. The IMC 
acts in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. The 
commission members also include representatives of the General Staff, the State 
Planning Organisations, the Under-Secretariat of the Prime Minister, the Environment 
General Directorate, and the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Public Work 
and Settlement, Transport and Communications, Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 
Forestry, Industry and Trade, Energy and Natural Resources, and of Culture.
The auxiliary units within the central organisation of the MoT are the 
Personnel Department, the Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs, the 
Defence Secretariat and the Office of Chef de Cabinet. The advisory body to the 
Ministry is the Council of Tourism (CoT), which normally meets once every three
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years to discuss relevant tourism matters, and they may also meet extraordinarily on 
the invitation of the Minister. Decisions of the CoT are consultative in nature.
Under current legislation, the Ministry has the duty and powers to determine 
principles that must be observed in relation to tourism issues by other ministries and 
government agencies, including the power to ensure that they work in co-operation 
(article 30). When its activities overlap with the activities of other ministries, the MoT 
is responsible for consulting with the concerned ministries and ensuring there is the 
necessary co-operation and co-ordination, within the framework of principles set out 
by the Prime Minister. The Tourism Minister, the Under-Secretary, and staff at all 
levels of the MoT and affiliated bodies, may delegate some of their powers to lower 
level organisations provided that they expressly specify the limits of the powers so 
delegated.
The MoT is also authorised in Law number 3046 to establish tourism 
organisations in the provinces, where this is deemed necessary. The Tourism 
Directorates (TDs) are administrative bodies responsible for the Ministry’s tourist- 
related services and for the development of tourism within the provinces and regions 
(Article 27 of the Decree-law number 355). The TDs obtain data for the preparation 
of provincial and regional tourism plans, determine the specific measures to 
implement these plans, and also inform the Ministry of their work. The TDs also 
implement the State Development Plans and Annual Programmes relating to regional 
tourism, and they also monitor progress in tourism investment made within the 
specified State Development Plan periods (Article 8). The TDs also facilitate co­
operation at the provincial scale between government agencies and organisations, and 
the private sector and local people, in order to channel the investment capacity of the 
provinces into tourism and to ensure that they contribute to the effective development 
of tourism. The TDs represent the MoT in the province where this is authorised by the 
provincial Governor.
6.4. Local government and the current state of tourism planning and 
development
The government strategy incorporated into the Fifth and the Sixth FYDPs 
(1990-1994) focuses on public sector privatisation and on the deregulation of the
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industry (Sezer and Harrison 1994). Prior to this, in the 1980s, the state had already 
adopted a more decentralised and liberal attitude to tourism, involving the transferral 
of some responsibilities for planning to local government and providing incentives to 
encourage the private sector to take a leading role. Despite these attempts to 
modernise the tourism administration, many of the administrative problems remain 
unresolved. As Sezer and Harrison note, “the lack of sectoral planning, ineffective 
control, the lack of participation by local people, the abuse of political power, the get- 
rich-quick mentality coupled with dubious practices, inconsistencies in the planning 
criteria and procedures, and the general lack of tourism culture resulted in missed 
opportunities and inadequate and inappropriate tourism development” (1994: 82). For 
example, during this period there was an increasing regional imbalance in tourism 
development in favour of the west and southwest of Turkey at the expense of the 
north and east. This has produced irrecoverable environmental damage as well as 
aggravating economic discrepancies between regions (Sezer and Harrison 1994). A 
number of actions were proposed in order better to realise the government's policy 
objectives of the 1980s: (1) A tourism sector development plan (TUSAP) was to be 
devised by university experts in order to create a more dynamic planning system 
whereby the goals, strategies and policies could be revised and adapted according to 
the changes and developments in the sector. (2) The budget of the MoT was to be 
increased and a new category of skilled personnel was to be created of “tourism 
specialists” who were mainly graduates with special training in tourism. (3) New 
legislation was to be introduced to reorganise the structure of both the public and 
private sectors in relation to tourism (Aksoy 1996; Karakaya 1995; Korzay 1994; 
Sezer and Harrison 1994).
One current difficulty relates to conflict and confusion between the 
organisations responsible for the design and implementation of plans. In tourism 
zones, master plans should be approved by the MoT and the Ministry of Public Works 
and Settlement, and preliminary permission to prepare these plans must also be 
obtained from these Ministries. The Municipal Board of the municipality examines 
the plans in cases where they are submitted to the municipality because they concern 
areas within the boundaries of the municipality or else neighbouring areas. For the 
provinces the Provincial Board carries out the same duty in cases where they are 
submitted to the Provincial Governor’s office (article 12, amendment 20197).
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However, a new law on Construction (Decree law number 3194) was introduced in 
1985, which has transferred some authority for planning to local government.
Settlement development plans (Imar Planlari) are designed to ensure that there 
is balanced and controlled urban development. These apply in coastal and rural areas 
where relevant legislation applies. However, the legal authority for planning in 
relation to these plans is divided, with the municipalities responsible for the 
implementation of both master plans and settlement development plans within their 
boundaries, while authority for such plans outside municipality boundaries rests with 
the Provincial Governor. Interestingly, while central government institutions develop 
these plans, local government is expected to put them into practice, despite them 
being excluded from many decision-making processes. The authority to make plans 
concerning tourism is vested by Article 7 of the Act for Encouragement of Tourism, 
and the Article 10 of the Act on Coasts jointly controlled by of the Ministry of 
Tourism and the Ministry of Public Affairs. The plans, formulated by the Ministry of 
Tourism or by a contracted tertiary organisation, are expected to be put into practice 
and monitored by the municipalities. As Soybay (1995) observes these plans and 
policies can be inconsistent with local requirements and characteristics, with them 
being developed and implemented by units producing nation-wide policies, so they 
may not meet the social and economic requirements of local people. This can lead to 
burdens that are difficult to overcome. Further, the fact that 24 institutions and 
organisations along with 20 regulations are involved in land-use planning means that 
there are many problems concerning the delegation of power and co-ordination, and 
these problems have often thwarted local government in their attempts to implement 
tourism plans (Coker 1996; Pirler 1996; Unal 1992; Yeter 1993).
While the 1980s saw unprecedented tourism growth in Turkey, the structural 
problems characterising tourism administration have continued during the 1990s. The 
relevant organisations have not been given the appropriate power and responsibility to 
achieve the desired tourism development objectives. These organisations have been 
thwarted by both the haphazard organisational structure and the piecemeal 
development of legislation (TEK 1992). Over-centralisation, ambiguous 
responsibilities, imbalances in authority, and an uneven distribution of duties and 
resources have given rise to a vague organisational framework. Co-ordination
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between the public and private sectors is almost absent and the boundaries of legal 
jurisdictions and responsibilities are not clearly defined (Coker 1996). Although a 
High Tourism Co-ordination Council was established in the early 1980s, this council 
lacked appropriate legislation to enable it to operate adequately. Reforms in tourism 
administration are widely thought to be a priority because of the difficulties resulting 
from Turkey’s centralised tourism administration (Sezer and Harrison 1994).
In the context of these structural problems, the seventh FDYP (1996-2000) 
proposed a more decentralised approach to tourism administration and emphasised 
reform in tourism administration, particularly in the role of local government. Some 
key objectives relevant to the present study are summarised in Table 6.1 (SPD 1996- 
2000).
Table 6.1 Some key objectives of the seventh Five Year Development I
Plan \
1. The restructuring o f local administration to be implemented in parallel with a greater 
decentralisation o f administration.
2. To achieve more decentralised administration, the organisational structures o f villages, 
municipalities and provincial special authorities are to be reformed so that they are more self- 
sufficient, both financially and administratively.
3. The financial, technical and organisational structures o f local administration are to be ^
rearranged.
4. The duties, authority, and resources are to be redistributed between central and local ,j
government in the context o f these reforms.
5. Improved co-ordination and co-operation is to be achieved in accordance with the new 
frameworks.
6. Some o f the responsibilities of central government are to be transferred to government 
representatives in the provinces, notably to Provincial Governors.
7. The union o f local authorities in Turkey will be given greater attention and more support.
8. New arrangements will be made for local people to participate more in decision-making 
processes and in the implementation o f programmes.
9. Local government will work in collaboration with central government in drawing up plans and 
programmes for their localities.
10. In the context o f these objectives, the dependency o f local government on central government 
is to be reduced.
Decentralised administration has been suggested as a remedy for the structural 
problems facing tourism administration of Turkey. The Seventh FYDP is the first 
radical recommendation with respect to decentralising the administration, being based 
on the principles of institutional restructuring, redefining the state's role, and the 
redistribution of some authority and resources. There is, however, a lack of evidence 
on the impact of decentralisation for the success of tourism planning and 
management.
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6.5 .Summary
In this chapter an attempt was made to introduce the main characteristics of 
Turkey's administration and the organisational structure of tourism in the country. The 
key characteristics of the administrative system likely to impact on tourism 
management and development include its highly centralised structure, administrative 
control by central government over local government decisions, a disorganised 
institutional framework for tourism planning, and weak local government. The 
organisational structure of tourism at national level appears to be chaotic, which is 
also not very different at the local level (Agaoglu 1989). There are a diverse number 
of institutions and legislation concerning the development and implementation of 
tourism policies. In addition to the Ministry of Tourism, the following ministries can 
also intervene indirectly in the decision-making and implementation process: the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Village Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Forestry, 
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Public 
Works. At the local level, the local organisations of the Ministry of Tourism and the 
local governments (municipality and the SPAs) are given responsibilities for 
implementing policies, and there exists ambiguity and imbalances concerning their 
autonomy and responsibilities. In addition to the Tourism Encourage Law (TEL), 
there are also a number of other regulations having a direct effect on the 
implementation of tourism policies. These include the National Parks Law, the Law 
for Protection of Cultural and Natural Wealth, the Law to Protect Coastal Zones, the 
Construction Law, the Municipalities’ Law, the Law to Protect General Health, the 
Environment Law, the Law of Forestry, the Law of Water Product, and the Decree for 
Using Agricultural Lands. This legislation authorises different institutions and 
organisations, and thus gives rise to clashes of authority and responsibilities (SPO 
1997).
The TEL was supposed to simplify the regulations for the private sector and 
local public sector in relation to tourism planning and development by reducing the 
number of relevant bodies. However, to date this has not been realised. The centralist 
administration system and ambiguities in the sharing of powers and responsibilities of 
organisations related to tourism at different government levels are posing difficulties
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for tourism management and planning. Operating within a very centralised 
administration, many national and local tourism organisations are often frustrated in 
performing their mandated duties. While there are recent attempts to "modernise" the 
country’s tourism administration , they appear not to have been backed by appropriate 
legislation, and the frequent changes in government have also led to further 
inconsistencies in tourism policies. The reviewed literature showed that local 
municipalities have rather limited authority over local tourism planning, and central 
government (mainly the MoT and the governor) applies administrative tutelage over 
local decisions. The administrative tutelage means that municipalities do not have 
autonomy in many cases to put into practice their decisions under their own initiative. 
By this power, central government keeps its authority to interfere with local affairs, 
deciding what services should be rendered for local communities and how they must 
be performed. The partial exclusion of local government and their limited authority in 
the face of decisions dictated by central government are likely to reduce the success of 
local tourism development plans, including that of Belek.
Another major inhibitor to tourism management and development in the 
country, including the Belek plan, is the political instability resulting from frequent 
government changes. Var (2001: 108) observes that “the frequent changes of 
coalition governments and turnover of the top-level administrators have resulted in 
discontinuity. Political stability is essential for achieving a sustainable national 
tourism policy”. There is thus a need for better planning on a national level based on 
clear and realistic objectives that do not change substantially as governments change. 
There is also a clear need for the government to recognise that the past strategies 
cannot be sustained for the longer term and require fundamental rethinking (Var
2001). In sum, tourism policy in Turkey seems to have been handled in a fragmented 
way and hence responsibilities for policy determination, implementation, and control 
are spread too wide (Var 2001). These problems are likely to be mirrored in the Belek 
case study area.
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7. Conceptual Framework and Methodology
7.1 Introduction and study objectives
This chapter explains the multi-stage research process that was followed to 
meet the study’s research objectives. While generic descriptions of the research 
process vary in terms of the number and detail of the stages or steps involved, their 
general sequencing remains almost universal (Saunders et al 1997; Ryan 1995). These 
stages include formulating and clarifying the research topic, reviewing the literature, 
choosing a strategy, collecting data, analysing the data and writing up. In parallel with 
the general sequence suggested in the literature, the researcher started by investigating 
the overall domain of the research subject. At this stage, the value of the research was 
established, the specific research topic was identified, and it was related to existing 
knowledge and theory. An exploratory review of the relevant literature was undertaken 
in order to clarify the theoretical rationale behind the specific research problem, and to 
identify what research had and had not been done previously. The subsequent 
sustained literature review facilitated an assessment of key parameters behind the case 
study research. A conceptual framework was then developed to identify and assess the 
inter-organisational relations in tourism, especially between central and local 
government organisations, as well as between the private sector and NGOs. This 
conceptual framework was partly derived from ideas and concepts identified in the 
literature review.
Next, a strategy was selected in order to advance the research. An eclectic 
approach was adopted in the choice of data collection and analytic methods. The next 
step was the generation of interview themes and questions which captured the research 
issues and themes as previously specified. The researcher refined the research 
instrument through pilot tests and consultation with other researchers in order to retain 
questions that effectively capture the constructs under investigation. Following the 
reduction of the interview questions and consideration of their validity, the detailed 
field research was conducted. Following the systematic collection of the data, the 
Nud.ist software programme was utilised to analyse the data. Each research stage is 
detailed in the following sections.
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The first section of this chapter recaps on the study's research aims and 
objectives and explains the reasons why a case study approach was employed. Next, 
the conceptual framework developed for the study is described and explained. There 
is then an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two key potential data 
collection methods - survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The phases 
followed in the implementation of the fieldwork and in the analysis of the resulting 
interview transcripts are explained next. Finally, there is discussion of the practical 
difficulties encountered in the course of the research and of possible limitations 
regarding the research findings.
7.1.1 Research aims and objectives
Two key issues in tourism planning are the balance of power in policy 
formulation and implementation between the national and local levels of public sector 
tourist organisations, and also how this balance in relations affects the practice of 
local level tourism planning. Tourism planning is likely to be affected by the 
administrative system and by the balance in relations between national and local 
levels in related policy areas, such as land-use planning and economic development. 
The co-ordination of activities, that is the fitting together of administrative 
arrangements, policy decisions, and policy implementation so that all are consistent 
and coherent and not at cross-purposes, is a precursor to successful tourism planning 
and development (Hall 1994). Previous researchers have generally focused on tourism 
planning techniques, and tourism impact assessments, while tourism administrative 
systems and their impact on tourism plan formulation and implementation have 
received inadequate attention. Given this limited previous research, the study aims to 
explore the nature and the extent of influence of centralised and localised tourism 
administration on the development and implementation of a tourism development 
plan. Focusing on Turkey, this study seeks to ascertain the elements of the 
organisational environment in which the planning is undertaken; to examine the ways 
in which the planning and implementation process is carried out; to identify the areas 
of interdependency and exchange of resource among agencies involved in the 
decision-making process concerning tourism development; and to identify elements 
that either facilitate or inhibit the building, maintenance and management of 
interorganisational relations formed among public and private sector organisations 
involved in the Belek Tourism Development Plan. Further, this study seeks insights
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into whether the use of alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, 
might have helped to enhance the management of tourism at the local level. The study 
draws on a critical review of the literature on inter-organisational relations, notably on 
central-local relations and on tourism planning, as well as of relevant literature in such 
disciplinary areas as political science, public administration, regional and urban 
planning and geography.
The research has four specific objectives.
1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational 
relations in tourism planning, including between central and local 
government. This includes consideration of tourism planning issues in 
Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and 
consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter­
organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, 
and the delegation of power. This draws on a substantial review of relevant 
literature.
2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case 
study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country 
with a centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a 
major tourism development initiative.
3. To evaluate the patterns and process, and strengths and weaknesses of 
inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the 
identified conceptual themes.
4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in 
relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on 
the potential to change its character.
7.2.1 Selection of the case study area
The Belek region was selected in order to study the patterns of inter-organisational 
relations, notably those between central and local tiers of government, and their 
implications for tourism development and plan implementation. There are several 
reasons behind the choice of Belek as the case study area and these were considered 
in detail in chapter one. Among the reasons explained in chapter one were that there is
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growing environmental awareness and related concerns to reverse environmental✓
degradation in the area. The Belek project also aims to establish sustainable tourism in 
the region and it marks perhaps the first time in Turkey that the development of a 
tourism management plan has been more substantially devolved to civil society. 
Further, there has been limited research on the extent to which the goals within the 
Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) have been realised in practice. Additionally, 
the unofficial delegation of some central powers to a private organisation (Betuyab) is 
an unprecedented and interesting practice in a centralised administrative context. The 
Belek case study is intended to enhance our understanding of whether top-down 
(centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) approaches to tourism planning and 
management are likely to be effective in handling the complex interactions between 
various parties in a developing world context. Previous research reports that there are 
ambiguities and conflicts in the sharing of authority and responsibility in relation to 
tourism management in the area (Soybay 1995). The success of the BMP will thus be 
related to a type of co-ordination and co-operation between public and private sectors 
and NGOs that is new and different in the Turkish context. The Belek case study is 
expected to provide insights into factors working for and against co-ordination in an 
environment where there are multiple relevant organisations that develop rules and 
monitor and supervise tourism planning and management.
7.3 Research design and methodology
A research design is simply the framework or plan that guides how to ask 
research questions and how to collect and analyse data (Churchill 1983). Terminology 
describing approaches to research design abound in the literature and are 
conventionally expressed in a dichotomous manner (e.g., theoretical-applied, 
descriptive-explanatory, qualitative-quantitative, exploratory-causal, experimental- 
non-experimental, cross sectional-longitudinal, and inductive-deductive) (for an 
extensive review see Clark et al 1998; Churchill 1990; DeVaus 1995; Pizam 1994; 
Ritchie and Spencer 1994; Robson 1993; Tull and Hawkins 1993; Veal 1997).
The choice of research design is contingent upon the nature of the research 
problem and its fundamental objective (Churchill 1990). It is important to note that 
there is not a single, standard or correct method of carrying out research. Simon (1969: 
4 in Yuksel 2000), for instance, notes "Do not wait to start your research until you find
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out the proper approach, because there are many ways to tackle the problem - some 
good, some bad, but probably several good ways. There is no single project design. A 
research method for a given problem is not like the solution to a problem in algebra. It 
is more like a recipe for beef-stroganoff, there is no one best recipe". Unlike the pure 
sciences, the development of a research design in tourism is normally affected by the 
researcher being unable to exercise control over the variables involved (Ryan 1995).
In such situations, ex post facto design is required, which is defined as "the systematic 
empirical enquiry in which the scientist does not have direct control of independent 
variables because their manifestations have already occurred or because they are 
inherently not manipulative" (Kerlinger 1973: 379 in Pizam 1994).
A case study approach, drawing on both secondary and primary data (Yin 
1993), was taken in order to highlight linkages between the realities of the tourism 
plan formulation and implementation processes and the theoretical context of this 
research (Williams et al 1998). Robson (1993: 40) defines a case study approach as 
“the development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case”, or a small 
number of related cases. Yin (1993) regards it as a method of choice when the 
phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context. This strategy 
was particularly suitable for the research, as the aim was to gain a rich understanding 
of the context of the tourism development initiative and the processes being enacted 
(Morris and Wood 1991). Yin (1993) notes that this method is particularly 
appropriate when researchers desire to (a) define topics broadly and not narrowly, (b) 
cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of study, and (c) rely on 
multiple and not singular sources of evidence. Another reason why a case study 
strategy was adopted is that it has considerable ability to generate answers to the 
question of “why”, as well as what and how (Robson 1993; Yin 1993), which tend to 
be the questions addressed by the survey method. It has to be noted that empirical 
findings from a case study are not necessarily transferable to other tourism or land use 
planning contexts, but should be taken as a foundation for more empirical testing 
elsewhere (Williams et al 1998).
When designing a case study it is necessary to have a conceptual framework, a 
set of research questions, a sampling strategy and appropriate methods and 
instruments for data collection (Robson 1993; Yin 1993). To answer the research
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question and meet the objectives, in congruence with suggestions in the literature, the 
researcher has consulted extensively relevant secondary data that had been collected 
for other reasons (Selin and Myers 1995). This secondary data provided a useful 
source from which to answer preliminary research questions. Secondary data were 
gleaned from previously published reports on the Belek Coastal Management Plan 
(BMP) by the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), newspaper cuttings, internet 
sources, as well as reports published by other relevant planning, tourism and 
environment authorities in Turkey. Locating and using secondary data provided 
enormous saving in resources and helped to build a general understanding of the 
context within which the planning processes were undertaken in the country.
Given the specific objectives of the research, the use of secondary data was 
not adequate on its own. Hence, primary data were also collected, which involved 
purposeful discussions or interviews with relevant people (Table 7.3), focusing on 
seven specific conceptual themes identified in a theoretical framework (Figure 7.1). 
The conceptual themes covered in these interviews include: the planning issues in 
Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus 
building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the 
roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. The interviews 
were carried out with selected representatives from organisations and other relevant 
stakeholders. In all cases the most directly involved and knowledgeable individual 
about the BMP within each organisation was interviewed (Selin and Chavez 1994). 
The interview technique was chosen in preference to mailing questionnaires for 
several reasons, which are discussed more fully shortly (Keogh 1990). Among the key 
reasons for this preference was that the interviews obtained a sufficient return from 
the limited population, and thereby helped ensure the validity of the results. The 
technique was also used to create an informal atmosphere in which respondents were 
encouraged to freely express their feelings on the Belek Plan. Further, the technique 
allowed the respondents to state their opinions in their own terms, thus ensuring that 
issues that they considered important were not overlooked. Open-ended questions 
were used to stimulate conversation on the limitations and strengths of the planning 
and implementation processes. All interviews, with few exceptions, were tape 
recorded and later transcribed word-for-word for subsequent analysis. The data were
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coded to reflect major themes and then recoded into specific sub- themes to reflect its 
specific content, as explained subsequently (Strauss 1987).
The next section (7.4) presents and explains the conceptual framework 
developed for the study, and the subsequent section (7.5) explains why qualitative 
techniques in the form of semi-structured interviews were preferred to quantitative 
techniques.
7.4 The conceptual framework
This research uses a case study of one area in Turkey in order to identify and 
assess the patterns and processes of inter-organisational relations between tourism- 
related organisations, and particularly between central and local government, as well 
as between the public and private sectors and NGOs. These relations are examined in 
relation to the formulation and implementation of a tourism development plan. A 
conceptual framework was developed specifically in order to fulfil this research 
objective. The framework was devised to analyse the nature and extent of the 
relationships between the public and private sectors and NGOs, their implications for 
the formulation and implementation of the Belek development plan, and to provide a 
better understanding of the elements of the tourism environment and of the relations 
among the parties involved in the plan. In the following discussion of the conceptual 
framework, the terms depicted in the summary in Figure 7.1 are shown in italics. 
Reference is also made to the literature that was reviewed in chapters 2-5 that is 
related to the ideas in the framework. The relevant section in the literature review 
chapters is indicated.
The conceptual framework puts emphasis on the roles of the public and 
private sectors, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in tourism 
planning and development, on the nature and extent of the interdependencies and 
interactions among the various parties, and on the social, economic, technological and 
political environment within which they operate (Hall 1994; Burkart and Medlik 
1981; Lickorish et al 1991; Sharpe 1970) (Figure 7.1). Attention is given to the 
relationships between public and private sector organisations and NGOs, and also to 
the links between organisations at different scales, notably, the national, provincial 
and local scales (Pearce 1992). The framework recognises that central government,
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particularly in developing countries, has critical functions to fulfil in terms of co­
ordination, planning, legislation, entrepreneur regulation, and the stimulation of 
tourism development (Jenkins and Henry 1982; Mill and Morrison 1985). “Problems 
arise and costs are increased when the different sectors do not develop harmoniously 
or when the motives and capabilities of different development agents conflict... 
uncontrolled growth of tourism can destroy the very source base on which it was 
built” (Pearce 1992: 12).
Government involvement is often necessary to achieve a united action to draw 
together the different operators and agents of development within a given destination 
(Hall 1998; Pearce 1992). Central government plays an arbiter role in serving 
competing interests in tourism planning. The defence of local and minority interests, 
notably the role of balancing various interests and values, in order to meet national or 
regional public interests rather than private interests has traditionally been a central 
government duty. The provision of infrastructure is also a widely accepted activity for 
public authorities - one which can facilitate tourism development and selectively 
direct it to particular areas (Pearce 1992).
The conceptual framework notes that local government is likely to be 
indispensable for both tourism planning and development. Local government is “a 
conductor, facilitating and leading a complex range and variety of organisations in 
civil society. The active civil society needs to be sustained and nurtured and local 
authorities would have a key role in establishing a framework for interest expression 
and co-operative problem solving” (Frazer and Lacey 1993: 28). "Local government 
is no passing luxury. It should be a guardian of fundamental values. It represents, first 
and foremost, a spread of political power.. .Local authorities represent the dispersion 
of legitimate political power in our society” (Jones and Stewart 1985 in Stoker 1996: 
12). Local government should be appreciated, as it can impair the anchored power of 
more central authorities (Stoker 1996). The private sector is another major influential 
actor in tourism planning and development, as it is responsible for most commercial 
development and the operation of most tourist facilities and services, along with much 
marketing. Additionally, some activities depend on voluntary relationships between 
individuals and groups often motivated by affectivity or ethical commitment (Brett 
2000). This is related to civil society, a third sector which can consist of families,
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professional associations, political parties, participatory organisations and NGOs. 
Their characteristics are different to those of state or commercial organisations. That 
is, they are private in that they do not depend on the coercive power of the state, and 
unlike private sector firms, they do not depend on self-interest where success is 
determined primarily by the measuring rod of money. Nowadays, voluntary 
organisations at international, national and local scales are involved in different 
aspects of tourism, such as conservation of the natural, historic, and cultural resources 
that tourism can use, and development of eco-tourism and community based projects. 
In the past, these organisations have often not been taken particularly seriously in 
policy circles, as they tend to have a limited role in service delivery (Brett 2000). 
However, this has altered for both practical and ideological reasons. The building and 
maintaining of close relations of co-operation and co-ordination among public, private 
and voluntary sector organisations and the community throughout the planning and
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implementation process is increasingly recognised as important in order to ensure that 
development achieves common objectives. The balance of power and extent of co­
ordination between these organisations are central issues, effecting the outcomes of 
planning and development. As discussed in chapter 2 sections 2.3 and 2.4, due to the 
multi-faceted nature of the tourism industry and diverse activities engaged in by these 
organisations, the questions of co-ordination and interorganisational interactions are 
critical in the analysis of tourism development initiatives. Hence, these relationships 
are central concerns of the conceptual framework.
This framework shown in Figure 7.1 draws on and integrates existing research 
literature on public administration, decentralisation, systems, interorganisational 
relations and network theories, and on the concepts of resource exchange and power- 
resource dependency (see chapters 2 to 5 for more details). Within the literature, four 
main types of influence can be identified which affect central-local relations in 
tourism planning and management, including the formulation and implementation of 
local tourism development plans. These are: the environmental context, the 
administrative structures, the geographical scale of the administrative structures, and 
the nature of the interorganisational interactions. In the framework each of these 
influences is broken down into related elements which can affect central-local 
relations in tourism planning and management (Figure 7.1).
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This model takes into consideration the role of the external environment and 
existing networks between organisations, and it adopts a domain level focus, which 
includes, "the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organisations) that become 
joined by a common problem or interest" (Gray 1989: 912). The model shown in 
Figure 7.1, proposes that tourism organisations at the same or different spatial scales 
operate in a dynamic environment, composed of micro, task and macro environment 
sets. It should be noted that each environment set has its own elements and there are 
reciprocal relations between the elements within each environment set, as well as 
between environment sets. Hence, these sets are not necessarily separate entities and 
they will exert more or less force on one another.
The arrows in Figure 7.1 emphasise this dynamic and cyclical nature of relations 
between the three sets of environments. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.3, 
different forms of interorganisational relations, such as co-operation, co-ordination, 
competition or conflict begin in the context of broader social, economic, political or 
technological forces that cause a relationship to be initiated (Selin and Chavez, 1995). 
The nature of these relationships is also to be determined and shaped by the absence 
or existence of microenvironment elements. The arrows in Figure 7.1 indicate that an 
organisation's proclivity to enter into a co-operative relation with another organisation 
will be heightened when the resources necessary to meet its organisational objectives 
are scarce. Similarly, high levels of competitive uncertainty will force organisations to 
enter into collective arrangements (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). When there is no 
respect of one another's identities {interorganisational evaluation), or there is 
insufficient information and consultation {communication network), the organisations 
are unlikely to form co-operative relations. Drawing on propositions reviewed in 
chapter 3 section 3.5, this model notes that organisations may know one another 
through working together on other projects in the past (existing network) or they 
might not have worked together previously (new network). Hence, the organisation's 
experiences with the same, similar or other organisations in the past may play an 
important role in interorganisational relations. These issues are now considered in 
more detail in the following paragraphs
The framework is based on the premise that relationships between organisations 
should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. Interorganisational
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relationships in tourism planning and implementation involve relations between 
central and local government, NGOs, the community and the private sector. As the 
arrows in Figure 7.1 illustrate, the linkages are multiple, and arise in particular from 
the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers. These resources 
and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, professional, 
informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). In other words, each 
organisation is interdependent and operates under the condition of partial autonomy 
(Gamm 1981). In other words, no organisation alone can perform its functions or 
tasks without at some time requiring resources controlled by other organisations or 
actions taken by them. Consequently, organisations within the system are likely to 
attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so they will employ various 
strategies.
The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and 
tourism plan development and implementation depend on the nature of the 
interactions (e.g., conflictual, competitive, and co-operative) between organisations at 
national, provincial and local levels. The framework recognises that 
interorganisational relationships take place in contexts where some organisations will 
be co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are competing for the 
same political, financial and informational resources or locus of power. As discussed 
in chapter 3 section 3.5, integral to the framework is the contention that peaceful and 
harmonious interactions based on mutual agreement are only viable where each 
organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions exist 
which embody and enforce the rules which allow them to exchange scarce resources 
on a secure and equitable basis.
The framework helps to evaluate how these organisations relate to their 
surrounding environment. As reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.3, it assumes that the 
nature of these interorganisational interactions is likely to be influenced by the 
structural dimensions of the environment, including the degree of resource 
concentration or dispersal, the concentration or diffusion of power, and extent of 
autonomy or mutual dependence (Benson 1975). In this environment the external 
regulations may take the form of either enacted laws, rules, or procedures or of the 
attitudes and values of the organisations, and these then shape the nature of the
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interorganisational relationships (Dawson 1986). The political culture of the country, 
the general economic conditions, as well as broader government policies are also 
likely to influence the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for interorganisational 
relations, including the communication networks, between the different levels of 
government agencies. They also affect the organisational interdependencies, their 
strategic perspectives, and their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992). 
This framework sees institutions as integrated within sets of rules that structure social 
interactions in particular ways, based on the knowledge shared by the members of the 
relevant community or society (Brett 2000). In other words, institutions both are 
affected by and affect the norms, rules, habits, customs and routines, both formal and 
informal, which govern the society at large. They influence the function, structure 
and behaviour of organisations and groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose and who come together to achieve joint objectives (Brett 2000).
The framework helps to assess the character of centralist approaches to 
government where a few central actors develop and apply policy proposals on their 
own, and of localist approaches where local capacities and suggestions are much more 
prominent. The framework recognises that collective action by actors at all 
geographical scales can play a central part in tourism policy-making and 
implementation. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate the processes of 
exchange between organisations (Laughlin 1996; O’Toole, 1997). For example, the 
legal and institutional framework strongly influences the allocation of financial 
resources, determines the duty to provide access to information, and is an important 
determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the organisational 
network. An analysis of interorganisational relations needs to be placed in the context 
of this institutional framework in order to understand its effects on system outcomes.
In essence, the conceptual framework developed for this study identifies the 
influences and processes affecting inter-organisational relations relevant to tourism, 
notably central- local government relations. Drawing on the concepts identified in the 
Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests that, in a tourism administrative 
context, consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between 
various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), the distribution of roles and 
duties between and within sub-systems, the extent of communication and co­
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ordination between the actors, the characteristics of the environmental context of the 
system and the related constraints, and the delegation or devolution of power (power 
distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an understanding of the interdependency 
between the different actors in the system in which tourism operates.
In order to enhance understanding of inter-organisational relations in relation 
to tourism-oriented policies, and notably of central-local government relations, this 
framework suggests that the research should identify:
•. The range of public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism 
management and in tourism plan formulation and implementation and also their 
overall and more specific aims and objectives.
• The extent to which different public, private and voluntary organisations influence 
tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the legal power to do so).
• The formal and informal rules and procedures that regulate the interactions 
between these institutions (notably the legislative framework and the “rules of the 
game”), and their effects on the power of these organisations.
• The extent of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and 
local level organisations, such as in relation to resource dependency.
• The forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, communicative, etc.,) used in 
managing relations between organisations, and their effects on the balance of 
power between those institutions.
• The overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the institutions involved in 
tourism management and in the formulation and implementation of tourism plans.
• The extent of interorganisational communication and the ways in which the 
organisations communicate with one another.
• The extent of conflict, if any, between organisations, the sources of this conflict, 
the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations 
between organisations.
• The extent of resource exchange, if any, between organisations.
• And, the extent and effectiveness of co-ordination between the organisations.
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This framework is evaluated subsequently in the context of Belek's 
management plan. The following section now details the methodology employed in 
the data collection for this case study.
7.5 Qualitative versus quantitative research
There are two distinct trends in research styles, which have been extensively 
used in interorganisational relationship research (Selin and Beason 1991; Walle 1997). 
First, a quantitative approach, which is considered here in relation to scientific 
research method, and, second, the qualitative approach, which usually employs more 
flexible tools of investigation. Punch (1998: 4) refers to quantitative research as 
“empirical research where the data are in the form of numbers, and qualitative research 
where the data are not in the form of numbers”. Henderson's (1990:169-188) 
characterisation of the differences between qualitative and quantitative research are 
summarised in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Henderson's characterisation of quantitative and qualitative
approaches to research
Quantitative Qualitative
Design Characteristics Pre-ordinated design Emergent design
Data Measurement using numbers Natural, interactive, personal
Setting Impersonal, controlled, 
manipulative
Natural, interactive, personal
Relationship with theory Confirming theory Developing theory
Process and procedure Rational Intuitive
These two approaches are generally treated as rivals in the literature. 
Proponents of quantitative research argue that it is superior to qualitative research, 
while advocates of qualitative research insist that qualitative research offers richer 
insights than quantitative research. It is suggested that qualitative methods work better 
in examining phenomena in tourism. Several attempts have been made to demarcate 
and highlight the differences between these two approaches. According to some, 
quantitative approaches test theories, whereas the other generates theories (Finn et al
2000). While there are distinctions between the two, these two methodological 
approaches are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative methods 
have their own strengths and weaknesses. Most researchers therefore tend to combine 
these two approaches so as to maximise the strengths and minimise the weakness of
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each method (Finn et al 2000). Conventionally, quantitative research is sometimes 
preceded by qualitative research in an attempt to confirm the validity of the questions 
being included or to ensure that all key variables within a situation have been 
identified.
7.5.1 Quantitative research
From an "empiricist" perspective, quantitative research, such as questionnaire- 
based surveys, has a number of advantages. Notably, it is suggested that there is some 
assurance about the validity and reliability of the findings. This is because carefully 
established questionnaire-based surveys are considered to lend themselves to the 
possibility of generalising the findings (Robson 1993). Questionnaire-based surveys 
are relatively low cost per person contacted and they provide a way of collecting large 
amounts of information and obtaining a high accuracy of results (Pizam 1994). Data 
obtained from surveys can be used to explore aspects of a situation, to seek 
explanation, or to provide data for testing hypotheses (Robson 1993). The fact that 
samples in questionnaire-based surveys tend to be large requires considerable attention 
to be paid to how their samples are drawn, typically on a representative and/or random 
basis. Unlike qualitative techniques, where the researcher can begin data collection in 
a tentative way and returns to the subjects for additional information in order gradually 
to build up the concepts, questionnaire-based surveys require researchers to be very 
specific about their data requirements from the beginning, since they are committed 
irrecoverably to the responses collected (Veal 1997).
Survey research is one of the two main methods of collecting data on 
interorganisational relations (Richins and Pearce 2000; Selin and Beason 1991; 
Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Waddock and Bannister 1991). Survey research is 
comparative in orientation. It is however seldom conducted on a longitudinal basis in 
this field. The reported advantage of using such a method is the generalisation of 
results. The researchers can draw inferences to a larger population, and therefore it is 
very efficient. Selin and Beason (1991) used this method in their research on 
interorganisational relations between the U.S. Forest Service, chambers of commerce 
and tourism associations adjacent to the Arkansas National Forest. Such quantitative 
research however is not without limitations. The first limitation relates to the scope 
for the questionnaires to incorporate all of the relevant and salient attributes to
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respondents (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). The majority of studies using questionnaires 
seem to have relied either on secondary sources of attribute information (literature 
reviews, brochures, previously used questionnaires), expert opinions, or the 
researcher’s own judgement. Relying merely on attribute lists obtained from 
secondary sources of information (literature reviews, brochures) as the complete list 
to study a given phenomenon might be considered inappropriate. The list might be 
incomplete by failing to incorporate all of the relevant features, attractions, facilities, 
and services of a given organisation.
Other researchers using questionnaire surveys use focus groups, in-depth 
interviews, or a mix of these in order to develop a complete list of attributes that are 
considered relevant and salient to the respondents. Hence, a qualitative technique 
involving a fairly small number of people in some depth is used to develop the attributes 
to include in closed questions used in a questionnaire survey. Although the use of focus 
groups is a powerful technique to obtain views when conducted properly (Ryan 1995), 
their use also has limitations (Morgan 1997; Hines 2000 in Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). 
There is a real concern that the moderator, in the name of maintaining the interview’s 
focus, will influence the group’s interaction. The composition of the group (e.g., cultural 
backgrounds) also may influence the nature of the data it produces. The concerns about 
focus groups include both a tendency toward conformity, in which some participants 
withhold things they might say in private, and a tendency toward polarisation, in which 
some participants express more extreme views in groups than in private (Yuksel and 
Yuksel 2001). The presence of a group may affect what participants say and how they say 
it. The level of participants’ involvement in discussion is another important issue. If the 
participants have little involvement with the topic, the researcher may only collect 
scattered information. In a typical focus group, six to ten people discuss a topic for an 
hour or two. Each person may only have a limited number of minutes of interview time 
(Blaxter et al 1996). More importantly, another concern is whether the attributes 
considered to be relevant by focus group participants, or in-depth interviews, would also 
be seen as relevant to a wider sample of people with different cultures (values, norms) 
and evaluation criteria.
Although quantitative methods allow a much larger sample size and range of 
questions to be addressed, and they are deemed to be rigorous, they also result in a
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corresponding loss in data richness (Ballantyne et al 1998). Additionally, a number of the 
individual elements of the population might not match the behaviours and character of the 
aggregated population profile; it may even be the case that no one single element matches 
the generalised character of the population (Hyde 2000). Moreover, the way in which 
questions are ordered in a research instrument like a questionnaire, the number of 
questions, and the scales used (Likert, semantic differential, etc.) may dictate a 
respondent’s response to a survey item (Drew and Bolton 1991). In quantitative methods, 
it appears that the process is constructed in large part by the researcher (Drew and Bolton 
1991: in Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). Survey research does not produce a deep and sensitive 
understanding of the issues being measured (Selltiz et al 1959, Glock 1967). This causes 
an important problem with interorganisational analysis because survey research on this 
social process is conducted using a large total of actors; there is a tendency to depend on 
gross models and extremely general measures of human beliefs and behaviour. 
Consequently, the further we get away from face-to-face interaction, the more susceptible 
we are to errors of improper interpretation or inference (Hannon 1970). While the 
dominant methodology in interorganisational relationship analysis is clearly survey 
research, many suggest that it would be useful to expand this approach with more 
qualitative data (Rogers and Whetten 1982).
7.5.2 Qualitative research
While quantitative techniques are often considered rigorous and statistically 
credible, given the complications, some researchers argue that qualitative methods fit 
better in examining the largely human and social phenomena involved with tourism. 
Conducting qualitative research, such as interviews, may offer several advantages over 
other data collection techniques. An interview offers the possibility of modifying the line 
of enquiry and the opportunity to follow up interesting responses, and it allows the 
investigation of underlying motives in a way that postal or other self-administered 
questionnaires cannot (Robson 1993). It allows for in-depth investigation of the subject 
and has a higher response rate than that of self-administered questionnaires. It is more 
appropriate for revealing infomiation about feelings and emotions regarding different 
subjects (Pizam 1994). An interview is suggested to be the most advantageous approach 
to attempt to obtain data where there are a large number of questions to be answered; 
where the questions are either complex or open-ended; and where the order and logic of 
questioning may need to be varied (Healey 1991; Saunders et al 1997). The qualitative
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method is argued to be better able to encompass change over time than quantitative 
research, with the latter tending to look only at current behaviour related to current social, 
economic, and environmental circumstances, ignoring the fact that most people’s 
behaviour is heavily influenced by their life story and experience (Veal 1997). However, 
while qualitative research can be a source of ideas, insights and new perspectives on a 
problem, it has limitations such as cost and the time involved in comparison to other data 
collection methods. The lack of standardisation inevitably also raises concern for the 
reliability and generality of the findings. Interviews may also be contaminated by the 
eagerness of the respondent to please the interviewer (Bailey 1978). Although interviews 
offer a substantial number of advantages, making profitable use of interviews calls for 
considerable skill and experience from the researcher in the interviews.
The lack of standardisation is one of the conventional concerns relating to the 
rigour, reliability, and generality of findings derived from qualitative techniques. 
Quantitative research is often preferred, as it is believed that it provides a statistical 
generalisation. That is, one takes a sample of elements by a probability selection method, 
a sample that allows estimation of the properties of the population of interest with a 
known degree of accuracy. However, the goal in qualitative research is to expand and 
generalise theories, not to establish the frequency with which a phenomenon is likely to 
occur in a population (Hyde 2000). Thus, if undertaking research is not a question of 
numbers but of reasoning, then a qualitative study, when studied sufficiently in-depth and 
with sufficient insight, can be as sound as a quantitative one, if  not more so (Christy and 
Wood 1999; Decrop 1999; Hyde 2000; O’Donnel and Cummins 1999). The goal of this 
research was to explain and understand the content of inter-organisational relations rather 
than to predict and measure things. Statistical generalising from the sample findings to 
the whole population was not vitally important for this research.
An additional debate over the use of a qualitative technique is that its analysis is 
often said to be subjective. In contrast, the analysis and interpretation of quantitative 
research is deemed to be entirely "objective". However, there are several reasons why this 
may not be the case. For example, some statistical techniques, such as factor analysis and 
cluster analysis, permit researchers to rotate data almost to the point where they get the 
answer they are looking for (Ryan 1995). Some sources of subjectivity in the analysis of 
qualitative research might also be reduced by the use of computer-aided qualitative data
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analysis techniques and by use of the inter-rated reliability method (Yuksel and Yuksel
2001). This method assumes that if two or more observers reach the same conclusion 
regarding the characteristics of one or several participants, then this conclusion is more 
likely to be an objective observation rather than a personal subjective opinion. 
Unfortunately, the role of qualitative enquiry has generally been regarded as secondary to 
that of quantitative research, with qualitative research simply advised as a first step to be 
taken before the quantitative enquiry. A qualitative study, however, can be as sound as a 
quantitative enquiry, and can lead to valid research findings in its own right, and it has its 
own strengths and also limitations.
There are various methods to assess opinions, including questionnaire-based 
surveys, group interviews, and individual interviews, and it seems that choosing the 
most appropriate method often involves compromises (Ballantyne et al 1998). While 
personal interviews allow individual responses to be explored and probed in depth, i
and thus they can provide a more complete understanding of opinions, they involve 5
significant cost in the time and effort involved in data collection and analysis. As a 
result, interview surveys tend to be limited to small sample sizes and relatively few 
research questions. Review of debates over the suitability and credibility of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques indicates that both qualitative and quantitative techniques *
can lead to valid research findings and may serve different research objectives.
Neither approach needs to rely on the other for its respectability, reliability and 
validity (Yuksel and Yuksel 2001). What was required in this research was not 
qualitative research followed by quantitative research for triangulation purposes, but 
an approach to provide in-depth insights into inter-organisational relations in Belek 
within the confines of the sample size and the research resources. It is accepted that 
method triangulation, perhaps involving a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques, is helpful to increase the soundness of research findings. Triangulation 
allows for the examination of a research question from different perspectives and 
hence for cross-validation of the data (Decrop 1999). However, there are many other 
ways for achieving this, such as using (1) different qualitative techniques, (2) 
secondary as well as primary sources of data, and (3) different researchers to interpret 
the data. In fact this particular combination of triangulation methods is the formula 
used for this present examination of Belek.
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7.6 Semi structured interviews
In this study two-phased, semi-structured interviews were conducted with five 
different groups of stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of 
the BMP. The reason for involving five groups of stakeholders and a common 
interview schedule was to have comparable information related to the research 
questions under investigation. These five stakeholder groups include central 
government officials (ministry levels, provincial and district levels), local government 
officials (municipalities and villages), local people, voluntary sector organisations (or 
NGOs), and the private sector organisations. An investigation into the extent of 
involvement of these five stakeholder groups in decisions related to the preparation 
and implementation of the Belek Management Plan was warranted. It is well 
documented that achieving the objectives of sustainable tourism development, such as 
economic health, subjective well- being of locals, unspoiled environments and 
protection of resources, relies heavily on the identification and reconciliation of 
various attitudes of different stakeholders toward tourism development.
The reason why two-phased interviews were carried out is simply that a broad 
array of issues needs to be addressed. Undertaking a long, single-phase interview 
could have reduced the reliability and quality of the data due to possible respondent 
fatigue (Neuman 1997). Robson (1993: 229) warns that “anything under half an hour 
is unlikely to be valuable; anything going much over an hour may be making 
unreasonable demands on busy interviewees; and could have the effect of reducing 
the numbers of people willing to participate, which might in turn lead to biases in the 
sample...”. In order to prevent this, the researcher obtained the co-operation of the 
interviewees, remained vigilant to any sign of boredom on the part of the interviewee 
during the actual interview session, and, if this happened, then terminated the 
interview and resumed it on a later agreed date. All interview sessions were carefully 
planned. Visit arrangements were agreed, necessary permissions were gained in 
advance, and when the need arose due to the unavailability of the interviewee on that 
day, the appointment was rescheduled. The guidance suggested in the literature in 
relation to conducting interviews was strictly observed during the interview sessions 
(Robson 1993; Saunders et al 1997; Veal 1997). These are to listen more than you 
speak, to put questions in a straightforward, clear, and non-threatening way, to 
eliminate clues which lead interviewees to respond in a particular way, to avoid
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double or combined questions, and not to include questions involving jargon and bias. 
Probes were used to get the interviewee to expand on a response. The conventional 
sequence of interviewing (introduction, warm-up, main body of interview, cool-off, 
and closure) was followed in both phases of the interviews. The majority of 
interviewees were willing to be interviewed partly because the interview topic was 
interesting and relevant to their own current work, and because they allowed them to 
reflect on current and past events.
Semi-structured interviews were preferred because, while the interviewer had 
worked out a set of questions in advance, they were also free to modify their order 
based upon their perception of what seemed most appropriate in the context of the 
structured conversation. They could change the way they are worded, give 
explanations, leave out particular questions which seem inappropriate with a 
particular interviewee, as well as being able to include additional questions (Robson 
1993). Semi structured interviews have been used by other interorganisational 
relationship researchers (Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Selin and Chavez 1994, 
Yuksel 1998). Semi-structured interviews potentially yield rich insights on people’s 
experiences, opinions, aspirations and feelings. This was a flexible and adaptable way 
of finding things out in relation to the present research. It gave the researcher 
opportunities to seek clarification and elaboration on the answers given (May 1997). 
Semi-structured interviews are suitable in qualitative research in order to conduct 
exploratory discussions to reveal and understand not only the “what and how”, but 
also to place more emphasis on exploring the “why” (Saunders et al 1997). The 
conduct of interviews requires considerable skill and experience (Robson 1993; 
Saunders et al 1997; Ryan 1995). Its success also depends in part on the extent and 
quality of the preparatory work, which precedes the interviews.
7.6.1 Development and implementation of the semi-structured 
interviews
The research was organised into four interdependent phases. These were: desk 
research, site visit, pilot study and the actual study phases.
7.6.1.1 Desk research
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An extensive review was undertaken of the secondary data published about 
Belek in different media and of existing research knowledge with regard to tourism 
administration, planning and implementation. This helped to build adequate 
information about the case area and to understand what has been done and what has 
not been done in the academic literature. The desk research commenced in 1998. It 
involved a review of relevant books and periodical journals, of a large number of 
domestic and international dissertations, theses, reports and conference proceedings, 
and of information available on the world-wide-web. This desk research process 
continued until the end of the research in order to keep abreast with new 
developments in the subject and also to develop and refine a workable conceptual 
framework. Study was made of research areas covered in previous interorganisational 
research, of the methodologies they employed, and their major findings and 
limitations, and this helped to refine the research objectives and questions. It also 
helped to highlight research possibilities that have been overlooked, to avoid 
repeating work that has already been done, and to gain insight into research strategies 
and methodologies that would be appropriate for the present research (Borg and Gall 
1989). Additionally, a careful review was made of tourism legislation in the country, 
particularly the Investment Law, the 1982 Constitution, and the Municipality Law. 
Advice was also gained from key bureaucrats and directors, with this helping to 
develop a general understanding of tourism-related administration processes and 
organisations in the country. A list of libraries and organisations visited in the course 
of the desk research in Turkey is given in Table 7.2. This on-going desk research was 
extremely helpful as it provided the researcher with an awareness of the current state 
of knowledge on the subject area, its limitations and of how the present research fits 
into this wider context (Gill and Johnson 1991).
Table 7.2 Organisations and libraries visited in Turkey for the desk research
Bilkent University 
Baskent University
The Association o f Tourism Development Investors (Betuyab)
State Planning Department
The Ministry o f Tourism
The Ministry o f Environment
The Union o f Mediterranean Municipalities (Antalya)
Provincial Government of Antalya
The Organisation of Middle East Public Management
The Society for the Protection o f Nature (NPS)
The Union o f Ankara Municipalities 
National Library________
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7.6.1.2 Site visits
The knowledge building process was consolidated through site visits made 
prior to the conduct of the main data collection phase. Saunders et al (1997) note that 
the researcher’s ability to collect data will depend on gaining access to appropriate 
sources. Failing to gain physical and social access is not uncommon in social 
research, and the reasons for this could be that individuals may not be prepared to 
engage in additional, voluntary activities because of the time and resources required. 
Other reasons for failing to gain access include a lack of interest due to a low 
valuation of the worth of research in relation to the work of the organisation or the 
individual, the sensitivity of the topic, concerns about the confidentiality of the 
information sought, and low perceptions about the credibility or competence of the 
researcher. Hence problems might occur in gaining permission for physical access, 
maintaining that access, and being able to create a sufficient scope to the access to 
address the research objectives fully. In order to overcome these potential limitations, 
the researcher used site visits to build up contacts and to use these early contacts again 
during the main research phase (Buchanan et al 1988). Buchanan et. al. (1988: 56) 
say, “we have been most successful where we have a friend, relative or student 
working in the organisations”. These initial contacts were also used in this research to 
establish a track record, with these contacts then referred to in the approaches to other 
organisations and individuals. This approach was easier to adopt in this research as it 
is based on case study and non-probability sampling. These contacts were used in 
relation to the purposive (and snowball) sampling process used in this study. Building 
personal contacts is essential in Turkey, where the importance of personal contacts 
forms a part of the “research conditions or culture”. For this reason site visits to three 
different localities were made prior to the main research. The site visits were helpful 
in terms of identifying and making contact with the initial informants about the case, 
and in establishing other contacts to meet in the main research phase. The site visits in 
Belek also helped the researcher to become familiar with the case study area, to build 
rapport with key informants who continued to provide indispensable information 
about on-going developments, to gain invaluable insights into how the actual research 
should be conducted, and to make practical arrangements for the main data collection 
phase.
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A preliminary field visit to the case study area of Belek was undertaken in 
order to understand the broad nature of the problem, identify organisations involved 
in tourism management (notably in the formulation and implementation of the Belek 
plan), gain access to these organisations, convince them to participate in the study, 
review published material concerning tourism administration in Belek and in Turkey 
as a whole, and to identify and refine issues and themes to be pursued in the main 
interviews. The preliminary visit was undertaken between June and July 1999.
During this visit, preliminary interviews were conducted with a number of 
conveniently selected representatives of key organisations involved in the formulation 
and implementation of the Belek Management Plan (Table 7.3). The respondents were 
categorized by organisation type and the geographical scale at which they had 
strongest interests. This was important given the focus on central-local relations.
Among the public sector organisations there is a broad spread across central, I
provincial and local spatial scales. At the central or national spatial scale there is 1
representation from the ministries, and planning and statistical institutions, and at the 
provincial scale there are representatives with administration, planning, and coastal 
development interests. At the local scale, there are more representatives with legal, 
administration, and environmental interests. In Table 7.2 the private and voluntary )
sector organisations were categorised as " others" as the study was less interested in I
spatial scale issues outside the public sector.
It was appropriate to use information obtained from the preliminary interviews 
in planning the subsequent semi-structured interviews within the main phase. It 
encouraged greater qualitative depth by allowing the interviewees to talk about the 
subject in terms of their own frames of reference and it provided a greater 
understanding of the subjects’ point of view (May 1998; Veal 1997). The use of such 
preliminary interviews is valuable in the formulation of a research problem, in the 
articulation of dimensions and hypotheses, and in the detailed development of a key 
research instrument (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 1996; Oppenheim 1992). The use of 
these initial exploratory interviews was of particular value for this research, as 
significant issues affecting the subject under investigation were identified, and these 
were then followed up during the later stages of the research (Chisnall 1992). Other 
researchers examining interorganisational relations have used similar methodologies
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in order to build valid research questions and instruments. To develop a valid and 
appropriate interview schedule, Tjosvold (1988) used a critical incident method, Selin 
and Myers (1995; 1998) made personal visits to key members of a partnership 
organisation, and Williams et. al. (1998) used the observation of preliminary meetings 
and a review of secondary data.
In the preliminary interviews, there was no tightly structured list of questions 
to work through, as the intent was to develop a clear idea about the aspects to be 
explored subsequently. The informants were given the opportunity to talk freely 
about events, and about their behaviour and beliefs in relation to how tourism 
planning was undertaken in the area. They were also free to discuss what successes 
and mistakes had occurred, how the implementation of the initiative was progressing, 
and so on. These interviews were tape recorded and later verbatim transcribed and 
then content analysed in order to uncover themes that needed to be addressed in the 
following phase. The research steps of transcribing and content analysis were 
relatively onerous and time consuming (Ritchie 1999). Although many decisions 
taken in later stages of the research were equally demanding, it was gathering and 
analysing this initial information as the basis for key subsequent research decisions 
that consumed a particularly large share of the research effort.
Table 7.3 The respondents involved in the preliminary interviews
Geographical
scale
Position Organisation Location Type of 
organisation
National Director State Planning Department Ankara Central
National Director The Ministry o f Tourism Ankara Central
National City Planner The Ministry o f Tourism Ankara Central
National City Planner The Ministry o f Tourism Ankara Central
National Economist State Statistics Department Ankara Central
National Director State Statistics Department Ankara Central
National Director Tourism Statistics Department of  
the Ministry of Tourism
Ankara Central
Provincial Planning Co­
ordinator
Provincial Government o f Antalya Antalya Provincial
Provincial Director
General
Tourism Directorate o f Antalya 
Province
Antalya Provincial
Provincial Marine Life 
Engineer
The Authority for Specially 
Protected Areas
Antalya Provincial
Local Attorney The Union of Mediterranean 
Municipalities
Antalya Local
Local Executive
Secretary
The Union o f Mediterranean 
Municipalities
Antalya Local
Local Architect The Union o f Mediterranean Antalya Local
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Municipalities
Local Engineer Local Environmental Society Antalya Local
Others Environment
Co-ordinator
The Association of Tourism 
Development Investors (Betuyab)
Belek Private
Others Investor Antalya Gucbirligi Holding Antalya Private
Others Director The Association o f Tourism 
Development Investors
Ankara Private
Others Project
manager
The Society for the Protection of 
Nature
Istanbul Voluntary
Others Director of
Coastal
Management
The Society for the Protection of 
Nature
Istanbul Voluntary
7.6.1.3 Pilot test
The information from the two preparatory phases, as well as from extensive 
consultations with the research supervisors and fellow researchers, was used to help 
structure the main interview questions. An initial set of seven themes and 59 interview 
questions were determined. Then pilot tests were run to identify and eliminate 
problems associated with the research strategy and with these questions before the 
main research was carried out (Johns and Lee-Ross 1998). Pilot testing is the process 
of trying out the research techniques and methods that the researcher has in mind, 
seeing how well they work in practice, and, if necessary, modifying them accordingly 
(Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 1996). It is an exploratory but essential stage in the 
development of effective questions (Callan 1997), as “no amount of intellectual 
exercise could substitute for actually testing an instrument” (Bennet and Krebs 1994: 
170). Blaxter et al (1996: 122) stress that “You may think that you know well enough 
what you are doing, but the value of pilot research cannot be overestimated. Things 
never work quite the way you envisage, even if you have done them many times 
before, and they have a nasty habit of turning out very differently than you expected. 
So try a pilot exercise”. Others also point out that, “Well-organised piloting reveals 
possible misinterpretations owing to ignorance or misunderstanding of questions, and 
indicates differences in the frames of reference between the researcher and 
respondents” (Chisnall 1992: 118). In the quantitative field, Oppenheim notes how 
“Questionnaires do not emerge fully-fledged; they have to be created or adapted, 
fashioned and developed to maturity after many abortive test flights. Pilot work can 
be of the greatest help in devising the actual wording of questions, and it operates as a 
healthy check, since fatal ambiguities may lurk in the most unexpected quarters” 
(1992: 47). It is important to note that there are no general ground rules on the size 
and the arrangement of the pilot surveys, and it is stated that the size (and
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arrangement) are a matter of convenience, practicability, time and money (Chisnall 
1992; Moser and Kalton 1989). The adequacy and the appropriateness of the research 
questions were assessed in five test interviews (mainly with academics, fellow 
research and Turkish graduate students studying in the UK, and representatives from 
the Nature Preservation Society). The number of questions was reduced from 59 to 
42, as there were similarities. The order of questions was slightly modified based on 
comments and observations. Upon the completion of the pilot tests and revision of the 
questions, they were translated into Turkish to overcome language problems. In this 
procedure, two bilinguals translated the questions from their original in English to 
Turkish. In order to ensure the conceptual equivalence in meaning the translation 
process was repeated twice, with the translated versions also being interchanged 
between the two translators.
7.6.1.4 Interview questions
The questions for the main interviews were structured to explore the 
perceptions of the interviewees, who were all directly involved in the 
formulation/implementation of the management plan, on seven interconnected 
conceptual themes. These questions drew on the earlier preliminary interviews. The 
preliminary interviews were tape-recorded, with only a few exceptions, and they were 
subsequently transcribed word-for-word for later content analysis. Two academicians 
coded the interviews, with the codes intended to reflect major themes, and also re­
coded into sub-themes to reflect more specific content. Additionally, a wide range of 
literature on tourism planning, interorganisational relations, network management, co­
ordination, co-operation, collaboration, public administration, and decentralisation 
was also scanned prior to the construction of the main interview questions. The 
researcher established a question bank through the analysis of the preliminary 
interviews and the literature review (e.g., Benson et al 1972; Schmidt and Kochan 
1977; Taner 1978; Costa 1996; Selin and Beason 1991; Selin and Chavez 1995; Selin 
and Myers 1994; Wiliams et al 1998). Based on the whole research process, but 
especially the conceptual framework shown in Figure 7.1, seven key conceptual 
themes were identified, and these were used to structure the questions in the 
interviews. These are shown in Table 7.4. These conceptual themes are the planning 
issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and 
consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co­
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ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power. 
These conceptual themes bring together the many issues raised by the conceptual 
framework, and provide a useful thematic approach for other researchers. They 
simplify and give coherence to the many issues identified in Figure 7.1, offering a 
clear, sequential structure for the interview questions and a set of themes which may 
be of value for other academics interested in understanding inter-organisational 
relations, and especially central-local government relations, around tourism planning 
in other areas. Due to the broad scope of the study findings, these seven conceptual 
themes are used to structure the seven different sections in the results chapter (chapter 
8).
Table 7.4 The seven conceptual themes derived from the conceptual
framework and used to organise the questions in the 
interview schedule
Planning issues in Belek Section 8.1 o f Results chapter
Inter-organisational communication Section 8.2 o f Results chapter
Stakeholder involvement and consensus building Section 8.3 of Results chapter
Resource sufficiency and exchange Section 8.4 o f Results chapter
Inter-organisational co-ordination Section 8.5 Results chapter
The roles and activities o f the organisations Section 8.6 Results chapter
Delegation o f power Section 8.7 Results chapter
In each section in the results chapter, the findings for Belek are discussed in 
the light of the relevant theory and concepts in the academic literature. The first 
section of the results chapter identifies factors that respondents considered affected 
tourism development in the region. The next section presents the structural and 
situational factors identified as facilitating or obstructing effective communication 
between central government and local organisations in Belek. The subsequent, third 
section attempts to explain what the stakeholders involved in the BMP thought about 
the decision-making process, notably whether they felt able to raise their concerns and 
whether they considered their concerns were incorporated satisfactorily in the 
decisions. The fourth section compares respondents' views about the adequacy of the 
organisational resources held by different parties involved in the BMP, including their 
financial, legal, informational and political power. The subsequent section examines 
the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP,
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and considers the influence on, and barriers to co-ordination and co-operation. The 
sixth section examines the perceptions of respondents about the responsibilities, 
competence, and performance of their own and of other organisations. The last section 
considers the forms of decentralisation that different stakeholders might consider 
suitable.
Based on the seven conceptual themes, the initial list of 59 questions was later 
reduced to 42 questions following the pilot interviews and discussions with 
supervisors and fellow researchers. The prepared list was then re-piloted with two 
respondents from the Belek Management Plan to identify and address potential 
problems. The list of questions used for the main semi- structured interviews, with 
headings based on the seven conceptual themes and which are highlighted in bold, is 
shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Interview questions and related seven conceptual themes 
Planning issues in Belek
What inhibits or facilitates the effectiveness of the BMP for the development o f tourism in the Belek 
region?
Are you aware o f the Belek Management Plan (BMP) and the tourism planning proposals it contains? 
If yes, do you support these proposals? Why?
Inter-organisational communication
In designing and implementing the BMP, with which organisations did you communicate most?
What reasons did you generally have for communicating with these organisations when designing and 
implementing the BMP?
From your organisation’s perspective, was communication with central government organisations or 
local organisations more important in relation to the BMP? and why?
Were there barriers to achieving effective communication in the design and implementation o f the 
BMP? If yes, what were they?
How might improvements be made in communications between national and local organisations in 
relation to the BMP?
Would communication between organisations be improved if  tourism planning decisions for Belek 
were left more to local or national organisations?
Stakeholder involvement and consensus building
Which parties with an interest in the Belek region have participated most or have been excluded from 
making decisions about the BMP? Why?
Have the concerns o f all relevant parties, including your own concerns, been taken into account during 
the design and implementation o f the BMP? If not, which parties’ concerns have not been taken into 
account in the design and implementation o f the BMP?
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How well were differences, if  any, worked out between all parties involved in the design and 
implementation o f the BMP?
Which national and local organisations, if  any, have had most influence on the design and 
implementation decisions o f the BMP? Why?
Has there been any change in the authority and responsibility o f national or local organisations between 
the design and the implementation phases o f the BMP? If yes, what were the implications o f this on the 
design and implementation o f the BMP?
If local organisations and national organisations have disagreed about how tourism is managed in 
Belek, what has been the cause o f this disagreement? How has this been resolved, if  at all?
Would it be likely to help or hinder reaching agreement about tourism planning decisions affecting 
Belek if  these decisions were left more to local or national organisations?
Resource sufficiency and exchange
Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked 
sufficient financial resources to make a success of implementing the Plan?
Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked 
sufficient legal authority to make a success o f implementing the Plan?
Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked 
sufficient information and understanding of the issues affecting tourism in Belek to make a success of 
implementing the Plan?
Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked 
sufficient political power or influence to make a success of implementing the Plan?
Which specific national and local organisations have contributed most resources to implementing the 
BMP?
Are there any specific national or local organisations that have not contributed as many resources as 
they should to implementing the BMP? Why?
Did some local and national organisations compete with each other for funds or authority? Why?
Would it be likely to help or hinder the Plan implementation if  the control o f resources was left more to 
the local or national government organisations?
Inter-organisational co-ordination
Are there any tourism related services that your organisation would like to provide but is not able to 
under the present legislation?
Which other local or national organisations, i f  any, have similar responsibility and authority in relation 
to tourism planning in Belek to that of your organisation?
Are all national and local organisations involved in tourism planning in Belek working together 
effectively to achieve the objectives o f the BMP? If not, which local and national organisations are not 
working together effectively to achieve the objectives o f the BMP, and why is this the case?
Is there anything about the ways things are done which tends to limit co-ordination and co-operation 
between national and local organisations involved in the BMP?
Can you suggest changes in the procedures and polices, which would encourage greater co-ordination 
and co-operation between national and local organisations in relation to Belek?
Would it be likely to help or hinder the co-ordination of tourism planning for Belek, i f  tourism 
planning decisions were left more to local or national government organisations?_____________________
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The roles and activities of the organisations
How does the division o f authority and responsibility between national and local organisations in 
relation to tourism planning in Belek affect the implementation o f the BMP, if  at all?
Do you believe that some parts o f the implementation work of central government in relation to the 
BMP could be done more effectively by a different organisation? If so, then what parts and what 
organisations would you suggest?
Do you believe that central government should expand or reduce present activities in the Belek region? 
Why?
What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility o f the 
municipality, if  any?
Do you believe that currently the municipalities carry out their tasks effectively in relation to the 
implementation of the BMP?
Do you believe that some activities o f local government could be done more effectively by another 
organisation? If so, then what parts and what organisations would you suggest?
Do you believe that local government should expand or reduce some o f its present activities in the 
region?
What specific changes would you like to see in their tasks? Why do you think those changes are 
needed?
What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the prime responsibility o f provincial 
government, if  any?
Do you believe that currently the provincial government carries out its tasks effectively in relation to 
the implementation o f the BMP?
Would the relationship between your organisation and other local and national organisations be 
improved if  current political, economic or legal systems and procedures were changed?
Delegation of power
What would you think if  central government passed the planning authority in relation to tourism in 
Belek to
■ the municipalities
■ a non-government organisation, such as Betuyab?
■ an independent agency set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations?
What would you think if  the central government retained its planning authority in relation to Belek?
The interview questions were structured to evaluate four main types of 
influences identified within the literature which affect inter-organisational relations, 
and notably central-local relations, in tourism planning and management. These are 
the environmental context, the administrative structures, the geographical scales of the 
administrative structures, and the nature of the inter-organisational interaction. 
Drawing on the research aims and objectives and on the Conceptual Framework, 
interview questions sought to elicit information about the planning issues in the case
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study area, the extent of communication among participants, level of participation of 
the respondents, sufficiency of resources, the distribution of roles and duties between 
organisations, the extent of co-ordination and co-operation between the actors, and the 
delegation of power.
It is emphasised within the literature that the linkages are multiple, and arise in 
particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and powers. 
These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, financial, 
professional, informational and administrative (Jones, 1980; Rhodes, 1981). The 
extent to which these resources and powers are distributed equally or they are 
concentrated in a relatively small group of organisations who dominate decision 
processes, can be an important influence on plan success or failure. Each organisation 
will control some resources, and each organisation has to interact with others in order 
to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement since no organisation can 
generate independently all the necessary resources. Specific questions were thus 
developed to seek the extent of interdependency, resource exchange and power 
relations between the different actors in the tourism planning system. Additionally, as 
was emphasised in the Conceptual Framework, implementation involves the joint 
efforts of various organisational parties, often located at different tiers of government. 
And, the existence of co-ordinative relations between tourism organisations at 
different spatial scales is considered imperative in order to formulate and implement 
effective tourism development plans and to accomplish harmonious tourism 
development. Co-ordination cannot be achieved without communication. Hence, 
questions were developed to understand the extent of interorganisational 
communication and the ways in which the organisations communicate with one 
another and how fragmented activities of different public and private sector agencies 
are co-ordinated. To address the specific objectives of the research, further questions 
were constructed to understand the overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the 
public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism planning in Belek, the 
extent of conflict between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the ways in 
which conflicts are resolved, and their effects on power relations between 
organisations. Questions were also developed to elicit information on different forms 
of decentralisation and their strengths and limitations in addressing the potential 
problems of centralised tourism management.
159
More specifically, the first two questions in the semi-structured interview 
schedule (Table 7.5) are partly a warm-up section for the interview and they deal with 
general planning and development issues affecting the Belek area (planning issues in 
Belek). The focus of the second set (inter-organisational communication) is on the 
extent and quality of interaction among participants involved in the formulation and 
implementation of the management plan. These questions examine the extent of 
communications among organisations and how these communications were 
conducted. Any existing barriers and how they could be overcome are also 
investigated. The third section (stakeholder involvement and consensus building) 
focuses on the level of participation of the respondents in the plan formulation and 
implementation, also on whether all relevant stakeholders with an interest in Belek 
could raise their concerns, and whether these concerns had been successfully 
incorporated into the plan objectives. The fourth section (resource sufficiency and 
exchange) explores the perceptions of interviewees on the sufficiency or insufficiency 
of the resources that the organisations possessed to make a success of the 
management plan. The fifth section (inter-organisational co-ordination) examines the 
extent of co-ordination and co-operation between parties involved in the BMP, and 
reflects the influences on, and barriers to co-ordination and co-operation. The sixth 
section is analysed by the next set of questions (the roles and activities of the 
organisations). These questions seek to discover the participants’ perceptions as to 
their own and other organisations', authority, responsibility, competence and 
performance. Consideration is also given to the extent of any interorganisational 
equilibrium among organisations. The seventh and final section (delegation of power) 
addresses the respondents’ opinions on whether leaving planning authority to different 
organisations - whether local, national and private -would produce better results.
7.6.1.5 Sampling procedure
Sampling is "the activity of selecting a few from the total and using the 
characteristics of the few to estimate the characteristics of the total"(Cannon 1994: 
132). Drawing on a review of literature on sampling methods, this research adopted 
the combination of snowball and purposive (judgemental) sampling in selecting the 
representatives to be interviewed. Snow balling was used as a valuable technique to 
identify respondents for the interviews in the Belek case study. This technique
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required asking respondents for the names of the participants involved in the BMP. 
The named respondents were then also asked to single out other relevant parties, and 
this process carried on until no new names were mentioned. It is suggested that this 
type of sampling is often used when working with very small samples, such as in case 
study research, when the researcher wishes to select cases that are particular 
informative about the research issue being studied (Neuman 1991).
The principle of selection in purposive sampling is the researcher’s judgement 
as to typicality or interest. Robson (1993) suggests that by employing purposive 
sampling a sample is formed which enables the researcher to satisfy their own specific 
needs for a project. Whether the selected sample represents the population is arguable, 
but purposive sampling is suggested as being an acceptable kind of sampling for 
special case studies (Neuman 1991).
The researcher used a “participant list” included in the BMP document of the 
28 representatives who had been involved in meetings for the formulation of the plan. 
Fifteen individuals in this original "participant list" were contacted and interviewed. 
The researcher was unable to contact the remaining individuals due to changes of 
address or their appointment to new tasks in other places. Two of them were foreign 
consultants, and hence they were not accessible. Based on these fifteen, a snowball 
sampling technique was employed, whereby each of the respondents provided more 
names for potential inclusion in the sample (Finn et al 2000), based on who they 
considered had also been involved in the preparation or implementation of the Belek 
Coastal Management Plan (BMP). This helped to identify key informants who might 
otherwise not be included, as they were not in the original "participant list", but who 
were considered by the participants to have taken an active role in the Plan. First, 
contacts were made with a few central government officials. They were then asked to 
identify other participants involved in the plan design or implementation that were not 
included in the original "participant list". They identified a number of private sector 
members, local government officials and locals who were not listed. These people 
were then asked to identify other relevant participants. Using this snowball process, a 
total of 32 respondents were identified, this number being considered satisfactory for 
the study objectives. The researcher met with two refusals to be interviewed due to 
their feeling that they had insufficient knowledge about the plan. The resulting total
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size of the sample (N= 30) is similar to many other studies using in-depth interview 
techniques (e.g., Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Timothy 
1998; Yuksel 1998).
These people were grouped into five stakeholder groups: central government 
officials, local government officials, local people, voluntary sector organisations, and 
private sector organisations. It was imperative to obtain the opinions of officials in 
local government, provincial government, and in the private and voluntary (or NGO) 
sectors, as well as local people, as they were key actors with reference to the BMP. 
They also reflect the study's interest in spatial scale and the relations between central, 
provincial, and local scales. The Central government officials in the "participant list" 
consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of 
Environment, the Ministry of Resettlement, the Provincial Government, and the State 
Planning Institution. The Local government officials consisted of mayors, ex-mayors 
and union members of the four municipalities. The private sector representatives were 
from the Association of Tourism Investors (Betuyab), Antalya Culture Preservation 
Association (ANSAV) and GATAB (Union of South Antalya Infrastructure). Finally, 
there were voluntary sector (or NGO) representatives, including from the Society for 
Natural Preservation (NPS), and academics from two universities. There were also 
some local people included in the list.
7.6.1.6 Research implementation
The main field research was carried out between June and October 2000. This 
was followed by the verbatim transcription of the interviews, identification of 
common themes (including the involvement of an independent researcher for 
triangulation), analysis of the qualitative data using NUD.IST software, interpretation 
of the findings, and final writing up.
Details of the 30 interviewees are provided in Table 7.6. The respondents 
were categorized by organisation type category and the geographical scale at which 
they had strongest interests. As is seen in Table 7.6, many of the actors involved in 
the BMP were public sector organisations. However, among these public sector 
organisations there was a broad spread across central, provincial and local spatial 
scales. At the central scale there was various representation from the ministries and
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state planning institution, and at the provincial scale there were representatives with 
•administration, planning, and tourism interests. At the local scale, however, there 
were representatives with legal, administration, and resident interests. In the table the 
private and voluntary sector organisations were categorised by type of interests and in 
accordance with the geographical scale at which their interests were focused. Among 
the private sector respondents there are representatives with cultural, environmental 
and infrastructural interests, and among the voluntary sector respondents there were 
representatives with education and environmental interests.
Interviews took place in seven different locations in Turkey, namely Antalya, 
Belek, Serik, Bogazkent, Kumkoy, Ankara and Istanbul. Seven interviewees were 
from central government institutions, ten were from local and provincial government, 
six were from private sector organisations, five were from voluntary sector 
organisations, and two were local people. It is important to note that the interview 
conducted with villagers of Kumkoy (one headman and ten villagers) was in the form 
of a focus group, this being due to several convenient reasons. All other 
representatives were interviewed either at their work places or homes. A recording 
device was used, where permitted, to provide an uninterrupted flow in the 
conversation and a complete report. Only two of the interviews were not recorded, 
due to the uneasiness of the interviewees. Two interviewers were present at the 
interviews, and one of the interviewers took notes in the two unrecorded interviews. A 
full record of each interview was assembled as soon as it was completed. The 
recorded interviews were then transcribed and prepared for analysis.
Table7.6 List of interviewees who were involved in the preparation or
implementation of the BMP
Geographical
scale
Position Organisation Location Type of 
Organisation
National Co-ordinator State Planning Institution Ankara Central
National City Planner Ministry of Tourism Ankara Central
National Director Ministry o f Public Culture Ankara Central
National Director Ministry o f Environment Ankara Central
Provincial Governor Antalya Governorship Antalya Provincial
Provincial Planning Coordinator Antalya Governorship Antalya Provincial
Provincial Director Provincial Tourism Directorate Antalya Provincial
Provincial District Governor Serik Serik Provincial
Local Attorney The Union o f Mediterranean 
Municipalities
Antalya Local
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Local Executive Secretary The Union o f Mediterranean 
Municipalities
Antalya Local
Local Mayor Belek Municipality Belek Local
Local Mayor Kadriye Municipality Kadriye Local
Local Ex-Mayor Kadriye
Municipality
Kadriye Local
Local Mayor Serik Municipality Serik Local
Local Ex-Mayor Serik Municipality Serik Local
Local Mayor Bogazkent Municipality Bogazkent Local
Local Village Headman Kumkoy Belek Local
Local Ex-Village Headman Belek Belek Local
Local Teacher Belek Belek Local
Others Board Member Holiday Village Ankara Private
Others President ANSAV(Antalya Culture Preservation 
Association)
Antalya Private
Others Director Betuyab (The Association o f Tourism 
Investors)
Belek Private
Others Environment Co­
ordinator
Betuyab Belek Private
Others Board Member GATAB (Union o f South Antalya 
Infrastructure)
Kemer Private
Others Board Member GATAB (Union o f South Antalya 
Infrastructure)
Kemer Private
Others Academic Baskent University Ankara Voluntary
Others Academic Hacettepe University Ankara Voluntary
Others Academic Akdeniz University Antalya Voluntary
Others Project Executor NPS (The Society for Nature Preservation) Belek Voluntary
Others Co-ordinator NPS Istanbul Voluntary
Great care was taken in administering the interviews. First, carefully 
constructed invitation letters were sent to the interviewees, stating the purpose of the 
interview, the themes of the interview questions, and they were cordially invited to be 
interviewed (Appendix A). A reminder was sent to interviewees who failed to reply 
the first invitation letter, and interview dates and times were scheduled and confirmed. 
The researcher did not encounter serious problems at this point due partly to the 
previous site visits and the quality of contacts built then. The interviewees were 
informed in advance that the information from this research would only be used as 
part of an academic investigation. Appointments were made that were convenient for 
the respondents, which is important because questions asked at inconvenient times 
“may result in misunderstanding or attract a series of rapid replies designed to get rid 
of the interviewer as quickly as possible” (Chisnall 1992: 150). Interviewees were 
provided with a list of interview themes in advance, as “providing participants with a 
list of interview themes before the event promotes validity and reliability through
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enabling the interviewee to consider the information being requested and allowing 
them the opportunity to gain the supporting organisational documentation from their 
files” (Saunders et al 1997: 220). Assurance was given that any confidential 
information provided would remain confidential in order to make the interviewee 
more relaxed and the discussion more open (Healey and Rawlinson 1994). This was 
intended to increase the level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the researcher 
and reduce the possibility of interviewee response bias (Healey and Rawlinson 1994). 
It was made clear to respondents at the interview start that their own name would not 
be revealed in the research. In addition, the clearly phrased and appropriately worded 
questions were asked in a carefully neutral tone. The interviewer avoided the use of 
comments and non-verbal behaviour such as gestures, as the literature review suggests 
that the researcher's posture or tone of voice might bias or inhibit the flow of 
discussion (Torrington 1991). Consideration was given to developing the trust of the 
interviewee, to ensure the information given was as valuable as possible, and to avoid 
doubts about its validity and reliability. The researcher was aware that an interview 
could be an intrusive process, where the interviewee may not like to discuss an aspect 
of the topic.
Based on the literature on interview design and implementation, importance 
was placed on the length of the interviews. Interviews lasted on average two hours. In 
most cases, two-phase interviews were conducted and single-phase interviews were 
only carried out for two of the 30 interviewees. Based on difficulties experienced 
previously in qualitative research undertaken by the researcher in Turkey (Yuksel et al 
1999), two interviewers were present during the interview sessions. Having had two 
researchers in the field facilitated many aspects of the fieldwork. For example, the 
research areas were dispersed throughout the country. Safety, particularly driving at 
night, was less of an issue with two people travelling together. Moreover, having male 
and female researchers assisted the accessibility issue for the interviewees. The 
interviewees were able to establish better rapport with the researchers in different 
situations and cases. For example, when the researchers went to Kumkoy for the 
interview, the residents had a negative attitude towards the female researcher. This is 
largely because one of the respondent organisations (NPS), whose majority of 
employers were female, had raised the expectations of the residents with regard to 
tourism development in the region, and then they were unable to fulfil those
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expectations. Hence, having another researcher of a different gender was beneficial in 
conducting the research. Furthermore, in cases where the use of recording device was 
not allowed, one of the researchers asked the questions and led the interview, and the 
other took detailed notes. Thus, eye contact with the interviewee continued 
uninterrupted throughout the session. In line with suggestions in the literature, the 
interviewer explained to the interviewee approximately how long the interview would 
take and determined whether or not they wanted to continue to the second part of the 
interview on another day. In practice, only two interviewees wanted to continue with 
the second part of the interview on the same day. The interviewers were observant as 
to any signs of tiredness, which may impose difficulty in terms of acquiring quality 
and extensive information. On the few occasions when tiredness was observed, the 
suggestion was made to continue the remaining questions on another day. In addition, 
one interviewee said that his schedule was unexpectedly tight, and hence the second 
phase of their interview was postponed to another date.
A focus group interview was carried out with ten volunteer local people and 
the headman of Kumkoy village at a local cafe. The main reason why a group 
interview was used rather than an individual interview was because these respondents 
were generally reluctant to speak individually because of their fear of resentment and 
reprisals. This specific problem is not peculiar to this case study area. Medeiros de 
Araujo (2000) similarly observes in the case of Brazil that there maybe quite distinct 
cultural barriers to research interviews in developing countries, including a low level 
of importance attached to scientific investigation, and a rejection of the presence of 
the researcher as an unwanted nuisance. While the researcher gave a full explanation 
of the purpose of the research, the villagers were still quite sceptical about the role 
and intentions of the researcher. At first, the researcher was confused with a 
government official or journalist who had came to the village some months 
previously, had sympathised with their problems, had promised to solve their 
problems but had not done so. The villagers were resentful about unethical 
researchers taking advantage of their goodwill and honesty simply to gain information 
for their own agenda. The researcher had to contact them several times before the 
group interview took place, and it was through the help of the village headman and 
the district governor, that the focus group interview was arranged. This form of 
interview was found to be insightful, with single comments or statements eliciting a
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whole range of additional revealing statements (Hines 2000; Morgan 1997; Ryan 
1995). It allowed more unconventional views to be stated and the members of the 
group stimulated each other (Ryan 1995).
7.7 Data analysis
Depending on the purpose of the research, a wide variety of analytical 
techniques have been employed in interorganisational relationship research. These 
techniques range from multiple regression (Turk 1973), sociograms, diagraphs 
(Reicker et al 1976), block modelling (Knoke and Rogers 1978; Van de Ven et al 
1979) to multidimensional scaling (Levine 1972; Reicker et al 1976). The principal 
objective of these techniques is to cluster organisations together on the basis of their 
interactions. Most of the studies with the above approaches have utilised “0” and “1” 
data, representing the presence of, or absence of a linkage between organisations. 
However, such approaches have a major deficiency in that they do not take into 
account the intensity of a relationship. Therefore, most of the variations in 
interorganisational relationships are lost, such as in terms of frequency of interaction, 
number of different forms of interaction (such as communication) and the degree of 
equality in the interaction (Rogers and Whetten 1982).
This research collected qualitative data and employed a number of 
complementary techniques to meaningfully explain the nature of the relationships 
between organisations, their extent and their implications. The framework approach 
(Ritchie and Spencer 1994) was employed in the analysis of the interview transcripts. 
Two academicians coded the interview transcripts, with the help of Nud.ist, a 
software package for qualitative analysis, to reflect major themes, as well as sub­
themes to illustrate the specific content. There are increasing numbers of qualitative 
software programmes available to researchers (Anderson and Shaw 1999), with 
Nud.ist 4.0 chosen as it is a leading programme for coding-oriented qualitative 
analysis (Weitzman and Miles 1995).
The analysis of qualitative data is argued to be problematic (Anderson and 
Shaw 1999), with some suggesting that much of the superiority of qualitative research 
is lost when it comes to analysis (Hong 1984). Often large amounts of qualitative data 
are collected, but frequently this leads to the analysis of the qualitative data being
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truncated prior to the end of the analysis (Wolfe et al 1993). Substantial difficulties 
are often reported in reducing the extensive quantity of data into manageable 
quantities (Popham 1993). Moore et al (1995: 34-39) share this view and state that 
"one of the most difficult things about using qualitative data is wading through the 
masses of text produced.... because of time constraints and limited resources, 
researchers using traditional coding procedures often solve the problem by ignoring 
the data altogether". One logical solution to the inherent problems in the analysis of 
qualitative data is computerisation (Hong 1984). The computer package programme 
has a number of benefits, such as it enables non-numerical, unstructured data to be 
indexed, searched and theorised. The computer package has the ability to retrieve vast 
quantities of data quickly and efficiently (Hall and Winchester 1997), and it provides 
a consistent method for selecting, condensing and transforming data, displaying data 
in an organised fashion, and drawing and verifying conclusions from the condensed 
displayed data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Nud.ist is suggested to be among the 
most advanced of the packages available, as it includes a malleable "node-tree" 
structure that assists with qualitative data management and theory building. While it 
took time to learn the software programme fully and master it, Nud.ist radically 
reduced the time involved in the mechanical manual processes of analysis. Each stage 
of analysis involved constant re-evaluation of each respondent’s answer, and 
discussion between the two researchers encouraged an in-depth focus on the data 
(Anderson and Shaw 1999).
The analytical framework involved five inter-connected systematic steps, which 
will now be explained (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). Two academicians were engaged 
in the analysis of the data in order to provide inter-rated reliability, that is 
categorisation is not simply a judgement of one researcher. This method assumes that 
if two or more researchers reach the same conclusion regarding the characteristics of 
the data, then this conclusion is a more objective observation and less pure subjective 
opinion. It also allowed for more discussion and reflection in relation to the 
interpretation of the interview transcripts.(l) Following the completion of the 
interview transcripts, each researcher read them, became familiar with the range and 
diversity of the data, and gained an overview of the body of material that had been 
collected. (2) Then, each researcher independently prepared a thematic framework of 
issues and concepts arising from the recurrence or patterning of the responses. Each
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response was analysed and the researchers, experienced with the software, developed 
categories inductively by using Nud.ist’s “free node” capabilities, and then these were 
coded hierarchically to create an index tree with general categories and sub­
categories. When developing these categories, each researcher attempted to ensure 
each was clear, had a logical correctness, was adapted to the structure of the situation, 
and was appropriate to the respondents’ frame of reference (Lazarsfeld and Barton 
1955). (3) The identified categories, issues and concepts were then rearranged into a 
more general analytical framework. Each researcher built a broader picture of the data 
as a whole by identifying key characteristics of the data based on the range of views 
and attitudes expressed by the interviewees. (4) At this stage, the academicians 
discussed and refined the resulting issues and concepts. It was observed that the 
researchers shared much commonality in the categories that they developed 
inductively. When there were differences they were discussed and a compromise 
reached or one position was adopted in preference to another after discussion. The 
developed categories were considered less biased because of the approach adopted.
(5) The last step of the framework approach related to the final interpretation of the 
findings. A narrative approach, using direct quotes from the interviews, is adopted in 
the presentation of the study findings in order to produce a multi-vocal text that offers 
the reader an opportunity to engage with the data and the narration of the participants 
(Jamal and Getz 2000). This technique has been applied by Jamal and Getz (2000: 
162), as “it recalls readers, scholars and managers to the human and ethical dimension 
of planning, the concerns and issues of those who are impacted by such processes, 
those who are studied by planning researchers and theorists, those who are managed 
by the writings and actions of researchers, planners, politicians, destination managers 
and other stakeholders”.
7.8 Research difficulties and limitations
The researcher encountered several problems during the fieldwork stage of the 
research. First, due to the economic crises and political instability in the country, 
many tourism development projects had either been completely abandoned or halted. 
Because of this discontinuity, the researcher had to change the case study area twice. 
This needs to be remembered when considering the wider applicability of the study 
findings for Turkey as whole. Another problem was the difficulty in locating a 
number of individuals involved in the formulation of the plan. Some of them had
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moved elsewhere, including some who had changed country for work purposes. The 
lack of a habit of “working by appointment” in Turkey was another real obstacle. The 
lack of co-operation with the research by a few informants was disheartening. 
Unfortunately, this is common in the country, where a low level of importance is 
attached to academic research. Consequently, it is difficult undertaking social science 
research in an extremely politically polarised environment where tolerance for others 
is sometimes quite low. Gaining access and objective information proved difficult in . 
some cases because of the low trust that some organisations and individuals held for 
one another. One of the local Mayors even claimed that the interviewers might be 
working for the opposition party, or could be agents of the British government (!). In 
addition to these ideological and practical problems, moving from one place to 
another to conduct interviews was difficult because of the climatic conditions (up to 
forty-five degrees in the shade) and the sometimes reckless habits of drivers. Finally, 
the general limitations of case study research apply to this study. As stated earlier, the 
empirical findings for this case study are not necessarily transferable to other tourism 
or land use planning contexts, rather they should be taken as a foundation for more 
empirical enquiry elsewhere.
7.9 Summary
In this chapter, the issues relating to the design and implementation of the 
research were discussed. Figure 7.2 illustrates the research process. The starting point 
of this research was a review of the appropriate literature and consultation with 
experts and supervisors. At this stage, key issues from the literature review were 
linked together, and their interactions and relationships were evaluated. This 
conceptualisation improved the researcher's understanding of the subject and 
highlighted gaps in the published literature.
At this stage, a case study approach, drawing on both secondary and primary 
data, was chosen as the research strategy in order to highlight linkages between the 
realities of the tourism plan formulation and implementation processes and the 
theoretical context of this research. Two of the most common methods used in 
interorganisational relations research, these being the survey questionnaire and in- 
depth interviews were evaluated next and their strengths and limitations were
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identified. A semi-structured, two-phased interview technique was adopted in this 
study due to its appropriateness.
Figure 7.2 The research process
Required level o f  
understanding reached
Fieldwork
Study contribution
Literature review
Analysis o f fieldwork 
data
Development of the 
research tool
Key research issues and 
problems
Conceptual model 
and conceptual themes
Consultation with 
supervisors and experts
Researcher's understanding 
of the subject
Site visit, preliminary 
interviews and concurrent 
data analysis
A site visit to the case study area and a series of preliminary interviews were 
then carried out. The data from this stage helped the researcher fine-tune and add to 
the conceptual framework, the conceptual themes and the related interview questions. 
Seven conceptual themes were identified based on this research process. These are 
planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder 
involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter­
organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and the 
delegation of power. The main fieldwork was then undertaken. Each conceptual
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theme was discussed in chapter eight which reports the results. As can be seen from 
Figure 7.2, this cycle of the fieldwork and refinement of conceptual thought was 
continued until the desired level of understanding was reached. This integrative 
process allowed for greater understanding of the research area and also helped the 
researcher to further develop expertise in data collection and analysis. The data were 
examined in depth and width to understand the key components of the research topic 
in the context within which it occurred. The study findings are presented in the next 
chapter according to the seven conceptual themes that have been identified.
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8. Results Chapter
Section 1. Planning Issues in Belek (The Effective Use of the Belek Coastal 
Management Plan)
8.1.1 Introduction to Chapter 8
The overall aim of this research is to examine interorganisational relations, 
notably central-local relations, in tourism planning. It does this in the specific context 
of tourism development in Belek, a rapidly expanding tourist resort in Antalya, 
Turkey. A central focus is to assess central-local relations in the multi-scale network 
that links the public, private and voluntary sectors and the national, provincial and 
local spatial scales, relevant to tourism development in Belek. The approach taken to 
this study in Belek stresses the structural dimensions of the environment, including 
the constitutional, institutional, and operational arrangements, the power relations and 
patterns of resource dependency, as well as the processes of communication, resource 
exchange, and of co-ordination.
The "Study Findings" presented in chapter 8 investigate the organisational 
environment in which the tourism planning for the Belek Coastal Management Plan 
(BMP) was undertaken. It examines the ways in which the tourism planning and 
implementation processes were carried out to identify the areas of interdependency 
and exchange of resources among the agencies involved. This chapter also considers 
the elements that either facilitated or inhibited the building, maintenance and 
management of interorganisational relations among the public and private sector 
organisations involved in the BMP. It also provides insights into whether the use of 
alternative administration forms, such as decentralisation, might have enhanced the 
management of tourism in Belek.
The results of the case study (Yin 1993) are presented in this chapter. It serves 
to highlight linkages between the realities of the formulation and implementation 
processes and the theoretical context for this research (Williams et al 1998). Seven 
conceptual themes were determined and used to organise the questions in the 
interviews. The primary data collection involved semi-structured interviews with
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relevant respondents, focusing on these seven conceptual themes identified in the 
theoretical framework. The researcher established a question bank through the 
analysis of the preliminary interviews and the literature review. The methods used to 
identify the 30 interviewees who were involved in the design and implementation of 
the BMP were explained in chapter seven. These respondents were in five stakeholder 
groups: central government officials (ministries, provincial and district level), local 
government officials (municipalities and villages), local people, voluntary 
organisations and the private organisations. The conceptual themes covered in the 
interviews with these respondents included: the planning issues in Belek, inter­
organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, 
resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and 
activities of the organisations, and the delegation of power.
The results of the study are discussed in the seven interconnected sections 
which make up chapter eight. Each section presents the findings and discusses them in 
the context of the reviewed literature. The analysis starts by reproducing the specific 
questions asked in the interview. This first section (section 1) examines the opinions 
of participants involved in the design and implementation of the BMP about what 
facilitated or inhibited the effectiveness of the BMP, and about whether the 
participants were fully aware of the BMP and its proposals, and the extent to which 
they supported these proposals. The detailed findings on the first two interview 
questions are now discussed.
8.1.2 Factors facilitating or inhibiting the plan's effectiveness
1) “What inhibits or facilitates the effectiveness of the BMP for 
the development of tourism in the Belek region?”
Plan formulation and implementation are complex processes fraught with 
difficulties. As Pearce (2000: 202) observes: “no matter how thorough the initial 
preparation and how comprehensive the scope of the plan, it is unlikely that planners 
will envisage all eventualities, either in implementation or in changing exogenous 
conditions, which may necessitate modifications to the original goals and strategies”. 
This is especially likely to be the case with newly emerging destinations particularly
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in the developing world. When the participants in this study commented on variables 
either facilitating or inhibiting the effectiveness of the BMP and tourism development, 
the identified variables were multi-faceted, as might be expected from the literature 
reviewed in chapter two. Some of these variables were locally based, whereas others 
were part of a broader system (Table 8.1.1). The variables included difficulties arising 
from the legislative, institutional, political and economic environment, a lack of civic 
consciousness and commitment, a lack of local resources, the rapid growth of second 
houses, and inadequate local infrastructure (Table 8.1.1).
These variables were categorised into two major groups based on the 
dominant scale of their influence. The variables that belong more to the immediate 
local environment constitute “local forces,” and variables associated more with the 
larger environment are labelled “macro forces” (Table 8.1.1). The existence of two 
different but interlocking environments suggests that a change in one of the 
environmental variables is likely to create reverberations affecting the functioning of 
others (Liu 1994; Elliot 1997). The following section will now discuss these forces in 
turn.
Table 8.1.1 Factors affecting the BMP’s effectiveness
Macro Forces Number o f  
respondents 
mentioning the 
factor
Local Forces Number o f  
respondents 
mentioning the 
factor
Legislative environment 16 Level and form of local 14
support
Institutional environment 15 Inadequate local resources 14
Political environment 14 Local infrastructure 12
(financial and human capital)
Economic environment 7 Rapid second home 11
development
Local apathy 9
8.1.2.1 Macro forces
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The most frequently mentioned macro forces were general characteristics of 
the legislative environment, this being mentioned by 16 of the 30 respondents (Table
8.1.1). Comments related to, for example, the appropriateness and adequacy of 
legislation, the distribution of responsibilities, resources, and power. The nature of the 
institutional environment (e.g., multiplicity of institutions, institutional rivalry, 
intolerance, incompatible organisational goals and ideologies, conflicting interests and 
expectations, low levels of institutional commitment, and staff discontinuity) was 
another frequently mentioned influential macro variable. Respondents also repeatedly 
brought up characteristics of the political environment (e.g., political instability, and 
discontinuity of political support). Another commonly mentioned macro variable was 
the economic environment. The following paragraphs examine these variables in 
detail.
8.1.2.1.1 The legislative and institutional environment
Tourism develops and functions within a legal framework (Liu 1994). The 
consensus in the literature is that collective action is fostered when enabling laws and 
management systems encourage the formation and continuance of partnership 
agreements (Selin 1998). As argued in the study's conceptual framework, in addition 
to the legislative environment, the tourism policy process takes place within a certain 
institutional context, and tourism programmes have little chance of success unless this 
context is considered and arranged carefully. The institutional arrangements may 
either facilitate or inhibit the plan implementation process.
As many as 16 of the 30 respondents mentioned that the organisational and 
legislative frameworks had not facilitated the design of appropriate tourism 
development programmes due to the fact that the country's needs and potential were 
not substantially taken into account. Frequently mentioned obstacles included an 
absence of interorganisational co-ordination, over-bureaucratisation of programmes, 
the low technical and administrative capability of several participating organisations, 
political ineptness, and an inadequate monitoring and evaluation of programme 
results. A private sector representative said that “too many” organisations tended to 
intervene in tourism-related decisions. He went on to comment that “an acquaintance 
of mine, an ex-director of the MoT, once said in a meeting that there were two 
subjects which everyone likes meddling with: taxation and tourism. Everyone has
something to say about these two issues in the country”. These respondents also 
pointed out that the current institutional framework has serious pitfalls that impede the 
effective use of the BMP for tourism development in the region. The specific 
arguments relating to the legislative and institutional influences on the effectiveness 
of the BMP are now considered. The next sections evaluate respondents' comments on 
the Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL), the enforcement of tourism-related 
legislation in the region, the problems and conflicts due to legal overlapping, the 
influence of varied interests and expectations of parties involved in the design and 
implementation of the BMP, and on the role of a centralist administration which has 
led to resource imbalances for the BMP.
8.1.2.1.2 The legislative framework
It was noted by respondents that a strong and clear legislative framework was 
necessary for the successful implementation of the plan. More than half of the 
respondents (16), however, complained that at present the legislation was in quite a 
shambles, producing too many conflictual relations between central and local units, so 
that it was almost impossible to put plans into practice effectively. Four central and 
two provincial government officials specifically mentioned that the current tourism- 
related legislation gave rise to fertile grounds for institutional problems. These 
respondents argued for a revision in the law. In contrast, eight private, voluntary and 
local government respondents argued that the current legislation was not to blame.
For them, the tourism legislation was appropriate and adequate, and the problem was 
that the enforcers were not applying the laws properly.
8.1.2.1.3 Flaws in the Tourism Encouragement Law
Several central and local government officials, and private and voluntary 
sector respondents heavily criticised the Tourism Encouragement Law (TEL). While 
this law had been intended to regulate tourism, it had actually encouraged an increase 
in the number of beds. The TEL was condemned because it had led to mass tourism. It 
had also encouraged the leasing of valued public land and of agricultural and forested 
land for tourism investments. Three voluntary sector respondents noted that this had 
given rise to very rapid construction, a haphazard development in coastal regions and 
environmental degradation.
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Seven central and local government officials and two private and voluntary 
sector respondents criticised the transfer under the TEL of planning and construction 
authority in tourism areas to the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). The subsequent changes 
in laws had also created much confusion. An experienced consultant noted, “in 1983 a 
regulation was promulgated that defines how authority for regulating development 
ought to be used. According to this regulation, in order that the Ministry approves 
such construction plans, the Municipal Committee is empowered to suggest its own 
opinion to approve or reject. This enables municipalities to assess a construction 
proposal and state their opinion. However, another regulation came in to existence in 
1989 that waived this condition. The new regulation introduced a limit of 30 days for 
municipalities to state their views about a proposal... otherwise it would be assumed 
that the municipality has accepted the proposal. In the same year, the planning 
authority in tourism regions was given to the Ministry of Work and Resettlement (Mo 
WR) and the MoWR has become the body that has the right to endorse or veto all 
development plans”.
Five local and provincial government officials stated that such legislation and 
regulations support the omission of municipalities and their local committees from 
having an influence, and in effect frustrates the effective functioning of local 
government. These respondents indicated that this had inevitably led to wrong 
decisions being made and had thwarted the establishment of good links between the 
municipalities and the tourism sector.
8.1.2.1.4 An inadequate enforcement of laws
While some respondents held the legislation responsible for problems, eight 
respondents argued instead that the problem was that the legislative framework had 
not been applied adequately. There appears to be two underlying reasons for their 
argument. The first relates to the custom of “getting round” the legislation. Many 
participants stated that the legislation could not achieve much on its own, due to the 
mentality of the officials responsible for enforcing the laws. They complained that 
there were countless ways to get round the legislation to exploit the environment for 
personal advantage, and that people tended to exploit this management weakness for 
their individual benefit. It was suggested that a sign of efforts to get round legislation 
could be the large number of people who visit members of the national assembly in
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the capital. Hence, members of the national assembly often by-pass local 
government's decisions in land-use related issues. They commented that the gaps 
between the law and its implementation should be closed and regulations concerning 
the use of natural resources should be applied to their full extent.
8.1.2.1.5 Conflict between different authorities
Several respondents complained that there are too many organisations, 
perhaps “more than a dozen”, that have some right to intervene in tourism-related 
decisions. This corresponds with the findings of other studies of Turkey. The present 
author's research on the heritage site of Pamukkale in Turkey (Yuksel, Bramwell and 
Yuksel 1999) reached a similar conclusion. As discussed in chapter six, according to 
the current institutional set up, the Ministry of Tourism has management authority 
over vast sections of the coast, where the goal is to organise and promote the 
establishment of tourist facilities. However, it was shown in chapter six that the 
Ministry of Environment also has authority to protect the environment, to use natural 
and land resources in rural and urban areas in an effective way, and to protect and 
enrich natural beauty and wildlife. The management of forested land in coastal areas 
is also under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (see Chapter Six).
Several respondents commented that, despite the existence of the Ministry of 
Tourism (MoT) which is intended to promote and develop tourism, the de facto 
situation was that the MoT could not act independently on implementation issues. 
With specific reference to Belek, a voluntary organisation respondent pointed out that: 
“the owner of the land [in the Belek region] was the Ministry of Forestry, the tenant 
of the land became the Ministry of Tourism, the planners of the zone were the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Tourism, and the agent that brought 
forward the planning proposals first was the Nature Preservation Society”. Given this 
framework, respondents noted that the current institutional and legislative 
arrangements had given rise to serious conflicts between different central and local 
organisations. This had undermined the building of interorganisational co-ordination 
and trust.
Fourteen of the 30 respondents stated that there was competition for prestige 
among a number of central government organisations. Many of these organisations
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tended to have incompatible goals and institutional ideologies, conflicting 
expectations, and differing degrees of commitment to tourism. The habit of sharing 
responsibility and resources among the central institutions was said to be almost 
absent. One of the consultants stated: “each [institution] attempts to cut the cake on its 
own. The municipalities try to cut a big piece for themselves, the MoWR does the 
same, so does the MoC”. Four central government officials complained that when the 
MoT wanted to make and enforce a decision on any subject in relation to tourism, the 
MoT was confronted with a spate of other ministries that were ready to thwart their 
efforts. One Tourism Ministry official conceded, “it is quite acceptable to expect the 
MoT to be poised to stop or at least take punitive actions against illegal second house 
development. However, this is beyond our current power. We admit that we are 
powerless in the face of many other central government organisations”. Seven private, 
voluntary and local government respondents shared this view about the MoT. They 
broadly argued that the MoT could not enforce measures adequately in relation to 
tourism because of its limited power in the face of other central institutions. The 
MoT's activities are subject to tampering by other institutions, and approvals have to 
be gained from many central institutions before they can move on any case.
8.1.2.1.6 Differing interests and expectations
Eleven respondents noted that differences in organisational and individual 
objectives and expectations had stifled progress to a great extent. Respondents often 
commented that the implementation of the BMP was rather unsuccessful because of 
the involvement of many agencies with different interests. Prominent differences in 
attitude were found between what local people had in mind and what Betuyab thought 
of the issues. Significant differences also existed between Betuyab and the Nature 
Preservation Society (NPS) in terms of how natural resources should be utilised. 
Additionally, there were clear differences in perspectives between local people and 
the NPS, between the NPS and the municipalities, between the municipalities and 
provincial government, between the municipalities and central government, and 
among the municipalities.
The NPS was concerned that central and local government and local people 
were converting fertile agricultural lands for second home development. A voluntary 
sector respondent stated, “they [locals] thought that selling their lands would bring
them the tranquillity and prosperity that they dream of for their retirement. The land 
around Kadriye is first class agricultural land, but this land has been lost with 
government incentives and encouragement. This is the greatest sin that a government 
can commit”. Two private sector respondents and three provincial government 
officials contended that economic gains should be considered in parallel with 
protective measures in order to secure healthy tourism development. These 
respondents stressed that the utilisation and protection of resources should be 
balanced in order to bring prosperity to the region. One of the officials stated, “if you 
insist that resources should just be protected, they will remain idle... just protection of 
resources will not contribute anything to the local economy”.
Five respondents commented that the views of some organisations changed 
during the process, as a result of goal displacement or because of interest conflicts. 
These respondents noted that co-operation achieved at the very beginning of the BMP 
talks withered away when the activities of organisations started to clash with each 
other. This was particularly the case between the NPS and Betuyab, between the NPS 
and the municipalities, and between the central government organisations.
8.L2.1.7 The centralised administration
Ten of the 16 respondents were critical of the key role enjoyed by physically 
distant central organisations in the delivery of local services. According to these 
respondents, the delivery of local public services by central organisations, with 
different hierarchical arrangements and structures, makes it extremely difficult to 
achieve co-ordination and the execution of effective control.
8.1.2.1.8 Resource imbalances
Three voluntary sector respondents, two local government officials and the 
representative of the villagers were critical of Betuyab for exploiting gaps in the 
legislative and institutional framework to its advantage. They felt it had acted like an 
intermediary or counterpart that simply carried out the tasks of central government. 
Respondents from the voluntary organisations thought that Betuyab had firmly 
established itself due to the absence of strong local government in the region. Almost 
all relations between the central government and the region were carried out and 
controlled by Betuyab, with much of its authority being based on its substantial
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financial power. The comments of one local person clearly illustrates the effect of 
financial power and imbalances on the relations: “our mayor has to get along with 
Betuyab very well as he knows that they are powerful and influential in relation to the 
central authorities; he doesn’t want to contradict with them in any way”. Two of the 
mayors were clearly opposed to the presence of Betuyab in the region. Distrust of this 
organisation was reflected in the comment that: “although Betuyab, in collaboration 
with Hacettepe University, is claiming that they are making rigorous research on 
marine turtles, I do not believe in the reliability of their research results. All the 
factors having an adverse effect on turtle nests and breeding are still continuing today. 
However, when you look at their results, you see an increase in the population of 
marine turtles, which is in total contrast to the reality. The marine turtles do not have 
space for breathing let alone breeding ”.
8.1.2.2 The political environment
The political context is depicted in the tourism literature as a key influence on 
tourism development (Liu 1994; Tosun 2000, 2001). Respondents’ comments 
indicated that the country's political system was seen as an important influence on the 
effectiveness of the BMP. The most frequently mentioned features of the political 
environment were the recurring shifts in the political arena and the uncertainty and 
instability that it created, the strong control imposed by central government, and 
partisanship and favouritism in return for political support. This is not a surprising 
finding. Decisions about tourism are taken in the context of a political system, so the 
political cultures, structures and situations will affect how tourism is organised and 
its development is controlled (deKadt 1979; Elliot 1997). Tourism is often 
manipulated for political purposes, and political forces can alter the bases of 
comparative advantage (Dicken 1986). The dominant ideological and philosophical 
values of the political system will determine how far governments will intervene in 
tourism development and planning. As was mentioned in chapter four, a shifting 
political climate may severely hamper implementation efforts by limiting the power 
of parties to take the actions they desire. Gray (1989) notes that successful 
implementation requires political skills to ensure that sufficient support can be 
sustained for agreements. Subsequent sections explored specific arguments related to 
the effects of the political environment on the BMP's effectiveness.
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8.1.2.2.1 Political instability
The frequent changes in the political environment in Turkey, characterised by 
short-lived political parties coming to power were discussed in chapter six. These 
changes were mentioned by many respondents as destabilising the political support 
for specific policies and organisations. Other observers have also noted this problem 
in Turkey. For instance, Tosun (2001) notes that from its foundation in 1963 up to 
1996, 30 ministers had served in the Ministry of Tourism, with an average span of 
duty of 1.1 years. This is too short a time span to achieve much either at national or 
local levels. Moreover, ministers and even chief officials have a custom of replacing 
the personnel in their department when they are first appointed to the post, and this 
can decrease continuity and efficiency. Brotherton et al (1994 in Tosun 2000) also 
observe how changes in government in Turkey can give rise to something of a 
political hiatus and a re-ordering of policies and priorities and changes in personnel.
Because of the recurrent political shifts, a voluntary sector respondent argued 
that, “unfortunately, the majority of plans (including the BMP) are stillborn in the 
country”. Many respondents stated that when the party leading the central government 
changed, so did the ministers and their staff. An official in the Ministry of Tourism 
stated that, “if the new minister has got a different view on an issue from that of his 
predecessor, then this ignites new debates [operational and power] between the 
institutions and significantly slows down the implementation process”. In relation to 
political influences and changes, a local stated that “Belek is a very curious place in 
many respects.. .every minute in Belek is destined for surprises”.
Two voluntary sector respondents indicated that they had tried to plan for all 
eventualities affecting the progress of the BMP, and they had striven to take 
appropriate measures. However, when they tried to implement the plan, they realised 
that problems that they had assumed to be small or medium in scale during the plan 
formulation stage had then turned out to be unmanageable. This was due to shifting 
political, social, and economic conditions. Eight respondents from both central and 
local institutions expressed concern that the legitimate planning decisions made for 
the protection of zones from development might be contradicted in the longer-term. 
One factor behind this was the constant changes in the politicians. Four local 
respondents expressed their scepticism that their designation of one area as a specially
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protected zone (SPZ) would subsequently be over-turned. This area had initially been 
considered for a marina development. A voluntary organisation representative 
expressed her concern that a change of politicians may adversely affect this area's 
future, “The area [Kumkoy] may still face deterioration as a result of political 
changes. A new person coming to power and under the influence of Betuyab, may 
take a decision that supersedes all other decisions thus far taken in that area. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be protected for ever”.
8.1.2.2.2 Central government control
Several respondents from local community institutions and the private and 
voluntary sectors held the central government to be responsible for “the minimal 
results achieved” in their region. Five local government officials complained that the 
central government was enthusiastic to transfer its responsibilities to local government 
agencies at the same time that it wanted to retain their authority and powers. The 
tradition of retaining authority at the centre, particularly with respect to financial 
resources and decisions, was argued to put local government under tremendous 
pressure. One local government official indicated that this political convention had led 
to a strong central government and a relatively weak local government structure 
growing in the country. Morah (1996) has observed a similar problem in Kenya. In 
both Kenyan and Turkish cases, central control is likely substantially to curb the local 
government’s capabilities and willingness to take the lead in tourism development.
8.1.2.2.3 Change in the municipalities
Twelve of the respondents commented that changes in the number and 
authority of organisations with an influence on Belek had affected the effectiveness of 
the BMP. In particular, the change in the number of municipalities was an important 
factor that had overwhelmed the effectiveness of the BMP. When discussions about 
the plan had started, there were only two municipalities in the region, but due to the 
rise in population to over 2,000 inhabitants in two of the villages in 1998, the number 
of municipalities had increased to four. A by-election had also taken place in 1998 
and this had brought a different party to power, and had resulted in municipal staff 
being replaced. The new municipalities had changed not only their physical borders 
but also the distribution of resources in the region. For instance, the declaration of 
Belek village’s new status as a municipality altered the balance of resources and
power in the region. The respondents also mentioned that the effect of this 
compartmentalisation was that resources and authority had become more fragmented. 
For instance, the Serik municipality had to hand over its management authority over 
the coastal zone to the newly established Belek Municipality. This was a thorny 
process, which had sparked hostility between the two towns. Achievement of co­
ordination had also become rather difficult in the region because of the different 
political parties of new mayors, which meant they differed ideologically from one 
another quite substantially.
Political wishes and connections had important implications for tourism 
planning in the region. A striking example of this was the water treatment plant 
which had been completed by the ex-mayor of Serik but had not been put into 
operation by his successor of an opposing party. The municipality that supported the 
ruling political party appeared to have certain advantages. Eight local and provincial 
government officials noted that if the mayor was a politician of the ruling party then 
this facilitated them gaining municipal resources and revenue controlled by the central 
government in a timely way. According to two voluntary sector representatives, the 
municipalities controlled by the opposition parties were marginalized by their 
financial or technical requests being given a low priority by central government. Six 
officials from local and provincial government and two voluntary sector 
representatives contended that those having the power due to their party allegiance 
had exploited this connection with central institutions to their advantage. As one 
voluntary sector representative claimed in relation to the BMP: “many public 
organisations have pulled their political strings and steered the political balance in 
order not to lose their influence and status in the area”.
8.1.2.2.4 Economic forces
A final "macro force" influencing the effectiveness of the BMP was economic. 
As Van Doom (in Pearce 1989: 12) claims “ tourism cannot be considered outside the 
context of the different stages of development countries have reached”. Tourism is 
likely to flourish best when it fits into the context of general economic policies and 
programmes designed to lead to the optimum growth of the country as a whole 
(Bhatia 1986). The economic environment affects virtually everything, from the 
availability and adequacy of tourism resources to the impacts of tourism development
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(Liu 1994). In line with this literature, almost all respondents mentioned that 
deficiencies in infrastructure or in local capital for investment were key obstacles to 
tourism development in the region. For example, five local government officials and 
three local people pointed to the problems of energy supply in the region, with this 
being insufficient to meet demand, particularly when tourist numbers increased 
during the summer. Others highlighted the lack of municipal revenue and its 
implications. A provincial government official stated that the “municipalities receive 
funds from central authorities [in proportion to the population of the town]. In the 
summer, these funds cannot meet the demand [as the population increases through 
immigrants and incoming tourists]. In this case, municipalities apply different 
"solutions" to bridge their deficits, such as encouraging more summer house 
development in the area [thus improving municipal levies and estate taxes]. Their 
financial problems induce visual as well as environmental pollution”. While there was 
no economic crisis at the time of the interviews, subsequent contacts with informants 
indicate that two such crises have more recently adversely affected the 
implementation of the BMP through substantial cuts in provincial and municipal 
budgets.
8.1.3 Local forces
Comments made by the respondents about what inhibits or facilitates the 
effectiveness of the BMP were categorised as "macro" and more "local" forces (Table
8.1). The later responses are now examined. The first category of these responses 
relates to local support.
8.1.3.1 Level and form of local support
Literature on tourism planning often indicates that socially responsible and 
economically viable tourism depends on securing community involvement (Brandon 
1993). This involvement may help to make the local community more supportive, 
confident and productive (Eber 1992).
Nine central, provincial, and local government officials and three voluntary 
and private sector respondents in this study commented that the support of the 
community was necessary for the BMP to succeed. However, it was generally felt that 
this support had not been secured. According to the investors, the underlying reason
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for the limited support from the community was their widespread misconceptions 
about tourism. A private sector respondent explained that the most notable problems 
that they had experienced in the area related to the villagers. When they first met with 
the villagers in the early 1990s, the villagers were extremely wary and apprehensive 
about the new tourism development proposals. According to investors, the proposals 
“would re-shape their physical environment and lifestyle for the better”. They felt that 
ignorance and lack of awareness about what tourism development was all about had 
fuelled this local reaction to the tourism development proposals. One Betuyab 
member stated that “villagers of that time used to think that they would be losing their 
forest and would not be able to use the sea and the beaches as a result of the proposed 
development”. Five central and provincial government officials shared similar points 
of view. According to the investors, there were “unwarranted local concerns” 
regarding the protection of local customs and traditions. One of them stated that 
“those people holding negative attitudes towards the proposed development carry 
traces of the old Anatolian culture and concerns. People stated that the main reason 
why they disagree is that they are concerned about opening their land to outsiders 
coming, especially from Europe, who they believe could rapidly alter their social 
structure and customs”.
The local respondents' perspective was very different from that presented by 
the investors and planners. The locals had been resentful about the priorities put 
forward by the developers and planners during the preliminary meetings for the BMP. 
One of the locals argued that there was more emphasis on the protection of wildlife 
than on helping local people. He felt that because the socio-economic dimension was 
absent, planners were “putting too much care and emphasis on turtles rather than 
people”. Other locals also commented that the prioritisation of wildlife (turtle) 
protection over the improvement of living conditions had contributed to local 
resentment. One of the respondents, speaking on behalf of Kumkoy villagers, quoted 
a local saying that captured the views of all the villagers interviewed: “a turtle should 
live like a turtle and a human should live like a human”. The locals had also 
complained that they had been accused of harming the turtles. From their point of 
view they were far from being the predator, indeed they believed they were the real 
protector of the turtles and other wildlife in the region. One local person stated that 
they never damaged the turtles and had even helped the hatchlings by hand to reach
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the sea. (Unfortunately, they are unaware that this “unnatural help” may mean the 
hatchling will not return to the place where it was bom).
The level of local support appears to have changed between the various phases 
of the BMP. Local support reached its peak following the initial meetings targeted to 
inform locals about the development. But, it then started to recede when locals began 
to realise that things that had been accepted or pledged during these meetings did not 
materialise. An ex-Mayor described this as a process of “window dressing”. The 
limited contacts that occurred at this time between local people and the "outsiders", 
notably the investors and planners, probably assisted in the deterioration of trust and 
heightened tension between these two parties.
The villagers claimed that they had been cheated by the outsiders and also that 
they had become physically segregated from the visitors. One local commented, 
“initially when meetings were held [these being organised by Betuyab, the NPS, and 
various ministries] we had been told that the proposed development would benefit the 
area in economic terms. We had been advised that we could set up co-operatives to 
run taxi services in the region. Due to our economic conditions and main source of 
income [agriculture which tends to fluctuate due to the climate conditions] we quite 
liked the idea of income stability.. .[and] we were all in favour of tourism 
development [in its proposed form]. However, we had not realised then that we had to 
compromise on other things to benefit from the proposed development”. Locals had 
faced several restrictions, generally imposed by Betuyab, which they felt had 
segregated them from the tourists. One villager commented that “we [locals] used to 
have full access to our beach, but today there are several restraints on its use. For 
some reason they insist that the beach belongs to the hotels. You cannot imagine what 
it means to have been excluded from using the beach that you have used since your 
childhood. However, the beach should be open for public use [by law] for the sake of 
fairness. But, to be frank, tourists are more privileged than locals”. The restrictions on 
the use of beaches in the area had given rise to local protests and pressure: “when we 
step on the beach, security guards immediately force us to leave it! We have fought 
for a long time to regain our constitutional rights, and following the establishment of 
the municipality our right had been reinstated, though still only partly. Now there are
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zones designated for public use and with facilities, and since then conditions and 
tension have improved relatively”.
Not only the restricted access to beaches but also the restricted access to forest 
areas infuriated the locals. The locals were upset by rumours that forest fires had been 
started deliberately by local people. One villager encapsulated their resentment of 
this: “They [Betuyab] claimed that we set the forest on fire deliberately since we are 
angry with them. That’s right. We were furious with them, but this doesn’t mean that 
we would harm our own land. Contrary to their claim, it was the developers who 
wanted to build a hotel here who set fire to one particular part of the forest. There 
were also fires started by the hoteliers last summer. Sometimes it happens three or 
four times a year.. .ironically enough you see that a new hotel is later underway in the 
burnt part. But they always cunningly put the blame on us”. A few villagers admitted 
openly that they had stopped participating in meetings because they had realised that 
they were not being told about the real facts. One described this as seeing “the real 
faces behind the masks of the investors and planners”.
8.1.3.2 Inadequate local resources
Fourteen of the 30 respondents indicated that the nature of resources, and 
extent to which they are available for local people and local decision-makers, had had 
a substantial influence on tourism development in the region. They mentioned several 
resources, and these can be categorised into human capital, environmental resources, 
financial resources and expertise. They also identified that the region did not possess 
any of these resources in the required quantity or quality. A voluntary organisation 
respondent argued that, “due to the social and economic shock following the opening 
up of the region to tourism, the local people, as well as their representatives, have 
found themselves far from being equipped to cope with the much aggravated social 
and environmental problems. Most of them were and still are not ready [mainly in 
terms of human capital] to take part in the newly opened tourism sector”. According 
to this respondent, although the region has a relatively young population, eager to take 
part in the tourism sector, “the lack of proper education and training forms a 
formidable obstacle in their pursuit of this aim”.
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As many as nine of the 30 respondents were in favour of investing in 
programmes in order to improve the skills of local people to help them gain more 
benefits from tourism. In contrast, four central and provincial government officials 
criticised local people as being lazy and reluctant to participate in such activities, and 
being resistant to change. A central government official was very critical of the local 
populace. She claimed that the “opportunistic and exploitative approach” to tourism 
of local people had obstructed the region's development. Another mainly criticised a 
“growing greed for rent”. He argued that “to be perfectly honest with you, although 
these people used to live in a region surrounded by sea, there were not many local 
fishermen because the main livelihood of the region was agriculture. Now that they 
have realised that tourism offers more prosperity than the very traditional 
agriculture... they claim that the declaration of the forests and beaches as protected 
zones prevents them from fishing. How many of them regularly go swimming or 
fishing is debatable. Once neighbouring towns flourished due to tourism-related 
activities, the locals [in Kumkoy] realised that there was an under-utilised sea behind 
the forest”. Interestingly, respondents representing the municipalities of the region 
were much more likely to mention the scarcity of their own financial resources than 
the problems related to deficiencies in the region’s human resources.
8.1.3.3 Local infrastructure and development of second homes
Eleven of the 30 respondents specifically mentioned the rapid construction of 
summerhouses and its implications for infrastructure. The region seems to have 
attracted many domestic immigrants due to the increase in the number of tourist 
facilities. This has greatly multiplied the population, and the subsequent disorganised 
attempts to accommodate the growing population have transformed these small 
villages into inadequately developed towns with insufficient infrastructure. Seven 
local respondents stated that the success of development would not only rest on the 
infrastructure of the development zone but also on that of neighbouring towns and 
villages.
Five central and provincial government officials pinpointed that the natural 
resources were not being used rationally and great mistakes were made through the 
urbanisation of the coastal belt. However, three local respondents stressed that rapid 
urbanisation was not a problem peculiar to this particular region. They depicted it as a
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“malignant plague widespread across the country”. They were conscious that abuse 
of resources would have great repercussions for the long term health of the tourism 
industry. The continuation of damaging activities on the environment has been 
connected to an absence of local environmental consciousness and to infrastructure 
deficiencies. For example, a provincial government official conceded that one of the 
municipalities discharges its collected garbage into a nearby valley because of the 
absence of a solid waste treatment plant. This location is not very distant from the 
town. An ecologist warned that if the detrimental activities went on at its current pace 
then in the near future the ecological equilibrium, including the reproduction of some 
species of birds and sea turtles as well as underground water supplies, would be in 
great jeopardy.
The development of second homes in the region was regarded as a particularly 
destructive Consequence of tourism development. These new second homes created 
two important problems. First, the second homes had devoured the area's natural 
resources through the conversion of fertile agricultural lands into building sites. 
Second, they added extra pressure on the region's already deficient infrastructure. A 
Tourism Ministry official stated that, "the development of second homes, many of 
which are idle at the moment, crippled the progress of development in the centre, 
since attention was being diverted to dealing with their problems rather than those of 
the centre". He explained "the second-houses (summerhouses) are paralysing the 
infrastructure. We built two water abatement plants in order to address a demand 
from a capacity of thirty thousand. In order to address the problems emanating from 
the existence of second-houses we are now trying to improve the capacity of these 
water abatement plants".
8.1.3.4 Local apathy
Another factor undermining tourism development in the region was the 
apparent apathy of local people about local decision-making. The level of civic 
engagement in a community is often depicted as having a strong influence on the 
success of development initiatives. "Communities with strong civic engagement have 
residents that participate actively in the life and politics of the community and state- 
joining associations and publicly advocating for quality of life improvements . 
Conversely the residents of communities lacking a strong tradition of civic
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engagement tend to develop dependencies on the state or corporations to provide for 
them" (Selin 1998:12). According to Tosun (2001), the administrative control of 
local government by central government in Turkey has encouraged non-participation 
or pseudo-participation by local people in their own affairs.
The responses in the interviews provide some degree of support for the 
influence of local apathy or inertia as an important influence on the BMP. One local 
government official commented, “traditionally local participation in the decision­
making process has been low to non-existent”. There seems to be a widely held 
perception in the local community that such participation would be ineffective and 
unproductive. A typical comment by a villager was: “Why do we need to participate? 
Will they really listen to us?”. For one voluntary sector respondent, the limited 
participation was largely “because local authorities are not empowered to be active in 
serving public needs, local people find participation to be inconsequential”. One local 
government official argued that “not only is local participation almost non-existent in 
the municipal decisions, but the public also tends to expect that almost everything 
should be carried out by central government, even the construction of a fountain”. 
Other local officials stated that the local population had got into the habit of expecting 
central government to meet their every need and it was felt that this habit was too well 
established.
The level of genuine commitment to implementing the BMP was also seen as 
an important influence on the effectiveness of the BMP. According to nine 
respondents, there were different levels of commitment during the formulation and 
implementation phases, with some suggesting they varied from “pseudo” to “real” 
commitment. The type of commitment may be linked with the forms of participation, 
proposed by Painter (1992), that range from a feeling of participation without its 
substance to power to determine the outcome of decisions.
8.1.4 Plan awareness and support
2) "Are you aware of the Belek Management Plan (BMP) and the 
tourism planning proposals it contains? If yes, do you support these 
proposals? Why?"
192
This section examines the extent to which respondents in this study were 
aware of the BMP and its proposals and whether they supported these proposals. It 
was found that the respondents were all aware of the BMP, but there were variations 
in the extent to which they fully knew of its specific content and planning proposals. 
In general, local, central and provincial government officials, and respondents from 
the private and voluntary sectors, were comparatively more knowledgeable than local 
people about the details in the plan. Villagers complained that, while there had been 
few contacts and little consultation during the formulation phase, they did not think 
that subsequently they had been given sufficient detailed information on the plan. 
They stated that to date they had yet to be provided with a final version of the plan.
The degree of support for the plan also varied among respondent groups.
Three local and provincial government officials, two respondents from the voluntary 
sector, and one respondent from the private sector expressed full support for the plan. 
However, local respondents were much less supportive. While local people tended 
fully to support the “environmental objectives”, they questioned the proposals in 
relation to whether they would ensure economic and social diversity and stability, and 
as to whether they would reduce the conflicting uses of the area's land and forest. 
Several said that their economic hopes were raised but later dashed. One of the local 
respondents complained that “.. .on top of everything, they [ the hoteliers] have 
introduced a new scheme called 'everything included' [all-inclusive] in the area. 
Because tourists paid for everything they prefer to stay in their hotel and do not go out 
and shop around in the town as they used to before. As a local businessman, how on 
earth do they expect my support for this illogical thing in which there is nothing for us 
[the locals]?” A provincial government official sympathised with such reservations, 
stating that “the plan does not help to achieve economic regeneration. Tourists do not 
dine out and do not shop outside of their accommodation”.
There appears to be competition for prosperity between the inhabitants of 
different towns. For example, a representative of the villagers stated, “ we wonder 
why Kumkoy has been declared a specially protected area [where no physical 
development could take place]. We do not want to remain as we were in the past.
Look at Belek [transformed from being a village to a town]. They [inhabitants of
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Belek] are in comfort, whereas our villagers are hard up [because of the specially 
protected area status]. We have every right to be and live like Belek villagers”.
8.1.5 Summary
This section has identified factors that the respondents considered have 
affected tourism development in the region, as well as the degree of their awareness 
of and support for the BMP and its proposals. As suggested in the academic literature, 
the political, legislative, institutional and economic environments have important 
implications for tourism planning. Awareness of the plan appeared to be high among 
the public and private sector representatives, but knowledge about its specific details 
among the local population was relatively low. The BMP was considered to have been 
only partly effective in developing the region's tourism industry. According to 
respondents, the aspects of the BMP which were ineffective were due to one or more 
of several factors. These included difficulties in the current legislative and 
institutional framework, frequent changes in the political environment and subsequent 
staff discontinuity, the influence of political games, involvement of multiple 
organisations and the clash of their different interests and expectations, the 
appointment of inappropriate staff, imbalances in the distribution of power and 
resources, the poor enforcement of regulations, a lack of knowledge about legal 
requirements, problems related to the credibility of some organisations, and the 
improper enforcement of rules and regulations.
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8. Results Chapter 
Section 2. Interorganisational Communication
8.2.1 Introduction
In chapter two it was shown that communication and information sharing are 
important aspects of tourism planning. Without information sharing, the differences and 
similarities between organisations will remain ambiguous, together with the aspects of their 
agendas that can be used as the starting point for co-ordination. The performance of 
organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when they know little about each 
other (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may lead to an unnecessary duplication of functions as 
well as compounding the problems of organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that agencies that interact are in a better position to know one another, and thus to 
respond better to the needs of their clients and to adapt to the environment within which they 
operate (Njoh 1993). Interorganisational communication has the potential to provide a number 
of benefits for management (Davidson 1976; Francis 1987). When successful, it gets people 
pulling in the same direction, makes it easier to introduce changes, gives people the 
information they need to do their jobs, helps managers control what is going on, shows 
people that what they do is worthwhile, and reduces the chance of enormous blunders. People 
from different organisations can share their experiences and expertise through effective 
communication in order to capture synergies and complement each other’s efforts (Tjosvold 
1988).
Six questions in the interviews were structured to explore the frequency and quality of 
communication between organisations involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan 
(BMP), and to evaluate the elements either facilitating or hindering interorganisational 
communication. In support of the propositions in the academic literature, the respondents 
almost always considered that communication was helpful in order to inform concerned 
parties about the work they were doing, partly to ensure that there would be no duplication. 
Some respondents considered that if two or more organisations were communicating, then 
they were doing more than talking together. It was felt that communication was important 
because only then could human energy and resources be channelled in the same direction. 
Communication was also broadly perceived as a kind of emotional glue, binding people
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together.
8.2.2 Communication between organisations
3) “In designing and implementing the BMP, with which organisations 
did you communicate most?”
This question sought to identify the other organisations with which each organisation 
had communicated most, with the results summarised in Table 8.2.1. The Nature Preservation 
Society (NPS) respondents indicated that they had most contact with the Ministry of Tourism 
and the Ministry of Environment, followed by local people, local government organisations, 
Betuyab, the provincial government, other national institutions, universities and voluntary 
organisations. Betuyab had most contact with the Ministry of Tourism during the formulation 
of the plan. Other parties frequently contacted by Betuyab included the Ministry of Forestry, 
the provincial government, NPS, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Culture, 
municipalities and local people. Officials in central government provincial units indicated that 
they had the most contacts with their own Ministry in Ankara due to the legislation that 
regulates their relations. A provincial unit official explained that “we have to report 
development in the region to Ankara, so we are in constant communication with the MoT. We 
do not have frequent contacts with the municipalities, unless they address anything to us... we 
are not the body that they need to contact. If an issue arises, they contact the governor. The 
governor then dispatches the subject to the concerned unit”.
Table 8.2.1 Contacts between organisations during the formulation and
implementation of the BMP
Organisation
responding
Contacts mentioned during the 
formulation o f  the BMP
Contacts mentioned during the 
implementation o f  the BMP
Betuyab MoT, MoF, Provincial Government, 
NPS, MoE, MoC, Municipalities, Local 
people
MoT, MoF, MoE, MoC, Army, 
General Directorate o f  Highways, 
MoWR, Provincial government, 
Municipalities, NPS, Universities
Nature MoT, Municipalities, Local MoT, MoC, MoE, MoF, SPAB,
Preservation Associations, Local People, Betuyab, Municipalities, Local People, Betuyab
Society (NPS) Provincial Government, MoE, MoC, 
MoF, MoA VA, MoENR, Universities
Municipalities NPS, Local People, Betuyab, Provincial 
Government, MoT, MoE, MoF, MoC
MoT, Betuyab, Local People, 
Provincial Government, SPAB, MoE, 
MoWR, MoC, MoF, NPS
Provincial Betuyab, Provincial units, NPS, MoT,
Government MoE, MoWR, Municipalities, Local
people, SPAB
Betuyab, Provincial units, MoT, MoE, 
Mo WR, Municipalities, Local people, 
SPAB, NPS
Tourism Ministry NPS, Betuyab, Provincial Government, Betuyab, Provincial government, MoC, 
Provincial units, MoE, MoC, MoF, MoE, MoF, SPAB, MoWR, NPS, Local
Universities people
Four local government officials commented that there was a legal requirement that 
they consult with central institutions to gain approval for decisions taken by their municipal 
council. Geographical distance also appears to affect the frequency and quality of contacts 
between local and central organisations. The relationship and thus frequency of contact 
between Betuyab and local government also differed from municipality to municipality. 
Compared to other municipalities, Belek municipality seems to have communicated most 
frequently with Betuyab. This municipality had most contacts with Betuyab as a result of the 
special management arrangements and financial relationships between this municipality and 
Betuyab. For example, the president of Betuyab and some of its members are also active 
members of the municipal council of Belek municipality. Additionally, the frequency of 
contact between Belek municipality and other municipalities was not relatively high. The 
comparatively low frequency of contact among the region's municipalities could be ascribed 
to their differing and often opposing political views.
The frequency of communication among organisations sometimes changed between 
the formulation and implementation phases of the BMP. A member of the NPS noted that 
“our communication with the Ministry of Culture (MoC) gained importance later. Our 
contacts intensified particularly after the declaration of one area as a protection zone. We built 
a strong relationship with the MoC and stood against Betuyab and the Ministry of Tourism in 
order to resist the Kumkoy Marina Development project”.
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8.2.3 Reasons for communicating with organisations
4) “What reasons did you generally have for communicating with these 
organisations when designing and implementing the BMP?”
This question determined the reasons for various types of communication. 
Organisations might have a single or multiple purposes in communicating with others 
(Francis 1987), and the results in this case are shown in Table 8.2.2.
Table 8.2.2 Reasons for communication between organisations involved in the
BMP
Reason Respondents mentioning
Information exchange 12
Preparation and sending o f activity reports 11
Co-ordination 8
Consultation 7
Promotion of environmental awareness 7
Conflict resolution 6
Control 5
Voicing complaint 4
Two provincial government officials stated that they contacted other organisations to 
disseminate information, find and discuss solutions and their feasibility, and to ask for more 
staff or expertise. Similarly, two respondents from the NPS stated that they had contacted 
national and local organisations to discuss the legal aspects and feasibility of the BMP. The 
reasons why local people from Kumkoy had contacted national organisations and other local 
organisations were to explain how they were adversely affected by the bans on public use of 
the beach and the continuing litigation with the Ministry of Forestry over the forest. The local 
respondents complained that they had petitioned over these issues for a long time but they had 
achieved almost nothing. Hence, the locals had approached major hoteliers in order to 
convince them to consider their region as an alternative development zone.
Some respondents explained that there was a formal relationship between the district 
government (the administration level between villages and cities, which is called district) and
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the municipalities based on monitoring the municipal activities and providing assistance when 
required. One reason given as to why national organisations contacted local government was 
to increase their environmental awareness. For example, a Ministry of Environment 
respondent stated that their main reason for local contacts was to instil and promote 
environmental concern. Respondents from Betuyab said that they contacted the 
municipalities to encourage them to develop infrastructure to a high standard so that the 
region would not suffer from negative publicity.
8.2.4 Relative importance of local and central organisations
5) “From your organisation’s perspective, was communication with central 
government organisations or local organisations more important in 
relation to the BMP, and why?”
Different parties viewed different organisations as more important in terms of their 
communication. There was a clear pattern in that central and provincial government officials 
viewed national organisations as more important for their communication (Table 8.2.3). In 
contrast, respondents from the voluntary sector and local organisations mentioned other local 
organisations as more important. Central and provincial government officials stated that 
central institutions were most important as they are the main tourism regulators in the country 
and are more knowledgeable and experienced in tourism and environment-related issues. One 
national organisation respondent also noted that “The involvement of the Ministry of Forestry 
(MoF) in the communication process was important because the area designated for tourism 
development had been approved by the MoF and because the MoF is more experienced than 
others in the preparation of preservation plans”.
From the perspective of the NPS respondents, effective communication with central 
institutions was essential. This was mostly to gain the support of other organisations involved 
in the formulation of the plan. One NPS respondent commented that “we had to gain the full 
support and trust of this Ministry [MoT] in order to acquire the respect of other institutions. 
This was also necessary to ease access to the field and to conduct the research”. This 
respondent considered that “persuasion of the MoT and its subsequent involvement in the 
chairing of meetings was necessary in order to provide more formal recognition to the 
meetings. Thus any party coming to the venue at the Ministry, becomes more attentive”.
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These two NPS respondents also explained that it was important to keep effective 
communication with local government and Betuyab. According to one NPS respondent, “they 
[Betuyab] have been operating in the area for a long time, at least longer than we have.. .We 
were aware of the fact that if a consensus could be gained with Betuyab and the local actors 
towards preserving the region, then central government would have a clear incentive to 
respect the work and be more likely to give full support to the implementation of the 
management plan”.
Members of Betuyab stated that gaining local community support was essential. They 
claimed that they frequently met up with the villagers in order to inform them about the 
proposed developments and the benefits there would be for the region. Respondents from five 
local organisations viewed communication with other local parties as more important. They 
felt that establishing good contacts with local government was crucial because local parties 
are best placed to identify local needs and wishes. One local Mayor maintained that quality 
communication particularly with the MoT and other central institutions was important. He 
explained that “we limit our communication with other municipalities unless they are from 
our political party. Our communication with the central institutions is more important. This is 
largely because the MoT and the SPAB provide us with grants”.
Table 8.2.3 Organisations perceived as most important for communications
Respondent's own organisation Organisation mentioned as important
Central government officials MoT, MoE, MoC, MoWR, SPAB, Provincial 
government, Betuyab, Municipalities, NPS, 
Universities
Provincial government MoT, MoE, MoC, SPAB, MoWR, Betuyab, 
Municipalities, NPS
Local government Provincial government, NPS, Betuyab, Local 
associations MoT, MoE, MoC, MoWR, Universities
Betuyab MoT, MoE, Provincial government, NPS, 
Municipalities, Gendarme, Universities
Nature Preservation Society MoT, MoC, MoE, Municipalities, Betuyab, Local 
associations
Four local respondents and two from Betuyab stated that planning necessitated an 
integrated and collective approach and thus all parties are important in terms of 
communication. According to these respondents, everyone involved in the plan had to
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communicate with one another in order to share information. Taking the overall pattern of 
respondents, they felt that both national and local organisations were important for effective 
communication. The national organisations were important because of the need for higher 
level approvals and also due to their expertise. Local organisations were important because 
they were thought to know more about local problems and workable solutions compared with 
institutions remote to the region. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the comments is 
that the specific issues that arose during the formulation and implementation phases of the 
plan helped to determine who had to be contacted.
8.2.5 Communication barriers
6) “Were there barriers to achieving effective communication in the 
design and implementation of the BMP? If yes, what were they?”
A number of structural and situational constraints to effective inter-organisational 
communication have been discussed in the literature. These include geographic and 
organisational fragmentation, long decision-making chains, jurisdictional boundaries, 
ideological differences, centralised government decision-making, competitive rhetoric, and an 
emphasis on one-way communication (Selin 1993). In the Belek case, as many as 28 of the 
30 respondents stated that there had been obstacles hindering effective communication, with 
only two provincial government officials suggesting that there had been no such barriers. The 
barriers to effective communication identified by the respondents are shown in Table 8.2.4.
Table 8.2.4 Barriers to effective communication
Barrier Respondents mentioning
Traditional administrative culture and related red tape 15
Institutional rivalries and jealousy 14
Differences in organisational interests and values 14
Staff discontinuity 13
Low commitment to communication 9
Low trust 9
Partisanship 8
Geographical distance 5
Personal differences 5
Under-recognition o f interdependence 5
Lack o f a communication plan 3
Tit-for-tat strategies 3
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Table 8.2.4 shows that the most frequently mentioned barrier slowing down 
communication between organisations (with 15 mentions) was the traditional administrative 
culture and related red tape. Respondents from the voluntary and private sector and local 
people often mentioned that institutional rivalries and jealousy, and an under- recognition of 
interdependence as obstacles to effective communication. Five respondents brought up not 
only organisational rivalries but also personal differences as having substantially blocked 
communication. Other obstacles that were frequently mentioned were different organisational 
interests and values (14 mentions), staff discontinuity (13), low commitment to 
communication (9), and low trust (9).
Local respondents regularly noted that physical or geographical distances between the 
offices of organisations often dictated the extent of their communication. Notably, the speed 
of communication with provincial and local units was seen as faster than communication with 
the centre. This is a consistent finding with contentions in the research literature.
Geographical closeness also encourages informal communication channels to form (Francis 
1987). Gray (1989) argues that geographic dispersal, increases the cost of face-to-face 
communication and introduces more possibilities for cultural differences between the 
initiators . These barriers are explained more fully subsequently.
8.2.5.1 Administrative culture as a barrier to communication
Administrative culture has long been recognised as an influence on inter­
organisational communication (Francis 1987). Unique cultures develop within administrative 
systems, and they become strong informal behavioural codes that shape relationships, 
attitudes and policies. As many as 15 of the 30 respondents were critical of the present 
centralised administrative system and its communication customs. Two local government 
respondents suggested that effective communication could not be achieved through a one­
way, downward flow of information, arguing instead for a communication culture built on 
openness, active listening and information sharing. They complained that such a 
communication culture is absent in the present administrative system. Communication was 
generally understood by central government as giving orders in a written form from top to 
bottom. One complained that “because of the authority vested in central institutions, 
sometimes communication took the form of intimidation”, and “some attempts by local 
government to communicate with central government departments are looked upon as a 
nuisance and are classed as nosy inquiries”. The absence of a two-way communication
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culture appears to have meant that there are virtual "walls" between locals and central 
government (Francis 1987).
Very many of the 15 respondents stated that red tape, which Francis (1987) depicts as 
a “tortuous and wasteful” form of communication, had consumed too much time, generated 
frustration, and made decision-making sluggish and inefficient. One local government official 
explained that “each document has to be registered.. .being kept in the pigeonholes for ages 
and signed by tens of people, thus hugely extending the response time for communication”. 
These respondents concurred that red tape needs to be fought, but as one argued: “like weeds 
in a garden, it easily grows again”. The inequality of the power relations involved in 
communicating with central organisations had also alienated the local representatives from 
sharing information with central government agencies. Past experience of central interference 
in local decisions about construction plans and the expropriation of land for development, had 
meant that the municipalities were not keen to build or maintain effective communication 
with central government. By contrast, one central government representative complained that 
the municipalities had deliberately not followed legally prescribed communication 
procedures. She complained that the “municipalities view us as a barrier that can block them 
from obtaining large amounts of rent and taxes. Although the existing construction plan only 
allows two storey buildings in the region, these mayors used to, and still do, condone the 
illegal construction of five-and six-storey buildings. The higher the number of storeys the 
higher is the tax that they [the municipalities] would earn from the housing. If we had seen the 
draft construction plans, we would definitely have stopped their development...This is why 
they never like communicating with the centre”.
8.2.5.2 Institutional rivalry and jealousies as a barrier to communication
Respondents from the NPS and Betuyab complained that national and local 
institutions were keen not to be seen as at the beck-and-call of another institution, fiercely 
guarding their independence. One of the biggest hurdles hindering effective communication 
was that the central agencies were highly suspicious of organisations in civil society 
undertaking a planning task that normally they themselves would lead. The central 
government respondents often commented that not only was the creation of a coastal zone 
management plan very new for Turkey, but the designation of an organisation in civil society 
as undertaking a leading role in this process was also unprecedented. The credibility of the 
NPS seems to have been very adversely affected by its position in civil society. Respondents
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from the NPS stated that some institutions were apprehensive and extremely disturbed about 
their leading role. They complained that the administrative system was not ready to accept the 
presence of a confident voluntary sector organisation. There was also prejudice against the 
presence of foreign members in the consultant team, with this team recruited by the NPS to 
conduct research and produce guidelines for new development. One NPS respondent 
commented that “It would have been better if we had not been presented as an organisation 
having strong ties with international institutions. This has disturbed the nationalistic 
sentiments of some agencies. Following the new coalition, with the Nationalist Party running 
the government, the nationalist pressure was felt even more”. Some central officials directly 
expressed critical views about the NPS. One MoT official cynically commented that “the NPS 
likes talking and promising a lot. It has become a commercial [rather than voluntary and non­
profit seeking] organisation in recent years. The preparation of a management plan involves 
fewer resources than actually doing something tangible. The NPS was able easily to swallow 
up international grants by suggesting that this or that should be done and this would benefit 
the area”.
The existence of rivalries largely promoted by past conflicts or by loyalties to political 
party have also hindered effective communication between organisations. It is evident from 
the comments that there are overt institutional rivalries between different national 
organisations, as well as between the municipalities. This has substantially clogged the flow 
of information and undermined the benefits likely to arise from sharing knowledge. An 
official from the District Government (the administrative level between villages and cities) 
noted “that conciliation between the different interests of parties through establishing a 
common vision is almost impossible because of the traditional rivalry between local and 
central organisations or even between central organisations”. The opposing political loyalties 
of the municipalities have also exacerbated the rivalries between these organisations. One 
mayor admitted that his municipality had not communicated with one other municipality 
because of political differences. The municipalities also held negative opinions about 
Betuyab's role in the region. The considerable power of Betuyab was severely criticised. One 
respondent complained that Betuyab communicated easily with ministries and national 
organisations, but they could not contact them with the same ease, and their requests had 
taken far longer to be dealt with.
A relative prejudice against the municipalities by central agencies was also often
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noted. One municipal respondent commented that the central government officials see local 
government as inefficient, extravagant, and oppressive toward their local inhabitants. Some 
felt that central government treats local government simply as an extension, and that it 
considers itself superior to local government, and this attitude appears to alienate local 
government officials from sharing information with the centre. This specific problem is also 
evident in the literature. For instance, Gray (1989) cites the study of Gricar (1981) in which 
local officials were found to be sceptical about the ability of some stakeholders, questioning 
the need to include citizens at all.
8.2.5.3 Staff discontinuity as a barrier to communication
One problem creating difficulties for communication is the regular changes in central 
government officials, often due to frequent changes in the party in government. This was 
mentioned by thirteen respondents. One respondent from Betuyab stated that they had no 
problem in terms of initiating communication with central government-appointed staff, but 
they found it very difficult to maintain this communication. This respondent complained that 
“conventionally, the staff of many institutions change due to changes in the government. It 
takes up too much time for these new staff to adopt to their environment, build up information 
about what is happening to local planning issues, and to comprehend their legal authority and 
responsibilities in respect to local issues. You then have to restart the communication process 
from the beginning, re-explaining things, and building up new relations”. And, because 
“many new staff know that they will be appointed elsewhere when there is a change in the 
government”, they tend to work reluctantly, not according to rules or are not committed 
enough to achieve things quickly.
Respondents from the NPS also drew attention to a problem that staff involved in the 
communication process sometimes lack adequate status and power. According to these 
respondents, many of the participants in the BMP were not empowered to make the formal 
decisions needed at the end of their meetings. One respondent from the NPS stated that “the 
majority of representatives had to consult with, and debrief their superiors before they could 
reach a decision”.
8.2.5.4 Low commitment as a barrier to communication
Low commitment was mentioned by nine respondents as a barrier to communication.
, It was felt that some national and local parties lacked a commitment to communication and
that this had substantially undermined the communication process. These respondents stated 
that the breakdown in the communication process resulting from low commitment had 
eventually undermined co-operative working in relation to the BMP. Two respondents from 
the NPS complained that there was a deliberate institutional slowness in making the reports 
available before crucial meetings. The meetings were thus unproductive. One respondent 
noted that “all we were doing was coming to a meeting, discussing the same issues which had 
already been discussed several times in earlier meetings, and setting up a date for the next 
meeting to discuss almost similar things”. Another private sector respondent argued that 
“many new staff [a result of frequent changes] work reluctantly and were not preparing 
reports on time, as they know that they will be appointed elsewhere when there is a change in 
the government”.
8.2.5.5 Low trust as a barrier to communication
Eight respondents mentioned that the low level of trust between organisations had 
substantially curtailed communication. According to a provincial government official, “some 
agents, because they do not trust others, do not communicate with other organisations”. A 
private sector respondent stated specifically that “particularly the municipalities deliberately 
did not communicate with one another, believing that information released in the 
communication process might be used against their own organisation in the future”.
8.2.5.6 Historical relations and personal dislikes as barriers to
communication
Personal dislikes of other people were mentioned five times as creating a big obstacle 
in the way of achieving steady and effective communication. One voluntary sector respondent 
noted that “there were also personal dislikes among the participants from the NPS and 
Betuyab. This was also the case with central units. Two of the representatives of different 
central units had had a personal conflict years ago, and this was the reason for their 
disagreements over each other's suggestions in the meetings”.
8.2.6 Improving communication
7) “How might improvements be made in communications 
between national and local organisations in relation to the 
BMP?”
Empirical research* suggests that good communication contributes to the effectiveness 
of partnerships (Selin and Myers 1998). However, when communication is viewed narrowly 
as not a good thing, then a spate of issues will arise that will constrain the effectiveness of 
partnerships. In their research, Selin and Chavez (1994) found that active listening, honesty 
and directness were important indicators of partnership success. Similarly, respondents in this 
study suggested several features that could improve communication in relation to the BMP, 
ranging from building trust to having permanent staff (Table 8.2.5). These suggestions for 
improving communication in relation to the BMP will now be addressed more fully.
Table 8.2.5 Summary of suggestions for improving communication in relation to
the BMP
Suggestion Number o f  respondents
Greater trust 14
Recognition o f  the importance o f  information sharing 12
Effective listening and active dialogue 9
Two-way communication 8
More commitment to communication 7
Greater recognition o f  mutual interdependence 6
More positive evaluations o f  each other 6
More use o f  simple and everyday language in discussions 5
Involvement o f  appropriate staff and their continuity 5
Discontinuity o f  partisanship 5
Reduced bureaucracy 4
More professionalism 3
More work to establish a common vision 3
Fourteen respondents mentioned that managing and maintaining communication was a 
matter of competence and trust. According to this group of respondents, the parties involved 
in implementing the BMP should be engaged in communication based on trust in order to 
develop good legislation or regulations. A voluntary sector respondent stated that “other 
organisations should not be seen as an opponent attempting to interfere with their operation. 
There must be a mutual trust and reliance”. One ex-Mayor suggested that “they [national 
organisations] need to give up the traditional conception of viewing municipalities as an organ 
operating under their strict order and control. They need to show a bit of confidence in local 
governments’ capacity in bringing local solutions to local problems. Once this mentality
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replaces the conventional coercive attitudes, I believe the communication will be improved”. 
One local government official wished that “there had been a couple of Betuyabs here”, as they 
trusted it more than other local organisations.
Active dialogue was mentioned as leading to better understanding and mutual 
confidence and reliance. Some locals suggested that such mutual confidence could foster a 
more participative, two-way form of communication. This would allow the actors to make 
full use of each other's expertise and to get more benefit from advisers and experts. Some 
locals felt that effective communication was a function of the characteristics of the people 
assigned to manage the communication process. Another frequently mentioned variable 
affecting communication was geographical closeness. One local government official noted 
that “I know it would make a difference if we were located nearer to the central government 
organisations in Ankara”. This problem is also observed in the research literature. Tosun and 
Jenkins (1996) argue that in most cases, the agencies responsible for the authorisation of 
tourism investment are not accessible to the majority of indigenous people in local tourist 
destinations due to their physical remoteness. This increases the knowledge gap between local 
communities and decision-makers and it also accelerates the isolation of local communities 
from the tourism development process. Consequently, the knowledge gaps between 
centralised authorities and local communities make it difficult for a host community to 
participate in joint arrangements in the tourism development process (Tosun and Jenkins 
1996).
Eight respondents mentioned that effective two-way communication between the 
relevant parties could not happen only through legislation and specified procedures. Active 
participation by high-ranking officials both from local and central government was also 
necessary for effective communication. These respondents stated that staff with a low status 
rank may be committed to communication, but their status substantially reduced their ability 
to get a timely response from their superiors.
It is apparent from the comments that past personal conflicts should not be allowed to 
influence meetings. Additionally, good communication between central and local government 
policy makers was less likely to be reached without a common vision and language. A 
provincial government official stated that “I think for effective communication, parties should 
agree on some common vision and individuals should try to cultivate the importance of
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knowledge-building through consultation with one another”. Some respondents also 
suggested that the language used in planning meetings and reports should be as simple as 
possible. It was felt that if an authority presented planning techniques and objectives in a 
hardly understandable form to non-specialists, then this could easily alineate this authority. 
Five respondents suggested that effective communication would never be attained unless the 
cross-sectoral intolerance among the main central institutions was eradicated.
8.2.7 Effects on communication of more centralised or decentralised decision­
making
8) “Would communication between organisations be improved if 
tourism planning decisions for Belek were left more to local or 
national organisations?”
This question was designed to identify views as to whether communication between 
organisations would be improved if planning decisions were left more to national or to local 
organisations. Here the respondents diverged in their opinions. Seven local respondents felt 
that national and local organisations were both unlikely to meet the requirements of this task. 
For instance, one of the ex-mayors noted that “I do not think that it would have made any 
difference if it had been left to any of the organisations. Communication is something that can 
only be achieved through commitment, and it is sort of a cultural thing”. Five respondents 
mainly from the private sector and national organisations expressed their concerns about 
leaving planning decisions to the municipalities. A private sector respondent expressed his 
reservations due to partisanship being rife: “as municipalities are supporters of different 
political parties with opposing ideologies, whether or not you have excellent legislation about 
communication, that cannot be achieved because of partisanship. When you look at the 
municipalities of different political parties, all they do is erect impassable hurdles in order to 
sabotage each other's activities”. One respondent from Betuyab noted that “as for the current 
local government, I do not think that they would handle the responsibilities of communication 
properly, as they would be inclined to give more priority to working with organisations that 
they think will benefit their own interest”. This respondent doubted that the municipalities 
would be effective at promoting fair and effective communication because of the fundamental 
problems inherent in the planning and implementing process, the variability of situations and 
governments, and the dynamics of social and economic change. His comments suggest that 
political interests and conflicts strongly influence the agendas of the municipalities.
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Many of the respondents did not trust the municipalities in relation to improving 
communication, on the grounds that the municipalities currently use communication in order 
to get benefits for themselves. By contrast, respondents from the municipalities argued that 
this task should not be given to Betuyab as it might exploit communication relations to their 
advantage. They suggested instead that local government should carry out communication- 
related tasks in the region, because local organisations know regional forces and balances. An 
ex-mayor stated that “one must admit the fact that implementation requires a fast circulation 
of information in order not to have overlapping duties and to produce more efficient co­
ordination. In order to do that, local government, I guess, because of their closeness to the 
area, would be considered more suitable to undertake the communication work regarding 
planning decisions and their implementation”. However, five other respondents from different 
organisations felt that tourism planning decisions should not be left largely to only one type of 
government organisation, as this would not be democratic and might lead to severe problems.
8.2.8 Summary
This section investigated the frequency and quality of interorganisational 
communication in relation to the BMP. Overall, the analysis showed that respondents 
considered interorganisational communication to be important. However, it is apparent from 
the comments that the inter-organisational communication had been hampered substantially 
by behavioural factors, shifting political interests, and the unfavourable perceptions that 
parties often had of each other. The dissimilarity in values and attitudes between organisations 
(e. g. while one supports protection, the other supports utilisation), and prejudice about the 
credibility of particularly organisations in civil society were notable obstacles to effective 
communication. Some national and private sector organisations were found to be reluctant to 
communicate with agencies with a perceived lower status. Perhaps inevitably when an agency 
has had very little contact with another organisation, this seems to have encouraged mutual 
distrust.
Communication problems appear to have been greater due to the absence of a common 
language. Additionally, the involvement of junior staff with little decision-making power 
emerged as another factor that slowed interorganisational communication. Gray (1989) also 
notes that individuals may participate in a collaborative initiative because of their technical
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expertise or local knowledge but that they may not have decision-making authority for their 
organisations. If an organisation is not represented at senior staff level, it is possible that 
policies subsequently will be forgotten or disavowed (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). It is 
evident from the evidence here that delays in the preparation of reports had resulted, and this 
had constituted another barrier to effective communication.
Respondents generally considered that effective communication could not be achieved 
through laws and regulations. They supported the view that for effective communication to 
occur some institutional practices should be abandoned and recognition of the importance of 
information sharing should be cultivated. It seems that negative stereotypes about other 
organisations also restricted co-operation. Finally, the analysis demonstrated that the intensity 
and form of communication between organisations varied depending on the history of the 
relationships between organisations. It seems that communication tends to become stronger or 
weaker by being reinforced through joint or co-operative activities or by being undermined 
through conflictual relations. The respondents suggested several ways to improve 
communication. They generally concluded that leaving communication to either national or 
local organisations would not improve communication as much as desired.
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8. Results Chapter
Section 3. Stakeholder Involvement and Consensus Building
8.3.1 Introduction
This third section examines the opinions of participants involved in the Belek 
Management Plan about four aspects of the planning process.
• The organisations that participated most in the formulation and implementation of 
the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP).
• The extent to which relevant stakeholders with an interest in Belek were able to 
raise their concerns, and the extent to which these concerns had successfully been 
incorporated into the plan objectives.
• Whether there were disagreements between the parties involved in the BMP, their 
causes, and how these disagreements were resolved, if at all.
• Finally, participants were also asked for their views on whether leaving planning 
decisions more to local or to national organisations would help or hinder the 
making of agreements about tourism planning in Belek.
8.3.2 Parties that participated or were excluded from decision-making
9) “Which parties with an interest in the Belek region have participated 
most or have been excluded from making decisions about the BMP? 
Why?”
When asked about which parties participated or were excluded from the BMP, almost 
all respondents mentioned there needed to be some local or community involvement in 
decision-making. This is consistent with the propositions presented in chapter two section 2. 
Locals in particular stressed the need for wide participation, one justification being that this 
would create the sense of ownership necessary for the successful implementation of the Belek 
Coastal Management Plan (BMP). One of the locals maintained that “ .. .such involvement 
would mean that decisions reached would be yours. And what is yours would be more 
acceptable and supportable than those imposed by someone else”. His comments and others 
support several arguments identified in chapter two. It is suggested in the literature that, 
despite many potential difficulties, decisions will have a better chance of being implemented
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when taken through an interactive or “communicative” planning process, which involves 
gathering the experiences, opinions and constructive recommendations of a wide spectrum of 
constituencies (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 1991; Lang 1988; Pearce 1981).
Table 8.3.1 Stakeholder views on the level of participation
Organisations that considered there was wide 
participation
Organisations that considered there was narrow 
participation
Provincial government Betuyab
Ministry of Tourism NPS
Ministry o f Environment Universities
Ministry o f Culture Local government
Ministry o f Forestry Local people
Stakeholder mentioned as excluded from Organisation that mentioned the excluded stakeholder
decision-making
Local people Betuyab
Local community NPS
Municipalities, local societies and associations, National organisations
and local community
Local people, municipalities and academicians Local people
Local government
Universities
Responses to Question 9 identified a divergence between respondents in relation to 
whether there was wide participation in the BMP. Table 8.3.1 show participants’ opinions 
about the participation level and about the parties that they felt had been excluded from 
participating. A fairly large number of respondents from national organisations -seven - 
considered that there was broad participation. By contrast, as many as 12 of the 30 
respondents, particularly from the municipalities and the local community, considered that 
participation was limited and some of them also claimed that there was only token 
participation. These respondents complained that particularly local people, local associations 
and municipalities were excluded from participating properly in the decision-making process. 
This suggests that some stakeholders were not well informed about the specifics of the project 
or felt it had not been sufficiently inclusive.
A voluntary sector representative, who believed that participation was limited, 
conceded that “.. .just looking at the numbers of participants might be deceptive. At first, you 
might think that wide participation was achieved and all concerns were harmonised in the 
decision-making process. However, this was not the case...”. By contrast, one government 
official, who considered that participation was open to all of the region’s relevant
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stakeholders, explained that “this was a very ambitious project [BMP]... and we contacted 
almost all the relevant parties in order to achieve wide participation”.
Locals considered that they had the right to participate in the project planning, and 
they offered several explanations as to why they had been isolated from the decision-making 
process. Some respondents offered more than one explanation. Table 8.3.2 shows these 
explanations, together with the stakeholders who mentioned them. Local stakeholders 
frequently mentioned how the current administrative system or else geographical distance had 
affected their level of participation in the decision-making process (Table 8.3.2). Locals 
complained specifically that they were not able to participate in meetings held in Ankara 
because of the geographical distance. It is evident from some locals’ comments that political 
distance or political polarisation was another barrier that hindered broader local participation 
in BMP meetings. One municipal official conceded that, because of political opposition 
between his and another municipality and the past history of party-related conflicts, he had not 
attended some meetings in order not to confront publicly with the other mayor. Based on 
direct observation by the researcher and on the interview results, it appears that the low level 
of trust in the current administrative system and the traditional approach to decision-making 
by which bureaucrats make decisions on behalf of local people had led to a feeling of isolation 
among local people. Some local respondents suggested that they were more capable than the 
planners of producing valuable, workable solutions to their existing problems. They felt that 
the political system favoured central decision-making and nepotism, and this appears to have 
stifled participation and increased the distance between the local community and other parties. 
It appears that there was also a difficulty for locals accessing responsible central agencies, a 
problem noted more generally in the tourism literature (Hall and Jenkins 1995; Tosun and 
Jenkins 1996). Some local respondents indicated that the responsible agencies were more 
accessible to local elites and entrepreneurs with political and financial power. Eight local 
respondents suggested that many participants were not keen to listen to other parties. 
Additionally, there were numerous parties who were unconvinced that all affected parties 
would agree on a shared vision.
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Table 8.3.2 Perceived barriers to wider participation and to reaching a consensus
Organisation Perceived barriers to wider participation and to reaching a consensus
Betuyab Legal structure, geographical distance, political fragmentation,
inappropriate staff
NPS Legislation, geographical distance, local elite, low commitment to meeting
responsibilities, inappropriate staff, inadequate knowledge
Local community Central administration, legislation, geographical distance, attitude of
bureaucrats, local elite, power imbalances
Local government Central administration, power inequality, attitude o f central officials,
geographical distance, political fragmentation
Universities Legislation, political fragmentation, geographical distance.
Six local interviewees were resentful that some public and private sector 
representatives involved in the BMP did not put more value on community participation. They 
felt that they did not have the opportunity to express their views fully and that some central 
government officials saw public participation in decision-making as unnecessary and time- 
consuming. This finding provides support for the arguments in the literature reviewed in 
chapter two, section 2.3.1. Some respondents from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), 
Local Associations and Betuyab, also believed that some public sector representatives were 
unreceptive to new ideas and that this, together with the current legal system, did not 
encourage local people to participate and instead it tended to put a distance between the 
formal authorities and local people. As suggested more generally by Desai (1985, 314), it 
appears that “there was lack of political will to implement participation because of the 
implications for the distribution of power and resources”. Local people generally felt that they 
had the right to be kept informed and consulted on matters that affected their way of living, 
but they did not consider that their views were given adequate consideration by either the 
public or private sectors. Four local interviewees identified the influence of power 
differentials as an obstacle to respectful listening of local views due to a supposed superiority. 
It was felt that they were marginalized because of their limited resources in the face of local 
elites and powerful tourism entrepreneurs.
As many as five of the seven representatives from national and provincial government 
considered that there was broad participation in the BMP. However, the respondents from 
NPS and Betuyab questioned the form of participation. This issue also emerged in the analysis 
of variables affecting the effectiveness of the BMP, presented in section 2 of chapter eight. 
Here the Betuyab and NPS respondents complained that some national organisations lacked a
215
"genuine commitment" to the BMP, arguing that they did not contribute to the planning efforts 
properly, equally or as much as required. One of these four respondents contented that “if you 
take participation as the numbers being present in a meeting, in that sense yes, there was wide 
participation in the meetings. However, if you take the meaning of participation as taking an 
active role, spending resources, taking responsibility, then I must admit that such a form of 
participation was non-existent”. Three respondents agreed that there was a large number of 
stakeholders involved in the plan's formulation, but they felt this was rather deceptive and 
should not be taken to suggest there was extensive participation, claiming that the inclusion of 
a name in the list did not meant that that organisation was a genuine participant. Two NPS 
representatives also shared this view, arguing further that full participation should mean active 
involvement in a project, the allocation of resources when necessary, avoiding undue conflict 
with the other participants. One of the NPS respondents stressed that, once organisations were 
required to contribute tangible resources, few were willing to do so, explaining that “I think 
people, including institutions, were committed to formulating the plan as long as the only . 
resource that they had to provide was only their time. When we [NPS] saw the initial 
enthusiasm, we naively thought that this would continue at the implementation stage.
However, this has proven wrong. The attitude rapidly changed when the resource that they 
had to allocate changed from time to tangible materials, especially money”. Eleven 
respondents were very critical of national and local organisations because they felt that they 
did things that contradicted their promise in the meetings. One of them gave the following 
example: “in meetings they [the municipalities] tend to agree that pollution, both 
environmental and visual, is a real threat that needs to be addressed immediately. However, 
when they go back to their area they tend to stimulate the growth of greedy second-home 
development in order to increase rents, or they buckle under the political pressure. Inclusion 
of their name in the list does not qualify them as genuinely committed, does it?”. Another 
respondent mentioned a different example: “in these meetings the Ministry of Environment 
recognised and endorsed the view that marine turtles needed to be protected. However, they 
did not spend money or appoint staff for projects relating to their protection, so how can this 
count as real participation?”.
8.3.3 Incorporation of interests and concerns
10) “Have the concerns of all relevant parties, including your own 
concerns, been taken into account during the design and
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implementation of the BMP? If not, which parties’ concerns have not 
been taken into account in the design and implementation of the 
BMP?”
It is argued in the literature that reaching a consensus involves a discursive process 
where participants might learn about and respect each other and their different points of view, 
come to reflect on their own point of view, work together with this combined local knowledge 
to establish a new discourse about the issues and the policy direction, and come to value and 
respond to the new policy direction (Healey 1997 in Bramwell and Sharman 1999). It should 
be recognised that reaching consensus can be difficult due to potential fractions among 
stakeholders, based on the wider cultural, social, economic and political environment, and that 
stakeholders need to be committed to understanding each other’s concerns and reaching out 
across their differences (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). Inequality in power and resource 
allocations, and differences in the interests and values of stakeholders, may mean that a 
consensus and a shared ownership of the resulting policies will not emerge between all 
stakeholders. Ritchie (1993) observes that there might be fundamental differences in the 
values systems that diverse stakeholders bring to the process, and thus reaching a consensus 
and obtaining endorsement is a challenging and often delicate task.
As many as 24 of the 30 respondents indicated that it was difficult for the BMP 
process to ensure that the concerns of all parties were taken into account due to the wider 
contextual influences. Responses to Question 10 are shown in Table 8.3.3, and they indicate a 
divergence between the respondents in relation to the extent to which they felt that the BMP 
encouraged the participants to listen to each other and to take each other's views into account. 
Respondents from Betuyab and the NPS felt that there was an adequate attempt to understand 
the concerns of relevant parties during the plan formulation phase. By sharp contrast, all the 
local community stakeholders felt that their concerns were just listened to, but not 
incorporated adequately in the plan's objectives (Table 8.3.3). One of the ex-Mayors who was 
quite concerned about how tourism development had taken place, claimed that their economic 
concerns were largely overlooked: “the extent to which our concerns had been reflected in 
decisions about the plan is disputable”. In research on Pamukkale World Heritage Site in 
Turkey, the researcher also reported a similar finding that the economic well-being of locals 
had not been incorporated into the plan (Yuksel, Bramwell, and Yuksel 1999). Importantly, 
the exclusion of local needs from planning consideration was likely to have reduced local
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support for the project. It is argued in the literature that if local populations do not participate 
actively in all aspects of developing and managing natural resources for tourism and do not 
also benefit from this development, then locals may choose to use the natural resources in 
other, perhaps less sustainable ways (Boo 1991). For example, in Kenya when officials gave 
more importance to preservation of the environment and wildlife than to local people’s needs, 
this resulted in a serious decline of wild animals as a result of poaching by residents (Olindo 
1991). Although it was to a lesser extent, the examination of disagreements in the following 
section of this study shows there was a similar tendency for local parties to disrupt the plan's 
progress.
Participants offered several explanations as to why their concerns had not been 
listened to or taken account of adequately. Differences between the priorities of national and 
local organisations was the most prominent issue, this being mentioned by 11 respondents. 
Two local respondents stated that some of the environmental issues raised by the Nature 
Preservation Society (NPS) in the early meetings of the BMP did not receive sufficient 
attention from the national organisations. These two respondents had agreed that the public 
and private sector participants in Belek were not prepared to support collective decisions 
which are against their own best interest, and they claimed that, while the NPS tried to draw to 
the attention of the national organisations the environmental degradation caused by illegal 
construction of tourist facilities in fragile zones, the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) seemed 
largely indifferent to this and they did nothing to stall the construction of these facilities. The 
NPS representatives, who thought that the public and voluntary sector priorities were very 
different, complained that they had emphasised countless times that the development of 
second houses must be stopped, but that so far nothing had been done. However, three other 
respondents, who shared the view that the MoT was largely unconcerned about environmental 
protection, felt that the MoT subsequently came to realise that this was stance was self­
destructive. In the view of these respondents, this reaction came late in the day and it 
eventually forced the Ministry to spend substantial amount of its resources to reverse the 
environmental degradation.
Table 8.3.3 Stakeholder views on whether the concerns of all relevant parties 
had been taken into account in the BMP
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Respondent group Concerns had been fully taken 
into account
Concerns had partly been 
taken into account
Concerns had not been 
taken into account
Betuyab V
NPS V
National organisations V
Provincial government V
Local community V
Local government V
Universities V
As many as seven of the local participants argued that raising concerns in the 
discussion sessions did not mean anything resulted from it. This problem is also identified in 
the literature on partnership working (see chapter two section 2.2.1.6). Locals offered more 
than one explanation for this problem, including hidden agendas, changing personal, or shifts 
in institutional values, beliefs and attitudes. One of the ex-Mayors conceded that “while they 
seem to have listened to our [local] concerns during the meetings, I do not think that they had 
made adequate effort to incorporate our views and expectations into actions. You know how 
planning works. In order to play the cards according to the rules, they always strive to achieve 
wide participation so as to show how attentive they are to the local problems and how keen 
they are to come up with a solution through agreement with the local players. However, the 
show is over when the plan starts to be implemented”. Another ex-Mayor, complained that 
many of the central officials in the meetings were short on patience and were not keen to 
change the decisions that they had already made. In particular he felt that “they thought that 
local participation was an unwarranted, long and tedious process. I believe that they would 
rather carry out the more comfortable and traditionally paternalistic approach to making 
decisions on behalf of the local people”. This respondent appreciated the level of knowledge 
of the planners, but he maintained that local plans decided by central units are generally based 
on official perceptions of local needs and on official standards and values, and “in many cases 
they are determined with the political and other conveniences of central government agencies 
in mind”.
Despite the generally negative local responses, three of the respondents in national 
organisations were reasonably positive about the BMP's approach. They conceded that it was 
necessary to hear all views, but also concluded that in practice it had been rather difficult to 
get everyone involved in the preparatory discussions. In the view of these respondents, the 
involvement of too many respondents would extend the time scale unnecessarily, and thus this 
was not generally favoured. One respondent who subscribed to this view, explained that
“while I am for wider participation in decision-making processes, in my opinion the 
preparation of plans should still be carried out with the participation of just a few people. 
Why? The reasons why I am saying is are that there are only a few people who have the 
qualifications necessary to prepare plans in the industry". Three respondents from the private 
and voluntary sectors and from a national organisation argued that it was impossible to realise 
the wishes of all relevant parties, and that the harmonisation and incorporation of very diverse 
preferences was a difficult task. One respondent thought that all the parties had been able to 
voice their concerns but that the plan simply couldn't address adequately everyone’s differing 
concerns. This person explained that there were many parties involved, with varying degrees 
of political influence and power, and hence those finally preparing the plan had to disregard 
the expectations of some groups in order to satisfy the expectations of others.
Despite the significance of local participation, the interviews indicate that the public 
officials were perceived to be reluctant to seek local people’s views (Ioannides 1992). Two 
reasons for the limited involvement of residents in the early stages of developing such a plan 
can be that this requires a good deal of time and this involvement may result in considerable 
debate over the implications of various types of development. The interviews indicate that the 
planners thought that the comments and variety of opinions so revealed might have escalated 
the conflicts and confusion and may have lessened the commitment to proceed.
The results indicate that a few meetings with wider participation were organised by 
central government and this might help explain why the government officials insisted that 
local participation was achieved in the plan decision-making process. However, these 
meetings were not seen as productive by the local stakeholders, as their views were not then 
taken into consideration. The academic literature suggests that a community’s willingness to 
participate in planning programmes may indeed depend on the outcome of earlier interactions 
with the developer or government agency over planning issues. The responses to Question 10 
show that some relevant stakeholders did not want to participate in subsequent meetings 
because of the outcomes of earlier meetings. Thus the history of participants' experiences with 
the major players sponsoring the participation work does seem to have influenced the level of 
subsequent participation. Local responses further suggest that the concept of tokenism 
identified by Arstein in his Citizen Participation Ladder (1969) has relevance to this case. 
Arstein recognises that meetings can be used only for one-way communication by the simple
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device of providing superficial information, discouraging questions and giving irrelevant 
answers. Amstein also points out that there is no certainty that citizens concerns and ideas 
will be taken into account because they lack the power to ensure that their views are heeded 
by the powerful. The present findings indicate that participation did not occur where each 
participant in decision-making meetings had equal power to determine the outcomes. 
However, there was tokenistic or “pseudo” participation in many instances which was 
restricted to such processes as providing information, and seeking endorsement, and this 
offered a feeling of participation more than its substance (Pearce et al, 1996).
8.3.4 Influential organisations
11) “Which national and local organisations, if any, have had most
influence on the design and implementation decisions of the BMP? 
Why?”
This question examined the national and local organisations that were considered to 
have had most influence on the design and implementation of the Belek Coastal Management 
Plan (BMP). As with the results of previous questions, there was some divergence between 
the respondents concerning the organisations perceived as most influential. It is interesting 
that some of the responses varied between the design and the implementation stages. Table
8.3.4 shows respondents' opinions as to the most influential organisation during the design 
and implementation stages of the BMP.
Table 8.3.4 Views on the most influential organisations
Respondents Most influential during the design o f  
the BMP
Most influential during the 
implementation o f  the BMP
Betuyab NPS Betuyab, MoT
NPS and voluntary NPS Betuyab
organisations
National organisations MoT, MoE, MoF Betuyab
Provincial government MoT, NPS, MoF, MoE, MoC, Betuyab, MoT, MoF, MoC, MoE
Local community Betuyab Betuyab
Local government Betuyab, MoT, NPS Betuyab
Universities NPS, Betuyab, MoT Betuyab, MoT
Two respondents from the voluntary sector stated that the NPS was most influential 
during the plan formulation phase, while five central and provincial government officials 
thought that the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) was the most influential in that phase, although
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the extent of its influence was perceived as decreasing during the implementation phase. 
According to central government officials, Betuyab was the most influential organisation 
during the implementation phase. As many of seven of the local respondents agreed that 
Betuyab was most influential and they claimed that this was due to its financial power and 
political ties. One voluntary sector representative who shared this view explained that: 
“because of their wealth of resources, the staff of Betuyab work effectively.. .Whenever they 
want to go somewhere they would go, but we cannot due to our limited resources. Their 
resources provide them with freedom of mobility and of speech, etc. They are recruiting 
presentable staff with a good educational background, in expensive clothes, and consequently 
their influence over relevant bodies and decisions is greater than ours”. Three local 
government officials conceded that they had hardly any influence at all, and they identified the 
central government agencies and Betuyab as most influential. An ex-Mayor commented rather 
revealingly that “it is he who pays the piper that calls the tune...we were not strong enough to 
make a stand against central government organisations”.
8.3.5 Changes in authority and responsibility and their implications
12) “Has there been any change in the authority and responsibility of 
national or local organisations between the design and the 
implementation phases of the BMP? If yes, what were the implications 
of this on the design and implementation of the BMP?”
This question examined whether there were changes in the authority and responsibility 
of organisations and whether they had implications for the BMP. Twenty of the respondents 
pinpointed several changes that occurred in the political environment, as well as in the number 
and the roles of institutions involved in the plan since it was first drawn up in 1995. These 
changes seem to have affected the relations between national and local government. Following 
the general elections in 1998, a new government was formed, and ministers and ministerial 
staff were replaced (see chapter 6), and as a result new mayors and a new governor were 
appointed. In the view of the majority of respondents, these changes had a tremendous effect 
on the plan's implementation. One Nature Preservation Society representative explained that 
“when I first came here, only Kadriye enjoyed the status as a town, and Belek and Kumkoy 
were very small villages. The area was under the complete jurisdiction of Serik Municipality, 
as there were no other municipalities at that time. The Serik Municipality regulated the
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operation of all facilities on the beaches and they enjoyed the income from renting out those 
facilities. As soon as the Belek Municipality was established, authority over these facilities 
and areas was given to this new municipality, because the facilities were within its borders. 
This has given rise to serious conflicts between the new municipality and that of Serik. Now 
Serik has got no physical connection with the seashore and they are on weak ground in 
fighting over the income that once used to belong them. This, of course, has led to an 
observable deterioration in their relations”. The declaration of Kumkoy reserve as a Specially 
Protected Area (SPA) was another change that has led to the involvement of different 
organisations. One central official explained that “their involvement [Specially Protected Area 
Board (SPAB)] has created another confusion [in relation to Kumkoy]...because they [SPAB] 
wanted to develop their own plan for the area rather than going ahead with the existing one”.
8.3.6 Disagreements and their causes
13) “If local organisations and national organisations have disagreed about 
how tourism is managed in Belek, what has been the cause of this 
disagreement? How has this been resolved, if at all?”
The aim of Question 13 was to identify any issues causing disagreement about how 
tourism is managed among the parties involved in the BMP. It was argued in chapter three 
that conflict is a normal consequence of human interaction in periods of change, the product 
of a situation where the gains or new activities of some parties are perceived to involve 
sacrifices by others (Milman and Pizaml988). Conflict is frequently equated with fighting, 
and is often seen as destructive, unpleasant and undesirable. It affects morale, communication 
and productivity, and it can bring organisations to a virtual standstill (Waddock and Bannister 
1991). Conflict is dynamic and unmanaged conflicts seldom remain constant for long 
(Carpenter and Kennedy 1988). They may stay dormant but then resurface in a more 
complicated and virulent form, making them even more difficult to manage. The reasons for 
disputes vary greatly. It is often the case that conflicts over natural resources are rarely exactly 
what they seem. Amy (1987 in Hall 2000) observes that “What appears to be a simple 
collision of purposes is usually a combination of issues, past history, personalities, and 
emotions” (Amy 1987). Opposition to the growth of tourism in an area or to specific tourism 
developments often arises partly because access to common resources, such as scenic
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qualities, water or open spaces, is coveted by other users with different, often incompatible 
interests (Milman and Pizam 1988).
Quite a high proportion of respondents -18- mentioned differences of opinion or 
disagreements between the various parties affected by the Belek plan. Table 8.3.5 summarises 
the specific disagreements or the conflictual issues about tourism that they identified, and 
Table 8.3.6 lists the more fundamental causes of the conflicts that they mentioned. The marina 
development project emerged as by far the most prominent specific issue causing conflict, 
having been mentioned by all the representatives of organisations included in the study. The 
main specific issues mentioned by local parties were the proliferation of large-scale, five star 
hotels in the region, the introduction of all-inclusive holidays, the ban on hunting, and the 
frequent interventions into traditional ways of life. Other issues frequently mentioned as 
causing conflict about tourism management in the region included the development of second 
homes, the use of beaches in neighbouring towns, measures for turtle protection, the water 
treatment plants, and the management of facilities in buffer zones. These specific issues are 
examined in detail later in this section.
Table 8.3.5 Specific causes of disagreements about how tourism is managed in 
Belek
Cause o f  disagreement Stakeholder mentioning the issue
Marina development proposal in Kumkoy Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Ministry of  
Tourism (MoT), Belek Tourism Investors’ 
Association (Betuyab), Local people, Specially 
Protected Area Board (SPAB), Provincial 
Government, Municipalities, Ministry o f Culture 
(MoC), Ministry o f Environment (MoE), Ministry o f  
Forestry (MoF)
Large-scale hotels Local people, Betuyab, MoT
All-inclusive holidays Local people, Betuyab, NPS
Traditional ways o f life Local people, Local public officials, Betuyab, 
Provincial Government
Development o f second homes Municipalities, Betuyab, NPS, MoT
Use o f beaches in neighbour towns Bogazkent Municipality, Betuyab, MoT
Ban on hunting and use of forest areas Betuyab, Local people, NPS
Turtle nests and lighting Betuyab, NPS
Water treatment plants Betuyab, Serik Municipality, NPS
Management o f facilities in the buffer zones Betuyab, Serik Municipality, Kadriye Municipality, 
MoT
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By far the most frequently mentioned more fundamental cause of conflict mentioned 
by respondents was the current legislative and institional framework, which led to imbalances 
in resources and power (Table 8.3.6). For example, one provincial government respondent, 
argued that: “every organisation wanted to do plans on their own... the Ministry of Public 
Resettlement urged that according to the Construction Law [see chapter six] they have 
jurisdiction over the formulation and approval of Constructions Plans, and other organisations 
should consult with them...[But] the Authority for Specially Protected Areas also claimed that 
they had the right to formulate their own plan in the same area. Accordingly, in a 30 square 
km of land, literally thirty institutions got involved”.
Table 8.3.6 Fundamental causes of the disagreements about how tourism was
managed in Belek
Stakeholder offering the explanation Cause mentioned
Local government, NPS, Betuyab, Local government, Imbalances in resource and power allocations
Universities, Local people
NPS, Betuyab, Local government, Universities, Different goals and values or the involvement o f too
Provincial Government, Local people, National many organisations
organisations
Local government, Betuyab, NPS, Constraints on access to local resources
MoT, MoE, Betuyab, NPS, Universities, Local Institutional practices
government
As many as 14 of the 30 respondents suggested that conflicts were related to different 
organisational philosophies, priorities, and objectives. For example, while some organisations 
favoured the protection of natural resources, others were in favour of their exploitation. This 
finding suggests that there was not a great deal of common ground for the stakeholders 
participating in the BMP to reach a shared vision. Even when they appreciated their mutual 
interdependence, there were likely to be difficulties in practice in engaging in shared decision­
making.
The interviewees provided several examples of the differences in priorities between 
organisations. A local association representative considered that the MoT was essentially a 
business-oriented organisation, while the MoC, as well as the MoE and the NPS, were more 
protection-oriented. A private sector respondent, who was dissatisfied with a perceived over­
emphasis on environmental protection, accused the NPS and the other institutions it worked
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with as “mistakenly giving more emphasis to the preservation side of the sustainable tourism 
terminology. They have, however, largely overlooked the rational and sustainable use of 
natural resources”. By contrast, one local respondent agreed that the NPS and other voluntary 
sector organisations were more concerned with preservation of social, natural and historical 
assets, and accused the national organisations of focusing merely on economic development at 
the expense of the depletion of irrecoverable natural resources. One NPS representative 
claimed that “there is no other country that accelerates the destruction of its beaches, forests 
and historic places for a far-fetched expectation of obtaining big returns. We are having 
cultural, economic and environmental erosion, and nobody at ministerial level really seems to 
care about this”. A private sector respondent felt that this economic bias could be attributed to 
the concept of sustainable tourism development not being well understood. Another 
respondent explained how people operating in the industry had had a stormy decade with 
frequent bankrupts and litigation, and it was felt “it is not yet in their horizon or agenda to pay 
attention to the more sustainable development of tourism in the area, and particularly to 
minimising the negative impacts on natural and cultural assets”.
' The next section focuses on a detailed analysis of the specific issues identified in 
Table 8.3.5 as having led to disagreements between the stakeholders about the management of 
tourism in the area. First, disagreements over the proposed marina development in Kumkoy 
will be evaluated.
8.3.6.1 M arina development proposal in Kumkoy
As many as two respondents from the NPS, five from national organisations, and two 
from private sector organisations mentioned significant disagreements in relation to the 
marina development proposal for Kumkoy. Several respondents in national and private sector 
organisations felt the marina development in Kumkoy bay was essential, in order to help 
revive and diversify the local economy, to provide an additional attraction in the region, and to 
differentiate the region from competing regions with similar features. The NPS representatives 
expressed a contrasting view, arguing that this project, proposed by the MoT and supported by 
Betuyab, would destroy an environmentally sensitive area. They also felt that this project 
would not bring as many benefits as expected. One NPS respondent contended that the marina 
proposal was incompatible with the proliferation of large-scale hotels in the region: “while 
they are trying to develop a marina to attract yachters, I doubt that a tourist travelling on a
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yacht will stay over-night in a hotel”. In her opinion the marina would help to diversify the 
economy but it would put extra pressures on the environment. The respondents from the 
national organisations were critical of the NPS because, together with other voluntary sector 
organisations, it had lobbied against the marina proposals of the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), 
and subsequently they had successfully used legal procedures to halt the execution of this 
project.
8.3.6.2 The proliferation of large-scale hotels
The researcher’s direct observation and the interviews suggest that the locals felt 
discontented about the growing number of large-scale hotels in the region. Three locals 
contended that five-star hotels were unwanted as they damaged the local environment and did 
not make a real impact on the local economy (Figure 8.3.1). They maintained that most 
tourists visiting their region no longer wanted a mass tourism experience, rather they wanted 
to travel independently in order to gain insights into the local culture and history. They also 
complained about the pricing policies of the five-star hotels, as the prices were not within the 
affordable range for most tourists. Locals were also dissatisfied with current package tour 
arrangements, as they were totally controlled by external tour operators. This meant that 
tourists were not free to do as they wished, having instead to comply with itineraries 
determined by the tour operator. One local representative claimed that “even the shops for 
purchasing souvenirs or other items have already been pre-determined by the tour operator”, 
and he went on advocate the development of lodging facilities for independent tourists as it 
was felt they are growing in number and that they would contribute more to the local economy 
than the package tourists. This preference for more lodging for independent tourists appears to 
have been shared by almost all the locals interviewed.
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Figure 8.3.1 Continuing construction of five star hotels in the region
8.3.6.3 All-inclusive holidays
A related issue on which there was much disagreement between locals and Betuyab 
was the “all-inclusive” holidays that had been promoted by hoteliers in the region. Seven local 
and voluntary sector representatives expressed real concerns about their long-term adverse 
impacts on the local economy. Many of them felt that tourists coming for all-inclusive 
holidays are unable to make their own decisions about what to do in the area as they largely 
comply with what is staged for them: “tourists in all-inclusive packages cannot get a real taste 
of the region”. The greatest concern for locals was not the related lack of promotion of their 
culture but the decrease in commercial transactions with visitors. One local complained that 
“if I was an all-inclusive customer, I would not want to go outside the hotel. Why bother, as 
everything is free and provided in the facility?”. The locals believed that this system was 
geared merely to benefit hoteliers, with this being seen as against the local community’s best 
interest. Some considered that, should the all-inclusives continue to be promoted, then tourism 
and the locality would decline substantially. One of the locals explained that “the shopkeepers 
will suffer great losses, and eventually they will end up being bankrupt, as long as the 
hoteliers continue to sell their rooms all-inclusive”. He felt that “ if  local resources are 
depleted at the expense of making outsiders [hoteliers and developers] richer, then I would 
call this [the BMP] an unjust development”.
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8.3.6.4 Traditional ways of life
Many mentioned the frequent conflict between locals and public sector officials over 
traditional ways of life. For example, it has been traditional for locals to move to huts along 
the beach during the summer due to the hot and humid climate, but three public sector 
respondents argued that these huts were built in a disorderly fashion because there was no 
legislation in relation to where and how they should be constructed, and that they visually 
polluted the beach (see Figure 8.3.2). These respondents reported that there had been physical 
conflicts between officials and villagers when the Provincial Government decided to demolish 
the huts. The villagers were dissatisfied with government interference in their traditional 
practices, and they complained that they could not afford to buy “air-conditioners”, as 
“cynically” suggested by some public officials as an incentive to staying in the beach huts . 
They were also annoyed about not being allowed freely to use the beach in front of the hotels. 
While there are no physical barriers preventing their entry to the beach, it appears that in 
practice the hotel security staff do not let locals use the beach. The locals were also infuriated 
by jokes that the hotel staff have made about local women swimming in their daily attire, 
including calling them "jelly fish".
Figure 8.3.2 View of deserted huts
fltiill
8.3.6.5 Second home development
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Another source of conflict mentioned by many respondents was the issuing of permits 
for second home development in the region (Figure 8.3.3). Two Betuyab representatives and 
two from the NPS stated that the increased construction of second homes was the result of the 
municipalities seeking extra income. One of these respondents complained that “it is 
incomprehensible why these buildings had been permitted to occupy such fertile land, and 
why they had been developed in such a haphazard style”. These interviewees and those from 
the national organisations were critical of the municipalities in this respect. Three central 
government officials also pointed to wider differences between national organisations and 
municipalities in relation to how residential tourism should be managed in the region. One of 
them explained that “we [the ministry] strongly resist the development of second homes in the 
region .. .such development is detrimental to the region’s success. However, the municipalities 
are indignant and indifferent to our concerns, and they have deliberately accelerated the 
development of second homes in the region”.
Figure 8.3.3 Second home development along the coast of Kadriye
8.3.6.6 Use of beaches in neighbouring towns
Another issue shown in Table 8.3.5 is the conflict between Bogazkent municipality, 
Betuyab and the Ministry of Tourism about the use of the beaches in the two neighbouring
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towns of Belek and Bogazkent (see Figure 8.3.4). The conflict focused on the building of a 
bridge connecting beaches in these neighbouring towns. Two respondents from Betuyab said 
that they favoured the construction of the bridge so it was possible to cross Acisu river 
dividing the two beaches. They expressed resentment with the Mayor of Bogazkent for 
imposing difficulties on this: “the Mayor of Bogazkent has taken a very strange attitude, 
issuing an order to demolish the already completed bridge on the basis that the construction 
violated the Coastal Zone Management Law and that it was illegal”. These Betuyab 
representatives explained that they had tried to confer with the mayor, and complained that the 
Mayor had obstinately refused to step back from his initial stance. They maintained that the 
decision to construct the bridge over the river was not taken by their organisation: “before the 
tourist facilities had been built there, the Ministry [of Tourism] had issued a permit to 
construct the bridge and we told the Mayor that we were not the person to contact on this 
issue. This problem should concern the Ministry and not our organisation”. However, from the 
perspective of the Mayor of Bogazkent, the construction of a bridge was an open violation of 
the relevant law and what he had done was right and legal. He claimed that if another attempt 
was made to build the bridge he would not hesitate to do the same, even this time in the high 
tourist season.
8.3.6.7 The ban on hunting and use of the forest
The ban on hunting and a regulation that restricts use of the forest appear to have 
created conflicts between Betuyab and the villagers. The Betuyab representatives complained 
that despite the ban the villagers did not cease their traditional hunting activities, explaining 
that in order to restrict the illegal hunting they had worked together with the Military Police. 
There were also conflicts between villagers and Betuyab over the fence that was built to 
regulate entrance to the forest. One Betuyab member complained that “we [Betuyab] managed 
to fence 40 km of the forest, and built entrance gates with master keys kept by us, by the 
Military Police and by the Ministry of Forestry. However, we encountered a negative response 
from local people. One night they broke these gates into pieces...what they wanted was to 
collect pinecones [for burning in their stoves]. The maintenance of the fence and gates has 
proven to be extremely costly and disruptive to our other functions”.
It is interesting to note that the NPS representatives were also critical of the attitude of 
Kumkoy villagers in relation to these issues. In addition, these respondents suggested that the
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Kumkoy villagers were indifferent to their warnings about the incremental impacts of eco- 
tourism, and claimed that they were blinded by the prosperity that tourism could deliver for 
them at one go and that they were not ready for tourism. The findings here are similar to those 
discussed earlier. It was stated that the educational level in the region was relatively low and 
the locals lacked the prosperity to enable them to make the investment needed to make the 
area internationally competitive (Soybay 1995). The NPS representatives felt that the region 
should be declared a protected zone and should remain as such. However, their suggestion 
went strongly against what local people wanted. They sought the supposed prosperity that 
tourism is reputed to bring. One NPS representative expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
locals’ understanding of tourism, explaining that the “ locals associate the presence of bulky 
five-star hotels in their region with tourism development. Countless times, we struggled to 
get across the fact that even if hotels are not built here they can still attract tourists to the 
region through eco-tourism. They can earn money, at the same time as preserving nature”.
This respondent also contended that if investors succeeded in constructing five-star hotels in 
the protected area, their operations would fail due to the standard of service being too low as a 
result of the limited skills of local people.
8.3.6.8 Turtle nests and lighting
Turtle nests and lighting was another specific issue over which Betuyab and the NPS 
disagreed markedly (Table 8.3.5). The Betuyab representatives were critical of the NPS for the 
inflexible application of their approach to sustainable tourism development, and in particular 
in relation to their attitude to lighting and nesting turtles. According to the NPS, the tourist 
facilities should switch their lights off at night when the marine turtles start nesting, as the 
lights can disturb their hatchlings and attract predators. The Betuyab representatives explained 
how “at first sight, this is a very reasonable recommendation. However, we cannot order every 
hotel proprietor to switch off their lights due to their need for security. When you turn off the 
lights of a thousand-bed hotel, you are up against a very serious security problem”. They said 
that when the lights were switched off, then the Military Police or the State Police Department 
would order them to switch the lights back on immediately for the safety of their guests and of 
the property. They maintained that they had brought up this issue in their meetings with the 
NPS to formulate the BMP, and had suggested that, rather than insisting strictly on a "total 
switch off', they could try to devise another lighting system which would not affect marine 
turtles in their nesting season (see Figure 8.3.4).
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Figure 8.3.4 Security lights during the night
One Betuyab representative explained that “we had devoted a large amount of money 
to experiments in order to assess the extent to which the turtles are disturbed by the lights and 
to calculated the light angles which would give them the least disturbance...In our experiments 
we found that hatchlings were affected by light coming through at 15 degrees to the ground. 
When the angle was changed about five degrees, the disturbance is over”. The NPS 
respondents were also in disagreement with the practices of Betuyab in relation to the turtles.
It seems they were dissatisfied with the practice whereby Betuyab fenced off the turtle nests 
during the breeding season became they thought that this then flagged up where the nests were 
and drew the tourists to these places, which eventually disturbed the hatchlings (see Figure 
8.3.5).
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Figure 8.3.5 Measures to protect turtle nests where tourists and turtles co-exist
S M I
8.3.6.9 Water treatment plant
The management of the water treatment plant in Serik Municipality was another 
specific issue mentioned by some representatives of Serik Municipality, Betuyab and the NPS. 
The Betuyab and NPS respondents argued that the Serik Mayor had left the water treatment 
plant idle as a negotiating weapon in political debates. One of the ex-Mayors explained that 
“everything about that collector (plant) is ready to use, but due to political jealousy it has not 
been used by the current Mayor”. These respondents expressed concern that as a result of the 
actions of the Serik Mayor the wastewater is flowing untreated to the sea. One of them 
explained that “water discharged into the river is not a real concern as long as this plant is 
working properly, is in good condition and is well maintained. However, if it is ill- 
maintained, then it will constitute a great risk for seawater quality”.
8.3.6.10 Management of facilities in buffer zones
Betuyab and the municipalities seem to have disagreed with each other over the 
designation and management of the environmental buffer zones in the Belek area, and 
particularly over the facilities for public use that are provided in them (Table 8.3.5). Figure 1
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in chapter one shows that there are five development zones in the Belek area and between 
each there is a buffer zone designated to protect the native fauna and flora. The Betuyab 
representatives claimed that the municipalities did not manage these areas according to the 
regulations issued by the Ministry of Tourism, and one explained that “because of their ill- 
management and hygiene-related problems, the Ministry has cancelled the permit for the 
management of these facilities given to Serik municipality, and it has also closed the facilities 
run by Kadriye municipality”. In the view of another respondent, these problems were related 
to the fact that “these people [the Mayors] view themselves as being dependent on their 
electors and they cannot withstand the often illegal requests of their voters. This mentality 
prompts numerous mistakes”. Perhaps surprisingly, one respondent described how they had 
spoken to the mayor and suggested to him that his actions violated the Coastal Zone 
Management Law, and the Mayor then "confesses: well, what could I do? These people are 
my voters, and I cannot say No to them”. The Betuyab members considered that these beach 
facilities were both illegal and unsuitable for the sale of food and drink. One of them 
explained that the “tourists coming to the region on a half-board basis want to use low-cost 
eating places and they frequent these places under the mistaken impression that they are 
hygienic. Due to the unhygienic food consumed at these places they come down with upset 
stomachs and then prosecute the hotel they are staying in rather than these proprietors. These 
guests are provided with medical reports indicating they have suffered food poisoning, and 
consequently we are obliged to pay compensation for the mistake of someone else”.
8.3.7 Quality of conflict resolution
The research literature suggests that conflicts should be dealt with as soon as possible 
with appropriate approaches and tools (Waddock and Bannister 1991). According to Burton 
(1979 in Tillet 1991: 9), conflict resolution means “terminating conflict by methods that are 
analytical and get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere 
management or “settlement”, points to an outcome that, in the view of parties involved, is a 
permanent solution to the problem”. It can take a number of forms, including information 
exchange, mediation involving a neutral third party, and binding arbitration whereby there is 
agreement to give the decision-making over a particular issue to a third party (Hall, 2000).
The forms of resolution may include fighting (even involving violence), adjudication, 
negotiation or bargaining, and withdrawal (Tillet, 1991). Hall (2000) argues that simply 
hosting a public meeting, which is a common consultation strategy, often does not lead to the
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conflict being resolved. Indeed, “it may well give rise to greater conflict between parties. 
Public meetings may well assist to identify conflict, however, they cannot resolve or manage 
them. This is largely because they allow everyone to have his or her say, but the causes of the 
conflicts are often overlooked” (Millman and Pizaml988: 123).
Apparently, stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of the BMP 
had disagreements about several issues (Table 8.3.6). Based on the researcher's direct 
observation and the interviews, it appears that very many of these conflicts had gone 
unmanaged, and they had often resurfaced later in different forms which made them very 
difficult to manage. One of the most frequently mentioned means to overcome disagreements 
was information exchange. However, the extent to which such information exchange helped 
to resolve disagreements is debatable. The Ministry of Tourism (MoT) organised public 
meetings to inform key parties, and particularly the NPS and local inhabitants, about the 
proposals for the Kumkoy Marina development. Similar public meetings were also employed 
by the NPS to inform local people about the adverse effects of the Kumkoy Marina.
However, these public meetings were treated with considerable suspicion by both the Kumkoy 
villagers and by Betuyab. Caught up in the dynamics of conflict, the Ministry of Tourism, 
Betuyab and NPS had reached a point where they had stopped talking with each other and 
instead they used public meetings to disseminate information that promoted their own 
position.
Another method of conflict resolution, that of legal adjudication and litigation, was 
used by the NPS and MoT in order to resolve the Kumkoy conflict. However, while winners 
(the NPS) and losers (the MoT) had been determined through this legal process, the conflict 
continued unabated and it even escalated further because the loser (the MoT) felt further 
alienated from the rules of the game. The Kumkoy villagers had also opted to use legal 
adjudication in relation to the dispute around the declaration of the forest area as a specially 
protected zone. It is likely that conflicts between the public sector organisations and Kumkoy 
villagers over their traditional ways of life will recur in the future unless the fundamental 
causes of these disagreements are addressed. The involvement of the Special Protected Areas 
Board (SPAB) in the management of these forests might be taken as an attempt to reduce the 
continuing conflicts over how these environmental resources could be used in the region. 
Compared to many other parties, the NPS considered that the SPAB was relatively more
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credible and impartial and could act as a mediator or arbitrator on issues causing conflict in 
the area. Even fighting as a method of conflict resolution had occurred over the management 
of facilities provided for the public in the buffer zones. Infuriated by the closure of the 
facilities in Serik Municipality, a number of interested parties had rushed down to the beach 
and had confronted the managers from Betuyab and other public officials. A similar incident 
involving some physical confrontation had also taken place between Kumkoy villagers and 
public sector officials over the proposal for the marina development.
In short, many of the attempts to resolve conflicts in the region had not been fully 
successful. This situation was likely to be a formidable barrier to co-operation between the 
parties and the co-ordination of their activities in relation to the BMP. The academic literature 
reviewed in chapter four section 4.7.6 suggest that parties involved in conflicts are often 
reluctant to give up their territory, and they will continue to be uncooperative and engage in 
turf protection if there is low trust, little commitment to conflict resolution, and if  their 
organisational goals are incompatible.
8.3.8 Leaving planning decisions to local or national organisations
14) “Would it be likely to help or hinder reaching agreement about tourism 
planning decisions affecting Belek if these decisions were left more to 
local or national organisations?”
This question examined stakeholders’ views as to whether leaving decisions more to 
local or national organisations would be likely to help or hinder agreements being reached 
about tourism planning decisions affecting Belek. The majority of respondents appear quite 
concerned that neither municipalities nor national organisations on their own would be able to 
make decisions about tourism planning that would be acceptable to other parties (Table 8.3.7). 
Six respondents from Betuyab and national organisations maintained that leaving decisions to 
the central government organisations or the municipalities alone would not work due to the 
fact that they would continue to tussle over power with each other. The Betuyab 
representatives thought that the municipalities would be unsuitable because of their 
partisanship and they considered that this would unnecessarily extend the time spent in 
reaching decisions and may introduce arbitrariness and biases. These respondents also felt that 
the transference of decision-making to local government may lead these municipalities to use
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this as a weapon due to the widespread corruption, claimed that the people running the 
municipalities were yet to grasp the real responsibilities of their role. The NPS 
representatives, generally shared this view, albeit a little less extremely, and they felt decision­
making authority should not be left to a single organisation as this would risk decisions being 
made arbitrarily or behind closed doors, and that this might further harm the environment and 
society.
Table 8.3.7 Preferences for which stakeholder should have more influence over
decision-making
Organisation o f  respondents National
organisations
Local
organisations
A union or combination
Betuyab V
NPS and other voluntary sector V
organisations
National organisations V
Provincial government V
Local community V
Local government V
Universities V V
Several of the respondents from local organisations maintained that as long as both 
national and local organisations doubted each other's ability, it was unlikely that they would 
accept decisions made exclusively by the other. There were many respondents who supported 
the idea of shared working in a union. Sometimes it was argued that local government was 
deficient at some tasks, partly because of resource deficiencies, but good at other things. 
Hence, they felt that, rather than leaving decisions to a single organisation, it would be wiser 
to link these institutions to use their individual strengths and counterbalance their weaknesses. 
Some of those who argued for a union or combination suggested that it was necessary to 
identify which organisations are good or bad at specific activities and to fuse their strengths 
together.
8.3.9 Summary
In this section six questions were evaluated to ascertain whether the stakeholders felt 
that the various parties had participated fully in the decision-making involved in formulating 
and implementing the BMP, whether they considered they could raise their concerns, and 
whether they felt their concerns had been incorporated in the decisions. There was found to be 
an interesting divergence in respondents’ opinions on the extent and nature of participation in 
the decision-making process. The respondents from NPS and Betuyab thought that the number
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of people present at meetings was less important than the extent of commitment and 
cooperativeness. It was argued that reaching consensus was almost impossible during the 
meetings. This may be partly because many of the representatives regularly attending these 
meetings lacked the power to make decisions on behalf of their organisation. Several local 
participants indicated that there was only token participation, and that they were particularly 
disadvantaged by their status and lack of power. Because of the largely centralised 
administration in the country, they felt that their concerns about development were unlikely to 
be addressed. The literature on tourism planning also highlights the problems of unequal 
access to power in decision-making (Hall 2000).
There were divergences in respondents’ opinions about whether full consideration was 
given to the views and priorities of all participants in the planning process. Several public 
sector officials were concerned that community participation takes time and resources. By 
contrast, the local parties often suggested that effective public participation could prevent the 
significant costs resulting from continued conflicts and the need to change decisions that 
proved to be poorly informed. The majority of respondents felt that there was little mutual 
respect and trust among the parties in their interactions around the planning process. This 
suggests that there was only a limited recognition of the stakeholder interdependence in 
relation to the problem-domain and of their need to work with others. This was exemplified 
by the national organisations being relatively unreceptive to listening to the multiple local 
organisations.
A number of conflicts between organisations were identified. There is clear evidence 
that the parties were largely unsuccessful in resolving domain-level problems and many of 
these conflicts appear to have gone unmanaged other than occasionally through litigation. 
Given the limited communication between parties that was identified previously, it is perhaps 
easier to understand why conflicts have generally not been settled successfully. Because many 
issues leading to conflicts between organisations had not been dealt at a deeper level, it had 
become almost common to use litigation as a form of conflict resolution. However, conflicts 
are likely to continue in the future and may become more destructive.
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8. Results Chapter
Section 4. Resource Sufficiency and Exchange
8.4.1 Introduction
The literature suggests that often little is achieved when organisational 
resources, such as finance, labour, and management skills, are not available, often due 
to a lack of commitment from key political and administrative people (Elliot 1996). 
Based on the study's conceptual framework, the aim of section four is to elicit views 
on the adequacy of the financial, legal, informational and political resources for the 
parties involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). More specifically, the 
questions in this section:
■ Identify which of the national and local organisations were perceived 
to lack resources to make a success of implementing the BMP.
■ Identify how many resources the national and local organisations 
contributed to implementing the Plan.
■ Examine whether there was institutional competition between the 
organisations for funds and authority.
■ Solicit the preferences of respondents about whether leaving control of 
resources to local or national organisations would help or hinder plan 
implementation.
8.4.2 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking financial resources
15) “Which organisations participating in designing and 
implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked sufficient 
financial resources to make a success of implementing the 
Plan?”
The responses to this question are summarised in Table 8.4.1. When asked 
about the adequacy of the financial sources of organisations involved in the BMP, 
respondents indicated that only a few organisations had enough such resources to 
fulfil the plan-related tasks successfully. Financially strong institutions were said to
include the Special Protected Area Board (SPAB), the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), 
the Ministry of Environment (MoE), and Betuyab.
Two respondents from Betuyab argued that the Betuyab investors had greater 
financial resources than many of the other organisations involved in the BMP. They 
felt that Betuyab had never confronted financial problems due to, for example, having 
monthly membership fees from its members. It was also explained that new Betuyab 
members had to allocate a small percentage of their initial construction capital for the 
use of Betuyab. Another organisation with sufficient resources was identified as the 
Ministry of Tourism (MoT). However, the adequacy of the resources allotted by 
central government to MoT was criticised by the Betuyab and NPS representatives. 
Two Betuyab respondents considered that central government was mean to the MoT: 
“although each year the country earns billions of dollars from tourism, central 
government does not transfer the necessary funds to the Ministry [MoT], which 
undeniably is playing the most important role in the creation of the income. This is 
very controversial”.
Table 8.4.1Views on the financial resources of different stakeholders
Financially Strong Financially Weak
Belek Tourism Investors' Nature Preservation Society (NPS)
Association (Betuyab) Municipalities and local community
Ministry o f Tourism (MoT) District government
Special Protected Area Board (SPAB) Provincial units o f national organisations
Ministry o f Environment (MoE)
According to Betuyab respondents, the organisations that most lacked 
financial resources were the municipalities. The municipalities were considered to 
lack financial resources not only because their centrally-determined funds were 
insufficient, but also because these funds were spent unwisely or were siphoned off 
somewhere or to someone else. Chapter six highlighted that this is a particular 
problem in Turkey. These Betuyab representatives, together with five others from the 
public and voluntary sectors, also reported that there were flaws in how central funds 
were distributed among municipalities in different regions. One respondent explained 
specifically that the financial burdens on municipalities operating in a tourist region 
were greater than those on a municipality operating in region detached from tourism. 
This respondent went on to explain that “the Provincial Bank allocates funds in
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proportion to the population of municipalities. An important point that they [the 
Provincial Bank] are missing is the population rise in the summer. A town of ten 
thousand inhabitants becomes a city accommodating two hundred thousand people. 
With the allocated funds for ten thousand inhabitants, how on earth can a municipality 
provide its services satisfactorily?”. She added that the depletion of natural resources 
within the region could have been reduced if the municipal revenue system had been 
reformed.
Eleven of the 30 respondents, from both national and local organisations, 
contended that almost all organisations found it difficult to allocate adequate financial 
resources for the requirements of the BMP. One respondent from provincial 
government admitted that lack of financial resources had impeded the delivery of an 
effective inspection service in the region: “the coastline to be inspected is about 300 
km long, and effective inspection of facilities, guides, travel agents, etc., in this vast 
territory involves much travel. When we travel from one spot to another [Alanya is 
135 km and Kas is 235 km away from Antalya] the cost of petrol consumption is 
unaffordable”. The District government official also indicated that they lacked 
adequate financial resources to fulfil their assignments successfully. He explained that 
the district government was dependent on funds provided by provincial government, 
which itself relies on funds allocated by central government.
Respondents from the NPS stated that with respect to technical equipment, 
financial resources, and also authority, they were among the least powerful 
organisations compared to government organisations and Betuyab. However, they felt 
that the municipalities were the weakest. Two Betuyab respondents stated that the 
NPS only had enough financial resources to start the management plan, and 
subsequently they lacked the funds to carry out their functions in the region. The 
financial difficulties of the NPS were seen in the closure of their office in the region.
Four local government officials felt that the kinds of control over finance 
exercised by central government had a damaging effect on local government's 
independence and initiative. This issue was also identified in chapter six. It appears 
that local government was far too dependent on central government for it to be fully 
responsive to local interests. But, while the local authorities bemoaned the central
242
interference in local affairs, they were not above requesting specific policy guidance 
and financial aid from central departments. The four local government officials also 
stated that the municipalities lacked sufficient financial resources to make a success of 
implementing the plan objectives. One of the ex-Mayors pointed out that historically 
they had always lacked financial resources, and he criticised the Municipality Law 
that holds the municipality responsible for such a wide range of activities in the 
region. He claimed that the current financial resources were inadequate to meet these 
services, let alone to meet the growing tourist-related requirements. It appears that the 
inadequacy of financial resources made them resort to other means to raise funds. For 
example, financial donations were sought from hoteliers and other proprietors 
operating tourist facilities in the region. One of the ex-Mayors explained, “we were 
working closely with co-operative owners and hoteliers. When the municipal budget 
was tight, we summoned these people [investors, proprietors] to see us to explain the 
situation, and to ask them for their generous donations. Without them we would not 
have been able to deliver the services within the budget allocated by central 
government. Of course the contribution of these people to the municipal budget was 
not unconditional. The process was like you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours”. 
Another ex-mayor considered this approach to funding to be legitimate. While three 
private sector respondents expressed their reservations about its repercussions, it 
appears that the financial problems suffered by most municipalities had forced them 
to use such approaches, with their potential for misuse of power and authority. As one 
respondent explained: “ they [the municipalities] allow the illegal construction of an 
additional storey or extensions to buildings, and then levy taxes on these extensions to 
raise funds”. Another complained that “collecting funds from bars, shops or restaurant 
owners through issuing them an operating permit is a rampant practice.. .but later the 
municipalities accede to the illegal wishes of these individuals”.
8.4.3 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking legal authority
16) “Which organisations participating in designing and
implementing the BMP, if  any, have lacked sufficient legal 
authority to make a success of implementing the plan?”
As with other questions examining the resources of organisations involved in
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the BMP, there were differences among the groups of respondents in their views on 
which organisations lacked legal authority. The stakeholders identified as legally 
strong and legally weak are shown in Table 8.4.2. Eight respondents from both the 
public and private sectors felt that the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) lacked most 
legal authority as they are a voluntary sector organisation. Four central government 
and one provincial government officials maintained that, despite the scale of 
Betuyab's contribution, it did not have authority over other central and local 
government organisations. It was stated that Betuyab acted under the vigilance of the 
MoT. The comments of locals and local government officials indicated that they felt 
that national organisations had adequate legal authority, whereas they felt this did not 
apply for local government. According to one ex-Mayor, the municipalities lacked 
sufficient legal authority, explaining that according to the Municipal Law a 
municipality could not encourage new development before a construction plan was 
drawn up and approved by the relevant ministry (see chapter six for more details). He 
found this practice to be time-consuming and he complained that the “preparation and 
approval of construction plans could take up to five years. What can you do now? If 
you wait for five years, the viability of the investment will be jeopardised”. Because 
of this, he admitted that work had begun on putting the draft construction plans into 
practice despite them not having been approved. Three local government officials and 
the villagers considered that the problem was not the lack of authority but conflicts 
over the use of this authority. These conflicts appeared to have substantially 
postponed the plan objectives being put into practice. Three central government 
officials thought differently about the municipalities, considering some local 
institutions had more than adequate legal authority, and that this had blocked success 
more than a lack of authority.
Table 8.4.2 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking legal authority
Legally Strong Legally Weak
Ministry o f Work and Resettlement Ministry o f Tourism (MoT)
(MoWR) Municipalities and local associations
Special Protected Area Board (SPAB) Belek Tourism Investors' Association (Betuyab)
Provincial government Nature Preservation Society (NPS)
Ministry o f Culture (MoC) Universities
Ministry of Environment (MoE)
Two NPS respondents pinpointed differences in relation to the legal authority 
among national organisations. They argued that some ministries could act
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independently, while others could not in relation to a particular issue. For example, 
the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and the municipalities are authorised to control the 
operations of hotels, whereas the Ministry of Environment does not have direct 
control over hotel operations. Further, it was stated that, unlike the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement, the MoT was not authorised to 
use central funds without gaining the approval of other institutions. It was sometimes 
argued that the MoT had become “an imploring ministry” rather than a doer, due to 
the Ministry lacking authority to use funds as it wished. An MoT official explained 
the implications of its need to get the approval of other ministries: “When we send a 
plan for approval it can be kept waiting for approval for more than two years. But, 
this is really sluggish, and tourism demand is a fashion. When you miss the right time, 
you cannot gain the same lucrative development. While our contribution to the 
national economy is far greater than many other industries, even the SPAB has got 
more authority than the MoT. They [SPAB] do not have to consult with other 
institutions on matters of development. We are trying to get authority to make 
construction plans from the size of 1:25,000 to 1:500 in tourism development 
regions, but so far this has been denied. There is great competition to get the credit for 
developments. When you ask people about who developed the Belek Centre, 
everyone [other ministries] will claim that they did it. Interestingly, the MoT never 
crosses anyone’s mind”. It appears that the dependency of the MoT on other 
institutions for approvals and funding has recently given rise to discussion at national 
level. Even the Minister admits that it would be better to abolish the ministry and set 
it up again as an institution represented by an under-secretary in the Council of 
Ministries.
8.4.4 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking information
17) “Which organisations participating in the BMP, if any, have 
lacked sufficient information and understanding of the issues 
affecting tourism in Belek to make a success of implementing 
the Plan?”
The overall pattern of responses to this question are summarised in Table 
8.4.3. Respondents from the NPS claimed that although the NPS was financially weak
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and pursued its projects through national and international donations, it had got the 
most qualified and experienced staff in relation to environmental issues in Turkey. 
Indeed, they felt that almost their only resource to combat other organisations was 
their environmental experience and local knowledge. According to the Betuyab 
respondents, their organisation, together with the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Ministry of Environment, stood out as having most knowledge about planning issues 
and about tourism development in the area.
Table 8.4.3: Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking information 
and understanding of issues affecting Belek
Respondents Adequate information and Inadequate information and
understanding understanding
Nature Preservation Municipalities, Local Ministry o f Tourism (MoT),
Society (NPS) associations, Nature Special Protected Area Board
Preservation Society (NPS), (SPAB), Ministry o f Culture
Ministry o f Environment (MoC)
(MoE), Provincial
government, Universities,
Betuyab
Belek Tourism Betuyab, MoT, NPS, MoE MoC, municipalities
Investors' Association
(Betuyab)
Local people Local people, Local NPS, MoT, Betuyab, MoC, MoE,
government Ministry o f Forestry (MoF), 
Ministry o f Work and Resettlement 
(MoWR), SPAB
Local government Local people, Local 
government, Provincial 
government, NPS
National organisations, Betuyab
One Betuyab respondent commented that the most important resource that 
many institutions lacked was know-how, with this applying particularly to the 
municipalities and the Ministry of Culture (MoC), which he considered had little 
understanding of the real issues affecting tourism in Belek. Many locals felt that the 
national organisations lacking sufficient information and understanding of issues 
affecting their region. This view was supported by one provincial government official: 
“While the central government is striving to determine its priorities as accurately as
possible, the local priorities never match these central priorities. I believe that if local 
government had been given adequate power it would have paid due attention to the 
improvement of the most serious problems through mobilising local resources. The 
tourism industry is their livelihood. It is natural that they will make mistakes during 
the course of their actions, but they would learn much from their mistakes”.
8.4.5 Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking political power
18) “Which organisations participating in designing and implementing the 
BMP, if any, have lacked sufficient political power or influence to make a 
success of implementing the plan?”
Table 8.4.4 shows that, while local respondents considered that they lacked 
most political power, they usually stated that the actor with the most political power 
was Betuyab. It was commented that the members of Betuyab ran large-scale 
businesses and included some of the wealthiest people in the country. Betuyab was 
seen to have strong personal and business relations with politicians as well as 
bureaucrats. Two respondents from the NPS admitted that they lacked political power, 
especially in relation to Betuyab: “Betuyab is the king of the area at the moment. 
While they do not have authority in legislation, through using their political ties, they 
act as if they have been thus empowered. They have already undertaken another 
responsibility, this being in relation to the promotion of Belek abroad”. Two Mayors 
considered that they had almost no political influence because their own political 
party was not among the coalition of parties ruling the national government.
Table 8.4.4. Stakeholder organisations identified as lacking political 
power
Respondents Stakeholder organisation Stakeholder organisation with
______________________with strong political power weak political power_____________
Nature Preservation Belek Tourism Investors' Nature Preservation Society (NPS),
Society (NPS) Association (Betuyab), municipalities, local people, local
Ministry of Tourism (MoT), associations 
Special Protected Area 
Board (SPAB), Ministry of 
Environment (M oE),
Provincial government
Belek Tourism National organisations Nature Preservation Society (NPS),
Investors' Belek Tourism Investors'
Association Association (Betuyab), local
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(Betuyab) government
Local government Belek Tourism Investors' Local government, Nature 
Association (Betuyab), Preservation Society (NPS)
Ministry of Tourism (MoT),
Special Protected Area
______________________ Board (SPAB),________________;_______________________________
One of the ex-Mayors felt that every participant involved in formulating the 
BMP could secure some political influence. This respondent maintained that all 
involved had some political power and know something of how the system worked. 
He felt that a good manager could acquire power not only from their legal and 
financial resources but also from their knowledge of the administrative system and of 
how to work within it: “everything depends on your personal skills, ties, and ability to 
mobilise other influential people. Let's assume that you are dealing with trade but 
have little money at the moment. If you know how to find your way in the trade 
world, though you haven't got money, you will succeed in purchasing the goods”.
This participant also argued that if one worked strictly within the regulations then one 
would achieve little in Turkey. This perhaps helps to explain why there are thousands 
of people visiting members of parliament in the capital, Ankara (see chapter six).
8.4.6 Stakeholder organisations identified as contributing most 
resources to the BMP
19) “Which specific national and local organisations have
contributed most resources to implementing the BMP? Are 
there any specific organisations that have not contributed as 
many resources as they should to implementing the BMP? 
Why?”
When asked about organisations that contributed most resources to the BMP, 
there was some variation in the responses, as shown in Table 8.4.5. According to two 
NPS members, their organisation made the most contribution of resources, but this 
was particularly in relation to the formulation rather than implementation of the plan. 
One of them claimed that no other institutions had put money into the formulation of 
the plan, with the expense of the planning activity all being met through NPS funds 
allocated by the World Bank. While Betuyab had hosted a number of meetings, they
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maintained that this cost little by comparison with the money they had spent on the 
consultation team and the data collection and analysis.
Table 8.4.5 Stakeholder organisations identified as contributing most 
resources to the BMP
Respondents Stakeholder organisations that Stakeholder organisations that
contributed most resources______ contributed least resources
Belek Tourism Investors' Nature Preservation Society
Association (Betuyab) (NPS), municipalities, Ministry
o f Culture ( MoC)
Ministry o f Tourism (MoT), Nature Preservation Society
Belek Tourism Investors' (NPS), Ministry o f Environment
Association (Betuyab) (MoE), Ministry o f Culture
(MoC), municipalities 
Nature Preservation Society Belek Tourism Investors'
(NPS), Ministry o f Culture Association (Betuyab),
(MoC) Provincial government, Ministry
o f Tourism (MoT), Ministry of 
Environment (MoE), Ministry 
o f Work and Resettlement 
 ___________________________ (MoWR), municipalities_______
By contrast, two Ministry of Tourism officials claimed that their organisation 
had contributed most to the project as a whole (Table 8.4.5). And two Betuyab 
respondents and five public and private sector representatives claimed that Betuyab 
had contributed most resources, such as labour, finance, technical support and 
information. According to one private sector respondent, Betuyab contributed most 
"because it had to. It spends over 700,000 DM every year on the environment and 
related projects. If this sum of money were spent on the promotion of the region in 
foreign exhibitions, I believe that the hotels of the area would reach full room 
occupancy. Betuyab is also conducting a project to prevent mosquito proliferation in 
the area.. .for its own good, as Betuyab has to find a radical solution that will 
eliminate the larvae in swamp areas”. A provincial government official argued that: 
“Betuyab is the only organisation in the region which can put in money and take 
prompt decisions, and which can have these decisions put into practice. It is because 
of their structure and the influence of their members. For example, last year when we 
[the provincial government] were confronted with tensions due to the arrest of a 
terrorist leader in the region, Betuyab in collaboration with our organisation moved 
swiftly to organise a press conference in the region. Through our overseas branches, 
they were able to contact prominent journalists in different countries and invite them 
to the region. Betuyab was able to meet their accommodation and other expenses.
Belek Tourism Investors' 
Association (Betuyab)
Ministry o f Tourism (MoT)
Nature Preservation Society 
(NPS)
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This was done to counteract the potential adverse effect of the tensions on the local 
tourism industry. This was an important press conference to show that the rumours 
were not true”.
Two Betuyab respondents claimed that some other institutions, apart from the 
Ministry of Tourism, tended to shirk their responsibilities in relation to resourcing the 
BMP. Respondents from the NPS also considered that the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement had not contributed as many resources as 
they ought. These respondents commented that they did not consider that the 
municipalities had contributed too little because they were only newly established and 
had only very limited budgets allocated by central government. A Betuyab respondent 
mentioned that the Ministry of Culture (MoC) had not contributed enough to 
implementing the plan despite its considerable resources, depicting this as a major 
obstacle. In his view, the MoC was empowered to designate valuable but sensitive 
natural and historical assets as Specially Protected Areas (SPA), but in doing so it had 
ignored the social structures and economic activities that had existed prior to the 
area's designation. A respondent from the Ministry of Tourism contended that the 
MoC, together with the NPS and the municipalities, had contributed the least. In 
relation to the NPS he claimed that it "suffered from discontinuity and inadequate 
human, technical and financial sources. Thus they were unable to contribute as many 
resources as they desired to implementing the plan”. Three participants from the 
private sector noted that most of the contributions promised by the national 
institutions had yet to be realised.
8.4.7 Organisations that competed with each other for funds and 
authority
20) “Did some local and national organisations compete with each 
other for funds or authority? Why?”
As many as 16 of the 30 respondents claimed that there were organisations 
competing amongst each other for funds, authority or prestige in the region. Eight 
respondents, from the private and voluntary sectors and from provincial government, 
indicated that the municipalities were competing fiercely and overtly with each other
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for the funds allocated for infrastructural development for the region. The fund is 
granted commensurate with the amount of infrastructure completed by the 
municipality, but some municipalities were alleged to be demanding more funds 
compared to how much work they had completed. Three provincial government 
respondents maintained that the municipalities were in overt competition for authority 
in the region, and that this inter-municipal competition had gained considerable extra 
momentum after the area's governance was divided between new municipalities.
Some municipalities claimed authority in the management of the protected zones, and 
there were arguments about the wielding of power there by the Ministry of Tourism. 
One respondent pointed to competition between the old and new municipalities, 
claiming that “the mayor of Kadriye is sad, affronted and resentful because Belek has 
been arranged as a municipality and it is no longer within the boundaries of Kadriye”. 
It appears that provincial government’s relations with the municipalities also entered a 
difficult period because of this competition among the municipalities for authority and 
central funds: “... when we attempt to accommodate a need of Belek municipality, the 
Municipality of Kadriye tends to resent us. On the other hand, when we resolve a 
problem for Kadriye, then Bogazkent municipality feels neglected”.
Two Betuyab respondents suggested that the central government institutions 
did not compete with each other for funds, but that this did not apply to the 
municipalities. However, they claimed that the government institutions were in covert 
competition for credit and prestige from projects, which was provoked by competition 
among them for political authority. The local respondents also felt there was 
competition for authority between the MoT and the MoC around the area designated 
as a nature reserve (Kumkoy). It appears that there was also competition for prestige 
between the NPS and Betuyab. According to members of the NPS, Betuyab was 
determined not to lose its monopoly powers in the region. One respondent explained, 
“Betuyab is aware of the fact that adherence to the guidelines contained in the plan is 
instrumental for its existence, and this provides a cutting edge for them. I do not think 
that they are 'turtle lovers': they are as fond of turtles as much as they are of stray 
dogs and cats. In the end they are businessmen, and they have to think and act like 
businessmen. Everything becomes an instrument for making money. If they are 
building bird watching towers, the underlying reason is not because they are sensitive 
to birds but because they want to make money”.
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It was suggested in the interviews that, while many organisations involved in 
the BMP had few resources, there was still little or no exchange of those resources 
between the organisations. Two respondents from the NPS argued that there was no 
tradition of voluntary exchanges of resources among national organisations and 
between national and local organisations in order to accomplish a common goal. One 
of them claimed that “there is no way that a municipality, civil society, a university 
and a ministry could combine their resources. This is unprecedented in Turkey”. She 
maintained that the pooling of their resources was impossible partly because of legal 
restrictions. A private sector respondent explained, “Central government units could 
not exchange resources with one another in order to realise a common goal, without 
going through a lengthy bureaucratic process involving several meetings and much 
paper work”. Similarly, a respondent from the district government (the government 
level between villages and provincial government) admitted that exchanges of 
equipment between central government departments was very unusual in Turkey. He 
complained that “ institutions, will not give equipment to another institution in need 
even if they don't use it. They would even let the equipment corrode, rather than hand 
it over to another institution”.
Four respondents from local organisations claimed that the limited exchange 
of resources between municipalities, and particularly of money, was frequently 
discussed among local people. One respondent explained that some municipalities 
possessed equipment that in combination would be enough to provide adequate 
services for the entire region. He suggested that "people seem to agree that a more 
effective and satisfactory service could be provided if these resources were combined. 
In practice, people disagree about how this assemblage should occur”. Several 
respondents criticised the prevalent culture of individualism, which some identified as 
an obstacle undermining co-operative action among the region's municipalities. 
Political fractions and historical partisanship also appear to have blocked the 
exchange of resources. For example, it was observed that due to partisanship it tends 
only to be municipalities from the same party that exchange resources.
Other barriers that appear to have impeded the exchange of resources between 
participants included negative perceptions of other organisations and institutional
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rivalry. One private sector respondent complained that “Because of municipal 
jealousies, some services are duplicated, which eventually leads to waste of 
resources”. He illustrated this with the following example: “assume that a 
municipality at the far end of the road is operating a bus service to transport people in 
and out of town. However, other municipalities cannot stomach the fact that the far 
municipality stops over within their border to take on or let off passengers. Despite 
the introduction of an additional bus service for the same route not being viable, 
jealous municipalities start bus services on the same route in order to undermine the 
profits and operation of the far municipality”. These arguments rather contradict the 
propositions of resource exchange theory, which indicate that organisations tend to 
exchange resources when they are scarce (see chapter three). In reality, resource 
scarcity in the study area was not sufficient on its own necessarily to result in 
exchange relationships between organisations, with factors such as political and 
institutional rivalry obstructing exchange relations.
8.4.8 Views on local or national government control of resources
21) “Would it be likely to help or hinder the Plan implementation 
if the control of resources was left more to the local or 
national government organisations?”
Respondents differed as to whether the Plan's implementation would be helped 
if control of resources was left more to local or national government organisations. 
Two respondents from Betuyab noted that responsibilities of the municipalities in the 
development of tourism in the country could not be understated. However, these 
respondents also felt that a transference of control of more resources to the 
municipalities would be irrational, if not very destructive. One of them explained that 
“they [municipalities] are either incompetent or greedy. Look at the deterioration of 
the natural environment occurring in the majority of areas opened to tourism 
development in the country. In my opinion, the greatest responsibility for this 
problem rests with our municipalities and their unlimited authority in relation to 
building construction”. He went on to state that “second-homes are the main cause of 
visual pollution. I am asking you, who has given permits for their construction? How 
is that areas without sewage systems or water distribution infrastructure were opened
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to construction? How is it that construction plans and areas were changed within only 
15 days? We have often experienced these plan changes, especially in areas with a 
small population. A mayor elected with only 15 votes has the authority, though he 
may lack sufficient knowledge, to decide on the nature and extent of alterations in a 
construction plan!”. A private sector respondent also expressed serious reservations 
about giving most authority to municipalities: “ when you give them the full authority 
of resource control, then you will have to put up with dire consequences, as resources 
will be wasted in order to get individual gains”.
By contrast, locals considered that local or provincial government should be 
given more discretion over the control of resources. However, local support for local 
government was not unconditional. Notably, many locals also felt that local 
government needed more financial resources, and some felt that they needed to adopt 
"modem" management techniques. Some also felt that competition for funds should 
be tackled, as competition had caused long delays in implementation. One ex-Mayor 
argued that local government should only be given extensive new controls over 
resources if the whole municipal structure was reviewed and re-structured. This was 
because “resource utilisation requires great skills, and unfortunately the employment 
strategies imposed by central government means that the municipalities are unable to 
recruit qualified staff’. According to local stakeholders, if more of the region's 
funding had been given to local government, then the area's infrastructural 
development might have been completed much earlier.
Two respondents from Betuyab were very concerned that, while greater local 
government control of resources might help speed the working process of local 
activities, there were substantial dangers: “money is sweet and this is a trap... The 
mayors might be very honest and sensitive initially about public spending. However, 
unfortunately as the conventional wheel of the administration system starts to turn, the 
grants are generally spent on other activities [politically influenced]”. Officials from 
the MoT shared a similar concern, with one stating that “there are strong local forces, 
which a mayor cannot stand up to”.
The respondents from Betuyab and the national organisations generally 
supported resource control remaining with central government. Four respondents in
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national organisations stated that personal greed was a real problem in the region and 
this could only be neutralised by power being retained by central government. On the 
other hand, others from local organisations were cautious about central government 
retaining its resource control. Three of them were particularly concerned that, while 
central government was striving to determine appropriate priorities, the local priorities 
rarely matched these priorities. One respondent considered that if local government 
had more resources it would have paid due attention to tackling the area's most 
serious problems through mobilising more local resources. However, one ex-Mayor 
noted that, because there were several municipalities in the area, there was likely to 
have been much tension if the municipalities had more control of resources due to the 
different political parties of the mayors. He stated that “every municipality would 
insist that its share of the resources should be increased, or they would engage in 
political games to reduce the power of municipalities run by an opposing party, or 
they would form an alliance with municipalities sharing similar political views in 
order to exert pressure on an opposing municipality”.
Two NPS respondents held the view that a union established through the 
participation of local and central government, neighbouring municipalities and 
villages might provide a better solution for the control of resources.
8.4.9 Summary
The conceptual framework developed for this study recognises that there are 
interdependencies between organisations, as no organisation alone can perform its 
function or task without at some stage requiring resources controlled by other 
organisations or needing actions by these organisations. Consequently, organisations 
within the system are likely to attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so 
they will employ various strategies. Problems related to resources are often the 
mainstay of explanations for policy-implementation gaps, especially in the developing 
world where resources are generally scarcer and the dead weight of population much 
greater (Morah 1996). “However, limited time and other resources, as well as 
scepticism by groups that have been involved in conflict over tourism development, 
may tend to make potential participants wary about joining; unless they perceive that 
the collaboration decisions will be implemented” (Jamal and Getz 1995: 197).
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A threshold of resources is probably necessary for there to be any possibility 
of realising policy objectives, and the level of resources above this threshold, up to 
some saturation point, is likely to be proportional to the probability of optimally 
achieving those objectives (Morah 1996). Obviously there would be no exchange of 
elements between two organisations that do not know one another and their functions. 
There would also be no exchange without some level of agreement or understanding, 
even if this is implicit. Thus, it could be argued that exchange agreements are 
contingent upon the organisation’s domain, which relates to the specific goals that the 
organisation wishes to pursue and the function it undertakes in order to implement its 
goals. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate this process of exchange between 
organisations (Laughlin 1996; O’Toole, 1997). For example, the legal and 
institutional framework determines duties to provide access to information and it is an 
important determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the 
organisational network (Laughlin 1996).
In this section, an attempt was made to identify organisations that lacked 
resources for the implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan. It is 
apparent from the analysis that most national and local organisations lacked some 
financial, legal, political and informational resources, and that these deficiencies were 
likely to have reduced the plan's success. The type of environment in Belek seems to 
correspond to one of resource scarcity, as suggested by Benson (1975). Based on the 
respondents’ comments it can be argued that resources were centrally concentrated 
and scarce, and that this has led to conflicts between organisations competing for the 
same resource, notably funds and authority. Factors mentioned by the respondents as 
impeding resource exchange between organisations involved in the BMP included the 
unequal distribution of existing resources, managerial incompetence in their use, 
institutional jealousies, limited levels of perceived interdependency, the political 
partisanship of organisations, and differences in ideology and organisational values.
It is also apparent that the environment affecting the participants in the BMP 
was not at all stable. For example, the balance in the distribution of resources and the 
quantity of these resources were seen to have changed as new actors entered or left 
the system. The NPS was an example of the latter, and the municipalities of the
256
former. It is not surprising to find that organisations implementing the BMP were in 
competition and that there were clearly asymmetric relations (Logsdon 1991), with 
each organisation attempted to achieve its own interests at the expense of others. It 
appears that there was a distinctly individualistic ethos, in which stakeholders viewed 
their own organisation's priorities as far more important than that of others. Finally, 
respondents differed in their views about whether resource control should be 
transferred more to national or to local organisations. While some felt that resource 
control should remain with the national organisations, others argued that local 
government was better placed to carry out the tasks effectively. On both sides there 
were concerns about control resting with a single organisation as this concentration of 
power carried significant risks of misuse.
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8. Results Chapter 
Section 5. Inter-organisational Co-ordination
8.5.1 Introduction
Previous studies emphasise that co-ordination is essential in order to produce 
effective tourism strategies and to avoid duplication of services across different levels 
of government. It is argued in the literature that tourism projects developed by co­
ordinated efforts are likely to have more leverage (Healey 1997). Efficiency would be 
decreased, more expense would be incurred, and tourism development projects would 
be stalled if relevant agencies failed to co-ordinate their efforts on development 
projects (Timothy 1998). While co-operation and co-ordination offer numerous 
potential benefits to organisations, they are political activities and thus difficult to 
achieve, particularly in the tourism sector, where diverse parties are involved in 
decision-making (Hall 2000).
This section examines the level of co-ordination and co-operation between 
parties involved in the Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP). Specific issues 
explored in this section include:
■ Whether there were any restrictions imposed by existing legislation on 
the range and delivery of services provided by the organisations.
■ Whether there was any overlapping of responsibility or authority 
between the parties involved in the BMP.
■ The nature and the extent of co-operation and co-ordination between 
parties involved in the BMP and the reasons for this.
■ The barriers in the way of achieving co-ordination, and the factors that 
might foster effective co-ordination and co-operation.
■ And, whether leaving planning decisions to local or national 
organisations would hinder or help the co-ordination of Belek's tourism 
planning.
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8.5.2 Legislation and the tourism services provided by stakeholder 
organisations
22) “Are there any tourism-related services that your
organisation would like to provide but is not able to under 
the present legislation?”
Quite a high proportion of stakeholders involved in the BMP felt that the 
existing legislative framework had hindered the provision of new attractions and 
services and development of new economic activities for local people, this being the 
view of 14 of the 30 respondents. Some of these respondents also stated that the 
legislative framework had complicated the designation of recreational areas, such as 
picnicking areas, and the planning for tourist facilities within Belek region. Table
8.5.1 shows the responses of these 14 respondents, and it shows that they tended to 
mention several tourism services hindered by the legislation.
Table 8.5.1 Tourism services hindered by the legislative framework
Services that were considered to be hindered Stakeholders who mentioned that
this service was hindered
Establishment and management o f a botanical garden 
Establishment o f recreational areas around Kumkoy 
Diversification o f economic activities for local villagers 
Pathways for jogging
NPS
Establishment and management of a theme park
Control over tourists facilities run by the Ministry of Tourism
Control over activities o f Betuyab
Municipality
Provision of cohesive and complementary services 
Control over second home development 
Diversification o f attractions (such as a marina development) 
Construction o f bridges to facilitate access to the beaches of
Betuyab
neighbouring areas
Diversification of attractions (such as a marina development) Ministry o f Tourism
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Control over activities o f Municipalities and o f national 
organisations
Introduction and management o f cave tourism in the region District Government
Two respondents from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) explained that 
they were planning to open a botanical garden in the region in order to preserve 
fragile native vegetation and provide the region with an additional attraction. They 
contended that they had confronted problems in relation to the park management as 
the legislation states that park management is under the jurisdiction of municipalities 
and that municipalities cannot delegate park management to an NGO. One NPS 
representative claimed that instituting a partnership between a municipality and civil 
society was frowned upon within the current administrative system. The NPS 
representatives also identified other tourism-related services they could not put into 
practice due to legislative blockages. They stated that the existing legislation stopped 
them from establishing recreational areas in the Kumkoy reserve, from helping 
diversify economic activities, and from designating zones where tourists could jog 
safely. They also complained that the uncertainties of the legislation, and the frequent 
changes in politics and power balances in the region, meant that they were uncertain 
whether the proposed marina development project in Kumkoy reserve would be 
reviewed because of its adverse environmental impacts.
One ex-Mayor claimed that the existing legislative framework hindered the 
provision of some municipal services, and his strongest complaint was that the 
municipalities were not allowed to inspect some of the tourist facilities operating 
within their boundaries as these are controlled by the Ministry of Tourism. In the view 
of this ex-Mayor, inspection of tourist facilities by two different organisations (some 
by the MOT and some by the municipalities) was also impeding service 
standardisation in the region. Based on the researcher's own observation and on the 
interviews, it appears that the central control of resources and intervention in 
decision-making, as prescribed by the constitution, as well as the financial 
dependency of municipalities on central government, are important factors inhibiting 
the provision of timely and adequate infrastructure by the municipalities in the region.
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The Betuyab representatives complained that even their operations were 
severely constrained by the current legislation. It appears that current legislation 
prohibits the close working of a limited company, in this case Betuyab, with a central 
government organisation for joint action. The two Betuyab representatives agreed that 
their organisation was inhibited from joint working not only by the law but also by 
misconceptions that private and public sector co-operation was being used to provide 
favours to a few individuals or "cronies". While some respondents argued that 
legislation should be eased to allow partnership working, two representatives 
expressed reservations in that public-private sector partnerships would fail in Belek 
largely due to the lack of resources of central government organisations. This can be 
illustrated by the proposal for partnership working to fight mosquitoes in the area. 
Here Betuyab sought to co-operate with the Ministries of Health and of Environment 
in order to ensure that the mosquito battle could be expanded well beyond the borders 
of Belek town. One respondent explained that harnessing their joint resources was 
essential because “a mosquito flies over a 12 km distance”. The respondent, who 
thought that central government organisations were inadequately resourced, asserted 
that “we [Betuyab] offered that Betuyab would provide technical equipment and staff 
and they [the Ministry of Environment] should provide the pesticide. We even 
suggested that they would have controlling authority over our activities.. .but this 
offer was turned down by the Ministry.. .what they said was that they were not able to 
allocate funds for buying the pesticide”. Additionally, the Betuyab representatives 
argued that some of the problems related to second home development in the area 
stemmed from legislative ambiguities, this being largely under the jurisdiction of the 
municipalities.
8.5.3 Similar responsibilities and authority between 
organisations
23) “Which other local or national organisations, if  any, have 
similar responsibility and authority in relation to tourism 
planning in Belek to that of your organisation?”
As many as 14 of the 30 respondents indicated that there were national and 
local organisations with similar responsibilities and authority in relation to tourism
2 6 1
planning and management. A government official considered that “there is certainly 
an abundance of organisations with similar responsibilities, that have authority in 
tourism. They clog our [Ministry of Tourism] progress due to the powers resulting 
from their higher position, and we try to offset their effect whenever and however 
possible”. Another provincial government respondent who thought there were 
jurisdictional overlaps and ambiguities, particularly between central government 
environmental and tourism organisations in the region, explained that the provincial 
units of the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of 
Culture provide almost identical services in Belek. While their duties are clearly 
specified by relevant laws, Betuyab had taken over some of their responsibilities 
because of changing politics and resource constraints. Betuyab representatives 
explained that they were fulfilling almost similar duties to those of normal 
municipalities, such as garbage collection, monitoring in the region, fire fighting, and 
infrastructure development. Taking over some of these responsibilities was said to be 
necessary, in order to facilitate municipal growth and because these municipalities 
had been established very recently and thus they lacked basic equipment, including a 
municipal headquarters building. Similar views were expressed by three locals who 
noted that there were specific responsibilities falling into the jurisdiction of both 
provincial and local governments. According to these locals, the unbalanced 
allocation of functions between tiers of government had led to a fragmentary 
provision of public services at the local level and had given local governments no 
basis from which to stimulate tourism development.
A significant proportion of the respondents -twelve- attributed the overlap of 
responsibilities between national organisations partly to the process in Turkey by 
which new responsibilities for national organisations came into existence, without old 
ones being stopped. A central government official who thought that the Ministry of 
Environment (MoE) and the Ministry of Culture held similar responsibilities, 
explained that “prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, there has 
been an article stating that the Ministry of Culture (MoC) can do protection and 
conservation work in tourism zones.. .despite our establishment [MoE], this article 
has not been changed yet”. The official concluded that the “declaration of protection 
zones shouldn’t be within the jurisdiction of the MoC because they don’t know what
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criteria there are for the strictly protected zones or for recreation zones. In fact, it 
should only be under the jurisdiction of MoE so as to clarify the confusion”.
8.5.4 Stakeholder organisations working together
24) “Are all national and local organisations involved in tourism 
planning in Belek working together effectively to achieve the 
objectives of the BMP? If not, which local and national 
organisations are not working together effectively to achieve 
the objectives of the BMP, and why is this the case?”
In chapter four section 4.2 it was argued that co-ordination and co-operative 
relations between national and local organisations were central to successful tourism 
development. In this survey, many respondents -  eleven - felt that the most 
elaborately formulated policies and projects would come to a naught if  the 
implementation of their components was carried out in a diffuse manner. One 
provincial government official stressed that co-ordination was a major problem in the 
region. The direct observations of the researcher and the interviews suggest that it is a 
real challenge in the Belek area:
■ to get relevant organisations to inform each other of their activities;
■ to agree on measures to prevent an overlap of work and to co-ordinate 
the timing of activities, so that they complement rather than duplicate 
or negate one another;
■ to agree on measures to prevent competition between one another; and
■ to orchestrate their efforts to achieve the goals of the BMP.
Seven of the 30 respondents indicated that there were times when 
organisations involved in the (BMP) would work together effectively, this not being 
an insignificant proportion. However, their comments and that of others also suggest 
that there were occasions when the organisations worked together extremely 
disjointedly, for several reasons. One Ministry of Environment representative thought 
that in the formulation stage, the atmosphere between parties was easy-going. 
According to him: “all parties had goodwill and good intentions to make a success of
263
the plan, and they worked in harmony”. But he argued that at the implementation 
stage, the national organisations in particular were not eager to compromise on their 
authority. A local, who referred to a number of different implementing organisations 
claimed that: “the more diverse the orientations the more difficult the planning and 
implementation process becomes”. He identified conflicting organisational 
expectations which had not been successfully settled at the start of the plan as a key 
factor inhibiting co-ordination. Similarly, four local respondents claimed that 
organisations at the local level were not working together in harmony. A local 
remarked that “none of the municipalities were getting along with one another, or 
with other local organisations, because of the so-called battle for rent and due to 
partisanship”. Another respondent agreed that there were uncooperative relations 
between the municipalities, illustrating this with the following example: “when one of 
the municipalities needed a space where they could dispose of their rubbish, then the 
one [municipality] behind the shoreline, despite its availability, didn’t want to provide 
the other with the available space”. The Mayor of the town that was claimed to have 
this space for dumping and processing waste, admitted that “the [other] municipality 
will reap the benefit, so why should I deal with its litter problem?”
Two Betuyab representatives stated that not only were they unable to work 
effectively with several national organisations, but also they had disruptive arguments 
with the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) over the protective measures taken in the 
early 1990s. However, a local respondent who agreed that Betuyab and the NPS 
opposed each other on many occasions, also gave examples of joint co-operative 
action between them: “there was hostile publicity put out by the Greek Nature 
Preservation Society. At that time, the NPS stood behind Betuyab and they gave a 
joint counter-attack to that hostile publicity”. Another indication of some co-operative 
relations between these two organisations is when Betuyab offered a furnished office 
to the NPS officials after the closure of their office in Belek due to them having a 
financial crisis at that time. In response to this generous suggestion, the NPS officials 
stated that Betuyab was carrying out activities of interest to the NPS very 
successfully, and thus the NPS did not need to occupy an office in the area and it 
should concentrate its efforts on another area. Further, the Betuyab representatives 
explained that, although the NPS had withdrawn partly from the area lately, the 
relation between NPS and Betuyab continued. For example, in light of proposals by
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the NPS, Betuyab had embarked on a marine turtle project and it carried out this 
project in collaboration with Hacettepe University. They considered that the project 
had been a success and they had shared the information with the NPS.
Representatives of Betuyab considered that their liaison with the Military 
Police was essential because the region wanted to provide a safe environment for 
visitors and to enforce environmental measures to conserve the area's natural richness. 
A Betuyab respondent viewed this as “an excellent example of public-private sector 
partnership”. He explained that “for the first time in Turkey, a joint effort with the 
gendarme and the Ministry of Forestry was made to install an emergency 
communication system (wireless radio system) (WDS), in order to react urgently and 
swiftly to fires and other problems”. This system appears to have quickened the 
response time to fires and other security-related problems in the region: “If the 
problem concerns safety, burglary, or a traffic accident, thanks to the WDS we can 
inform the relevant bodies, and this network of communication allows us to respond 
more quickly to problems. This network of communication is really functioning well, 
and helping our work to a great extent”.
8.5.5 Barriers to co-ordination and co-operation
25) “Is there anything about the ways things are done which tends 
to limit co-ordination and co-operation between national and 
local organisations involved in the BMP?”
The literature reviewed in chapter four, section 4.3 suggests that three 
conditions must be present before significant co-ordination can occur. Parties must 
have shared goals, complementary resources, and efficient control mechanisms for 
whatever exchanges are involved (Reid 1997). Similarly, in a study of employment 
training and development partnerships, various correlates of effective partnerships 
were identified (Waddock 1991). According to this study, partners need to trust other 
parties, have adequate power to make decisions for their organisation, and recognise 
that they are interdependent in order to resolve issues. Waddock’s list of correlates 
also includes the clarity of organisational objectives, a balance of power among 
participants, and strong leadership within the partnership. A common goal is often
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identified as a necessary condition for co-ordination and co-operation. However, Reid 
(1997) argues that, while sharing a goal may be a necessary condition, it is not in 
itself sufficient. Each party must also be able to provide the others with the resources 
they need to achieve their goals in order for co-operative exchange to occur. The 
literature suggests that to accomplish co-ordination much more may be needed than 
bringing agencies together, developing channels of communication between them, 
and providing mediation. Whetten (1981) identifies some other conditions that must 
be met in order for voluntary and mandatory co-ordination to occur (Whetten 1981). 
First, it is necessary for decision-makers to have a positive attitude towards inter- 
organisational co-ordination. Next, they must recognise an organisational need for 
co-ordination that is salient enough to justify absorbing the costs inherent in co­
ordination. And, finally, the participating agencies must assess their capacity to 
adequately manage the on-going co-ordination process.
In response to this question, the stakeholders interviewed for this study did 
identify some of these barriers reported in previous research. Many respondents 
identified more than one barrier. Table 8.5.2 shows the stakeholder organisations and 
the barriers that they identified in the way of an effective co-ordination of activities 
related to the Belek Management Plan (BMP). Perhaps not surprisingly (see chapter 
six), quite a significant proportion of respondents from both national and local parties 
- seven - considered that policy-making and programme implementation, was even 
more complex than usual in the Belek case. The process demanded an unusual degree 
of multi-sectoral involvement and inter-institutional linkages. Quite a high proportion 
of the stakeholders involved in the BMP felt that managing a tourism development 
programme within the current administrative system was a challenge and they offered 
several explanations in support of this contention. Among the most frequently 
mentioned difficulties were the absence of inter-organisational co-ordination, the 
bureaucratisation of the programme, a low technical and administrative capability 
among the parties, political ineptness, and an inadequate monitoring and evaluation of 
the programme. Local representatives also identified bureaucratic traditions, a lack of 
understanding of the value of co-operation and co-ordination, and an unwillingness to 
devote time and resources to giving the assistance required for co-ordination, as other 
barriers ( see Table 8.5.2). National institutions were blamed for not being able clearly 
to set out their objectives for their provincial organisations. Other barriers identified
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by the respondents were a lack of information circulated among the institutions, a lack 
of resources necessary to put an organisation's responsibilities into action, and the 
absence of an organisation set up to co-ordinate the activities in Belek. These barriers 
are now examined in more detail.
Table 8.5.2 Barriers to co-ordination and co-operation
Perceived barriers to co-ordination and co-operation Stakeholder organisation that 
mentioned the barrier
The institutional set up 
Lack o f  communication 
Different organisational ideologies 
Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy 
Low inter-organisational trust 
Bureaucratic traditions 
Uneven resource distribution 
A difficult external environment 
Under- recognition o f  the need to work with each other.
NPS
The institutional set up 
Different organisational ideologies 
Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy 
Lack o f  communication 
Low inter-organisational trust.
Betuyab
The institutional set up
Lack o f  communication and geographical distance 
Different organisational ideologies 
Inter-organisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy, 
Low inter-organisational trust.
Municipalities
The institutional set up 
Bureaucratic traditions 
Lack o f  communication
Interorganisational perceptions, rivalries and jealousy 
Under- recognition o f  the need to work with each other.
National organisations
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8.5.5.1 The institutional set up as a barrier to co-ordination
The term “turf protection” is used in the literature as a catchall phrase to 
capture many of the barriers to inter-organisational co-operation or co-ordination.
The literature suggests that the problems are accentuated in a pluralistic political 
system that generates a plethora of programmes and agencies over time in order to 
address similar and often overlapping needs. And the growing use of a broad array of 
service providers complicates matters further. Associated barriers to co-ordination 
include separate missions, competing legal mandates, distinct constituencies, 
competition for resources, overlapping political and geographic domains, duplication 
of administration, services, and funding sources, and an inequitable distribution of 
funding.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the Belek case the division of authority between 
organisations was one of the most frequently mentioned barriers stopping parties from 
engaging in co-ordinative and co-operative relations. As many as fourteen 
respondents mentioned that the clashes over authority and overlapping of 
responsibilities stemming from the current institutional set up were a generic problem 
that applied not only to Belek but also to other tourism centres in Turkey. Conflicts 
over authority were said to happen between central and local government and also 
between central ministries and their local branches. The Betuyab representatives also 
considered that co-ordination between the national organisations was poor. One 
respondent referred to the Kumkoy marina development project in Belek as a typical 
example of co-ordination failure. The area had already been designated as a tourism 
centre by the Ministry of Tourism, but he explained that the Ministry of Culture then 
declared the area a first degree Specially Protected Zone in order to pre-empt a marina 
development project. In the view of this respondent, this had not only prohibited any 
kind of physical development within the specified borders, but it had also thwarted 
any potential co-ordination and co-operation between these two ministries in the 
future.
A significant proportion of these respondents -eleven- described the 
institutional set-up as too fragmented, complex or ambiguous, particularly in the 
delegation of responsibilities. The low level of co-ordination between national and 
local organisations reflected the limited cross-sectoral approach to problem solving
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which characterises Turkey’s administrative culture (see chapter six). With specific 
reference to Belek, it was stated that there were more than thirty organisations 
entrusted with various responsibilities related to coastal protection and management. 
Additionally, there were at least ten laws concerning tourism, environment and 
culture. Many stakeholders interviewed in this study stated that co-ordination of 
tourism development planning and implementation was difficult to achieve because of 
the very practical nature of these problems, and because of the complexity and scale 
of the institutional system. From their point of view, the main obstacle tended to be 
the management culture, which should be characterised by co-operation, joint 
decision-taking, and the sharing of information. It appears that the current Turkish 
context of central-local relations lacks this administrative culture, and instead there is 
only a limited and largely one-way dialogue between central and local government 
organisations.
A district government (the administration level between villages and cities) 
respondent considered that the unofficial transference of power from the Ministry of 
Tourism to Betuyab had caused a major problem in terms of co-ordination and co­
operation in the region. A national organisation official, who shared a similar view on 
the transference of power to Betuyab, thought that in addition to there being 
ambiguous authority in the legislative framework, such arrangements were actually 
preventing tourism development in the region. Another telling example of ambiguous 
authority and poor co-ordination in the area was the complex case of the Kumkoy 
marina development. A local government official explained it thus: “.. .by law, the 
Ministry of Tourism (MoT) has to implement all decisions taken by the Higher 
Planning Commission (HPC). The HPC had decided that the Ministry should develop 
a marina in Kumkoy. The ministry is obliged to fulfil this decision, since a higher 
authority orders it. They [MoT] designated the area for marina development. In the 
face of such development, quite rightly the NPS, the Ministry of Culture (MoC) and 
the Ministry of Environment (MoE) had lobbied together and disagreed with the 
designation. The MoT was telling them that they were executing a decision given by a 
higher authority, so they [NPS, MoC, MoE] should be lobbying against this authority. 
To cut the long story short, an investor who qualified for work in the earmarked area, 
started to construct the proposed project. However, the MoC declared the area 
immediately as a first degree Specially Protected Zone, as this was under their
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jurisdiction. The construction project had to be stalled. As the investor had acquired 
the land from the MoT, the Ministry was pressurising him to finish the construction 
before the deadline. Otherwise they [MoT] would start litigation. The Ministry of 
Culture was making statements.. .claiming that he [the investor] could not dare to 
hammer in even a single nail.. .all the affected institutions attacked the investor. The 
poor investor was saying that he was not guilty. He was a qualified investor and the 
Ministry had given him an earmarked area, and everything was legal. He was not told 
that he should be extra careful, as some other central organisations could develop 
obstacles. The controversy and conflict of authority over the area made the investor 
suffer bad consequences. In short, his investment had been wasted because of the lack 
of co-ordination among these national institutions”.
8.5.5.2 Organisational rivalries and jealousy as barriers to co-ordination
It is argued in the literature that as organisations interact over a period of time, 
particular images of each other take form and are institutionalised. These images 
become difficult to change. When an organisation interprets the other as a threat, 
whether it be founded or unfounded, future attempts at co-ordination will generally 
fail (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Fox (1982) argues that “when decision-making for 
both parties to a conflict adheres to rigid images of each other, there is little likelihood 
that even genuine attempts to resolve the issue will have the desired effects. Such an 
argument suggests that communication with adversaries remain almost impossible”. 
Organisations remain reluctant to co-ordinate with the parties with lower status and 
that allegedly may be incompetent. However, the fear of losing organisational 
prestige and strategic position may have very little to do with the competency and 
legitimacy of the other party.
Based on direct observation by the researcher and the interviews, it is apparent 
that some organisations had negative perceptions of other organisations involved in 
the BMP. A significant proportion of local respondents -  seven -  were critical about 
central officials having preconceptions about the capabilities of local organisations. 
One local respondent explained that local government activities were generally being 
considered extrinsic to central concerns. Several of these respondents felt that central 
government had ignored the opportunity to work through local authorities, and thus it 
was likely that the chances of achieving widespread participation in the development
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effort was weakened and mistrust could develop. The NPS representatives also 
complained that the central organisations had an institutional prejudice toward their 
organisation. Another local respondent who represented a municipality in the region 
encapsulated the attitudes of central government in this way: “They [ central. 
government] act always like this. Be suspicious. Say what you want. Drag your feet 
and keep doing what you have always done”. Five local respondents felt that a major 
barrier to orchestrated co-ordination was that the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of 
Environment, and the Ministry of Culture had strong historical perceptions of one 
another as competitors. This appears often to have resulted in a refusal to work 
together. One respondent from a local organisation remarked that “I guess that co­
ordination is not regarded as a useful solution to the remedy of institutional 
problems... the directors of these [national] organisations do not hold a positive 
attitude toward the accomplishment of inter-institutional co-ordination.. .it is a 
cultural thing”.
As was found for local respondents, a similar number of central government 
officials also commented on the institutional competition and jealousy among central 
government organisations. Some stated that certain central institutions tended to 
disallow projects developed by another institution for no sensible reason, and this 
undermined the work of the other institution and reduced its prestige among the 
public. One Ministry of Tourism official explained that “there is an enormous dispute 
and conflict between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Work and 
Resettlement (MoWR). The Ministry of Tourism (MoT) formulates and draws up 
plans but the MoWR does not ratify these plans. When the MoWR does something 
without consultation with relevant parties, including the MoT, this time the Ministry 
of Tourism disapproves their plan concerning tourism development sites”. The 
responses in the interviews also suggest that organisational rivalry has characterised 
relationships between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture. It appears 
that the main issue giving rise to conflicts between these two is authority over the 
designation of cultural and historical assets for the use of tourism. One Ministry of 
Tourism (MoT) official explained that when the MoT wanted to designate a region as 
a tourism centre, it was usually the case that after a month of its declaration, the 
Ministry of Culture declares the same region as a specially protected zone (SPA). 
According to another official from the MoT, this was very unproductive: “designation
of a zone for tourism involves painstaking work.. .first, we make several visits to the 
area in order to assess its conditions (economic, social, environmental, etc) with a 
number of staff (city planner, economist, landscape designer, geophysical engineer, 
etc.)”. His main dissatisfaction was that “other ministries (including the Ministry of 
Culture) have recently been established and they lack sufficient information and 
knowledge about the area which is proposed as a development zone... but after its 
declaration they make visits to the area.. .and then declares it as an SPZ.. .the result is 
a waste of organisational resources”. In the view of this respondent, while the MoT 
appears to advise other relevant ministries to make an inventory of sensitive regions 
in Turkey and to help establish criteria about what sorts of development would be 
allowed within those locations, these ministries do not respond.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Betuyab representatives agreed that a big 
hindrance to co-operation was the "wall" that was put up by the municipalities in the 
region. One Betuyab member complained that “although the wall of Berlin has been 
abolished, we are unsuccessful in demolishing the "wall" between our organisation 
and the municipalities.. .This does not result from our incompetence, rather it arises 
from their stubborn attitude”. According to another Betuyab member, “they 
[municipalities] have not been able to stomach the existence of our organisation. To 
be honest with you, they take our organisation as a mine from which they can take 
away resources necessary for their existence any time they want. Their relation with 
us is strongly based on our financial aid”. From Betuyab's point of view, this attitude 
played a crucial role in inhibiting co-operation between the two. A local respondent, 
also remarked how the “Municipalities are tussling over power with each other, and 
the situation in Ankara [the capital city] is not that different at all”.
8.5.5.3 Different organisational ideologies as a barrier to co-ordination
Quite a high proportion of stakeholders -ten- involved in the BMP identified 
differences in organisational ideologies, philosophies and expectations as a factor 
curtailing the establishment of co-ordination and co-operative relations among the 
participants. Clearly, as one local Mayor conceded, it is likely that the more diverse 
the objectives, the more difficult the planning and implementation becomes. The 
Mayor who thought there were simply far too many institutions involved, compared 
the situation to “the law of nature whereby striking two unlike substances together
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produces a spark”. A similar view was expressed by a private sector respondent, who 
noted that “there is no collective mentality in the region and each institution wants to 
cut the cake on its own... the municipalities try to cut a big piece for themselves, the 
Ministry of Work and Resettlement do the same... so does the Ministry of Culture”.
Based on the interviews and various documents, it is apparent that the Nature 
Preservation Society (NPS) seeks a more sustainable form of tourism development in 
the area which directly benefits the local community. They wish to tap the vast 
tourism potential while also preserving the cultural and natural environment, and with 
these resources enhancing the visitors' stay. In the interviews the NPS respondents 
explained that they wanted a form of tourism that respects local wishes and that 
provides real economic opportunities for the local community. They felt that their 
organisation would benefit the local community, but agreed that they had failed to 
achieve a large part of their objectives because of the ideological differences between 
the locals, the NPS and Betuyab in terms of how best to use the tourism assets of the 
region. These ideological differences between the NPS, local people and other 
organisations involved in the BMP were encapsulated thus by one NPS respondent: 
“Our [NPS] purpose was not to get buildings demolished in the area. As you know, 
infrastructure development in the area had started already in 1986 and had finished 
long before we started on this management project. Neither was our purpose in Belek 
to create a turtle heaven. Our main aim was to take measures to prevent deterioration 
in the area, including taking measures to maintain water quality .. .we were aiming at 
the sustainability and viability of tourism in the region.. .we did not have any 
sanctioning power, as the villagers themselves had to become convinced”. She 
considered that the NPS lost its prestige and support from the local community 
because it had objectives that are not compatible with those of the community. For 
example, this representative thought that the NPS had different priorities from 
Betuyab and local people on the matter of bridge construction, conceding that “we 
resisted the idea of constructing a bridge over the Acisu River, as it would threaten the 
ecological system.. .but since we had gained an image as an organisation resisting 
every development, we had lost favour among local people”. Such comments do 
suggest that parties that are unshakably on opposite sides ideologically on tourism- 
related issues can find it very difficult to form relations for co-ordination and co­
operation.
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8.5.5.4 Lack of communication and low trust as barriers to co-ordination
It is argued in the literature that the performance of organisations in any given 
setting can be severely hampered when the agencies know little about one another 
(Njoh 1993). Without the sharing of information, then the differences and similarities 
between organisations and the aspects of their agendas and approaches which can be 
used as the starting point for co-ordination will remain unrecognised. A lack of 
communication increases the knowledge gap between local communities and 
decision-makers, and it also accelerates the isolation of local communities from the 
tourism development process. Consequently, the knowledge gaps between central 
authorities and local communities make it difficult for a host community to participate 
in joint arrangements for tourism development.
While stakeholders involved in the BMP agreed that information sharing was 
an important issue for co-ordination, their interview responses suggest that in practice 
there had been limited communication between some parties. Nine of the 30 
respondents identified limited communication, such as between the public and private 
sectors and between national and local organisations, as a major obstacle to achieving 
effective co-ordination and co-operation. Two local respondents stated that the level 
of communication between the municipalities and local people was not at all 
encouraging, concluding that this was partly because local people were traditionally 
not much inclined to participate in municipal decision-making processes. Six 
respondents thought that the national institutions hardly communicated among 
themselves and much less with the public. Some of these respondents had lost 
confidence in the BMP as a result. The municipalities and other local institutions felt 
somewhat powerless in relation to Betuyab and the tourism investors, and this might 
help explain why they seldom met or communicated with each other. Two Betuyab 
representatives agreed that communication was poor, but attributed this to specific 
local circumstances, including the newness of the municipalities. As many as five 
respondents in national organisations agreed that the region's municipalities were not 
very keen to communicate with national organisations. One Ministry of Tourism 
official explained that “no municipality has approached our ministry to say that they 
want to do such-and-such things to improve the appearance of their location and 
environment.. .no mayor stated that five-six storey buildings were eye sores and they
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wanted have a new regulation, or at least adhere to the existing legislation”. By 
contrast, three of the mayors identified Betuyab as a barrier preventing 
communication and they accused Betuyab of holding on to much relevant information 
and not sharing it with the municipalities. While there seems to have been some level 
of agreement among respondents as to conservation of the environment, quite a few 
local respondents, five, felt that many organisations, including Betuyab, had hidden 
agendas in this respect which they had not explained at the early BMP meetings. 
Despite there being little indication that exchanges of information occurred between 
the municipalities, one Mayor thought that “Betuyab breaks the harmony between 
organisations. They don't inform us about their operations. Besides, they don't take 
into account our views in any way”.
According to the literature (see chapter five), when a party has had little contact 
with another organisation, perceptions of each other have not had time to form and 
become institutionalised, and distrust may then arise. However, vested interests play a 
crucial role in hindering moves toward co-ordination. Related differences in 
organisational ideologies can generate conflict, rather than co-operation. Building 
trust is increasingly seen as fundamental to good management of inter-organisational 
relations. Trust constitutes the central organisational glue within networked 
organisations. The greater the level of trust, the less the need for negotiation over 
matters or detail (and a reduction in friction or transaction costs), and the greater the 
opportunity for long-term planning, risk-taking and innovation. The interview 
responses indicate that trust was relatively low among the respondents, this 
specifically being stated by six of them. The Betuyab respondents clearly felt very 
little trust in relation to the region's municipalities. A Betuyab representative, who had 
worked in the area for more than eleven years, was critical of the abilities of the local 
mayors: “at the moment, these elected mayors do not have the capability, 
management experience, or the skills that are required for the position they occupy. 
They all come from different backgrounds unrelated to tourism. For example, the 
Kadriye Mayor used to be a bus driver, the Mayor of Belek was a taxi driver, the 
Mayor of Bogazkent was dealing in trade, and the Serik Mayor is an engineer... as 
you can see they have no relation with tourism whatsoever. The only relation that 
they have with tourism is the rent created by the tourism development that has taken 
place in their environment”.
Representatives of the Nature Preservation Society (NPS) remarked that local 
people had lost their trust in their organisation due in part to inaccurate rumours: 
“Fishermen in Kumkoy were made to believe that we [NPS] were operating in their 
environment to prevent them from fishing. Locals said to us that we had stopped the 
fishing in Dal’yan [another area under environmental protection] and had the police 
confiscate fishing boats. I do not know where they got this information, but this is not 
true”. One of the NPS representatives noted also that rumours indicating that the 
villagers had started forest fires had led to growing mistrust between the villagers and 
other organisations: “the villagers are blamed for the current fires. However, the 
same villagers could have burnt the area several years ago. It is curious why it did not 
happen then, but happens now”. These representatives felt that Betuyab might have 
been behind these rumours in order to weaken the image of NPS: “Such incidents 
spoiled our communication and contacts with Betuyab for a long time, as these two 
institutions viewed each other as enemies. As there was no confidence in one another, 
we were not able to co-operate”. She further added: “To what extent can you trust in 
Betuyab, an organisation observing investors’ interests”, a comment which hints at 
deep ideological fractures and dissent.
8.5.5.5 Partisanship as a barrier to co-ordination
As many as nine of the 30 respondents stated that the municipalities were not 
working co-operatively with each other, and this was usually explained as due to 
different political opinions and to partisanship. Several of them thought that each of 
the municipalities in the region had tried to undermine each other's activities because 
of partisanship and misconceptions between the political parties. One local 
respondent felt that “the partisanship really does hinder the building of co-operative 
relations, as a mayor becomes reluctant to press the button of a facility [water 
treatment plant] built by the ex-Mayor of the opposing party. This is ridiculous, but 
true”. Additionally, in the view of five local participants, municipal ambitions and 
greed were related major factors inhibiting co-operation among the municipalities.
8.5.5.6 Under-recognition of interdependence as a barrier to co­
ordination
Seven respondents noted that under-recognition of the need for organisations
to work with each other had significantly hampered co-ordination and co-operation. 
For example, an official from the Ministry of Tourism complained that each party 
involved in the BMP assumed itself to be more important than others. Observation by 
the researcher and the interviews both suggest that the organisations often viewed 
themselves as independent, regularly acting alone and sharing few or no common 
goals.
8.5.5.7 Abuse of power as a barrier to co-ordination
Four respondents from national organisations stated that there was a tendency, 
particularly among the municipalities, to abuse their authority, and they felt this had 
generated antagonism and alienation among other parties. One respondent from 
Betuyab also indicated that, when the municipalities could not obtain what they 
wanted from Betuyab, they would try to coerce Betuyab through other means. He 
supported his assertion with the following example: “although there are no obvious 
visible faults [with the tourist facilities] they [the municipality officials who have the 
right to inspect tourist facilities within their municipal borders] come up with reports 
indicating faults, in order to complicate and stifle our progress, and force us to accept 
other things they wanted”.
8.5.5.8 Low commitment as a barrier to co-ordination
Two NPS representatives contended that inter-organisational co-operation 
between national and local parties involved in the BMP was weak due to their being 
insufficient commitment. One NPS representative drew attention to differences in the 
degree of commitment of different organisations to the BMP, and she illustrated her 
point with the following comparison: “It is like when your tutor assigns you to a team 
of five students and gives you an assignment to be prepared within a deadline. There 
is only one student who is diligent and who studies hard to get the assignment 
completed on time. The rest are lazy and lean on the industrious student, and are not 
concerned about who needs to do what, when, where, how and why.. .But they are 
ready to take all the credit, or to put the blame for failure on the single hard- working 
student when things go wrong”. Local respondents shared similar views to that of the 
NPS respondents, and there was a sense that, if tourism had become difficult to 
administer in the region, this was partly because of the indifference of the national 
organisations.
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8.5.6 Suggestions for improved co-ordination
26) “Can you suggest changes in the procedure and policies, 
which would encourage greater co-ordination and co­
operation between national and local organisations in relation 
to Belek?”
In response to this question, as many as 22 respondents who had participated 
in the BMP suggested conditions that needed to be met for there to have been more 
successful co-ordination and co-operation. Seven conditions or issues were 
mentioned, and they are shown in Table 8.5.3. Many of these suggestions add support 
to those identified in the research literature, as reviewed in chapter five. A common 
view among the respondents was that changes were needed not only in procedures 
and policies, but also in how people viewed co-operation and co-ordination. Half of 
the respondents- fifteen of the 30 - indicated that there was a need for mandatory 
forms of co-ordination. The suggestion being mentioned by the next largest number of 
respondents was a need for parties to exchange and share information. An enabling 
environment was mentioned as being important for co-ordination by eleven 
respondents. Two other suggestions mentioned quite often were that the parties 
needed to recognise the need to work with others, and that they should have positive 
attitudes and a commitment to co-ordination and co-operation. The need for parties to 
hold similar beliefs and expectations was mentioned by nine respondents. The 
academic literature also suggests that if organisations share little in common then they 
will have little incentive to co-operate (Whetten 1981). On the other hand, the theory 
suggests that if they share too much, then they are likely to perceive one another as 
competitors and refuse to work together. The suggestions identified in Table 8.5.3 are 
now evaluated further.
Table 8.5.3 Suggestions for the improvement of co-ordination and co­
operation
Suggestions fo r  improved co-ordination and co-operation Number o f  respondents
mentioning the suggestion 
Forms o f co-ordination need to be made mandatory 15
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Parties need to exchange and share information with others
An enabling environment needs to be created
Parties need to recognise the need to work with others
Parties need to have trust in each other
Need for a positive commitment to co-ordination
Parties need to have similar beliefs and expectations 9
9
10
11
10
14
8.5.6.1 The need for some forms of co-ordination to be mandatory
As many as fifteen of the 30 respondents felt that it would be beneficial for 
some forms of co-ordination to be made mandatory in the region. Several of them 
mentioned that it might be useful to have an independent body, empowered with veto 
power, to deal with issues related to development plans in areas of environmental 
importance. Some of these respondents argued that co-ordination would need to be 
backed up by strong legislative support. It was also commented that the existing 
legislative confusion about organisational responsibilities and authority needed to be 
cleared up, such as in relation to the Provincial Bank, the Ministry of Tourism, the 
Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Work and 
Resettlement, and the municipalities. For example, one ex-Mayor considered that 
central government needed to review the legislation in relation to the tasks that the 
municipalities now perform, the kind of functions they could undertake in the future, 
and the resources that they would need to fulfil those functions.
8.5.6.2 The need for more information exchange
As many as fourteen respondents considered that the exchange of information 
in an active dialogue would promote more effective co-ordination. Again this finding 
supports assertions in the literature on inter-organisational relations, as discussed in 
chapter five. Their view of this information exchange appears to have extended to the 
whole relationship, both formal and infonnal, such as joint preparation of plans, joint 
decision-making, and co-operation between different local and central government 
organisations. These respondents also often indicated that co-operation is about 
making optimum use of resources, including each other's knowledge and experiences. 
One respondent indicated that “to ensure co-ordination and co-operation, I think 
managers should be committed to engage in negotiation and conciliation through 
consulting with one another. They have to try to settle their conflicting objectives, and 
find a solution to institutional rivalry”.
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8.5.6.3 The need for an enabling environment
Eleven of the 30 respondents commented on the need for an enabling 
environment for co-ordination. A Municipal Association representative who identified 
that a conducive external environment was important, made the following complaint: 
“look at the political problems we have now.. .Do you think that this is an enabling 
environment for collective action and development?”. The conceptual framework for 
this study similarly identifies the need to examine the wider environment. Some 
respondents specifically mentioned that attention must be paid to resolving past 
conflicts between the parties involved in a management plan, and to understanding the 
real forces influencing the planning process. There was a belief that tourism 
development plans could not work without full participation by the local authorities, 
and by other local institutions. Some respondents seem to have recognised that an 
underestimation or negligence of the institutional forces influencing the planning 
process can produce unwanted consequences. One Betuyab representative agreed that 
legislative support is necessary for collaboration in tourism planning, but he felt this 
was simply a matter of exercising existing powers and responsibilities.
8.5.6.4 The need for a positive commitment to co-ordination
Nine of the 30 respondents considered that effective co-ordination depends on 
having a political culture which encourages a commitment to co-ordination, and it 
was seen as still being uncommon in Turkey to find national and local organisations 
working together on a joint project. Two respondents depicted co-ordination as a 
coalition between government organisations where one needs to recognise and settle 
the differences of interests and values of the participating parties in order to maintain 
unity. In the view of one local respondent, when one works painstakingly to find out a 
common benefit, then the “bundle easily got disentangled”. It was felt that in order to 
promote co-ordination in its various dimensions, it was important to have 
commitment and also to institutionalise the appropriate inter-organisational 
relationships.
8.5.7 Whether co-ordination would be helped by local or national 
organisations having greater influence on tourism planning 
decisions
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27) “Would it be likely to help or hinder the co-ordination of 
tourism planning for Belek, if tourism planning decisions 
were left more to local or national government 
organisations?”
Responses to this question suggest there were different views as to whether 
leaving tourism planning decisions to national or local organisations would help or 
hinder the co-ordination of tourism planning in Belek. Among the 30 respondents, a 
very slight majority, that is 16, stated that they would have preferred it if  national 
organisations had more influence on tourism planning decisions in order to help co­
ordination. More specifically, as seen in Table 8.5.4, national organisations are 
preferred for a bigger role in tourism planning primarily by central government 
representatives (4 out of 5), provincial organisations (2 out of 2), the majority of 
private sector organisations (5 out of 6), one third of local organisations (4 out of 12) 
and one of the five voluntary sector organisations. The priority for national 
organisations having this co-ordinating role was for several reasons. For example, this 
was felt appropriate as tourism makes a major contribution to Turkey’s economy, 
because the state was felt to have a key co-ordinating role, and because the central and 
provincial governments were thought to be best placed to see the big picture in order 
to balance national and local interests. On the other hand, other individual 
organisations, such as local organisations or private sector organisations, were not 
preferred above central organisations as on their own they were not considered 
capable of representing a wide range of public interests. Almost half of the 
respondents (14) preferred the setting up of a statutory organisation in which local 
government was represented. This idea was favoured by more than half of the 
representatives of local organisations (6 out of 10), almost all of the voluntary sector 
respondents (4 out of 5), a minority of private sector representatives (1 out of 6), local 
people (2 in total), and one of the five respondents from central organisations.
Table 8.5.4 Preferences for organisations having a bigger role in tourism 
planning in order to aid co-ordination
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The organisation preferred 
fo r a greater role
Number o f  respondents by type 
favouring this organisation
Number o f  respondents 
favouring this organisation
National organisation Central organisations (4) 16
Provincial organisations (2)
Private sector organisations (5)
Local organisations (4)
Voluntary sector organisations (1)
A statutory organisation Local organisations (6) 14
in which local government Local people (2)
is represented Voluntary sector (4)
Private sector (1)
Central organisations (1)
Local organisations _ _
Private sector _ _
organisations
Voluntary organisations - -
Eleven respondents, from both the private sector and national organisations, 
expressed concern that leaving decisions to local organisations would hinder co­
ordination and co-operation. Two Betuyab respondents agreed that leaving the co­
ordination function to municipalities would not produce the desired results because of 
their current management mentality, the political pressures that they suffer, and 
because of the links between the mayor and the voters. Respondents from the 
Ministry of Tourism generally also shared this view. An official from the Ministry of 
Tourism complained: “Look, they [municipalities] are making decisions concerning 
the construction plans. Who is doing it? Make a guess.. .the local hairdresser, local 
butcher, greengrocer, etc. [the members of the municipal board], who have the right 
vested in them to make decisions on construction issues and the development of the 
region. What about their experience, what about their understanding of planning..?”. 
This respondent considered that a central government organisation, empowered with 
adequate authority might help in the co-ordination of tourism planning for Belek.
By contrast, seven respondents from local organisations and the municipalities 
were sceptical about the suitability of national organisations for the task of having a 
stronger co-ordinating role. Respondents in this group felt that the co-ordination of 
activities by central government might not yield the expected results as long as the
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national political culture remained the same, which they depicted as characterised by 
nepotism, cronyism and favouritism. But these respondents also agreed that the 
municipalities would be unable to carry out such a task unless the legislation was 
changed. A major concern was that the distant central elite would be replaced with a 
local elite if co-ordination were left to local organisations without legal amendments. 
Four respondents from the municipalities suggested that it was imperative to 
understand what precluded co-ordination among Turkey’s public institutions before a 
new model for co-ordination could be devised. They felt that the municipalities could 
undertake such a co-ordination task, provided that the problems inherent in the 
present system were identified. They were against co-ordination being undertaken by 
a central institution and they expressed concern that central officials will always have 
different priorities and goals, as well as different views on how to attain them, 
compared with those of local organisations. These local respondents also argued that 
decision-makers should not be geographically distant as that inevitably creates 
communication problems. They were concerned that all attempts at co-ordination 
would be challenged by large quantities of red tape, poor administrative support, and 
authority conflicts, those being the characteristics of Turkey's present administrative 
culture (as examined in chapter six).
However, five respondents, from provincial and national organisations, stated 
that they would not support more authority being given to any single organisation on 
its own. In their view, whatever organisation was to gain extra powers, be it the 
Ministry of Tourism or the Ministry of Environment, this would simply increase the 
irrational use of power and resources. One respondent explained that “ .. .it may do 
more harm than good. If you hand the authority for tourism development to the 
Ministry of Environment, it may be disastrous, as the Ministry of Environment will 
definitely restrict the use of environment resources for tourism. And if you handed 
over authority for environmental management to the Ministry of Tourism, this time 
the Ministry of Tourism would obliterate the environment resources at the expense of 
a thriving tourism industry”. One district government (the administration level 
between villages and cities) respondent, who was dissatisfied with the parties 
complaining about each other's incapacity, explained that “despite all of their 
weaknesses, these institutions [municipalities] do have different strengths that may 
complement one another. My opinion is that these two organisations (central and
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local) should be fused under one vision and a shared goal, and should assemble all 
their strengths to collect information and adapt development policy to the local 
conditions”.
8.5.8 Summary
This section examined views on the co-ordination and co-operation between 
parties involved in the BMP. The interview results indicate that certain conditions 
were required for improved co-ordination and co-operation to have occurred between 
parties involved in the Belek Management Plan (BMP). As was discussed in chapter 
five, co-ordination and co-operation can be a good thing as inter-organisational co­
operation can help organisations to get jobs done more effectively and efficiently. In 
this study the respondents agreed that co-ordination and co-operation could assist in 
preventing the duplication, overlaps and fragmentation of services between parties in 
the region. They also indicated that in practice the co-ordination of activities in 
relation to the BMP was poor.
It was argued in the literature that organisations tend to be more receptive to 
inter-organisational co-operation and co-ordination when they are faced with 
situations of resource scarcity. Resource scarcity can force organisations to enter into 
more co-operative activities in order to stretch their resources to meet rising 
expectations. Interestingly, while there was resource scarcity in Belek, the comments 
suggests that co-ordination and co-operation were not common among the parties 
involved in the BMP. It appears that some parties wanted to benefit without 
contributing to the solution. Respondents gave several explanations as to why co­
ordination was limited in the region. They suggested that co-ordination and co­
operation between the parties largely failed because of the diverse range of public 
organisations involved, each with their own political agendas, and each seeking to 
increase their power. In line with Whetten (1981), it seems that the commitment of 
organisational resources to the BMP was modest for most organisations, and 
consequently the relationships between the different parties were typically less intense 
and less formal, and thus these relationships were difficult to maintain, especially in 
the implementation phase (see chapter five).
Co-ordination between parties was significantly hindered by the strong
opposition to the policies of some national and local parties. Respondents suggested 
several ways to overcome the barriers in the way of co-ordination. Several argued that 
the parties should commit themselves to joint action and that they should 
communicate this commitment to the other parties. Co-ordination was likely to entail 
some national (e.g., the Ministry of Culture) and local organisations (Betuyab) 
relinquishing a degree of control over elements of their responsibilities and power.
But the literature suggests that these organisations are unlikely to relinquish their 
control without receiving in return some concessions to compensate for any negative 
consequences that might result (Davidson 1976). Interestingly, the NPS appears to 
have decided that due to its financial problems it was in its own best interest to 
relinquish its responsibilities and to pass them to Betuyab, even though its position 
was not enhanced and Betuyab has gained more. In accordance with the responses in 
previous sections, the respondents again felt that giving greater authority for the BMP 
to a single organisation would have its own limitations. Many felt it might be better if 
the national and local organisations could be unified in a single organisation so as to 
fuse their strengths and to reduce their individual weaknesses.
This section examined whether there was co-ordination between the 
organisations and activities involved in the BMP. As indicated in the study's 
conceptual framework, the next section now examines what stakeholders think about 
the roles of the other organisations involved in the BMP. Identifying differences and 
similarities in opinions assists in determining the degree of equilibrium between the 
parties involved in formulating and implementing the BMP.
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Chapter 8. Results Chapter
Section 6. The Roles and Activities of the Organisations
8.6.1 Introduction
The conceptual framework developed for this study is premised on the assumption that 
the formulation and implementation of tourism plans is affected by interactions between 
organisations at national, provincial and local levels. It is usual for inter-organisational 
relationships to involve some organisations co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, 
and for others to compete for the same political, financial, informational resources or power. 
The literature reviewed in chapter three suggests that peaceful and harmonious interaction 
based on mutual agreement and the exchange of scarce resources will only be viable where 
each organisation respects the rights of others and where there are viable institutions which 
embody and enforce the rules. These issues are important for the study of central-local 
government relations.
Inter-organisational interactions can be in equilibrium when the relationships between 
two or more organisations are harmonious, non-conflicting, and collaborative. As discussed in 
chapters three and four, there are four interrelated components of this equilibrium: work co­
ordination, domain consensus, ideological consensus, and inter-organisational evaluation. An 
increase or decrease in one component is likely to produce a corresponding increase or 
decrease in other components. For example, domain consensus influences the co-ordination of 
work, that is, the greater the agreement between organisations regarding the appropriate role 
and scope of each, the greater the likely co-ordination of work between them. Domain 
consensus also influences the ideological consensus, that is, the greater the agreement between 
organisations regarding the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their likely 
agreement regarding the nature of their activities. Domain consensus can also influence inter- 
organisational evaluations, that is, the greater the agreement between organisations regarding 
the appropriate role and scope of each, the greater their tendency to evaluate each other 
positively. Similarly, understanding how organisations evaluate the work of each other is 
important, as the more positive the evaluation, the greater the likelihood of co-ordinated
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activity between them. All of these evaluations are relevant to relations between central and 
local government.
The discussion now evaluates the views of the various organisations involved in the 
Belek Coastal Management Plan (BMP) regarding the appropriate roles and scope of the other 
parties in the work related to the plan. This is related in particular to the relative roles of 
central and local government. More specifically, this section aims to identify:
■ The views of the stakeholders concerning the work conducted by the other 
organisations involved in the BMP, including the extent to which there was 
agreement regarding the appropriate roles and activities of central and local 
organisations.
■ And, the views of the various parties as to whether inter-organisational 
relations in Belek would be enhanced if changes were made in the contextual 
environment, notably in the roles of central and local government.
8.6.2 Division of authority and responsibility
28) “How does the division of authority and responsibility between national 
and local organisations in relation to tourism planning in Belek affect 
the implementation of the BMP, if at all?”
Responses to Question 28 suggest that many respondents thought there were flaws in 
the current division of authority and responsibilities between the concerned organisations.
Such dissatisfaction with the current situation perhaps should not be surprising given the 
highly political nature of tourism in the country and the proliferation of state institutions.
Quite a high number of respondents -17 of the 30 - from both national and local 
organisations, agreed that the current division of responsibility and authority between different 
governmental tiers was a major obstacle preventing the BMP's successful implementation. In 
the view of these respondents, land use planning and development authority and related 
responsibilities were divided inappropriately among various sectoral ministries and agencies, 
and between national, provincial and local authorities. This finding lends additional support to 
the contentions discussed in chapter six. A district government official who was dissatisfied
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with the multiple organisations interfering with tourism-related issues, each with differing 
levels of authority and responsibility, explained that this had resulted in a spate of problems 
and brought about unnecessary inter-organisational disputes. A substantial number of 
respondents -  14 -  expressed views suggesting that they felt that integrated activity was 
almost impossible given the current distribution of responsibilities and authority. The current 
situation was considered to produce management ineffectiveness, and to undermine 
accountability, as each party tended to put the blame on each other when things went wrong.
Five respondents, from the Nature Preservation Society (NPS), Betuyab and the 
Ministry of Tourism (MoT), argued that the MoT was relatively powerless in the face of other 
ministries. Despite feeling that the MoT was important due its resources and accumulated 
experience in tourism planning, one Betuyab member conceded that “.. .the Ministry of 
Tourism, which has been set up to manage, develop and promote tourism in the country, is
now earning more hard currency than any other ministry.. .sadly it ranks as the 16^ ministry 
in the government protocol”. The respondent argued that this substantially hampers its ability 
to influence decisions taken by higher ranked institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior, or 
the Higher Planning Council. This view was shared by a respondent from the Nature 
Preservation Society (NPS), who suggested that personal political favours were used by these 
higher institutions to block the work of the MoT, and that this had caused substantial delays. 
Others also indicated that similiar problems apply to relationships between the MoT and other 
central institutions and also the municipalities.
Ten of the 17 respondents who were negative about the division of authority and 
responsibility argued that local government suffered from a lack of authority. Many of these 
felt that the boundaries to municipal authority in relation to the designated tourism 
development areas had not been defined clearly. It was felt that local government lacks 
autonomy to put decisions into practice under its own initiative due to central intervention in 
decisions (see chapter six). Many of them felt the municipalities were aware of the 
significance of tourism for the economy, but they had insufficient powers to develop the 
industry, and this had caused them to feel alienated. Two respondents from the association of 
local authorities thought that central government was extremely interventionist and acting 
largely on political and economic concerns. The interviews suggested that in principle central 
government is enthusiastic to transfer its responsibilities to local government, but that in
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practice it withholds the authority and power. Intervention by central government in the 
management of municipalities, and by the MoT in relation to tourism-related issues, has 
affected relations in the region, and it has created conflicts such as between the existing and 
new organisations in the Belek region. Some respondents also mentioned that delays and 
conflicts had been caused by ambiguities over authority and by local government not 
exercising their legal authority properly for various political reasons.
8.6.3 Suggested organisation to undertake some of the implementation activities 
of central government
29) “Do you believe that some parts of the implementation work of
central government in relation to the BMP could be done more 
effectively by a different organisation? If so, then what parts and what 
organisations would you suggest?”
A substantial 16 of the 30 respondents considered that some of the implementation 
work by central government could be done more effectively by another organisation. It should 
be noted that in response to Question 29, many respondents interpreted the central government 
as being the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). Thus, in the remainder of this section, it should be 
noted that the MoT was widely interpreted as the relevant central government representative. 
Sixteen of the 30 respondents found the MoT relatively ineffective compared to another 
potential organisation, and several explanations were put forward in support of this response. 
Table 8.6.1 presents the explanations offered by these stakeholders. Eleven of them attributed 
the ineffectiveness of the MoT to the current legislation and regulations that have 
marginalized the MoT relative to other ministries. Six respondents from national and local 
organisations felt that the Ministry of Tourism had become subservient to other national 
organisations because of on-going amendments in regulations and legislation and because the 
MoT could not enforce decisions on its own without the approval of other institutions. For 
example, the Ministry had to gain the approval of the Ministry of Work and Resettlement 
when altering construction plans. A central government official explained that “unlike many 
other institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Work and Resettlement, 
the Ministry of Tourism is unfortunately not authorised to spend or channel central financial 
resources without securing other institutions’ approval.. .Ironically, due to the regulations the
289
Ministry [MoT] has to make a request to the Treasury for the transfer of funds for such 
developments. This is an unacceptable practice, considering the amount of hard currency that 
the MoT earns”.
Table 8.6.1 Perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Tourism
Perceived cause of ineffectiveness Number of respondents 
mentioning the cause
Current legislation and regulations 11
Other national organisations with more power 9
Geographical distance 6
Structure and size o f the Ministry 6
Lack o f resilience to political pressures 1
Six respondents considered that the ineffectiveness of the Ministry was closely related 
to its relatively small size in terms of the number of employees or the size of its regional units. 
Three of these respondents suggested that the ministry could be more effective if  it reduced its 
size centrally and increased the size and influence of its regional units. Four respondents felt 
that political pressure from the National Assembly contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
national organisations, including the MoT, an issue that was discussed in chapter six. It was 
felt that central government had become an institution that dealt with almost every small 
detail, and that this meant that central government could not perform its real duties and 
responsibilities adequately. It is evident in the comments that this situation was the source of 
much public disappointment and dissatisfaction.
The 16 respondents who considered that some central government work could be done 
more effectively by another organisation were asked about what organisations should 
undertake these duties in relation to the BMP, and their responses are shown in Table 8.6.2. In 
the view of NPS respondents, the best organisation to undertake these duties was the Specially 
Protected Area Council. They considered that this organisation would carry out the co­
ordination task effectively because it would be “resilient enough to withstand political and 
other forms of pressure”. Quite differently, perhaps because of their current positive relations 
with the Ministry, the Betuyab representatives suggested that the Ministry of Tourism could 
take on more of the diverse activities of other ministries in relation to tourism. By contrast, 
three respondents from other national organisations, but not the MoT, considered that
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geographical distance precludes the central government from functioning effectively at the 
local level and suggested that a local union could be set up involving participation by the 
provincial government, private sector and municipalities. However, they felt this would only 
work if it was backed up with sufficient legal power, a view also shared by the municipal 
representatives.
Table 8.6.2 Suggested organisation to undertake some of the work of central 
government
Respondents Organisation suggested fo r  the task
NPS Specially Protected Area Council
Betuyab MoT
MoT Local union
Municipalities Local union
8.6.4 Expansion or reduction of central government activities
30) “Do you believe that central government should expand or reduce its 
present activities in the Belek region? Why?”
When respondents were asked about whether central government should expand or 
reduce its present activities, seven of them felt that it should reduce its activities, and six 
stated that it should expand its activities. These respondents offered differing explanations in 
support of their view. While the NPS representatives were in favour of a reduction in the role 
of central government, by contrast, five respondents from national organisations and 
provincial government argued that the MoT should increase its activities, particularly its 
control over the allegedly arbitrary practices of land expropriation by the municipalities. Local 
respondents appeared to be dissatisfied with the relationships between the MoT and Betuyab. 
Four of the local respondents indicated that the MoT should reduce its over- dependency and 
reliance on Betuyab, and that it should stop seeing Betuyab as their only counterpart in the 
region. It was felt that national organisations should step back from “making plans for local 
people and start making plans with the community”, an argument which was discussed in 
chapter two. Two local association respondents considered that central government should act 
as a facilitator rather than service provider, and that the role and authority of local government 
should be increased in tourism-related issues. An official from the MoT considered that if
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there was an active local union in operation then central government could reduce some of its 
activities, but he still advised that control of tourism development should remain under the 
jurisdiction of central government in order to facilitate development that is integrated with 
that of other tourism regions in Turkey.
8.6.5 Municipal responsibilities
31) “What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the 
prime responsibility of the municipality, if  any?”
Responses to Question 31 indicate that it was widely felt that the municipalities should 
undertake a number of responsibilities, including securing a clean and a healthy environment 
for tourism, the provision of effective services for the satisfaction of local people and tourists, 
and the completion of the infrastructure needed for the subsequent development of 
superstructure. A substantial proportion of local respondents -  five -  considered that the 
municipalities should be more involved with health and safety issues, explaining that poor 
standards in these areas are likely to deter visitors. These respondents, commented that the 
municipalities should avoid rent-oriented actions and should not compromise general interests 
at the expense of individual interests. According to the NPS representatives, the municipalities 
needed to protect and manage the environmentally sensitive areas much better, as well as 
adopt a better management style in their operation of the facilities provided there. They 
contended that the first task of a municipality should be to find ways of using scarce resources 
more rationally. Many of the central government officials involved in the BMP thought that 
the municipalities should put a priority on enhancing local people’s living standards, and in 
particular on taking care of the environment. They considered that the municipalities should 
avoid engaging in inter-municipal conflicts and strive to ignite the spirit of co-operation. In 
addition, it was suggested that the municipalities should create educational opportunities for 
young people to work in tourism and attempt to reduce the distrust of local people towards 
both central institutions and the municipalities.
The Betuyab representatives considered that the region's municipalities should work 
harder to apply sanctions to stop the conversion of fertile agricultural land into real estate 
development land. According to these respondents, the municipalities should refrain from
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encouraging the development of second homes in order to secure votes at the next election. 
They also thought that the municipalities should be more careful about the construction and 
operation of facilities in designated areas on the beaches, as well as give priority to the 
improvement of the local infrastructure: “overall they [municipalities] must be more strategic 
in the area.. .they are extremely active when it comes to defending their financial interests; 
however, when it comes to environmental preservation they are not as enthusiastic as they 
should be”.
8.6.6 Municipal effectiveness
32) “Do you believe that currently the municipalities carry out their
tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?”
As many as 17 of the stakeholders involved in the BMP considered that the 
municipalities were ineffective. A private sector respondent criticised the municipalities for 
indulging in some actions that it was felt might damage the future of tourism. While this 
respondent considered she was broadly supportive of the municipalities, she complained that 
"I have never believed that they [the municipalities] carry out these tasks effectively. Can you 
give me one reason why a tourist would leave the region satisfied? The pavements are a 
shambles.. .the garbage collection is disorderly.. .the area is over-crowded with both people 
and buildings.. .water is insufficient and power cuts are happening... the roads are not safe as 
the traffic is dangerously uncontrolled.. .and noise pollution is at incredible levels”. In defence 
of municipalities, a local association member argued that their so-called ineffectiveness did 
not only apply to the municipalities. In the view of this respondent, the central government 
attempted to produce some services, without giving real thought to what they are doing, and 
local government is in turn almost paralysed with inactivity. Nine of the respondents 
suggested that both local and central government had thwarted the provision of quality 
services in the region.
Table 8.6.3 summarises the six most common explanations given as to why 
respondents thought the municipalities were ineffective. Many of them indicated that the 
centralist administration or central control were important causes of this problem. Another 
cause that was often mentioned was the multiple responsibilities assigned to the municipalities
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by the relevant laws. Linked to the last point was the limited financial resources of the 
municipalities. Other causes often mentioned were a scarcity of human resources, and the lack 
of a collaborative culture between organisations. These causes will now be evaluated in more 
detail.
Table 8.6.3 Perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of the municipalities
Causes Number of respondents
Centralist administration 16
Central control 14
Multiple responsibilities 12
Limited financial resources 12
Limited human resources 12
Limited collaboration between organisations 10
8.6.6.1 Centralist administration and central control
As many as 16 respondents considered that the centralist administration was a barrier 
to municipal effectiveness. As was discussed in chapter six, local services were generally 
planned according to the priorities of numerous central organisations. The respondents saw 
this as frustrating the meeting of local needs and preferences as well as undermining the more 
effective use of local resources. They often mentioned the imposition of restraints by central 
government on local government and the expansion of central bureaucracy as slowing down 
the speed of municipal decision-making. One example was provided by a local association 
respondent: “sometimes a decision that could be taken in a day might take months or more, 
and consequently, this delays the completion of initiatives and increases service costs”. 
Another local respondent, who disagreed with the suggestion that central government should 
retain a veto over final decisions, explained that the centralised administration had prevented 
public involvement in decision-making, which in turn had alienated the public and reduced 
their engagement in implementing decisions.
As many as seven of the local respondents were unhappy with the extreme 
concentration of executive power in Ankara, which they considered had obliged both local 
politicians and citizens to go to Ankara to put their case. As indicated in chapter six, these 
respondents concluded that local people regularly have to resort to visiting their members of 
parliament to solicit their help, often by taking the case to the various central agencies,
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including ministries. The result is that many organisations in Ankara are almost overwhelmed 
every day with visitors. This unique problem eventually obstructs the national politicians and 
bureaucrats from engaging in their own duties effectively and efficiently. The local 
respondents argued that MPs in Ankara have to expend too much of their time to meet 
individual electors' wishes so that they cannot perform their main duties competently. They 
complained that the central bureaucracy had been enlarged and new departments had 
mushroomed in order to deal with the numerous small enquires. Some local respondents also 
noted that there was much redundant employment in both municipal and central government 
departments, and they claimed this was due to political favouritism.
Fourteen respondents identified the concentration of power at the centre as a cause of 
municipal ineffectiveness. Two NPS representatives complained that central government 
retained the authority to interfere with local affairs and to decide what services should be 
rendered for local communities and how they must be delivered. They contended that power 
to determine the priorities for local services and their realisation should rest with local 
communities as this would be more democratic. The local respondents shared a similar view 
and thought that central administrative control was a major problem. The interviews suggest 
that the kinds of control exercised by central government had a damaging effect on the 
independence and the initiative of local government in the region. Perhaps partly because they 
were newly established, the local government appeared to be far too dependent on central 
government to be adequately responsive to local interests.
8.6.6.2 Multiple responsibilities
Twelve of the 30 respondents attributed the municipal ineffectiveness to the number of 
responsibilities that each municipality had to fulfil. One Betuyab representative illustrated 
this problem thus: “the Municipal Law lists over 80 responsibilities for a municipality.. .in a 
seminar I attended, a lawyer who had been working on public management in Turkey 
confessed that he had been working for over 20 years on this topic and he still could not draw 
up a full list of the duties and responsibilities of a village headman in Turkey. In contrast to 
the array of responsibilities, the headman has got only one authority, which is to take the 
minutes”. Interestingly, he explained that the headman is meant to take with him someone 
who is esteemed in the area when handing in these minutes to the head official of the district. 
This interpretation was also applied to the multiple responsibilities of municipalities.
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8.6.6.3 Limited financial resources
Limited financial resources were mentioned by 12 respondents as another factor that 
restricted the development and delivery of effective municipal services. Hence, while local 
government was expected to contribute to the development of tourism in the area and to take 
an active part in the preparation of development plans, this was not fully practical due to their 
limited resources. According to one ex-Mayor, this represented an unfair distribution between 
the scale of the assigned tasks and the resources allocated to local government. This 
respondent felt that a restructuring of public administration could not be achieved unless this 
imbalance in resources and responsibilities was rectified. Others also criticised the central 
government’s system to allocate funds, which failed to recognise big increases in population 
in the summer in the municipalities providing services in tourist regions. One municipality 
representative was offended by the attitude of central government to the problems of the 
summer population increases. Another local respondent noted that a town of ten thousand 
inhabitants could become a city accommodating two hundred thousand people, and asked 
“with the allocated fund for ten thousand inhabitants, how on earth can a municipality provide 
its services satisfactorily?”. Three respondents from local organisations identified the absence 
of a nationally established system of resource distribution as a critical problem. They 
disapproved of the current uneven share of financial resources between municipalities in 
touristic and non-touristic regions, and they felt that the central provision of financial 
resources to local government had impeded their sense of responsibility, and participation and 
had hampered the civic consciousness of local citizens. As explained earlier, the mayors 
conceded that they resorted to pestering Ministers, Member of Parliaments, and party leaders 
with frequent visits in order to secure the funding needed for local services.
8.6.6.4 Limited human resources
‘ Twelve respondents from the public and private sectors and the municipal association 
also mentioned the problem of the scarcity and quality of human capital in municipal 
government. It appears that many of the practices of the municipalities in the fields of 
personnel selection, appointment, promotion and human resource planning are also restricted 
by central intervention. The Betuyab and NPS representatives in particular considered that the 
limited qualifications of the mayors was a further related factor limiting the effectiveness of 
their service provision. They suggested that to improve municipal effectiveness in the region
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they needed far-sighted and open-minded mayors who would not sacrifice the general interest 
to private interests. These respondents suggested that the mayors currently acted impulsively, 
and without long-term thinking, and they were pre-occupied with retaining votes.
8.6.6.5 Limited collaboration
Ten of the 30 respondents identified the limited collaboration between municipalities 
as a factor inhibiting the effective provision of services. Three central government officials 
stated that a division of resources between the local municipalities, particularly after the 
creation of new municipalities in 1995, had created a spate of issues that had limited their 
effectiveness. A Betuyab representative, who argued that there should be a more consistent 
quality of services provided by municipalities in the Belek region, complained that “there is 
no consistency whatsoever in the nature of the work and services implemented in the 
area.. .two bordering municipalities are providing incompatible services. One of them is 
doing sewage work underground, while the bordering municipality is providing asphalted 
roads. However, the cost of doing sewage or asphalt work will decrease considerably when 
they do them together. Instead of seeking co-operation, the two municipalities are in conflict 
about authority over the same area”. The problem seems to have stemmed from the 
incompatibility of the nature of work done and its timing, and also from political problems. A 
central government official described how “.. .when infrastructure development starts, it can 
only progress to the point of the neighbouring municipality’s border. The mayors will not 
permit you to maintain the road, as it may benefit his opponent”. He elaborated how: “they 
[mayors] are from different political parties,.. .and succeeding in getting them together in a 
room is as difficult as making a camel pass through the eye of a needle”. This respondent also 
argued that only a few municipalities sought to work with the help of expert public agencies 
and private sector firms.
8.6.7 An organisation that could undertake some local government activities 
more effectively
33) “Do you believe that some activities of local government could be done 
more effectively by another organisation? If so, then what parts and 
what organisations would you suggest?”
A total of 16 of the 30 respondents considered that a single statutory organisation 
might be necessary to undertake some of the activities of local government in the region. It 
was generally felt that this organisation could fulfil some roles of local government more 
effectively since its structure could give it more autonomy and independence from central 
bureaucratic procedures. Four municipal respondents seemed to favour a “Local Municipality 
Association” that would lead and monitor the tasks of the municipalities in the region. 
However, this Association would only succeed if  the problems related to the duties and 
powers of local government and to the administrative controls imposed on the municipalities 
were addressed.
8.6.8 Expansion or reduction of local government activities
34) “Do you believe that local government should expand or reduce some 
of its present activities in the region?”
Twelve respondents supported the expansion of local government activities in the 
region, and fourteen favoured a reduction. Respondents favouring expansion were careful to 
specify how the municipalities should execute their enlarged duties. Two NPS representatives 
who did not directly support the expansion of local government activities still considered that 
the municipalities needed to be more resilient against the political pressure and other 
influences being exerted, in particular by the private sector, and including Betuyab. One 
respondent suggested that the municipal staff lacked awareness of the relevant legislation, 
arguing that they needed to study this legislation and to initiate co-operative relations with 
national and other local institutions so that scarce resources can be combined to generate 
improved benefits. It was also contended that the municipalities should look for long-term 
benefits and should be more careful when awarding construction licences.
By contrast, five respondents in national organisations argued that municipal authority 
should not be expanded, rather it needed to be reviewed. These respondents were particularly 
dissatisfied with the qualities of mayors, suggesting that a similar approach followed in 
presidential elections should be adopted in the nomination and election of mayors. These 
respondents believed that the municipalities had all necessary resources, but that they had 
weakened themselves as a result of the mismanagement of resources. The Betuyab 
representatives put forward similar arguments and considered that the problems meant
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authority over construction planning should be taken on by the Ministry of Tourism rather 
than by the municipalities. One Betuyab member depicted the municipal authority over 
construction activity as the biggest weapon of the municipalities, and he suggested that:
“what has to be done is that.. .the list of tasks assigned to municipalities should be reduced 
down to four or five. They should be directed so that they are only responsible for garbage 
collection, street cleaning, the maintenance of roads, etc.. .they should be watched over 
closely”.
8.6.9 Proposed changes in the tasks of local government
35) “What specific changes would you like to see in their tasks? Why do 
you think those changes are needed?”
As many as nine respondents supported the view that powers over construction 
planning should be taken from the municipalities and handed over perhaps to the governor. It 
was stated that this was needed in order to prevent patron-client relations and other sources of 
corruption. They considered that construction plans needed to be carried out in a more 
disciplined manner and the authority should not be given to small municipalities, as they can 
easily be manipulated by powerful local elites. According to four local respondents, the 
problem with local government was that it had little scope to raise sufficient revenue to meet 
their responsibilities relating to tourism development in the region. It appears that local 
government budgets are often exhausted once their primary duties were met for education, 
infrastructure, and public health. These respondents argued that local government should be 
given greater flexibility in raising revenue, which may be changed depending on the 
circumstances.
8.6.10 The responsibilities of provincial government
36) “What tasks to implement the BMP do you believe should be the 
prime responsibility of provincial government, if any?”
Responses to Question 36 suggested that provincial government should have prime 
responsibility for the tasks of monitoring, co-ordination, enforcement of laws, public safety, 
health, education, the generation and distribution of revenues, and of controlling the
municipalities.
8.6.11 Provincial government effectiveness
37) . “Do you believe that currently the provincial government carries out
its tasks effectively in relation to the implementation of the BMP?”
It is notable that none of the respondents from the local associations, private sector or 
the municipalities considered that the provincial government was effective. By contrast, 
respondents from the national and provincial government did consider that the provincial 
government was effectively carrying out its responsibilities. The two NPS representatives 
argued that Antalya provincial government acted in a very undisciplined way, and the policies 
they pursued had paved the way for a proliferation of second homes in the area. They also 
claimed that this institution was rather remote from local people with no ordinary citizens 
appearing to visit provincial government officials unless there was litigation. The locals 
depicted the provincial government as the watchdog of central government, being seen as the 
extension of central government. As noted in chapter six, it is apparent that the provincial 
government and villages have lost many of their duties and responsibilities for local services 
over recent years. The majority of the public services under the jurisdiction of these units 
have gradually been transferred to central government. As a result, these local government 
units were depicted as merely “empty shells”.
There was often ambiguity about the jurisdiction and duties of local government, 
including that of provincial government, and for some services it was not unusual that there 
was duplication with central government. It was argued that the most complex patterns of 
authority and responsibility related to those of the provincial government, as they had many of 
the same responsibilities as those given to provincial units of central government.
Additionally, it appears that the provincial government has become an institution whose 
responsibilities increased or decreased according to the political party in power and to the 
change in governor. The large size of the province was also considered as a factor that limited 
their effectiveness in the region. Table 8.6.4 summarises the causes of ineffectiveness that 
were mentioned by the stakeholders.
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Table 8.6.4 Perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of the provincial government
Respondents Perceived cause o f  ineffectiveness
Betuyab Large size o f  the province
Limited resources available to provincial government 
Ambiguous division o f  authority and o f  responsibilities 
People bypass the provincial government in matters concerning tourism in 
the region
Municipalities The personal capabilities o f  the governor
Excessive central control
Interference by other national organisations
NPS Frequent changes o f  governors and related changes in provincial projects 
Financial dependence on central funds
People bypass the provincial government in matters concerning tourism in 
the region , 
The personal capabilities o f  the governor
The perceived causes of the ineffectiveness of provincial government share some 
similarities with those of municipal government. One ex-Mayor considered that the most 
important causes included the attitude and commitment of the governor, centralised control 
and orders from central government superseding provincial decisions. Another factor was 
thought to be that local government organisations and people often bypass the provincial 
government and tiy to seek solutions in the capital”. Many respondents agreed that the central 
government controls on provincial government were as tight as those imposed on the 
municipalities. One local association member, who supported local government having more 
powers, conceded that the central controls made “the governor extremely impotent.. .his 
decisions are likely to be superseded by a higher authority at the centre because of the political 
favouritism in decisions”.
8.6.12 Potential changes in the political, economic and legal systems and 
procedures and their effects on organisational relations
38) “Would the relationship between your organisation and other local
and national organisations be improved if current political, economic
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or legal systems and procedures were changed?”
When asked this question, the respondents identified several changes in relations in 
the system and procedures that they believed would improve their relationships with other 
organisations. These changes ranged from alterations in the current legislative system to the 
termination of political games and arbitrary decision-making in relation to the region's 
planning. Seven respondents felt that the centralist system was creating difficulties, and it was 
suggested that: “politics and public sector management need to be de-coupled”. A local 
association representative, who considered that many difficulties experienced in inter- 
organisational relations were caused by the centralist system, explained that “bureaucrats are 
extremely reluctant to devolve their power, and none of them would completely agree with the 
idea of devolving power .. .Article 127 emphasizes that central government is bestowed with 
controlling authority over local government and this authority should have been used in a 
positive manner to facilitate and guide local development issues. However, what we see today' 
is that this authority has become one of the biggest barriers in the way of the work and 1
services that have to be implemented locally”. This respondent felt that determination of local 
budgets by central government should be abandoned and local government should be allowed 
to collect their own financial resources. It was felt that this would lead to enhanced 
accountability for local government and central government, as the public would know who i 
collected and spent the tax revenues. Five local government respondents also agreed that the 
administrative controls imposed by central government over local government should be 
carefully reviewed, suggesting that they should be reduced so that local government could 
raise revenue and provide better services to the public.
The views of the Betuyab representatives were rather different. They wanted more 
strategic planning for the tourism sector and for this to be administered by one organisation 
only, and also felt that incentive schemes needed to be revised and more appealing incentives 
needed to be introduced to help the economy prosper. The Betuyab respondents even 
suggested that there was a need to abolish the municipalities in tourist areas. Five respondents 
considered that the practice of central government control over local government should be 
stopped, or at least decreased, and local government should be strengthened to enable it to 
make decisions through its own committees. Three local association respondents suggested 
that there needed to be changes in the management structure of local government as it was
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ineffective in distributing resources, slow to make decisions, coercive, and non-participatory. 
One respondent felt that such a restructuring of local government was only part of the solution 
as central government structures also needed reform.
As many as nine respondents, representing Betuyab, the NPS, provincial and national 
governments, and local people, thought that the legal frameworks were appropriately 
conceived, and that the problems largely arose from the partial application of the law. For 
example, an NPS member explained that “when you review the relevant legislation, their 
excellent logic and thoroughness will amaze you. The nature and content of the legislation 
does not lie at the root of the problem.. .the problem is its misapplication by the enforcers”. 
She claimed that if everything was pursued in accordance with the legislation, there would not 
be any environmental problems in the coastal zones. A similiar view was expressed by a 
provincial government official, who agreed that “you can find solutions within the legislation; 
however, it is not being effectively implemented. For example, the law states explicitly that 
sand mining is an illegal activity and there are sanctions for use against the people violating 
the law.. .but people make up many excuses to get around the legislation”. A local respondent 
and the members of Betuyab also shared this view, and they argued that there was no need to 
change the law. By contrast, other respondents did support revision in the current legislation, 
partly because it dated back to the early 1980s when different conditions prevailed.
8.6.13 Summary
This section has examined the roles and activities of organisations involved in the 
BMP. It seems that many interviewees were dissatisfied with the way in which authority and 
responsibility were divided between central and local government. The interviewees made 
frequent suggestions about the benefits of reductions in the authority of central or local 
organisations and there is evidence of dissent in the domain among central institutions, 
between central and local organisations, and also between local organisations. It was argued in 
the literature (see chapter three) that inter-organisational relations are affected by the extent of 
domain consensus (i.e., the degree of agreement between organisations regarding their 
appropriate roles and activities). The findings of this study provide strong support for this 
contention. In response to Question 28, the local representatives accused the central 
government of being interventionist and acting merely in relation to their own political and 
economic concerns. The central institutions were also accused of trumpeting visitor numbers
as an indication of success and overlooking the real cost of tourism for the area. Based on the 
interviews, it would be naive to think that it would be easy to build effective inter- 
organisational relations under circumstances where each organisation viewed itself as more 
important than the others, and also disparaged the work undertaken by the others.
Responses to Questions 28-36 suggest that the stakeholders were dissatisfied with the 
current division of power, as it was not distributed evenly among the central and local 
organisations and there was considerable monopoly of power where one party dominated 
others. While local government had been required to carry out certain tourism-related tasks, 
Betuyab appears to have concentrated the power to do this, largely through its own 
organisational resources, its network of personal connections in Ankara, and its unofficial 
transference of power from the Ministry of Tourism, in the name of decentralisation. The fact 
that Betuyab has more organisational resources than many other organisations involved in the 
BMP, might help to explain why they were happy for the Ministry of Tourism to have a 
stronger role. This transference of powers from the Ministry to Betuyab was assumed to be 
illegal by the local representatives, as it is not based on a legal framework. Many local 
stakeholders claimed that the local government was powerless in the context of this informal 
arrangement and that they were dissatisfied with the way in which Betuyab exercised its 
power. That one organisation, in this case Betuyab, held so much authority and had an 
orientation that differed from that of the other local organisations and voluntary sector was 
likely to have had important implications for the nature and the extent of inter-organisational 
relations (Benson 1975). It is relevant to note Pearce’s (1998) suggestion that it is usual for 
organisations to search for an adequate supply of authority and money from the political 
system in order to maintain their domain and defend their way of doing things.
The respondents were critical about the effectiveness of provincial government and 
local government, and the respondents provided many explanations for their view. It was 
suggested that the administrative incapacity of both provincial and local government was 
influenced by such problems as a high staff turnover (including of the governor), the 
centralised interventions and control, the multiple responsibilities, and the lack of financial 
and human resources. Other factors mentioned as influencing their administrative 
effectiveness were political pressure, nepotism, favouritism, and clientelism. When asked 
about what should be changed to improve relationships between the organisations, the
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respondents made a number of suggestions. While some concentrated on changes to the 
current legislation, others argued that the legislation was appropriate, but there were problems 
in relation to its implementation. The next section examines whether changes in the form of 
administration could address the problems of centralised tourism planning and management in 
this developing country.
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8. Result Chapter
Section 7. Delegation of Power
8.7.1 Introduction
It was argued in chapter two that the long-term success of tourism increasingly relies 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework within which it operates. 
Two alternative administrative models were identified in the literature and were studied in 
depth in chapter five. The first model, Centralised Tourism Administration (CTA), assumes 
that a central steering agency has at its disposal the necessary information about existing 
public problems and preferences and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al.
1997). The CTA is generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system 
allowing decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected by them, with tourism 
usually considered to be an industry of national concern which should be centrally planned 
and controlled (Wahap 1997). This administrative form of tourism management has certain 
advantages, but also limitations, and there are numerous cases of tourism plans formulated at 
the top and implemented by people at the bottom that have not achieved the desired outcomes. 
One explanation for this is that centrally formulated plans may be out of touch with local 
people's needs and may lack a detailed knowledge of the local environment.
The second model, Decentralised Tourism Administration (DTA), involves the 
transfer of power from central agencies to local government and it takes the interests of local 
actors as its point of departure. It is argued that “when implemented properly”, 
decentralisation could offer greater efficiency and effectiveness in various areas (Turner and 
Hulme 1997). Decentralisation plans can be tailor-made for local areas using detailed, up-to- 
date information which is only available locally, and inter-organisational co-ordination can be 
achieved more effectively at the local level. Experimentation and innovation can also be 
fostered, which can increase the chances of establishing more effective development strategies 
(see chapter five). Decentralisation may also help enhance the motivation of field level 
personnel, as they will have greater responsibility for the programmes they manage. It is • 
argued in the literature that a reduction in the workload of central government will relieve
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them from routine decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues so 
that the quality of policy should improve.
The discussion now examines the views of respondents as to whether administrative 
frameworks based on decentralisation might enhance local-level tourism management in the 
Belek region. Based on different forms of decentralisation reviewed in chapter five, the 
analysis considers stakeholder opinions as to:
■ Whether passing planning authority in relation to tourism in Belek to the 
municipalities (devolution), provincial units of central government 
(deconcentration), non-government organisations (delegation) or an 
independent body set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations 
will enhance tourism management in the area.
■ Whether retaining this authority within central government would produce 
better results in terms of tourism planning in the country.
8.7.2 Transferring planning authority
39) “What would you think if central government passed the planning
authority in relation to tourism in Belek to (1) the municipalities, (2) a 
non government organisation such as Betuyab, (3) an independent 
agency set up jointly by the relevant national and local organisations?”
Responses to Question 39 suggested that stakeholders interviewed in this study had 
different preferences and they provided several explanations in support of their preference. 
Table 8.7.1 presents these stakeholder organisations and which organisation that they 
considered most appropriate for tourism planning in relation to Belek.
Table 8.7.1 Transferring planning authority
The type o f  models Number o f  people who 
preferred the model
Partnership model 12
Devolution 10
Deconcentration 5
Delegation 3
307
Quite a significant number of respondents -  twelve - supported a partnership model 
that could be established through the involvement of representatives either from national and 
local government or else cross sectorally from the public and private sectors and NGOs. As 
many as ten of the 30 respondents favoured devolution - passing the planning authority to 
local government (see Table 8.7.2), whereas a moderate number of respondents -  five - 
considered that a central government unit in the region should retain the planning authority - 
deconcentration. Only three of the 30 respondents agreed that delegation - leaving the entire 
planning authority to a private sector organisation - would be more beneficial. While 
stakeholders interviewed in this study differed in their preferences, they almost always shared 
the same opinion -  that the planning authority should only be transferred gradually to any of 
these organisations after they meet certain conditions. Responses given to each of these 
models are evaluated in the subsequent sections.
Table 8.7.2 Who should have the planning authority?
Organisation favoured 
fo r  tourism management 
in Belek
Stakeholder organisation 
considering the suggested 
organisation appropriate
Stakeholder organisation 
considering the suggested 
organisation inappropriate
Municipalities Nature Preservation Society Betuyab
(NPS) Ministry of Tourism (MoT)
Municipalities Ministry o f Culture (MoC)
Municipal Association Ministry o f Environment (MoE)
Private organisation Betuyab MoT, MoC, MoE 
Municipalities 
Municipal Association 
NPS
Provincial government
Partnership Provincial government
Municipalities
Municipal Association
Betuyab
NPS
MoT, MoC, MoE
Central government MoT, MoC, MoE NPS
Municipalities 
Municipal Association 
Betuyab
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8.7.2.1 Partnership
Quite a significant number of respondents -12 of the 30- considered that different tiers 
of government, both local and central, should usefully work together in a public sector 
partnership as this might be more beneficial than local or central government acting alone. 
These twelve respondents provided as many as six different explanations as to why an 
independent body, set up jointly by local and central government organisations, should 
undertake tourism management in Belek. The majority of these respondents thought that 
central government might bring feasible solutions on some occasions, whereas in other cases 
local government could suggest better solutions. These respondents felt that both national and 
local organisations have individual strengths, and they suggested that a dialogue between them 
could be promoted in order to encourage them to work together and muster their differential 
capabilities for a common goal. In the view of these respondents, both central and local 
government needed one another and they should abandon their present subversive activities.
Eight of the twelve respondents thought that the benefits of the tourism industry for 
the region could best be enhanced by the participation of all actors affected by, or whose 
activities affect tourism, suggesting that a suitable model would involve cross-sectoral 
working by the municipalities, provincial units, and the private sector. They suggested that a 
steering committee could be instituted, and that in setting this up the existing powers and 
influence of each organisation should be carefully balanced. A provincial government official, 
who agreed that a partnership would help to achieve healthy tourism development, argued 
rather unusually that the reason for the partial exclusion of local government from decisions 
about national development plans was not because central government did not want to share 
its power. He felt that most bureaucrats and politicians were aware that centralisation had 
frustrated the distribution of benefits to local people, and that a good number of them 
considered it politically expedient to strengthen local government and thereby reduce the 
inability of the centre to meet local needs effectively. He considered that the so-called 
reluctance of central government bureaucrats to share power with the local authorities was not 
the real problem. The main concern he expressed was that decentralisation is often politically 
motivated and poorly planned, and that the current form of decentralisation which is in use - 
deconcentration - had failed to provide sufficient resources to enable provincial government to 
meet local needs. Two Nature Preservation Society (NPS) representatives shared a similar
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concern, and they felt that the current institutional and legal context meant that in practice it 
was doubted that a partnership model could work.
S.7.2.2 Municipalities
Responses to question 39 suggest that ten respondents favoured devolved form of 
decentralisation, in which the municipalities manage tourism. However, the same respondents 
expressed concerns about leaving tourism management in the hands of the municipalities. The 
NPS representatives favoured tourism management being left to local organisations, but they 
conceded that the municipalities in the Belek region may be less able to manage tourism 
adequately than the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), due partly to their newness as a municipality 
and their lack of experience. They suggested that one of the major limitations of the 
municipalities was staff incompetence: “they [the municipalities] do not have competent 
staff.. .it is questionable how much the decision-makers in the municipalities know about the 
planning prerequisites.. .whereas the MoT is a ministry that has mobilised the resources to 
create the most competitive exporting activity in the country over the past thirty years”. The 
second limitation that the NPS representatives identified was the arbitrariness of the municipal 
decision-making processes. Despite feeling that handing over tourism management 
completely to local administrators is much to be desired, one of these representatives 
conceded that this would bring about formidable difficulties. Her main concern was that local 
interests might be exaggerated and pursued at the expense of national interests, as the 
objective of local government would be to defend their own interests. Additionally, she noted 
that frequent changes in local government in Turkey generally might change the municipal 
objectives, and the new local government leaders might well simply replace the objectives and 
initiatives that were agreed by the previous leaders.
One private sector representative agreed that decentralisation would relieve central 
government of some of its duties and that this could pave the way for democracy to prosper 
more in the country. But he also claimed that the country was not ready for decentralisation.
He considered that, while central authority had not yet been decentralised, the municipalities 
in the region still do largely as they wish, which he felt had caused unnecessary conflicts of 
interests. He suggested that municipalities operating within a tourism zone should have a 
different organisational and functional structure to municipalities elsewhere and that they 
should abide by the prescribed objectives of the relevant tourism plans. According to another
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private sector representative, the majority of mayors lacked the capacity to understand the 
requirements of sustainable tourism development. The main complaint of this representative 
was that because the municipalities lacked financial resources they sought various ways of 
generating income for their activities, often at the expense of the environment: “on most 
occasions the municipalities concede to the illegal wishes of local people and there is a 
rampant practice of collecting donations from bars, shops or restaurant owners by issuing 
them with operating permits”. He was also concerned about the allegedly widespread 
partisanship and nepotism in municipal administration: “if a mayor from the True Path Party 
comes to power he replaces the staff to employ his own people. He lays off all partisans of the 
Republic Party recruited in the municipality by the former mayor”. A central government 
official, who was opposed to leaving tourism management to local government, argued that 
“when you transfer to them [the municipalities] the responsibility for controlling and using 
resources, this would be equal to throwing an atomic bomb in the region”.
By contrast, a respondent from the Union of Mediterranean Municipalities, who 
criticised central government, contended that “central government makes up some stories in 
order to mask their failure in the provision of services. They tend to put the blame on alleged 
corruption and nepotism supposedly rampant in the municipalities. This is hardly true.. .there 
is wide-spread corruption and nepotism in central government, and it is not in the 
municipalities”. According to this respondent, the municipalities are examined frequently by 
the Municipal Association, as well as by the local press and local people. He remarked that if 
nepotism was a culture throughout the administrative system, then it is not the problem of the 
municipalities alone. He suggested that local communities should compel the municipalities to 
be more transparent in order to eliminate the expansion of corruption, and he argued that more 
work was needed to improve public awareness of the issues. Another Municipal Association 
respondent agreed that local government was close to the area and was best placed to carry out 
services that were satisfactory. He agreed with the NPS representatives that when central 
government carried out local services they were often not provided according to local 
priorities, but priorities determined by central government. These three respondents were also 
unhappy about their geographical distance from Ankara, arguing that it was impossible to plan 
and steer all the tourist regions of Turkey from the capital. They felt that this led to wasted 
resources, as many plans had been destined to fail even before they were put into practice. 
While they believed that the municipalities should be authorised for tourism management,
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they saw this as insufficient on its own. Their main concern with specific reference to Antalya 
region was the multiplicity of existing municipalities and the potential conflicts of interests 
between them: “there are more than sixty municipalities in Antalya province. If you let each 
of them manage and develop tourism on their own, then you will end up with chaotic 
development”.
The Betuyab representatives concluded that transference of administrative powers for 
tourism management and development to the municipalities would be like “playing with fire”. 
One of them explained that “ .. .sometimes actions speak louder than the words. Look at their 
current practices. Would you make such a transference of administrative power to local 
government? I doubt it. I am very fanatical about the total removal of the municipalities from 
this administration. As long as they are not empowered, I can put up with an administrative 
model that is under the complete dominion of central government”. A Ministry of Tourism 
official, who accused the local administrators of being extremely greedy, explained further 
that in an ideal world the best thing to do would be to decentralise all the authority and 
responsibility since this would allow for the gradual downsizing of central government, bring 
more local autonomy, and force administrators to become more responsible and accountable. 
However, he added that “what we have seen after planning authority for construction was 
devolved to local government is very frightening”. This respondent was concerned about the 
authority related to construction resting with the municipalities as the mayors lack planning 
knowledge, and they seek to gain greater rent by expropriating land for construction. He gave 
the following example in support of his concern: “the construction of three or more storey 
buildings is generally prohibited [by law] in areas where the ground is unsuitable.. .[the 
mayors], disregarding this fact, issued permits for buildings with five or six storeys.. .Why? 
Because each additional storey means extra rent.. .there is nothing that these greedy people 
[the mayors] would not do to gain extra money”. Another government official mentioned the 
inadequate number of qualified staff working in the municipalities, explaining that “ .. .you 
would be giving the planning authority to municipalities. However, there are no staff equipped 
with the required qualifications and skills to undertake such a huge and sensitive task as 
planning. They [the municipalities] do not employ a city planner, landscape designer, 
environmental engineer, etc. The mayor, a graduate of a primary school, is a literate individual 
who could only do mathematics...he was in agriculture but nothing else during his entire 
life.. ..and you are telling him that he is the authority for planning in a location neighbouring
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the most important tourism centre in Turkey [Belek]. Is this sensible? He will certainly enjoy 
this authority and gain as much as possible until the next elections by permitting illegal 
buildings”.
8.7.2.3 Private sector
As many as eight of the 30 respondents from the national and local organisations were 
against leaving the entire authority for tourism management to the private sector. The usual 
explanation related to the risk that the private sector would prioritise maximising their profit 
levels rather than considering the general public benefit. Three provincial government 
respondents suggested that leaving planning authority to a private sector organisation might be 
a viable option, but they also agreed that it was not free of shortcomings. According to one 
district government official, the Betuyab model constitutes one of the best examples in the 
region; however, “because of its structure, which does not involve local people, there is a kind 
of distrust toward this organisation in the region”.
By contrast, two Betuyab representatives thought that the private sector alone was a 
suitable option as this sector has some superior characteristics compared with the other 
national and local institutions. In their opinion, “the private sector is not as clumsy as the 
central administration. It is capable of thinking and moving more quickly as a result of their 
management techniques and accrued business experience... in comparison with some 
organisations in the central administration. The private sector is always face to face with 
emerging problems .. .[and]it has the capacity to produce solutions and mobilise resources 
faster than central government”. These Betuyab representatives considered that an 
administrative re-arrangement of this kind would benefit the region, although they thought 
that the private sector managers should be qualified people, who are highly experienced in 
management techniques, observant, and not detached from the real world. They also suggested 
that if the private sector concentrated only on issues in the tourism centre, but ignored the 
issues beyond the borders, then this management would fail.
8.7.3 Retention of planning authority by central government
40) “What would you think if central government retained its planning 
authority in relation to Belek?”
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Question 40 divided the respondents into two different groups. The NPS 
representatives, four local government officials, two municipal association members, 
villagers, and two academicians were against the complete retention of planning authority by 
central government; whereas five central government officials preferred the central 
government retaining this authority. Several respondents against central government planning 
authority argued that plans drawn up by central government tended not to match the local 
realities and priorities.
The explanations provided by respondents who were against central planning control 
are similar to arguments discussed in the academic literature. Some of the respondents 
complained about the implications of distant bureaucracy. As discussed in the literature:" if 
bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then people 
become alienated" (Barry 1965: 56 in Stoker 1996). The responses of the interviewees 
reflected local concern about lack of access to decision-making, a breakdown in the flow of 
communication, and alienation from participation. As discussed in the literature, this may 
impair the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powel 1966; Barry 1965). 
Similar problems were found in other research by Tosun and Jenkins (1996: 527) on Turkey: 
“the Ministry of Tourism and bodies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment 
and incentives are accessible to a rich and educated elite and not to the majority of indigenous 
people in tourist regions. In this sense, there is a big communication gap between 
communities and decision-makers. In short centralisation has intensified formidable 
bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a barrier for people who may not be 
able to afford to go to the capital city”. The respondents in this Belek study were often 
concerned that the central officials lacked sufficient local information, and many felt that local 
organisations are better placed to understand local needs and wishes and to find appropriate 
solutions to local problems.
Two of the municipal association representatives felt that the problems concerning 
tourism planning could not be resolved through a centralist form of administration. According 
to these respondents, the central government should only undertake advisory and guiding 
roles, rather than exerting more restrictive controls over local government. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, one of the ex-Mayors thought that if planning authority were left entirely to the
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municipalities, then environmental devastation might ensue, claiming instead that central 
government control was essential. He argued that “although I am for strengthening the power 
and finances of the municipalities, I still want to see the control of central government or 
another independent inspection unit over local government in order to prevent any 
misuse.. .Without the constructive intervention of central government, I do not think that it 
will be sensible to authorise a single organisation to be responsible for the management of the 
region.. .we are human beings, and if not controlled, we might be tempted to use resources to 
our own advantage”.
While the Betuyab representatives appeared to prefer central government retaining 
planning authority, they also had reservations. On the one hand, they considered that the 
involvement of the state in planning administration would foster trust and confidence among 
local people. In their view, local people would then know that the private sector was 
conducting things in line with the state’s close monitoring and it was not exploiting local 
resources solely for their own benefit. On the other hand, these respondents also noted that 
there were problems associated with centralist management: “with the interference of central 
government in tourism planning decisions, the development will either be stalled or continue 
in a piecemeal fashion”. This problem he attributed to the frequent changes in the party in 
government: “changes in the central government bring about frequent changes in the context 
of the policies pursued in the country. With a change of the director the whole perspective of 
an organisation changes, and thus the administration becomes more or less authoritative, or 
bureaucratic, or manipulative or laissez-faire.. .all of these alterations do have an impact on 
the management practices”.
A local government respondent felt that plans drawn up by central government were 
generally associated with acute bureaucracy so that actions were very difficult. She expressed 
concern that the central planning authorities were sometimes detached from the real world, 
arguing that their powers should be carefully restricted and their freedom of action should be 
subject to defined constraints. Similarly, one of the Betuyab representatives suggested that 
central institutions should not view themselves as the prime actor, rather their task should be 
to act in such a manner that initiatives broadly conform with the pattern they propose: “they 
should remember that it is not the central planner who implements the plan, but individuals 
and organisations drawn into it in various ways”.
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8.7.4 Summary
This section has examined the respondents' views as to whether administrative 
frameworks based on decentralisation might help to enhance the local level management of 
tourism in the Belek region. The concept of decentralised management has attracted growing 
support from researchers as it is thought to offset the problems of centralised tourism 
management. While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms 
of administration, no research has attempted to ascertain in any depth whether this form of 
administration is likely to be more viable and applicable given the prevailing constitutional 
and institutional contexts of centralist countries. At present, there is inadequate understanding 
of whether decentralised forms are likely to be more or less effective in handling the complex 
interactions between parties with differing perceptions, preferences and strategies, especially 
in developing nations. The responses to Questions 39 and 40 indicate that in the Belek context 
any administrative model involving the delegation of power to a single level of organisation 
might suffer from major limitations. The main reservation of the present stakeholders was that 
a new concentration of control might lead to an expansion of favouritism, which was allegedly 
already widespread in the administrative system. Local respondents in particular felt that local 
officials were more informed about local problems, and better able to mobilise local 
resources. By contrast, the central government officials usually feared that handing over 
power to local organisations would have adverse consequences, including uncoordinated 
developments between regions. Another concern of central officials was the continuity of 
projects, arguing that mayors might not resume the projects commenced by their predecessors, 
particularly if they were initiated by an opposing party.
Thus the current administrative customs, such as of corruption, bureaucracy, and 
clientelism, were identified as obstacles to the success of decentralisation in the country. 
Despite the feeling that decentralisation is favourable, the responses indicated that in Belek it 
risked arbitrary decision-making. One NPS representative contended that “if you hand over 
planning authority to a single organisation, whether it is central or local, this authority may be 
misused for organisational or individual gain”. Several other respondents from the national 
organisations felt that, while decentralisation is debated, the human infrastructure of the 
country is not ready yet for this process. One of them explained that “there are more than 
5,400 municipalities across the country. This means that these municipalities would have to
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recruit 5,400 city planners. There are however only 2,500 city planner graduates in the 
country”. In sum, it appears that the different forms of potential decentralisation in Belek all 
involve limitations, and that these forms may or may not be effective in overcoming the 
structural and behavioural obstacles identified by the stakeholders.
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9. Conclusions and Research Implications
9.1 Introduction and study objectives
There has been some previous research to identify and understand elements of 
the environment which influence the structure and behaviour of tourist organisations, 
as well as the relations and communication networks among them, their 
interdependencies, their strategic perspectives, and their problem-solving capacities 
(Pearce 1992). The need to analyse the form of interaction (co-ordination, co­
operation, competition and conflict) between institutions and stakeholders in order to 
ensure successful outcomes from such activities has also recently been established 
(Jamal and Getz 1995). However, only a few studies within the current tourism 
planning literature have assessed the barriers to inter-organisational relations (Selin 
and Beason 1991). Clearly a more substantial and systematic study of tourist 
organisations in an interactive framework is needed (Pearce 1992). Drawing on a 
conceptual framework which takes account of the wider features of the planning 
environment, this study examined the nature and extent of inter-organisational 
relationships between different management tiers, their effects on tourism 
administration, and their implications for local tourism development and planning.
Tourism planning involves relations between multiple organisations, including 
central and local government, NGOs, the private sector, the community and so on. 
Understanding the balance of power in the formulation and implementation of 
policies between tourist organisations at national and local levels, and how this 
balance in relations affects the practice of local level tourism planning are key issues. 
However, there has been comparatively little research on interorganisational relations 
between national, provincial and local levels in the tourism literature. Previous 
research on central-local relations in tourism is generally descriptive and simply 
outlines the nature and role of tourism organisations without much analysis of how 
they work to accomplish objectives that require collective action (Pearce 1992). To 
date the extent to which the balance in relations between central and local levels can 
affect the formulation of local level tourism development plans and their 
implementation has not been examined in any depth. Relationships between central 
and local organisations and the context within which they develop and operate can be
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conceptualised as a multi-scale network linking national, provincial and local scales 
of operation and which is set within a broader socio-economic and political system. 
Thus, it is necessary to understand the elements of the tourism environment, the 
patterns of relations among interdependent parties involved in plan formulation and 
implementation, and the factors determining these relationships. This research 
addressed some of these gaps or lacunae in current tourism research. More 
specifically, it had the following four objectives:
1. To develop a conceptual framework in relation to inter-organisational relations 
in tourism planning, including between central and local government. Drawing 
on a review of related literature, this includes consideration of tourism 
planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational communication, stakeholder 
involvement and consensus building, resource sufficiency and exchange, inter- 
organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities of the organisations, and 
the delegation of power.
2. To apply the conceptual framework and key conceptual themes to the case 
study of Belek in Turkey, chosen as it is in a rapidly developing country with a 
centralised system of governance and as the area is subject to a major tourism 
development initiative.
3. To evaluate the patterns and process, and strengths and weaknesses of inter- 
organisational relations around tourism planning in Belek using the identified 
conceptual themes.
4. To evaluate the relations between central and local government levels in 
relation to tourism planning in Belek, to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of the tourism administration system, and to examine views on the potential to 
change its character.
The research used a case study of one area, Belek, to identify inter-organisational 
relations, and notably central-local relations, within the highly centralised, fragmented 
and bureaucratic public administration and planning system in Turkey, where local 
government has limited power to use its own initiative for coastal development. The 
study considered how these problems influenced the structure and behaviour of 
tourism organisations in the Belek case, the relations between them in the 
communication network, their inter-dependencies, and their problem-solving
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capacities in relation to formulating and implementing the Belek Coastal Management 
Plan (BMP). The study examined the centralised administrative system and the 
ambiguities in the sharing of power and responsibility among the organisations related 
to tourism planning at different government levels in the Belek case. It is intended this 
may assist other countries that have similar administrative structures, and also help 
them to restructure the relations among their different management tiers and to 
increase their problem- solving capacities by taking preventive actions.
This concluding chapter provides, first, a review of the conceptual framework and the 
related conceptual themes that were developed in this study. It is hoped that the 
framework and themes will be of value for other researchers. Hence, there is a 
consideration of the value of the conceptual framework and of the themes for other 
researchers and practitioners. Consideration is also given to the major findings of the 
study based on the application of the concepts to the Belek case study. Finally, the 
chapter examines some key implications of the study for researchers and practitioners 
in the field of inter-organisational relations, and notably those interested in central- 
local relations, around tourism planning. The study has relevance for studies of such 
relations in both developing countries and developed countries.
9.2 Conceptual framework and conceptual themes
The study developed a conceptual framework and a set of related conceptual 
themes and has applied them to understand the nature of inter-organisational relations 
in Belek. The framework and themes are intended to have value for other researchers 
in the field. Key aspects of both are now summarised.
The conceptual framework developed for this study identifies influences and 
processes affecting central-local government relations relevant to tourism. Drawing 
on concepts identified in the Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests 
that, in a tourism administrative context, consideration needs to be given to the 
character of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of 
interaction), the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems, the 
extent of communication and co-ordination between the actors, the characteristics of 
the environmental context of the system and the related constraints, and the delegation 
or devolution of power (power distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an
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understanding of the interdependency between the different actors in the system in 
which tourism operates.
In order to enhance understanding of central-local relations and of their 
relevance to tourism-oriented policies, this framework suggested that research 
identifies:
• The range of public, private and voluntary institutions involved in tourism 
management and in tourism plan formulation and implementation and also their 
overall and more specific aims and objectives.
• The extent to which different public, private and voluntary organisations influence 
tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the legal power to do so).
• The formal and informal rules and procedures that regulate the interactions 
between these institutions (notably the legislative framework and the “rules of the 
game”), and their effects on the power of these organisations.
• The extent of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and 
local level organisations, such as in relation to resource dependency.
• The forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, communicative, etc.,) used in 
managing relations between organisations, and their effects on the balance of 
power between those institutions.
• The overlapping responsibilities and autonomy of the institutions involved in 
tourism management and in the formulation and implementation of tourism plans.
• The extent of inter-organisational communication and the ways in which the 
organisations communicate with one another.
• The extent of conflict, if any, between organisations, the sources of this conflict, 
the ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations 
between organisations.
• The extent of resource exchange, if any, between organisations.
• And, the extent and effectiveness of co-ordination between the organisations.
Inter-organisational analysis has been a tool for understanding and 
restructuring relations among organisations in the real world. This form of analysis is 
concerned with networks of organisations, consisting of “a number of distinguishable
organisations engaged in a significant amount of interaction with each other” (Benson 
1975 in Pearce 1992: 15). Scholars have examined interorganisational relations in 
many fields. However, there have been only a few attempts to explain this 
phenomenon in detail from a tourism planning point of view. Previous researchers 
have generally focused on tourism planning and development issues and on tourism 
impact assessments. Tourism administration systems and their impact on tourism plan 
formulation and implementation processes have received inadequate attention (Pearce 
1992; Selin and Beason 1991). Most research is concentrated on a single spatial scale 
but not on interorganisational relations at multi-level scales. However, successful 
tourism development requires the different activities of organisations at different 
scales to be closely matched and co-ordinated (Pearce 1992). While dyadic 
relationships between only two organisations have been examined in the literature 
(Selin and Beason 1991), a network level of analysis is much less usual. There is a 
need for studies examining the nature and direction of the interactions occurring 
among organisations (national, provincial, local) in the network, and also of which 
functions are most appropriately undertaken at what scale and by which organisation 
(Pearce 1992).
The research used a case study of one area in Turkey in order to identify and 
assess the patterns and processes of relations between central and local government 
tourism-related organisations, as well as between the public and private sectors and 
NGOs, in the context of tourism management. These relations were examined in 
relation to the formulation and implementation of a tourism development plan. A 
conceptual framework was developed specifically in order to fulfil this research 
objective. The framework was devised to analyse the nature and extent of the 
relationships between the public and private sectors and NGOs, their implications for 
the formulation and implementation of the Belek development plan, and to provide a 
better understanding of the elements of the tourism environment and of the relations 
among the parties involved in the plan. In the following discussion of the conceptual 
framework, the terms depicted in the summary in Figure 9.1 are shown in italics.
The conceptual framework put emphasis on the roles of the public and private sectors 
as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in tourism planning and 
development, on the nature and extent of the interdependencies and interactions
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among the various parties, and on the social, economic, technological and political 
environment within which they operate (Hall 1994; Burkart and Medlik 1981; 
Lickorish et al 1991; Sharpe 1970) (Figure 9.1). Attention was given to the 
relationships between public and private sector organisations and NGOs, and also to 
the links between organisations at different scales, notably, the national, provincial 
and local scales (Pearce 1992). The framework recognised that central government, 
particularly in developing countries, has critical functions to fulfil in terms of co­
ordination, planning, legislation, entrepreneur regulation, and the stimulation of 
tourism development (Jenkins and Henry 1982; Mill and Morrison 1985). “Problems 
arise and costs are increased when the different sectors do not develop harmoniously 
or when the motives and capabilities of different development agents conflict... 
uncontrolled growth of tourism can destroy the very source base on which it was 
built” (Pearce 1992: 12).
This framework reproduced again in Figure 9.1 drew on and integrated 
existing research literature on public administration, decentralisation, systems, inter­
organisational relations and network theories, and on the concepts of resource 
exchange and power-resource dependency (see chapters 2 to 5 for more details). 
Within the literature, four main types of influence can be identified which affect 
centre-local relations in tourism planning and management, including the formulation 
and implementation of local tourism development plans. These are: the environmental 
context, the administrative structures, the geographical scale of the administrative 
structures, and the nature of the inter-organisational interactions. In the framework 
each of these influences was broken down into related elements which can affect 
central-local relations in tourism planning and management (Figure 9.1).
This model takes into consideration the role of the external environment and 
existing networks between organisations, and it adopts a domain level focus, which 
includes, "the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organisations) that become 
joined by a common problem or interest" (Gray 1989: 912). It proposes that tourism 
organisations at the same or different spatial scales operate in a dynamic environment, 
composed of micro, task and macro environment sets. It should be noted that each 
environment set has its own elements and there are reciprocal relations between the 
elements within each environment set, as well as between environment sets. Hence,
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these sets are not necessarily separate entities and they will exert more or less force on 
one another.
The arrows in Figure 9.1 emphasise this dynamic and cyclical nature of relations 
between the three sets of environments. As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.3, 
different forms of inter-organisational relations, such as co-operation, co-ordination, 
competition or conflict, begin in the context of broader social, economic, political or 
technological forces that cause a relationship to be initiated (Selin and Chavez, 1995). 
The nature of these relationships is also determined and shaped by the absence or 
existence of microenvironment elements. The arrows in Figure 9.1 indicate that an 
organisation's proclivity to enter into a co-operative relation with another organisation 
will be heightened when the resources necessary to meet its organisational objectives 
are scarce. Similarly, high levels of competitive uncertainty will force organisations to 
enter into collective arrangements (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). When there is no 
respect of one another's identities (inter-organisational evaluation), or there is 
insufficient information and consultation {communication network), the organisations 
are unlikely to form co-operative relations. Drawing on propositions reviewed in 
chapter 3 section 3.5, the model noted that organisations may know one another 
through working together on other projects in the past (existing network) or they 
might not have worked together previously (new network). Hence, the organisation's 
experiences with the same, similar or other organisations in the past may play an 
important role in inter-organisational relations.
The framework was based on the premise that relationships between 
organisations should not be conceptualised along one dimension alone. 
Interorganisational relationships in tourism planning and implementation involve 
relations between central and local government, NGOs, the community and the 
private sector. As the arrows in Figure 9.1 illustrate, the linkages are multiple, and 
arise in particular from the possession by each organisation of certain resources and 
powers.
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These resources and powers may be, for instance, constitutional, legal, 
financial, professional, informational and administrative (Jones 1980; Rhodes 1981). 
In other words, each organisation is interdependent and operates under the condition 
of partial autonomy (Gamm 1981). In other words, no organisation alone can perform 
its functions or tasks without at some time requiring resources controlled by other 
organisations or actions taken by them. Consequently, organisations within the system 
are likely to attempt to gain the necessary resources, and to do so they will employ 
various strategies.
The framework provides a means to evaluate how tourism management and 
tourism plan development and implementation depend on the nature of the 
interactions (e.g., conflictual, competitive, and co-operative) between organisations at 
national, provincial and local levels. The framework recognises that inter­
organisational relationships take place in contexts where some organisations will be 
co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are competing for the 
same political, financial and informational resources or locus of power. As discussed 
in chapter 3 section 3.5, integral to the framework is the contention that peaceful and 
harmonious interactions based on mutual agreement are only viable where each 
organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions exist 
which embody and enforce the rules which allow them to exchange scarce resources 
on a secure and equitable basis.
The framework helps to evaluate how these organisations relate to their 
surrounding environment. As reviewed in chapter 3 section 3.3, it assumes that the 
nature of these inter-organisational interactions is likely to be influenced by the 
structural dimensions of the environment, including the degree of resource 
concentration or dispersal, the concentration or diffusion of power, and extent of 
autonomy or mutual dependence (Benson 1975). In this environment the external 
regulations may take the form of either enacted laws, rules, or procedures or of the 
attitudes and values of the organisations, and these then shape the nature of the inter­
organisational relationships (Dawson 1986). The political culture of the country, the 
general economic conditions, as well as broader government policies are also likely to 
influence the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for inter-organisational
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relations, including the communication networks, between the different levels of 
government agencies. They also affect the organisational interdependencies, their 
strategic perspectives, and their problem solving capacities (Klijn 1997; Pearce 1992). 
This framework sees institutions as integrated within sets of rules that structure social 
interactions in particular ways, based on the knowledge shared by the members of the 
relevant community or society (Brett 2000). In other words, institutions both are 
affected by and affect the norms, rules, habits, customs and routines, both formal and 
informal, which govern the society at large. They influence the function, structure 
and behaviour of organisations and groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose and who come together to achieve joint objectives (Brett 2000).
The framework helps to assess the character of centralist approaches to 
government where a few central actors develop and apply policy proposals on their 
own, and of localist approaches where local capacities and suggestions are much more 
prominent. The framework recognises that collective action by actors at all 
geographical scales can play a central part in tourism policy-making and 
implementation. Certain rules and procedures tend to regulate the processes of 
exchange between organisations (Laughlin 1996; O’Toole, 1997). For example, the 
legal and institutional framework strongly influences the allocation of financial 
resources, determines the duty to provide access to information, and is an important 
determinant of the hierarchical character of relationships in the organisational 
network. An analysis of inter-organisational relations needs to be placed in the 
context of this institutional framework in order to understand its effects on system 
outcomes.
The model is intended to provide a framework for researchers and 
practitioners to critically interpret inter-organisational relations, and notably central- 
local relations, for tourism planning. Thus, the research potentially has great value for 
tourism researchers and practitioners examining such relations in tourism and related 
disciplines. The model might have particular relevance in tourist destinations within 
other developing countries.
In essence, the conceptual framework developed for this study identified the 
influences and processes affecting inter-organisational relations, notably central-local
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government relations relevant to tourism. Drawing on the concepts identified in the 
Literature Review chapters, this framework suggests that, in a tourism administrative 
context, consideration needs to be given to the character of the interactions between 
various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), the distribution of roles and 
duties between and within sub-systems, the extent of communication and co­
ordination between the actors, the characteristics of the environmental context of the 
system and the related constraints, and the delegation or devolution of power (power 
distribution). Moreover, there needs to be an understanding of the interdependency 
between the different actors in the system in which tourism operates. The model 
integrates inter-organisational relations around tourism planning in a multi- scale 
tourism development network, including those related to central-local interactions. 
The concepts in the conceptual framework and conceptual themes and the relations 
among the several levels have been examined in detail in this study.
A wide range of literature on tourism planning, inter-organisational relations, 
network management, co-ordination, co-operation, collaboration, public 
administration, and decentralisation was reviewed. The researcher established a 
question bank through the analysis of the preliminary interviews and the literature 
review (e.g., Benson et al 1972; Schmidt and Kochan 1977; Taner 1978; Costa 1996; 
Selin and Beason 1991; Selin and Chavez 1995; Selin and Myers 1994; Williams et al 
1998). The construction of the conceptual framework helped the researcher to identify 
a small number of related conceptual themes that were then pursued in the related 
interview questions. As a result of this extensive search and theoretical development, 
the conceptual themes may be of value for other researchers and practitioners who 
want to do similar research within the tourism field (see Table 9.1).
Seven conceptual themes were determined and used to organize the questions 
in the interviews, these being: the planning issues in Belek, inter-organisational 
communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, resource 
sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and activities 
of the organisations, and the delegation of power (Table 9.1).
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Table 9.1 The conceptual themes derived from the conceptual framework 
and used to organise the questions in the interview schedule
Planning issues in Belek Result section 8.1
Inter-organisational communication Result section 8.2
Stakeholder involvement and consensus building Result section 8.3
Resource sufficiency and exchange Result section 8.4
Inter-organisational co-ordination Result section 8.5
The roles and activities of the organisations Result section 8.6
Delegation of power Result section 8.7
The conceptual themes provided many insights concerning inter­
organisational relation in a multi-scale tourism development network, and notably 
those between central and local scales. The themes simplified the concepts in the 
more complex conceptual framework of elements related to inter-organisational 
relationships, and between different management tiers involved in tourism 
administration. In conclusion, the conceptual framework, the conceptual themes and 
the study findings may well have direct relevance for other researchers and 
practitioners interested in other tourist destinations in Turkey or in other developing 
countries. The next section considers in more detail the potential value of the study 
for other researchers and for practitioners.
9.2.1 The value of the conceptual framework and conceptual 
themes
This section highlights the contribution of this study to the development of an 
improved theoretical understanding of inter-organisational relations, and notably of 
central-local relations in tourism planning. There have been only limited attempts to 
examine inter-organisational relations in the tourism context - a gap in current 
academic knowledge that has been commented on by a number of tourism researchers 
(Costa, 1996; Hall and Jenkins, 1995; Pearce, 1992). The existing literature is largely 
descriptive and does not adequately problematise the character of relations between 
organisations and especially between organisations at different geographical scales. In 
addition, there has been only very limited critical consideration of the strengths and
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weaknesses of decentralised and centralised administration structures. Integrating 
approaches, theories and concepts drawn from the literature in politics, public 
administration, management, tourism, planning, geography and law, this research has 
provided one of the first comprehensive studies of the under-researched academic 
area of inter-organisational relations, and notably of central-local relations, and their 
likely impacts on local tourism policy-making and implementation. The development 
of a conceptual framework and of key conceptual themes to analyse inter­
organisational relations in the tourism context fills a recognised gap in current 
academic knowledge.
This research relates to the pressing practical issues faced by governments 
throughout the world, but notably in developing countries with a long history of 
centralised public administration. This is the issue of how best to combine central 
with local policy-making. The findings of the study provided a detailed evaluation of 
relations between central and local government in Belek, and the approach and 
findings have clear implications for other countries, that have similar tourism 
administrative structures to those in Turkey. The research can lead to a greater 
understanding of centralised, decentralised and network-based tourism management, 
their merits, limitations and applicability in a developing country context.
While developed to examine the specific case of the Belek Management Plan, 
the conceptual framework and themes used in this study may have relevance to 
researchers examining similar tourism destinations. They integrate tourism planning 
and implementation with other organisational elements, including with the local, 
provincial and national contexts, and with the broader socio-economic, political and 
legislative situations. The framework and themes give provenance to issues of 
geographical scale and to the different functions of tourist organisations in the pursuit 
of their goals. The emphasis is on an improved understanding of the ways in which 
tourism planning and development processes are carried out (Costa 1996). They 
indicate that there is the need to pay more attention to the organisational framework in 
which planning is undertaken (the administrative component), since this strongly 
affects planning efficiency and effectiveness. There is also a need for governments to 
pay more attention to local level administration, since the success of planning activity 
and the profitability of the tourism industry will increasingly depend on the efficiency
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and effectiveness of planning and co-ordinating attitudes delivered locally (the local 
component). Account also needs to be taken of the potential role of networks in the 
improvement of tourism planning and in the co-ordination of the tourism sector (the 
network component). Greater flexibility and responsiveness in the way tourism 
planning is applied may be encouraged through recognition of the areas of 
interdependency, the exchange of resources among agencies involved in decision­
making processes, and of the elements that either facilitate or inhibit the building of 
effective inter-organisational relationships. These assessments can help both 
researchers and planners to read local circumstances accurately and to identify 
relevant stakeholder organisations and individuals, and their values, interests and 
relative power.
Although it is argued that the research is worthwhile for other researchers and 
practitioners in the tourism field, the wider applicability of the empirical side of the 
research to other destinations of Turkey or other countries may be slightly limited due 
to the specific role and status of the private and voluntary sector organisations in the 
Belek case study which may not be commonly found elsewhere. Notably, delegation 
of authority to a private sector organisation, that is to Betuyab, as a counterpart of 
central government is not a widespread approach to tourism development in other 
destinations in Turkey and perhaps also in other developing countries. Similarly, the 
strong role of a voluntary sector organisation, NPS, in the formulation of the BMP is 
also unusual for tourism development in the country. This is largely because the BMP 
was intended to be a demonstration project providing a new paradigm for other 
tourism destinations of Turkey and for other Mediterranean countries. However, it is 
important to remember that the circumstances in every case and in each country are 
unique. More typically, the Belek case study still reflects the issues found in a highly 
centralised system for tourism administration, with central government organisations 
having a key role in tourism development. Hence, the case study provides important 
potential lessons for tourism planners in Turkey and other developing countries, 
especially in relation to how they can more proactively manage stakeholder 
relationships to better promote cooperative planning and plan implementation.
9.3 Conceptual themes applied to Belek
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The research applied the concepts developed from a conceptual framework to 
the study of inter-organisational relationships in tourism planning, and notably those 
between national and local levels, to the specific context of Belek, a rapidly 
expanding tourism resort in Antalya, Turkey. This was based on the case study 
approach, and it drew on both secondary and primary data (Yin 1993, Williams et al
1998). The primary data collection involved purposeful semi-structured interviews 
with relevant people, focusing on seven conceptual themes identified from the 
theoretical framework. A software programme (Nud.ist) was used to analyse the 
interviews that had been carried out with selected representatives from relevant 
organisations and other groups. By this means important insights were gained into the 
nature of central-local relations in a developing country context. However, the 
empirical findings from this case study are not necessarily transferable to other 
tourism or land use planning contexts. Rather, they should be taken as a foundation 
for more empirical testing elsewhere.
The seven conceptual themes used in the study were developed from the 
study's conceptual framework. These themes were planning issues in Belek, inter­
organisational communication, stakeholder involvement and consensus building, 
resource sufficiency and exchange, inter-organisational co-ordination, the roles and 
activities of the organisations , and the delegation of power (Table 9.1). The 
discussion that follows reviews the major findings of the study in relation to these 
seven conceptual themes.
9.3.1 Planning issues in Belek (tourism planning and development)
The elements influencing the effective use of the Management Plan for 
tourism development in the Belek region included difficulties arising from the 
legislative, institutional, political and economic environment, and from a lack of civic 
consciousness and commitment, a lack of local resources, the rapid growth of second 
homes, and the inadequate local infrastructure. Based on the scope and scale of their 
influence, these variables were categorised into two major groups. The variables 
belonging to the immediate local environment constitute the “micro environment”, 
and the variables associated with the larger environment are labelled the “macro 
environment”. The macro environment is the level of the tourism system’s external 
environment made up of variables that are broad in scope and often influence tourism
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development through affecting its operating environment (Liu 1994). Local forces, on 
the other hand, consist of those elements or characteristics of an area that influence 
the process of development or determine the capability and capacity of the region to 
respond to development requirements. The existence of two different but interlocked 
environments suggests that a change in one of the environmental variables is likely to 
create reverberations affecting the functioning of others (Liu 1994; Elliot 1997). 
Planners thus have to be concerned with not only technical aspects of planning but 
also have to understand the content of, and envision changes in, elements of the 
broader environment, which may have direct or indirect effects on planning and 
development. The following paragraphs now present some of these major forces in 
more detail.
9.3.1.1 Constitutional and legislative framework (Macro environment)
The variables in Belek’s macro environment most frequently mentioned by 
respondents were the general characteristics of the legislative environment (e.g., 
appropriateness and adequacy of legislation, and the distribution of responsibility, 
resources, and power in relation to legislation). This corresponds with the findings of 
Selin (1998), who argues that implementation is fostered when the enabling laws and 
management systems assist in the formation and continuance of partnership 
agreements. Respondents in this study complained that at present the legislation was 
in quite a shambles, leading to too many conflictual relations among central and local 
organisations. Under Turkey’s present legislative framework, it was almost 
impossible to put plans into practice effectively, and it was in need of significant 
revision. In contrast, some stated that the current legislation was not to blame. In their 
view, the tourism legislation was appropriate and adequate, but the enforcers were not 
applying the laws appropriately. The custom of “getting round” the legislation was 
stated to be rife in the region. It was noted that legislation could not achieve much on 
its own, as the mentality of the individuals involved greatly influenced the 
enforcement of any law. Respondents complained that there were countless ways to 
get around the legislation in order to exploit the environment to the advantage of 
individuals.
9.3.1.2 Institutional framework (Macro environment)
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Another frequently mentioned influential macro variable was the nature of the 
institutional environment (e.g., a multiplicity of institutions, institutional rivalry and 
intolerance, incompatible goals and organisational ideologies, conflicting interests and 
expectations, a low level of institutional commitment, and staff discontinuity). 
Tourism programmes involve interactions between government agencies and quasi- 
government and private organisations. Information, goals and resources are 
exchanged in these interactions. Tourism programmes have little chance of success 
unless this institutional context is considered and arranged carefully. The findings for 
Belek indicate that the institutional arrangements had inhibited the plan 
implementation process. In the Belek case there were problems of competition for 
prestige among a number of central organisations. Many of these organisations had 
incompatible goals and institutional ideologies, conflicting expectations and varying 
degrees of commitment to tourism-related issues. A collective mentality in terms of 
sharing the responsibilities and resources among the central institutions was almost 
absent.
9.3.1.3 Political environment (Macro environment)
The other factor in the macro environment repeatedly mentioned as adversely 
influencing Belek’s tourism planning was the unstable political environment and the 
discontinuity of political support. The most frequently mentioned features of the 
political environment were the recurring shifts in the political arena and the 
uncertainty and instability that it created, the tutelage imposed by central government, 
and partisanship and favouritism. This is not a surprising finding. As decisions about 
tourism are taken in the context of a political system, then political cultures, structures 
and situations are likely to affect the ways in which tourism is organised and its 
development is controlled (deKadt 1979; Elliot 1997). This finding indicates that a 
shifting political climate may severely hamper implementation efforts by limiting the 
power of the parties to take the actions they desire. Thus one may argue that 
successful implementation requires political skills, both within the domain and with 
respect to the wider environment, to ensure that sufficient political support for the 
agreements can be sustained (Gray 1989). Political instability can be seen as a 
hygiene factor in that it may not necessarily promote tourism development but its 
absence would certainly considerably damage or hamper plan implementation. The 
frequent changes taking place in the political environment, characterised by short­
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lived political parties coming to power, were among the variables destabilising 
political support, a necessary ingredient for the success of any tourism development. 
These changes both in central and local government would give birth to something of 
a political hiatus and re-ordering of priorities, and changes in personnel and policies 
in the region. Ministers and even officers have a habit of replacing personnel in their 
department when they are appointed to a new post. It was claimed that high personnel 
turnover rates decreased efficiency, continuity, and thus the effectiveness of the 
collective arrangement for tourism development in Belek.
9.3.1.4 Micro environment
Frequently mentioned local factors influencing effective application of the 
BMP were the level of local commitment, the availability of human capital and other 
local resources, and the extent to which there was a sense of ownership of the Plan. 
The level of local engagement in a community is often stated to have a strong effect 
on the success of such efforts: “Communities with strong civic engagement have 
residents that participate actively in the life and politics of the community and state- 
joining associations and publicly advocating for quality of life improvements. 
Conversely the residents of communities lacking a strong tradition of civic 
engagement tend to develop dependencies on the state or corporations to provide for 
them” (Selin 1998: 12). A so-called indifferent attitude among local people towards 
local decision-making had undermined the Plan's effectiveness in the region. Here the 
administrative tutelage practised by central government on local government in 
Turkey may have fostered a tradition or expectation of non-participation or pseudo­
participation by local people in their own affairs (Tosun 2001).
9.3.2 Inter-organisational communication
Communication and information sharing are important issues in tourism 
planning and implementation. Communication provides a number of benefits to 
management (Davidson 1976; Francis 1987). Without the sharing of information, 
ambiguities can remain in the differences and similarities between organisations, and 
the aspects of their agendas and approaches which can be used as the starting point for 
co-ordination. If organisations have communicated very little or have not 
communicated, it is highly likely that they will have had very few grounds on which 
to build co-ordination (Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman 1976; Torrens 1969). The
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performance of organisations in any given setting can be severely hampered when the 
agencies know nothing about one another (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance may lead to 
the unnecessary duplication of functions as well as compound the problem of 
organisational uncertainty. It is therefore reasonable to expect that agencies that 
interact are in a better position to know one another, and hence to respond better to 
the needs of their clients and adapt to the larger environment within which they 
operate than those that do not (Njoh 1993). Several factors, however, may work 
against achieving effective communication between stakeholders involved in tourism 
plans.
9.3.2.1 Barriers to effective communication
Interorganisational communication during the formulation and implementation 
of the Belek Plan was hampered substantially by several structural and personal 
factors, shifting political interests, and by unfavourable perceptions that parties held 
about each other. Dissimilarity in values and attitudes between organisations (i.e., 
while one supports environmental protection, the other supports its utilisation),' and 
prejudice toward the capability and credibility of particularly voluntary sector 
organisations, appeared to be among the main obstacles in the way of effective 
communication. An absence of common and complementary goals was stated to be an 
important barrier to interorganisational communication (Gray 1989; Schermerhom 
1975; Selin and Chavez 1994; Tjosvold 1988). In this study, individual relations, 
current legislation, and geographical distance were other significant variables 
determining the frequency of contact between organisations. This finding parallels 
observations made by Gray (1989). Physical proximity facilitates frequency of 
contact, and enhances the likelihood that there is some interdependence among 
stakeholders with respect to information resources. Geographic dispersion increases 
the cost of face-to-face communication, and introduces the possibility of cultural 
differences (institutional norms) that will make structuring more difficult (Gray 
1989).
A number of external and internal factors, such as an adequate representation 
of interests, good working relationships and open communication may determine the 
success of inter-organisational relations (Selin and Myers 1998). The recognition by 
stakeholder groups that their actions are inextricably linked to the actions of other
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stakeholders could be a critical basis for successful communication and co-operation 
(Gray 1989). Moreover, a perceived right and capacity to participate (legitimacy) in 
the formulation and implementation process might be among the factors determining 
the frequency of inter-organisational communication (Gray 1989). Historical 
relationships among stakeholders undoubtedly colour their perceptions of legitimacy. 
For example “government officials may not perceive citizens as having a 'legitimate 
voice' in a technical issue even though the citizens will have to live with whatever 
solution is adopted” (Gray 1989: 322). The legitimacy of organisations involved in 
the Belek planning process was an issue. In line with the theoretical arguments 
outlined, the respondents complained that no national and local institution was keen to 
be at the beck and call of another institution. Despite the fact that the fear of losing 
organisational prestige and strategic position may have very little to do with the 
competency and legitimacy of the other agency, some organisations remained 
reluctant to contact parties with a perceived lower status. The negative stereotypes 
about a number of organisations in the administrative system not only curtailed co­
operation, but also increased the difficulty of correcting those stereotypes because 
information flows were severely restricted. This applied, for example, in the case of 
the Nature Preservation Society. Certain repercussions may flow from this. For 
instance, distrust may prevail when one party has had little contact with another 
organisation, and images have not had time to be modified. Central government 
officials relevant to the Belek area were critical of local officials. They held a 
stereotype that local government was inefficient, extravagant, and oppressive over 
their local inhabitants, while they felt that the centre, as the guardian of wider public 
interests, was more committed to stimulating efficiency, to eradicating waste and to 
protecting local inhabitants from local mal-administration. Central government treated 
local government as its extension and considered itself superior to local government, 
which meant that the local government officials were alienated and did not share 
information with the centre. These specific problems are also evident in the literature. 
For instance, Gray (1989) cites the study of Gricar (1981) in which local officials 
were found to be sceptical about the ability of some stakeholders, and hence they 
questioned the need to include citizens at all.
Lack of a common language might have given rise to communication 
problems. The involvement of junior staff representing key institutions but who
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lacked the required power in decision-making emerged as another factor that 
considerably slowed inter-organisational communication. Gray (1989) noted a similar 
problem. Individuals participating in a collaborative initiative because of their 
technical expertise or local knowledge may not have decision-making authority for 
their organisations. Hence, if  an organisation is not represented at senior staff level, it 
is possible that policies subsequently will be forgotten or disavowed (Bramwell and 
Sharmann 1999). Additionally, some irresolvable differences and incompatible 
interests between national and local organisations blocked the flow of information 
upward and downward between these two levels. The effects of red tape on effective 
communication were also observed. Red tape or “tortuous and wasteful” 
communication, as Francis (1987) puts it, might have consumed too much time, 
generated frustration and made decision-making sluggish and inefficient. Many of the 
communication problems could be due to the absence of a communication and Public 
Relations strategy.
9.3.2.2 Improving communication
Empirical research elsewhere suggests that proper communication contributes 
to the effectiveness of partnerships (Selin and Myers 1998); however, when 
communication is viewed narrowly (i.e., communication is not a good thing to be 
doing) then a spate of issues is likely to constrain effectiveness. In their research Selin 
and Chavez (1994) found that active listening, honesty and directness were important 
success indicators. Similarly, respondents in this study of Belek suggested a number 
of ways to promote this, ranging from building trust to having permanent staff. 
However, they indicated that effective communication could not be achieved through 
laws and regulations. Instead, the importance of information sharing should be 
actively cultivated between individuals.
9.3.3 Stakeholder involvement and consensus building
Despite the many difficulties that it may involve, decisions are more likely to 
be implemented if they are taken through interactive or “communicative” planning in 
which a participatory process is employed to gather experiences, opinions and 
constructive recommendations from diverse constituencies (Gunn 1994; Inskeep 
1991; Lang 1988; Pearce 1981). Stakeholder involvement in the decision-making 
process is also recognised as one of the prerequisites of sustainable tourism planning
338
(Harssel 1994). Much has been written illustrating the significance of stakeholder
involvement in planning (Brandon 1993). Direct and meaningful participation in
decision-making is likely to induce a sense of ownership (Brandon 1993), and this
sense may be imperative in implementation and in achieving results. The involvement
of relevant stakeholders in the planning process is also often depicted as vital, as
$failure to involve relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process can be a major 
obstacle to realising the goal of sustainable development (Ioannides 1992). The 
literature is replete with examples of how an absence or lack of stakeholder 
involvement may lead to incurable negative social and economic impacts (Inskeep 
1991). In this Belek study, respondents criticised the form of participation. They also 
questioned the way in which their concerns had been listened to but had not been 
adequately incorporated in plan objectives.
9.3.3.1 Forms and levels of participation
There was an apparent divergence among stakeholders in relation to the extent 
and nature of participation in the decision-making processes. In particular, the NPS 
and Betuyab respondents considered that participation should not be judged according 
to the number of people present at a meeting. Instead, they argued that it should be 
evaluated on the basis of commitment and cooperativeness. It seems that the reaching 
of full consensus was almost impossible during the BMP meetings, partly because 
many of the participants who regularly attended them did not have sufficient power to 
make decisions on behalf of their own organisations. Based on local respondents’ 
comments, it could be said that there was token participation, and residents were the 
only group disadvantaged by their limited status and power in the making of 
decisions. These respondents stated that the centralist administration that was 
dominant in the country meant they were unable to have their concerns addressed 
adequately about the kind of development they wanted. Several of the barriers to 
reaching consensus that were mentioned share similarities with those identified in 
previous studies (Bramwell and Sharman 1999).
9.3.3.2 Barriers to reaching consensus
According to the literature, individual access to power and decision-making is 
usually unequal, and this tends to inhibit consensus-building (Hall 2000; Hall and 
Jenkins 1995; Tosun and Jenkins 1996). From the perspective of local Belek
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stakeholders, there was a difficulty in accessing the responsible central agencies. 
However, these agencies were thought to be more accessible to the local elite and 
entrepreneurs with more political and financial power. Additionally, the existence of a 
low level of trust in the administrative system and the tradition that bureaucrats made 
decisions on behalf of the local people, led to a feeling of isolation among the local 
population. The legal system had not encouraged local people to participate, rather it 
put a distance between them and the authorities. Local respondents complained 
specifically that because of geographical distance they were unable to participate in 
meetings, particularly those held in Ankara. Political distance or fractures constituted 
another barrier that hindered broader participation in the initial and subsequent 
meetings related to the Belek Plan. Political opposition between municipalities and 
the history of past conflicts also meant that some mayors avoided being present in 
some meetings in order to avoid public confrontation with another mayor.
Reaching a consensus involves a discursive process where participants learn 
about and respect each other and their different points of view, come to reflect on 
their own point of view, work together with this combined local knowledge to 
establish a new discourse about the issues and the policy direction, and come to value 
and respond to the new policy direction (Healey 1997 in Bramwell and Sharman 
1999). It should recognise the potential fractions among stakeholders, should help the 
stakeholders to understand each other’s concerns, and should reach out across their 
differences (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). In Belek the inequalities in power and 
resource allocations between stakeholders, and their differences in interests and 
values meant that a consensus and a shared ownership of the resulting policies had not 
emerged between all stakeholders. As Ritchie (1993) observes, there were 
fundamental differences in values systems that the wide-ranging stakeholders had 
brought to the process. Thus reaching a consensus and obtaining endorsement was a 
challenging and delicate task. Local people in general noted that their concerns were 
just listened to but not incorporated adequately in the objectives. In Belek concerns 
raised in meetings might not have been taken account of as a result of hidden agendas, 
changing personal or institutional values, or beliefs and attitudes. Local respondents 
in general in Belek complained that many central government officials in the meetings 
were short of patience and were not keen to change decisions that they had already 
made. In contrast, the public officials were of the view that community participation
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takes up a lot of time and resources. More effective public participation in decision­
making in Belek, however, could have prevented many of the costs resulting from 
continued conflicts and from the need to change decisions that prove subsequently to 
be inadequately informed. Several disputes had ensued in part because of the failure 
to reach an adequate consensus among stakeholders.
9.3.3.3 Disputes and their causes
There were conflicts between organisations in the case study area. Many of 
these conflicts had gone unmanaged in the region because of the lack of a conflict 
management procedure other than litigation. Given the limited communication 
between parties identified in this study, it is not difficult to understand why conflicts 
had not been settled successfully. Issues giving rise to conflicts between organisations 
had not been dealt with at a deeper level. Some conflicts had continued and become 
quite destructive. The ongoing conflictual relations between Kumkoy villagers and 
the Ministry of Forestry exemplified such a case. These parties used litigation for the 
resolution of their problem. However, adjudication defines winners and losers, and 
thereby it decreases support for the implementation of agreed decisions (Hall 2000; 
Williams et al., 1998). Consensus building, on the other hand, produces win-win 
solutions, which reduce or eliminate power imbalances between parties because each 
effectively has a say over decisions and hence they are free from the autocracy of the 
majority (Cormick 1989). However, this approach has not been exercised to any 
fundamental degree in the case study area.
9.3.4 Resource sufficiency and exchange
Problems related to resources are the mainstay of explanations for the policy- 
implementation gap, especially in the developing world, where resources are 
generally scarcer (Morah 1996). The findings for Belek indicated that only a few 
national and local organisations had certain resources. Most of the national and local 
organisations, however, lacked the financial, legal, political and informational 
resources to make a success of the BMP. The Belek environment corresponds to the 
“resource scarcity” type of environment suggested by Benson (1975). This had a 
considerable effect on the supply of money and other resources and on the distribution 
of power within the network. In Belek some parties in the environment dominated 
others as a consequence of their resource abundance (money, authority, etc.,). There
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was a clear-cut pattern of dominance in which some parties controlled others (e.g., the 
relations between Betuyab and the Belek municipality). The authoritative control 
mechanisms used by central government over local government appears to have 
important implications for the nature of relations within the network. An overall lack 
of organisational resources also adversely affected the results of the Belek 
Management Plan.
9.3.4.1 Resource exchange
The tourism environment is made up of a various organisations, with each 
controlling these resources to a differing extent, including capital, technology, 
personnel and knowledge. As no organisation can possess or generate independently 
all the necessary resources, each organisation is likely to interact with others in order 
to acquire the resources necessary for goal achievement (Klijn 1997). The interactions 
with other organisations may consist of the exchange of funds, sharing of information, 
and collaboration and sharing of personnel. The interactions may also include 
expressions of criticism or opposition, competition for funds, and even purposeful 
disregard between agencies. The literature supports the view that resource scarcity 
leads organisations to exchange relations. This study, however, showed that resource 
scarcity is likely to produce conflicting strategies between organisations. This would 
inhibit effective interactions between organisations.
9.3.4.2 Barriers to resource exchange
Resource exchange between organisations tends to emerge in periods of 
resource scarcity or declining resources. Interestingly, however, while the resources 
of many organisations were scarce in the Belek study, there was little or no exchange 
of resources between organisations at the same or different spatial levels. For 
exchange relations to occur the interactions between organisations must be based on a 
high degree of cooperation and shared problem-solving. However, interactions among 
organisations involved in the Belek Management Plan could be characterised by a 
high level of conflict and bargaining. This might have greatly hampered resource 
exchange relations.
Several issues are discussed as correlates of resource exchange between 
organisations (Levine and White 1961). For example, exchange would be very
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unlikely without some level of agreement. Factors mentioned in Belek as impeding 
resource exchange between organisations were the unequal distribution of existing 
resources, managerial incompetence in their utilisation, institutional jealousy, the 
limited level of perceived interdependency, politically partisan organisations, and 
differences in ideology and organisational values. Respondents were critical about 
there being a culture of individualism. This appears to have been a key impediment 
undermining co-operative actions, particularly among the municipalities of the region.
The history of political fractions and rampant partisanship might have blocked the
exchange of resources. Because several national organisations, and to some extent
local government organisations, had highly similar domains, they were likely to need
the same kind of resources, and this reduced the potential benefits of making
exchanges. The power and money possessed by a party influenced whether they
followed competitive strategies (as in the case of national organisations), or whether
they preferred co-operative strategies to help reduce uncertainty (such as the mutual i
agreement between the Nature Preservation Society and Betuyab after the closure of i
the former’s office in Belek as a result of the budget problems at Nature Preservation
Society headquarters). The national organisations involved in implementing the BMP
were in competitive relations, or asymmetric relations, as Logsdon (1991) puts it.
Each organisation attempted to achieve its own interests at the expense of others. 1
Resources were centrally concentrated and scarce, which eventually led to conflicts <
between local government organisations competing for these same resources, 
including for funding and authority. Moreover, the environment within which 
organisations made contact was not at all stable. Furthermore, the balance in the 
distribution of resources and their quantity changed as a result of new actors entering 
or leaving the system. The Nature Preservation Society was an example of the latter, 
while the municipalities illustrate the former.
9.3.5 Inter-organisational co-ordination
The notions of co-ordination, collaboration and partnership in tourism have 
received growing research attention in recent years as a means of finding solutions to 
resource management and destination development problems (Hall 2000; Selin 2000).
However, despite the potential value of such attention, these concepts have remained 
relatively poorly critically evaluated from a public policy perspective (Bramwell and 
Lane 2000; Hall 2000). This study showed that discussing co-ordination on paper
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might be easier than doing it in practice. Several obstacles were identified in the way 
of co-ordination.
9.3.5.1 Barriers to co-ordination
Organisations tend to seek out or be more receptive to interorganisational co­
operation and co-ordination when they face resource scarcity. The underpinning 
reason is that resource scarcity forces organisations to enter into co-operative 
activities in order to make resources stretch to meet increasing needs. Interestingly, 
despite the resource scarcity of many parties involved in the BMP, co-ordination and 
co-operation were exercised infrequently. Some parties wanted to benefit without 
contributing. Importantly, because the commitment of organisational resources was 
modest, the relationships between organisations were less formal and consequently 
more difficult to maintain. Co-ordination between organisations was also vulnerable 
to the turnover of organisational staff. The co-ordination between some parties was a 
“mutual adjustment” form of co-ordination (Whetten 1981), whereby co-ordination 
focused on specific cases rather than on the development of a comprehensive delivery 
system.
Co-ordination and co-operation between the parties in Belek failed 
substantially because of the diversity of public organisations involved, each with its 
own political agenda to increase its power. The institutional set up was described as 
too fragmented, complex and ambiguous in the delegation of responsibilities. The low 
level of co-ordination between national and local organisations was also attributed to 
the administrative culture in Turkey which discourages a cross-sectoral approach to 
problem solving. This is despite the potential value of direct relationships between 
groups, organisations and individuals operating in close proximity (Robinson 2000). 
This would enable informal interactions between key decision-makers and 
communication between the staff of organisations. Such interaction would facilitate a 
recognition of (1) similarities in orientation, (2) similarities in the training of staff, (3) 
possible cross-matches between goals and resources, and (4) an inter-dependency for 
scarce resources. Organisational performance was severely hampered as the agencies 
knew very little about each other (Njoh 1993). Such ignorance led to an unnecessary 
duplication of functions. The national organisations hardly communicated amongst 
themselves much less with local organisations, whose confidence they had lost as a
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result. When an agency has had very little contact with another organisation, then 
distrust may arise and prevail. Ideological differences between private and public 
organisations, and among public organisations generated conflict rather than 
collaboration. As central government ignored the opportunity to work through the 
local authorities, the chances of achieving widespread participation in the 
development effort became weakened and mistrust developed.
The cultivation of co-ordination and co-operation between parties in Belek 
would be difficult because of strong opposition to the policies of some national and 
local parties. The respondents suggested that each party should commit itself to an 
agreed course of action, and communicate this commitment to other parties in the 
relationship. The reluctance to promote co-ordination was partly because for some 
national (Ministry of Culture) and local organisations (Betuyab) this entailed 
relinquishing some control over important elements of their viability, power and 
privileges. It is clear that these organisations were unlikely to relinquish control 
without receiving in return some compensatory concessions (Davidson 1976). The 
study findings support ideas discussed by Whetten (1981) that managers must have a 
positive attitude toward interorganisational co-ordination, they must recognise partial 
interdependence and an organisational need, and they must have the capacity to 
manage the on-going co-ordination process. However, given the differences between 
organisations, it was difficult to secure the co-ordination of all organisations within 
the network relevant to the BMP. For example, the mayors’ comments revealed that 
they were in fear of losing their prestige in the eyes of their political supporters, and 
thus of their strategic position, if they engaged in co-ordinated relations with another 
mayor of an opposing party. Similarly, some national organisations were reluctant to 
co-ordinate with agencies perceived to have lesser importance.
9.3.6 Roles and activities of the organisations
Peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement is only viable 
where each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable 
institutions exist which embody and enforce the rules, thus allowing them to exchange 
scarce resources on a secure and equitable basis. This study found that the nature of 
relations was likely to be determined by the level of agreement between organisations 
regarding the appropriate role and scope of an agency (domain consensus), the nature
of the tasks confronted by the organisation and the appropriate approaches to those 
tasks (ideological consensus), the judgement in one organisation of the value of the 
work of another organisation (positive evaluation), and the patterns of co-ordination 
(work co-ordination).
9.3.6.1 Domain and ideological conflict
Respondents were unhappy about the way in which authority and 
responsibility was divided in relation to tourism planning in Belek. Similar planning 
authority was given to different public organisations. Because of the domain 
similarities of many national organisations, the potential for territorial disputes and 
competition was high. Undertaking organised and integrated activities between 
organisations was a challenge with this current distribution of responsibilities and 
authority. The situation was characterised by ambiguity. This had induced 
management incapacity and also undermined accountability because each unit tended 
to put the blame on each other when things went wrong. There was authority 
(domain) conflict between central units, between central and local units, and between 
local units. The power was not distributed equally among the organisations and there 
existed a power monopoly. Central government was accused of being interventionist 
and acting merely on political and economic concerns. While local government was 
empowered to carry out certain tasks, the legislation in this respect was violated 
because of the monopoly of power through the personal contacts of Betuyab staff. The 
central government had transferred some of its responsibilities to Betuyab (a non­
government unit) in the name of decentralisation. However, this transference was 
widely assumed to be illegal, as it was not based on a legal framework. Local 
government was powerless and helpless in the face of this informal arrangement.
There were differences in opinion about what tasks should be undertaken by 
organisations at different spatial levels. Many respondents felt that central 
government interest in promotion and development should be matched by concerns 
for the environmental impacts of tourism development and environment protection. It 
was also often argued that the municipalities should pay more attention to the 
realisation of environment protection measures through observing careful resource 
management, undertaking co-operative relations between central and local units, and 
by improving public consciousness and public participation in decision-making.
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According to Betuyab, the municipalities in the area must be more attentive and 
sensitive to the development and application of sanctions to stop the conversion of 
fertile agricultural land into development land. In turn, Betuyab’s role was severely 
criticised by the majority of local government representatives and some other public 
and private sector organisations. These signal serious domain and ideological 
dissension among organisations.
9.3.6.2 Negative evaluation of other parties and work co-ordination
The majority of national organisations involved in the Belek plan disparaged 
the performance of the other national organisations in general and local government in 
particular. The same was true of opinions of local people about national and local 
organisations. This negative evaluation appears to have been closely related to the 
domain and ideological conflicts. The litigation process and its outcome between the 
villagers and the Ministry of Forestry, and the continuing opposition of villagers to 
their lands being designated as a specially protected zone, were clearly difficult 
barriers to the development of positive evaluations of one another. The central units 
were accused of illusionist presentations, such as by trumpeting visitor numbers as an 
indication of success and by overlooking of the real costs of tourism for the area.
Many respondents were critical about the effectiveness and efficiency of provincial 
government, local government and central government, and also felt that a union 
involving local and central units might be a better solution. The administrative 
incapacity of provincial and local government might have been clearly affected by 
political pressures, limited professionalism, a high staff turnover (such as of the 
governor), and a lack of appropriate skills. The administrative incapacity of local and 
central units might not largely stem from inefficient legislation, being affected more 
by factors such as by nepotism, favouritism, and clientelism. According to several 
respondents, the effectiveness of municipal services was impeded by financial and 
human resources constraints, by administrative tutelage and by the central monopoly 
of power. Respondents did not believe that relations would be improved if the 
legislation was changed. As they commented, the legislation was satisfactory but its 
implementation was poor. These results indicate that attempts at domain expansion 
and domain defence by both national and local organisations were severely hampering 
effective interorganisational relations in Belek. Similarly, work co-ordination between 
parties largely failed because of the diverse range of public organisations involved,
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each with their own political agendas, and each seeking to increase their power. Based 
on the interviews, it would be naive to think that it would be easy to build effective 
inter-organisational relations under circumstances where each organisation viewed 
itself as more important than the others, and also disparaged the work undertaken by 
the others.
The conceptual framework developed for this study is premised on the 
assumption that the formulation and implementation of tourism plans is affected by 
interactions between organisations at national, provincial and local levels. It is usual 
for inter-organisational relationships to involve some organisations co-operating with 
each other for mutual benefit, and for others to compete for the same political, 
financial, informational resources or power. The literature reviewed in chapter three 
suggests that peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement and the 
exchange of scarce resources will only be viable where each organisation respects the 
rights of others and where there are viable institutions which embody and enforce the 
rules. Inter-organisational interactions can be in equilibrium when the relationships 
between two or more organisations are harmonious, non-conflicting, and 
collaborative. In this study, inter-organisational relations were not in equilibrium as 
there was domain and ideological conflict together with negative evaluation of other 
parties and a limited degree of work co-ordination.
9.3.7 Delegation of power
It was argued in chapter two that the long-term success of tourism increasingly 
relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative framework within 
which it operates. Two alternative administrative models were identified in the 
literature and were studied in depth in chapter five. The first model, Centralised 
Tourism Administration (CTA), assumes that a central steering agency has at its 
disposal the necessary information about existing public problems and preferences 
and about the available resources and solutions (Kickert et al. 1997). The CTA is 
generally adopted by developing countries where there is no system allowing 
decisions to be taken by the people most immediately affected by them, with tourism 
usually considered to be an industry of national concern which should be centrally 
planned and controlled (Wahap 1997). This administrative form of tourism 
management has certain advantages but also limitations, and there are numerous cases
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of tourism plans formulated at the top and implemented by people at the bottom that 
have not achieved the desired outcomes. One explanation for this is that centrally 
formulated plans may be out of touch with local people's needs and may lack a 
detailed knowledge of the local environment.
Centralisation means that the authority, responsibility and ability to perform the 
basic functions of the state are concentrated in central governing organisations 
(Ocampo 1991: 193). These elements can be concentrated in the central government 
of a country so that it can command and control the behaviour of more localised 
organisations, and notably local government. It can do this by setting limits on or 
dictating their goals, by directing or otherwise guiding their decisions and actions, by 
substituting their judgement with their own through prior or post-hoc approval or by 
their own direct action, by monitoring and evaluating their performance, by instituting 
corrective measures, and by imposing sanctions for local deviations from central 
guidelines (Ocampo 1991). Centralisation may be justified as necessary to define a 
comprehensive and coherent framework of goals and norms for the government and 
nation as a whole and to ensure there is consistency and compatibility of local 
activities within that framework. It may be needed not only to co-ordinate local 
decisions and actions, but also to aggregate and distribute resources and capacities • 
and to focus them according to national standards and priorities that transcend those 
of local units. Foreign relations, environmental standards, human rights and social 
justice in particular are often considered beyond the competence of local units to 
undertake without central guidance and assistance (Ocampo 1991: 194).
However, this form of tourism management has certain limitations. When goals, 
targets and priorities are promulgated by central government in a top-down fashion, 
there is usually little opportunity for local contributions to their formulation. Central 
government tends to put a premium on a strict instead of a liberal interpretation of 
local powers, to require prior clearance of local decisions, to closely supervise local 
performance, and to penalise departures from norms. In order to ensure goal- 
achievement, central government may even pre-empt implementation, such as by 
directly taking on policy making and planning roles and by allocating the resources 
necessary to perform them. There is very limited local autonomy under a centralist 
regime. Central control tends to stifle any initiative, discretion, or self-reliance that
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local units may want to exercise. Local units may not be self-aware to begin with, 
their identity having been suppressed by the primacy of central government. Most of 
the powers and resources as well as responsibilities may be concentrated at the centre 
and top. While there may be local government and local representatives of national 
agencies, they may be under-endowed in many respects and look to central 
government for resources and support. However, these conditions are argued to work 
against the whole system. For example, it is argued that centralism is likely to 
overload central government with unessential tasks, hierarchical overgrowth, and 
unnecessary resources. Staff and line units are likely to proliferate near the top. The 
ability of central authorities to make sound decisions and to command and control 
local actions will be impaired because of the sheer volume and complexity of 
functions that they have to perform or direct. The information that local units get 
might be fragmented and distorted by crowded and convoluted communication 
channels, their decisions delayed or derailed by confused lines of command, and 
implementing actions may lag far behind and become incongruent with changing 
environmental conditions.
There are numerous cases where tourism plans formulated at the top and 
implemented by people at the bottom have not achieved the desired outcomes. One 
reason for this consequence is that the formulation and application of plans by central 
government might be out of touch with the needs of local people and is not based on 
detailed knowledge of the local environment (Baud Bovy 1982). CTA results in local 
tourism development decisions being taken by central rather than by local authorities, 
and decisions are inevitably made at a distance from the location of local 
administrative units. The existence of this physical distance can impact on the 
willingness of local stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process. Barry 
(1965: 56 in Stoker 1996) points out that "if bureaucracies are too large or too distant 
from the people affected by decisions then people become alienated". When 
individuals do not have access to decision-making, this brings about a substantive 
breakdown in the flow of communication. This alienation from participation, whether 
as a result of distance or bureaucracy, may impair the legitimacy of the resulting 
policy decisions (Almond and Powel 1966; Barry 1965). Building on a study 
conducted in Turkey, Tosun and Jenkins (1996) point out that “the Ministry of 
Tourism and bodies responsible for the authorisation of tourism investment and
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incentives are accessible to a rich and educated elite and not to the majority of 
indigenous people in tourist regions. In this sense, there is a big communication gap 
between communities and decision-makers. In short centralisation has intensified 
formidable bureaucracies. Even the physical distance from Ankara is a barrier for 
people who may not be able to afford to go to the capital city” (p. 527).
CTA seems likely to reduce the legitimacy of decisions. It can also hinder plan 
or policy implementation in local areas distant from the centre. Tourism plans 
developed by a mono-actor form of centralised administration generally overlook the 
knowledge, skills and goals of local public and private sector tourism organisations, in 
their design phase. Subsequently, there may be resistance from the implementing 
bodies, such as from local government. The centralist model appears to neglect the 
values and interests of implementing bodies, fails to utilise the resources and 
capacities of local actors, and promotes the bureaucratisation of the public sector, 
which therefore diminishes management effectiveness and efficiency (Kickert et al 
1997). Key characteristics of the CTA can clearly thwart the effectiveness of tourism 
administration, such as through coercive decision-making, ambiguous balances 
between responsibility and authority, a distant bureaucracy, limited local 
participation, and uneven power relations.
An alternative form of administration, decentralisation, has been suggested in 
order to overcome the potential problems that may ensue from CTA. The second 
model, Decentralised Tourism Administration (DTA), involves the transfer of power 
from central agencies to local government and it takes the interests of local actors as 
its point of departure. Smith (1985: 1) describes this concept as “the delegation of 
power to lower levels in territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of 
governments within a state or offices within a large-scale organisation. Thus 
decentralisation refers to territorially-based delegation not to purely functionally 
based delegation”(in Turner and Hulme, 1997).
It is argued that “when implemented properly”, decentralisation could offer 
greater efficiency and effectiveness in various areas (Turner and Hulme 1997).
Through decentralisation, plans can be tailor-made for local areas using detailed, up- 
to-date information which is only available locally, and inter-organisational co­
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ordination can be achieved more effectively at the local level. Experimentation and 
innovation can also be fostered, which can increase the chances of establishing more 
effective development strategies (see chapter five). Decentralisation may also help 
enhance the motivation of field level personnel, as they will have greater 
responsibility for the programmes they manage. It is argued in the literature that a 
reduction in the workload of central government will relieve them from routine 
decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues so that the 
quality of policy should improve.
It is important to note that decentralisation does not imply that all authority 
should be delegated. The central government may retain a core of functions over 
essential national matters and ultimately has the authority to redesign the system of 
government and to discipline or suspend decentralisation units that are not performing 
effectively. However, “how extensive this core of central government functions 
remains is a major ideological and intellectual debate of the late twentieth century” 
(Turner and Hulme 1997: 154). According to some, DTA needs to be adopted in order 
to “emphasise an equitable distribution of the benefits of development which have 
required programmes that need the support and involvement of local level 
administrators and the citizens. It has been necessary to develop the administrative 
capacity of local organisations to provide services in the remote areas as well as to 
improve the effectiveness of central government” (Rondinelli 1978: 45 in Huque 
1986). The reasons for decentralised administration are varied. The process may be 
resorted to in order to overcome difficulties and constraints that are faced in 
centralised planning. Administrators may prefer decentralisation to emphasise an 
equitable distribution of benefits of development which have required programmes 
that need the support and involvement of local level administrators and citizens. 
Decentralisation may help to accelerate the pace and spread the benefits of growth, 
integrate diverse regions in internally heterogeneous countries, and use scarce 
resources more efficiently to promote development in economically lagging or 
relatively poor areas (Rondinelli 1981).
Some argue that it may be more suitable to incorporate a combination of 
principles adapted from both centralised and decentralised management approaches 
(Turner and Hulme 1997). However, while it might appear easy to achieve this in
theory, implementing a combination of central control and local autonomy that 
responds to administrative needs and popular participation is still a puzzle for 
governments. The excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within 
central government continues to represent an obstacle to the effective performance of 
public administration in most developing countries (ibid.).
9.3.7.1 Decentralisation
An alternative form of management, decentralisation, has been suggested in 
the literature in order to overcome the potential problems of centralised tourism 
management. The concept of decentralisation basically implies the transference of 
power from central government to local government. It has received growing support 
from researchers as a means for achieving better implementation. However, the 
application of this administrative system particularly in developing countries seems to 
be problematic too, which raises questions about the suitability of this approach. 
While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of 
tourism administration, there is no information readily available for authorities to 
guide this transition. The question of whether this form of administration can be 
applied to a developing country with different institutional and constitutional contexts 
remains unexplored. There is also limited understanding of whether top-down 
(centralist) or bottom-up (decentralist) perspectives on management are likely to be 
more or less effective in handling complex interactions between various parties with 
different perceptions, preferences and strategies.
The concept of decentralised management has attracted growing support from 
researchers as it is thought to offset the problems of centralised tourism management. 
While tourism authorities are advised to switch to relatively decentralised forms of 
administration, no research has attempted to ascertain in depth whether this form of 
administration is likely to be more viable and applicable given the prevailing 
constitutional and institutional contexts of centralist countries. Although the 
decentralisation concept supports the retreat of central government from the public 
domain, at the same time central government is urged to give more attention to the 
problems of local organisations and to provide them with more resources, and to the 
co-ordination of the system as a whole. Thus, the extent to which decentralisation 
represents a realistic alternative to the centralist model, may be disputed. It seems
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that whatever approach is adopted, a greater understanding is needed of the relations 
between multiple actors involved in plan formulation and implementation, their 
interdependencies and the way in which these patterns and interdependencies 
influence management processes (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997).
Rondinelli (1979; 1981), Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), Rondinelli, McCullough 
and Johnson (1989) identify a number of potential advantages arising from 
transferring more responsibilities for development planning and management from 
central government to lower administrative levels. Some of the potential benefits of 
decentralisation are presented in Table 9.2.
Table 9.2 Potential benefits of decentralisation
■ Decentralisation is a means o f overcoming the severe limitations o f centrally controlled 
planning by delegating greater authority for development planning and management to 
officials who are working in the field, closer to the problems.
■ Decentralisation to local levels allows officials to tailor development plans and programmes to 
the needs o f different areas and people within a country.
■ Decentralisation is useful in cutting through red tape and highly structured procedures, 
common characteristics o f central planning in developing nations, and which can result from 
an over- concentration o f power, authority and resources at the centre.
■ Central officials can be reassigned to local levels, thus increasing their knowledge o f and 
sensitivity to local level problems and needs.
■ Decentralisation offers closer contact between government officials and the local population, 
thus allowing them to obtain better information with which to formulate more realistic and 
effective plans for government programmes.
■ Decentralisation can pave the way for greater political and administrative penetration of 
national government polices into areas remote from the national capital, where central 
government plans are often unknown or ignored by the populace or hampered by local elites.
■ Decentralisation might allow greater representation for various political and other groups in 
development decision-making, and this could lead to greater equity in the allocation of 
government resources and investments.
■ It might lead to an enhanced administrative capability o f local government and private sector 
institutions in the regions or provinces. It may help to expand their capacities to take over 
functions that are not usually performed well by central ministries, such as the maintenance of  
roads and infrastructure investments in areas remote from the national capital.
■ The efficiency o f  central government could be increased by decentralisation. The time 
released from routine administration can free political and administrative leaders to plan more 
carefully and supervise more effectively the implementation o f development polices.
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■ Decentralisation may provide a structure through which the activities o f various central 
government agencies involved in development can be co-ordinated more effectively both with 
each other and with local leaders and non-governmental organisations.
■ A decentralised government structure can facilitate the exchange o f information about local 
needs and channel political demands from the local community to national ministries.
■ By proving alternative means of decision-making, decentralisation can offset the influence or 
control over development activities by entrenched local elites who are often unsympathetic to 
national development polices and insensitive to the needs o f the poorer groups in rural 
communities.
■ Decentralisation can lead to more flexible, innovative and creative administration. Local 
government can have greater potential to experiment with new policies in selected areas. If 
experiments fail, their impacts will only be on small jurisdictions.
■ Decentralisation can allow local leaders to deliver services more effectively within 
communities, to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economies, and to monitor 
and evaluate the implementation o f development projects more effectively than central 
government.
■ Decentralisation can increase political stability and national unity by giving groups in 
different parts o f the country the ability to participate more directly in development decision­
making, thereby increasing their stake in maintaining the political system.
It is important to note that the assertions underlying the potential advantages 
shown in Table 9.2 have not all been empirically verified. Rondinelli (1981) admits 
that in reality, the results of decentralisation policies in many developing countries are 
often disappointing. Huque (1986: 91-92), for instance, insists strongly that “judging 
from the existing conditions, it might be wise to abandon efforts directed at complete 
decentralisation in Bangladesh and concentrate on limited decentralisation”. However, 
there are also cases where some of the potential benefits of decentralisation listed in 
Table 9.2 have been observed. Crook and Manor (1994) argue that some countries, 
such as India, have benefited from the practice of decentralisation. They suggest that 
in India decentralisation has resulted in a clear division of responsibilities between 
central and local government. Through India’s decentralisation policies, community 
needs have been taken into account better and benefits have sometimes been 
channelled more effectively to vulnerable groups. Other achievements have included 
an improved effectiveness in project delivery, a better mobilisation of local resources, 
and improved horizontal co-ordination. In addition, political awareness has been 
created among local residents, and better information gathering networks have been 
established in local constituencies. Similarly, they argue that through decentralisation,
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the completion rate of local projects has increased and the distribution of resources in 
localities has sometimes become fairer. Decentralisation has also prompted 
improvements in the institutional response to the problems identified.
Stakeholders interviewed in this study in the context of Belek in Turkey, a 
country with a highly centralised tourism administrative system, had varying 
preferences and they provided several explanations in support of these preferences. 
Table 9.3 shows the respondents' preferences in relation to different types of 
decentralisation of planning authority in relation to Belek.
Table 9.3 Preferences for different types decentralisation of 
planning authority in relation to Belek
The type o f  decentralisation models Number o f  people who 
preferred the model
Partnership model 12
Devolution 10.
Deconcentration 5
Delegation 3
Quite a significant number of respondents -twelve- supported a partnership 
model that could be established through the involvement of representatives either 
from national and local government or else cross-sectorally from among the public 
and private sectors and NGOs. As many as ten of the 30 respondents favoured 
devolution - passing the planning authority to local government - whereas a moderate 
number of respondents - five - considered that a central government unit in the region 
should lead the planning process, which entails deconcentration. Only three of the 30 
respondents agreed that delegation - leaving the entire planning authority to a private 
sector organisation - would be more beneficial. At present, there is inadequate 
understanding of whether decentralist forms are likely to be more or less effective in 
handling the complex interactions between parties with differing perceptions, 
preferences and strategies.
9.3.7.2 Barriers to decentralisation
The current administrative customs (corruption, bureaucracy, clientelism, etc.)
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appeared to be seen as a big obstacle to the success of decentralisation in the country. 
The comments indicated that each of these alternative administrative approaches 
suffered from major limitations. Those against central administration stated that if 
authority was retained by central government, then policies would generally be 
idealistic and plans conceived by the central units would tend not match the local 
realities and priorities. This corresponds with Barry’s (1965: 56) observation that: " if 
bureaucracies are too large or too distant from the people affected by decisions then 
people become alienated". When individuals do not have access to decision-making, 
this brings about a substantive breakdown in the flow of communication. This 
alienation from participation, whether as a result o f distance or bureaucracy, might 
have impaired the legitimacy of the resulting policy decisions (Almond and Powel 
1966; Blaul964).
According to the respondents, any model supporting the delegation of power 
to a single organisation might suffer from major limitations and serious repercussions. 
The concentration of control under one organisation might lead to an expansion of 
favouritism, which allegedly was rampant in the region. Local respondents stated that 
local officials were more informed about local problems. This is a conventional 
contention raised in the decentralisation literature. They were also perceived to have a 
greater capacity to mobilise local resources. The central units, however, might not be 
aware of local priorities. By contrast, central government officials stated that handing 
over power to local units might have adverse consequences. It might lead to regional 
inequality as local authorities may not respond to the needs of other regions in a 
balanced way. Another concern of the central officials was about the continuity of 
projects. They stated that because partisanship was rife, subsequent mayors might not 
resume projects commenced by their predecessors, particularly if  they were from an 
opposing party. Additionally, respondents stated that while decentralisation was 
generally favoured, it came with a real risk of arbitrariness. They felt that the human 
infrastructure of the country was not yet ready for decentralisation.
When the various stakeholders with an interest in the BMP were asked 
whether local or national organisations should be in charge of decision-making on 
their own, they largely favour neither level of governance having such power. Rather 
than leaving decision-making authority to a single organisation, it was suggested that
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these institutions should be linked together in such a way that their individual 
strengths are utilised and their weaknesses are counterbalanced. A process is badly 
needed to identify which organisation is good or bad at what and to fuse their 
strengths together, since both local and national organisations have the resources and 
capabilities required to make a success of Belek’s tourism development.
9.4 Implications of the study
Until now the chapter has focused on reporting the conceptual framework and 
conceptual themes together with the findings of the study. The goal of this section is 
to draw attention to the contribution of the study to the development of enhanced 
theoretical understandings of inter-organisational relations, and notably of central- 
local interactions in tourism planning. Therefore, the following section presents 
several implications or recommendations that planners could take into account in 
order to facilitate interorganisational relations and subsequently to enhance the 
success of tourism plans.
9.4.1 A learning approach to planning is likely to be a key success factor.
An examination of the Belek case suggests that the tourism planning process 
should be adaptive and strategic, flexible to overcome unexpected constraints, and 
ready to propose alternative solutions to unforeseen situations. It also shows that a 
realistic period of time is needed to achieve the expected results of tourism plans. 
Adopting a rigid “blueprint” in the making of tourism plans should be avoided. The 
blueprint model of planning is where planning is thought of as a one-shot activity, 
with set deadlines, and specified activities, and which is schedule-driven, and assumes 
no deviation. It is like a job description where one’s duties and responsibilities are 
itemised (Korten, 1980). The case study shows that planning is in fact best conceived 
as a learning process. The learning process approach to planning suggests the idea of 
an open system, which is so permeated by influences that it is difficult to estimate 
precisely the diversity of attitudes, activities and responses. The approach recognises 
that the project must be in balance with its environment, in terms of the social, 
economic and political contexts in which it takes place (Korten, 1980). Once goals are 
established, it may be better to design activities for the first year, and define 
subsequent activities on the basis of project learning. The study also indicates that 
change could be a source of programme failure or success. A change in any of the 
broader and sub-systems, whether environmental, organisational or personal, is likely
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to have ripple effects on projects. For example, a change in project personnel might 
mean an increase, or conversely a decrease, in project performance, dependent on, for 
instances, the disposition of the individual toward the project. People do also change 
their minds and attitudes, and they may become unexpectedly conciliatory on a topic, 
which enraged them earlier. And a solution argued to be acceptable initially, may 
become controversial. As changes may occur in the goals and functions of tourism 
organisations during planning, additional research will be needed to develop 
empirically-based intervention strategies for facilitating and maintaining coordinative 
and co-operative relations in unstable environments.
9.4.2 Adequate resources are needed not only to start but also to maintain 
tourism plans.
The case study analysis further suggests that goodwill and good intentions are 
necessary but they may not be sufficient for successful planning. A threshold of 
policy resources is necessary for there to be any possibility of realising policy 
objectives (Morah 1996). Resource scarcities in a developing nation context may 
frustrate planning intentions from being put into concrete action. Resources should be 
allocated at the outset, and they must be sufficient for an ongoing programme and 
renewed as necessary. An equally important issue which planners should pay attention 
to is the equality of access to resources. This study shows that control over access to 
resources can be restricted to powerful elite organisations and that this can give rise to 
adversarial relations.
9.4.3 The degree to which consensus emerges among stakeholders may 
dictate the success of a tourism plan.
It is true that tourism planning would benefit from participative approaches. 
However, the study shows that participation is not sufficient on its own to reach 
consensus. Planning is complicated by the existence of diverse organisations with 
different viewpoints and vested interests. The study shows that reaching a consensus 
is a delicate task. Even if it seems to have been reached, it may only represent the 
interests of, and opinions of, elite and powerful organisations. It must be noted that 
not all participants would enthusiastically accept or embrace all the initial proposals 
and resulting policies. More interpretative case studies will be necessary to fully
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capture the essence of the concept of partial consensus (Bramwell and Sharmann
1999).
9.4.4. Preparation of a plan on its own will not guarantee that the 
recommendations will be implemented.
The study suggests that preparation of a plan will not guarantee that the 
recommendations will be implemented. All agencies should be integrated into the 
process of project implementation at all stages under terms and conditions expressed 
and agreed by all sides. Much focus needs to be placed on the realistic means to 
achieve implementation (Inskeep 1991). The initial consensus reached during 
preliminary stages of tourism plans might be deceptive. As Bardach (1977) notes, 
each group may have its own set of goals, and it may attempt to play one of the many 
games that would enable it to pull the implementation process in its duration, either 
furthering the policy but steering it in the direction desired by the group, or delaying 
the policy and dissipating its energies. Effective implementation mechanisms are 
likely to entail the logical staging of development, the effective organisation of public 
and private sectors in tourism, close co-ordination between the public and private 
sectors and with NGOs, and the adaptation and application of appropriate legislation 
and regulations for tourism development. Tourism development plans would not be 
capable of being implemented unless the relationship elements are envisaged and 
managed accordingly. Thus, not only technical aspects of planning but also the 
relationship elements should not be understated, such as commitment, and willingness 
to collaborate, share information and co-operate on the outcomes.
9.4.5 The broader environment must be enabling for plans to succeed.
The activities, goals, and ideologies of tourism organisations of various types, 
and of different spatial scales, influence virtually all aspects of tourism planning and 
implementation. The BMP shows that tourism policies and programme 
implementation result from decision-making within the organisation, interactions 
between other organisations, and from the legislative, economic, institutional and 
political environment. The study suggests that tourist organisations are organic and 
they act like other organisations. They interact with the broader environment in order 
to acquire resources while also being influenced by the political culture of the 
country, its general economic conditions, as well as the broader government policies.
360
It is helpful to analyse organisations as part of an open system and to understand the 
conditions external to the organisation and how they directly or indirectly influence its 
activity, efficiency and behaviour. For example, in the case study area the planning 
environment within which decisions were made was characterised by turbulence. 
There were competing national organisations, all acting independently in many 
diverse directions, producing unanticipated events in their shared environment. Thus, 
different structural dimensions of the environment, such as the concentration and 
dispersal of resources, and power and autonomy may need to be studied carefully to 
better understand organisations and their behaviour. Additional research will be 
needed to develop empirically-based strategies for facilitating co-operative relations 
within different environment types.
9.4.6 There may be forces other than resource scarcity that encourage 
organisations to exchange resources.
Two main approaches, exchange and the power-dependency, have been 
proposed to explain interactions among organisations. Exchange theory (Levine and 
White 1961) assumes that organisational exchange is a voluntary activity between two 
organisations, which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realisation of 
their respective goals or objectives. The power dependency model argues that 
organisations form relations to gain or improve their own control over scarce 
resources in the environment. According to the exchange model, tourism 
organisations view the chances of realising their goals in some domains to be greater 
by performing jointly rather than by acting independently (Pearce 1992). The 
emphasis is on voluntary, goal-oriented behaviour, not just on the transfer of material 
goods (Pearce 1992). The results of the study, however, indicate that resource 
exchange may not be a straightforward strategy, as one might assume particularly in a 
developing nation context. There are a number of structural and behavioural 
constraints, which need to be addressed before there can be an effective exchange of 
resources. The limited resource exchange found in this study indicates that 
organisations by and large may be in competitive and conflictual relations, and this 
reduced the effectiveness of the plan in this case. The study further shows that 
organisations are not likely to engage solely in exchange relationships or solely in 
power-dependency relationships, but are likely to be involved in a mixture of each 
type.
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9.4.7 Clarity about who does what, and for whom, needs to be established.
The institutional arrangements may either facilitate or inhibit the plan 
implementation process. Researchers examining tourism planning and development 
thus have to be concerned with the range of public, private and voluntary institutions 
involved in tourism management and in tourism plan formulation and 
implementation. They should also be concerned with the aims and objectives of 
organisations and the extent to which different public, private and voluntary 
organisations influence tourism planning decisions at the local level (including the 
legal power to do so). The study shows that the formal and informal rules and 
procedures that regulate interactions between these institutions (notably the legislative 
framework and “rules of the game”), and their effects on the power of these 
organisations, have important implications for tourism planning and implementation. 
The implications of dependency between these institutions, notably between state and 
local level organisations, and of the forms of instruments (e.g., regulatory, financial, 
communicative, etc.,) used in managing relations between organisations for tourism 
planning could not be understated. Additionally, the autonomy of the institutions 
involved in tourism management should be considered. This study suggests that the 
extent of interorganisational communication and the ways in which the organisations 
communicate with one another may underpin the success of tourism plans. The study 
further shows that adversarial conflicts between interest groups could be wasteful. 
Thus, the extent of conflict between organisations, the sources of this conflict, the 
ways in which conflicts are resolved, and the effects on power relations between 
organisations should receive adequate consideration in planning. The question as to 
which functions are most appropriately undertaken at which scale by which 
organisations to achieve which goals needs further attention.
9.4.8 Strategies need to be developed to facilitate co-ordination when 
disequilibrium exists between organisations.
The case study analysis suggests that the degree of equilibrium between 
organisations and its causes must be studied extensively before planning starts. More 
specifically: (1) the appropriate role and scope of an agency (domain consensus); (2) 
the nature of the tasks confronted by the organisations and appropriate approaches to 
those tasks (ideological consensus); (3) the judgement by workers in one organisation
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of the value of the work of another organisation (positive-negative evaluation); and 
(4) patterns of collaboration and co-operation (work co-ordination) must be examined 
(Benson 1975). Effective planning depends on building, maintaining and managing 
positive interorganisational relations, which rests heavily on the degree of equilibrium 
present among tourism organisations. Consistent with Selin and Beason’s (1991) 
finding, in this study many of the respondents did not see how the work of other 
organisations was important to their organisation. This independent view might have 
contributed to a lack of co-operative relations among the organisations. The study 
shows that interorganisational relationships take place in contexts where some 
organisations will be co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, while others are 
competing for the same political, financial, informational resources or locus of power. 
Peaceful and harmonious interaction based on mutual agreement is only viable where 
each organisation respects the rights of all the others, and where viable institutions 
exist which embody and enforce the rules, which allow them all to exchange scarce 
resources on a secure and equitable basis. However, this statement may be easier to 
say than to achieve.
9.4.9 The balance of power between central and local organisations is a 
central issue, that has a significant effect on the implementation 
of tourism plans.
The study suggests that planning efforts in tourism are likely to be hindered 
when significant power differences exist among stakeholders or when certain 
stakeholders are seen as illegitimate. In this study, the Nature Preservation Society for 
instance was perceived to be illegitimate by some public and private organisations. 
This has greatly reduced the extent of their influence. The study results further show 
that the extent to which powerful stakeholders perceive little or no interdependence 
with other stakeholders will determine whether or not they resist efforts to balance the 
power differences among stakeholders. In this case study, some public and private 
sector organisations were observed to have concerns about preserving their own 
institutional power, which posed a real obstacle to effective co-ordination and co­
operation. Two forms of power relations might be stated: vertical and horizontal. The 
control authority of national organisations over strategic resources required by the 
peripheral organisations dictates the nature of vertical power relations between 
national and local public organisations. The bureaucratic structure of vertical power
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relations may need to be made more flexible for organisations engaged in vertical 
power relations to achieve better outcomes. It is clear that the network among 
multiple organisations (e.g., municipalities, Betuyab and NPS) is often blocked and 
non-co-operative because these agencies suffer from resource shortages and cannot 
muster power sufficient to dictate terms to others (Benson 1975).
Lack of power, however, does not necessarily make one organisation 
subservient to another. Manipulative strategies might be favoured by organisations 
that lack certain forms of power but are rich in others. For example, due to its limited 
authority, Betuyab attempted to divert resource flows and establish dependency 
relations with some mayors and the MOT. By providing some local services that 
should be rendered by the municipalities, Betuyab attempted to ensure that relations 
were established in a way that protected its own dominance. Power inequalities may 
also push some organisations to co-operate. The refusal of some weaker organisations 
(e.g. municipalities, the NPS) to accommodate the demands of stronger agencies (e.g., 
the MoT, Betuyab) appears to have had serious consequences for the weaker 
organisations. The case study further suggests that in this Turkish context the 
planning mediator might best be an external body with very little to gain from the 
planning outcomes. In this case, Betuyab acted as an informal mediator between the 
national and local organisations, but the problems seem to have been interpreted 
according to their own organisational ideologies and the solutions reflected their own 
goals.
9.4.10 Trust is central to the building and continuation of mutually
satisfying inter-organisational relations and trust grows by its use.
Trust is the basic element that fosters co-operation and co-ordination among 
stakeholders involved in the tourism planning process. Understanding the elements 
contributing to the restricted level of trust among stakeholders clearly needs more 
attention. To understand it better, one needs to focus on historical relations among 
organisations. The case study suggests that the more diverse the group, the less likely 
it is to secure trust, and thus the more difficult it is to sustain interorganisational 
arrangements. Trust requires a common set of values to operate between 
stakeholders. Conflicts over controversial issues may deplete trust. Much attention in 
conflict resolution and mediation needs to be given to the social and political contexts
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within which tourism development occurs and conflicts arise. The study shows that 
taking legal action against one another in order to resolve problems may even lead to 
greater conflicts between parties. Therefore, different forms of conflict resolution 
must be sought through which trust can develop. It is also shown that information 
sharing is critical to the building of trust in planning. Tourism planning often gives 
rise to new organisational structures and/or responsibilities (Hall 2000). Some 
stakeholders, because of their power and position may have more access to 
information than others and unless this information is shared with others mistrust may 
prevail.
9.4.11 Several explicit structural and behavioural disincentives to co­
ordination may exist.
The literature suggests that when faced with complex problems that are 
beyond the capabilities of any one organisation to resolve, the organisation may 
engage in joint arrangements to cope with this complexity. This study suggests that 
this may not be so. In addition to structural obstacles, the study shows that in the 
Belek context the low commitment of organisations to co-ordination and co-operation 
constituted a behavioural obstacle. There may be several reasons underlying such a 
low level of commitment. Partisanship clearly provides disincentives to co-ordination. 
The perceived costs involved in co-ordination may also deter municipalities from 
establishing co-ordination. Since in Belek they appeared to communicate little with 
one another, it is likely that they may have few grounds on which to build any type of 
co-ordination. Some mayors may see co-ordination as too costly due to their own 
weak organisational resources. Resource inadequacy may be perceived to form an 
inferior position in exchange relations. The fear of losing autonomy may be another 
deterrent. Getting municipalities to see co-ordination and co-operation with other 
municipalities of opposing political parties as a feasible and desirable alternative 
certainly requires education about the advantages. Co-ordination is also low between 
different governmental tiers. The administrative tutelage imposed by Turkey’s central 
government on local government and the attitude of central officials have inhibited 
the formation of voluntary co-ordination between local and central organisations. The 
locus of decision-making and structural differences between private and public 
organisations are other significant factors hindering co-ordination. In essence, many 
of the factors necessary for successful co-ordination were not in place. This augurs
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badly for the future effectiveness of the BMP. However, it should be noted that co­
ordination is only one form of interorganisational linkage, involving a partial pooling 
of assets. Betuyab uses a somewhat less involving strategy of placing one of its 
representatives on the municipal committee of Belek town. Although this arrangement 
does not involve the same degree of commitment of resources as co-ordination, it 
nevertheless has facilitated more stable interactions between Betuyab and the 
Municipality over time. This practice has provided the opportunity to establish 
friendships, the exchange of information, and identification with the focal 
organisation (with the Belek Municipality).
9.4.12 Decentralisation: playing the same old song?
A major characteristic of centralised government, which causes management 
inefficiency, is that public institutions are often geographically and socially remote 
from local people. This study shows that the decisions taken in central government 
may not reflect, or address local needs and problems. This may largely be because of 
a lack of consultation with local people or with their representatives. Centralised 
governance is slow as a result of lengthy bureaucratic procedures, prompted by laws 
regulating interactions between government agencies at different levels and by 
conflicting responsibilities and authorities. As a result, a more decentralised 
management approach may be suggested in order to overcome these difficulties and 
constraints. The forms of decentralisation are: (1) deconcentration, which refers to 
transferring resources and decision-making from headquarters to other branches of 
central government; (2) devolution, referring to devolution of resources and power to 
autonomous units of government, such as municipalities and local governments; (3) 
and delegation, meaning delegation of resources and power to organisations outside 
the regular bureaucratic structures, such as public corporations and development 
agencies. Table 9.4 shows the forms of Decentralised Administration in the literature.
Table 9.4 The forms of Decentralisation Management
De-concentration Power transfer from headquarters to other branches of central 
government
Devolution Power transfer to autonomous units o f government, such as 
municipalities
Delegation Power transfer to organisations outside the bureaucratic structures, such 
as development agencies
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However, these alternative forms of governance did not find the level of 
support from the stakeholders interviewed that might be expected due to their inherent 
and more specific weaknesses in the Belek case. When carried out properly, these 
forms of devolution and delegation can make development programmes effective. 
However, decentralisation in a developing country context was perceived by the 
stakeholders to be problematic, as it may take the form of deconcentration, which 
implies that the potential benefits of decentralisation are likely to be enjoyed by 
dominant power groups, such as by the ruling political party, and not by the local 
people.
Both centralised and decentralised administrative forms fail to consider tourism 
management from a network perspective, which recognises that the multiple actors 
involved in plan formulation and implementation are essentially interdependent 
stakeholders. In other words, actors are dependent on each other because they need 
each other’s resources (of capital, technology, labour, expertise, and information) for 
goal achievement, as no organisation can generate independently all the necessary 
resources. Thus consideration needs to be given to a framework which endorses co­
operation and co-ordination between interdependent parties with different and often 
conflicting rationality, interests and strategies. This may help to ensure that all 
decisions, policies, and activities are consistent and coherent and not at cross­
purposes.
The success of tourism increasingly relies on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the administrative framework. A framework which promotes participative decision­
making, delineates clear balances between responsibility and authority, promotes co­
operative relations and effectively co-ordinates the fragmented activities carried out 
by different public and private sector organisations undoubtedly enhances the chances 
of success. By contrast, a framework endorsing coercive decision-making, resulting in 
ambiguous balances between responsibility and autonomy, and inducing a distant 
bureaucracy and uneven power relations between public and private agencies can 
undermine the legitimacy of policy decisions and their implementation. Thus, 
successful tourism administration requires democratic and transparent participation in 
decision-making, and it promotes a greater accountability of institutions to the people
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they are instituted to serve, it increases the availability of information, and it 
optimises the use of resources by clarifying responsibilities, authority and standards.
The study suggests that decentralisation is not a relatively straightforward 
process of transfer of powers originally held by the centre to units of local 
government. The complex web of interorganisational relationship elements may still 
apply within a decentralised administration context. Transferring powers partially or 
completely to another organisation may not be a cure on its own. The question is not 
whose interests form the point of departure but how can mutual respect, 
understanding, trust and a shared vision be built. Decentralisation of administration 
can still create problems of co-ordination. A tourism project can fail, despite its 
apparent worth, simply because of the many levels of organisation through which it 
must pass to be implemented successfully. The problems of creating a tourism policy 
that can survive intergovernmental action may be overcome by including elements of 
both centralisation and decentralisation. Both administrative models have merits, and 
in some cases one would be more effective and economic than the other. Thus, the 
challenge for most governments is “to find a balance between centralised and 
decentralised arrangements and to link them in ways that promote development most 
effectively” Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 11). What is the optimal mix is a 
challenging question.
9.5 Toward future research
Numerous planning paradigms, with slightly different considerations, have 
been proposed to guide stakeholders involved in the formulation of tourism plans. 
However, despite strictly following the guidelines and the often high level of goodwill 
that stakeholders have at the formulation phase, the majority of tourism plans either 
fall short of the ideal or are never initiated. The case investigated in this study did not 
escape from this legacy. Inadequate consideration seems to have been given to 
understanding the micro -and macro- organisational environment in which the 
planning was undertaken, and of the ways in which the planning and development 
process was carried out. A limited collective understanding of the pattern of relations, 
resources, and power interdependencies between the multiple agencies involved in the
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decision-making process might have laid the foundation for most of the problems 
encountered.
This study has contributed to further research by bringing together, in a single 
study, the various issues creating problems associated with implementing a tourism 
policy in a developing nation context. The study results show that relationships 
between central and local organisations develop and operate within a broader socio­
economic and political system. The environmental conditions are likely to determine 
the plan outcomes by laying the foundation for the relations and communication 
networks between different governmental levels. In this study, organisations at 
different scales had different values, ideologies, goals and interests. This has given 
rise to different interpretations of the problem at hand and therefore of the solutions. 
There are examples of local government and national organisations bargaining over 
the specific form and content of planning policies with regard to Belek and of local 
government simply not implementing central policies. This suggests that due 
attention needs to be given not only to the formal aspects of relationships, but also to 
their informal aspects, the strategies employed and the extent of bargaining (Rhodes 
1980). Respondents interviewed did not see how the work of other organisations was 
important to their own. This independent stance, observed by Selin and Beason 
(1991), might have contributed to a lack of co-operative relations between national 
and local organisations. Neither local nor central government should be viewed as 
dependent or independent of the other levels, as linkages between levels of 
government are based on interdependence.
The study results showed how the structural dimensions of the environment 
influenced the nature of interorganisational relationships (Pearce 1992). The 
concentration, control and distribution of resources at the centre gave rise to conflicts 
among organisations competing for the same kind of resources. The power to 
formulate and implement policies between the national and local levels of public 
sector tourist organisations influenced the balance in central-local relations, which in 
turn affected the practice of local level tourism planning. Disequilibrium existed 
among the parties involved in the management plan. There was a low to non-existent 
domain consensus between central and local units, which has given rise to conflicts. 
For example, both central and local units assume that planning activity is in their
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jurisdiction, and unless there is some agreement on this then either local or local 
government will be in a state of conflict with one another. Stakeholder organisations 
disagreed on the nature of the tasks of other organisations and on the appropriateness 
of the approaches to those tasks. There seemed to be little positive assessment of other 
parties’ competence and performance. The activities and programmes of stakeholder 
organisations involved in the plan have not been integrated with each other to secure 
effectiveness and efficiency. Because the commitment and contribution of 
organisational resources to shared work is low or modest, the relationships formed 
between organisations were difficult to maintain. Overall, the Belek area suffers from 
ambiguously defined authority. Further attempts should be made to realise new 
institutional arrangements that are needed for gathering and allocating necessary 
resources, renegotiating relationships, and co-ordinating and controlling 
implementation.
Planning is not simply about explicit planning but is probably an ongoing 
process in which a number of factors play a role: environmental, organisational, 
individual and so on. Successful interorganisational relationships are thus critical to 
the implementation of tourism plans. Consideration needs to be given to the character 
of the interactions between various actors in the system (patterns of interaction), and 
the distribution of roles and duties between and within sub-systems. Understanding 
organisations involved in planning is the important first step towards identifying and 
devising action points in order to build interorganisational relationships. In this 
analysis, the issues of relative power, and of control of, and access to, resources must 
receive attention. There is a tendency to overlook the political side and barriers in 
discussions of interorganisational relationships in tourism. However, the autonomy 
and power relations depend on political circumstances. The level of understanding 
about how an organisation retains its autonomy whilst working jointly with other 
organisations needs to be expanded. The implications of different kinds of 
institutional arrangements may be great. Much more needs to be understood about 
different levels and forms of interactions between stakeholders, about elements that 
determine the form of these relations, and about formal and informal negotiations 
which may permeate all aspects of interorganisational relationships. Additional 
insight into principles for creating win-win negotiations in tourism planning contexts 
is needed, and this may constitute a fruitful research avenue.
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By pooling or exchanging resources, tourism organisations can forge cost- 
effective solutions to challenges (Selin and Beason 1991). Interestingly, despite the 
scarcity of resources, organisations were not greatly involved in exchange relations, 
and most were in conflictual relations. One must note that building interorganisational 
relationships (co-ordination or co-operation) is not merely a technical issue about 
resources. It is a very human activity where success depends on the individuals’ 
ability to work together. Interorganisational relationships are neither automatic nor 
costless, and they have to be nurtured and invested in (Robinson 2001). There may be 
no easy blueprints for building interorganisational relationships, as this process may 
differ as a result of structural and organisational variations. However, the components 
of the conceptual framework and the conceptual themes developed for this research 
may constitute starting points for those interested in exploring interorganisational 
relations in tourism. This study pointed to a number of problems involved in 
implementing tourism policy in Belek, including the need to work with and through a 
large number of separate organisations. The planning effort needs to be fully 
cognizant of the implementation process. Interactions between organisations have 
crucial effects on the processes of both policy-making and implementation and these 
warrant far more attention than they have received to date. It is to be expected that 
some organisations will attempt to control complexity and turbulence to their 
advantage by limiting the access of other organisations to the necessary resources. 
Thus, interpretative case studies and longitudinal research are needed to explore 
whether and how co-ordination, co-operation or partnership between central and local 
organisations can successfully reduce uncertainty and turbulence.
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planning fo r  the Belek Coastal Management Plan
Sheffield Hallam University 
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Sheffield Science Park 
Unit 1 City Campus 
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UK
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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Sheffield,15.05.2000
D ear......
I am conducting research on tourism planning for a PhD thesis at 
Sheffield Hallam University, England.
The research examines the participation of organisations and other 
interested parties from government, the private sector and NGOs in 
tourism planning for the Belek Coastal Management Plan. The 
research will assess inter-organisational relations, notably between 
central and local government, with an interest in the formulation 
and implementation of the Belek Coastal Management Plan.
I would be grateful if you would agree to be interviewed in relation 
to this research. The purpose of the interview would be to discuss 
your organisation's views about the planning process for the Belek 
Coastal Management Plan. Your views will be very useful for the 
PhD research project. I can assure you that opinions expressed in 
the interview will be used strictly only for the purpose of academic 
research and will not be used in any other way.
I will contact you in the near future to schedule an interview with 
you and, if you are in agreement, to fix an appointment at a time 
and place most convenient for you.
Yours sincerely,
Research Co-ordinator
Fisun Yuksel Dr. Atila Yuksel
